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# Modern Political Systems: Asia



Modern Political Systems

# ASIA

Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis

*Editors*

PRENTICE-HALL, INC.

*Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey*

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*Library of Congress Catalog No.: 63-12489*

*Printed in the United States of America*

Modern Political Systems: Asia  
*Ward and Macridis*

*Designed by Walter Behnke*

*Maps by Liam Dunne*

# Preface

This two-volume series on *Modern Political Systems* is a byproduct of a continuing process of revaluation and theory-building in the field of comparative political analysis that began at an Inter-University Research Seminar sponsored by the Social Science Research Council in 1952. We would like to take this occasion to acknowledge our debt and our gratitude to Dr. Pendleton Herring, the Council's president. We as a group and comparative politics as a discipline are to an unusual degree beholden to him for his unfailing understanding and support of scholarly efforts to advance the level of both theory and practice in this field. We are similarly indebted to the Committee on Comparative Politics and to its chairman, Professor Gabriel A. Almond, and to Dr. Kenneth Thompson, Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation, for the personal encouragement and Foundation support a number of contributors received over a period of years.

These volumes represent an attempt to translate our own versions of some of the recent theorizing and writing in the field of comparative politics into a text for American undergraduates. We have retained the traditional "country by country" format, since this fits best the organization and needs of existing courses. While treating each political system or group of systems separately, we have also tried to utilize a common framework of exposition and analysis. We conceive of politics as a system for the identification and posing of

problems and the making and administering of decisions in the realm of public affairs. Political systems are part of a larger social system which actually generates the conditions, attitudes, and demands that constitute the basic working materials of politics. In these books, therefore, we have made an especial effort to place politics and government in their appropriate historical, social, economic, and ideological setting.

Such an approach makes little sense if it does not also help the student to understand the more general political problems of our time. It is our hope that these volumes will stimulate interest in and genuine intellectual curiosity about these issues that will extend beyond the classroom. The fate of parliamentary institutions, the challenge of totalitarianism, the politics of emerging nations, the explosive forces of rising expectations and demands among the new nations, the perennial contradictions between stability and change, and the political competition between "democratic" and "totalitarian" models in the struggle to "modernize" the underdeveloped world are problems that will determine all of our lives and shape the kind of world in which we live. If we succeed in introducing such issues to the student and in stimulating some

better-informed and more systematic attention to the problems which underlie them, we shall have achieved our major goal.

The editors are grateful above all to the authors for their cooperation and patience. Particular thanks in this case are also due the publishers. Alfred W. Goodyear and James J. Murray III have been sources of constant help and encouragement. But the main burden was

assumed by James M. Guher, Jr., of the Project Planning Department of Prentice-Hall. He has edited the entire manuscript, and his work and criticisms have helped us immensely in the completion and improvement of both volumes. Responsibility naturally lies with the editors and authors. While assuming it cheerfully, we are conscious that the magnitude of the undertaking leaves room for many errors.

R. E. W.      R. C. M.

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ROBERT E. WARD  
*and* ROY C. MACRIDIS

# Introduction





# Introduction

## I

This volume of *Modern Political Systems* is dedicated to the proposition that it is no longer valid or profitable to study comparative politics within an essentially North American- and European-centered frame of reference. While admittedly more familiar, more comprehensible, and—in the past, at least—closer and more important to us, the political histories, ideologies, and institutions of these areas constitute but a small though vital fragment of the political universe with which the student of contemporary political systems must be concerned. Politically speaking, the history of the twentieth century is in large part the history of the re-emergence of non-European areas and states to positions of independence and prominence on the world scene. We can ignore this fact only at our peril.

Asia, Latin America, and Africa together account for approximately sixty-three per cent of the land area and seventy-five per cent of the population of the earth. Today, three factors combine to give new meaning and importance to these figures. First, the age of imperialism

and colonialism—at least in the classic sense of these terms—is now being liquidated. Thus non-Western states—often themselves but recent graduates from colonial status—are obtaining a degree of political independence and freedom of decision and maneuver which is, in a collective sense, unique in their recent histories.

Second, this development is both impelled and accompanied by what is often referred to as “a revolution of rising expectations.” Great masses of people in the underdeveloped areas are being exposed to the highly revolutionary concept that meaningful types of economic, political, and social change are possible in their countries, and that these carry with them the promise of a better life for themselves and their children. They are becoming actively dissatisfied with the products and performance of their traditional societies and in increasing numbers are demanding some measure of modernization. It happens that these demands coincide with a period when the skills and technologies necessary to support such modernization are for the first time becoming broadly available. Thus, in a long-term sense, most of the governments of these non-Western states—some eagerly, others with trepidation and reluctance—are

being committed to more or less systematic efforts to modernize at least segments of their societies. Gradually, therefore, the technological and power gap which has long separated West from non-West is beginning to narrow, and the material circumstances of the two areas are becoming less disparate.

Third, both of the previous developments are taking place at a time when modern communications and weaponry have made all men uneasy neighbors in a world where global rivalry between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and ceaseless competition between the "democratic" and "Communist" approaches to the solution of political, economic, and social problems have become the predominant international problems of the age. In such circumstances, the political and military weakness of most of these non-Western states is no longer so controlling a factor. In the first place, it is not a fixed condition. Some of them, such as China, have become formidable—and soon probably atomic—powers in their own right. In the second place, the very existence of the cold war endows them with an importance and possibilities of maneuver which they might otherwise lack. No matter how remote their location or "underdeveloped" their circumstances, the territory, resources, skills, or allegiances of each of these states are of significant value in this all-encompassing struggle. From this complex of factors is emerging a world which—even in the conduct of its hostilities—is characterized by new degrees and dimensions of unity and interdependence. It is also a world in which the hitherto relatively passive societies of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas are coming to play new, more active, and far more important roles.

It is essential that the discipline of comparative politics keep abreast of such developments and expand its frames of reference and concern so as to include the political sys-

tems of these emergent non-Western areas. This is easy to say, but hard in practice to do. The governments involved are so numerous, their political heritages and institutions so complex and diverse, and the materials and skills relevant to their study and analysis so scattered, uneven in quality, and difficult to use that—for introductory purposes, anyway—a sizable element of selectivity must be involved. In the present volume, we direct attention only to the political systems of Asia south of the frontiers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It has not been possible to treat, for example, the equally interesting systems to be found in Latin America or Africa or, indeed, some of the smaller Asian systems. In ideal terms we regret this, but, on balance, Asia seems to us to be the most critical of the major non-Western areas, the place where, next to Europe, our national and personal fortunes and interests are most deeply and urgently engaged now and in the foreseeable future. It is also the non-Western area most familiar to postwar American scholarship, and it is thus more readily possible to bring to bear upon it an appreciable store of accumulated professional insights and knowledge. For reasons such as these, we have chosen to concentrate our attention on the political systems of sub-Soviet Asia.

In the pages that follow, major sections will be devoted to the description and analysis of the contemporary political systems of Japan, the Chinese People's Republic, and India. Only incidental attention will be paid to the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan. Somewhat briefer sections will treat, in the form of area essays, a majority of the numerous smaller political systems of Southeastern and Southwestern Asia. This selection represents an enormous range of sociopolitical heritages and institutions. Yet there are also underlying similarities that cut across all or large portions of Asia and provide some degree of continental unity. The societies concerned are predominantly peasant societies in which the great majority of the populations live outside the cities and make their living through the primary occupations of agricul-

ture, fishing, hunting, or herding. These rural majorities are largely illiterate, family- and local-centered in their interests and associations, and normally passive or apathetic where most issues of national politics are concerned. The differences between city and countryside are apt to be very marked, and, in general, lines of social and political stratification tend to be sharply drawn between the few possessed of education, status, wealth and power and the many excluded from these privileges.

The majority of the states and peoples concerned have either once shared the role of Western colonies or have been powerfully influenced by the threat of colonization. The latter-day reaction of such states has quite uniformly taken the form of a fierce and assertive nationalism vis-à-vis the former imperialist powers. Again, these Asian countries share in remarkably similar form the vast range of problems posed by their common need to strengthen and modernize their economies, social structures, and political institutions in order to increase the stability and security of their own societies. Finally, most confront the same basic choice of political means. Which approach to the solution of these shared problems of modernization, stability, security, and status is most appropriate for societies in their circumstances: the totalitarian, the democratic, or some alternative form of political modernization? Should they follow the Chinese path, the Indian path, or, perhaps, the Japanese path to modernization, as some would state the problem? In ways such as these, the states of contemporary Asia

do have substantially more in common than is generally recognized.

This is not to say, however, that all lend themselves with equal readiness to description and analysis in the chapters which follow. It is difficult to compare so extensive a range of political systems in terms of a rigorous common frame of reference without doing violence to the uniqueness of the individual systems involved. Consider, for example, the varieties of political and historical experiences here represented. Sub-Soviet Asia includes three of the world's greatest cultural traditions (the Islamic, the Indian, and the Sino-Japanese), as well as societies and economies as archaic as Yemen and as modern as Japan, and governments as ancient as China and as new as Malaya. Among them, these systems run the gamut from totalitarian Communism to liberal democracy, and from practically medieval despotism to an administrative and social service state rivaling the West in its professionalization and modernity. Such divergencies in essential political characteristics necessitate some variations in organization and treatment in the following chapters. The very real differences in the level and reliability of our information and knowledge about the Asian states and areas concerned—particularly the inadequacy of our information about the Chinese People's Republic—reinforce this tendency. We are dealing, therefore, with a selection of political systems which, while similar in some respects, are dissimilar in many others. Why and how shall we attempt to compare them?

## II

The whys of comparative politics are many and persuasive for student and teacher alike. Comparison, to begin with, for any student, and more particularly for the American college student, is like a guided tour of foreign lands. It shows that human beings living in different societies differ in their political behavior. They differ in the political values they hold dear; in the ways in which

they apprehend each other and the outside world; in the manner in which they solve similar problems. Thus those who study comparative politics come to realize that health services may be a completely nationalized

service in one country and based on one's ability to pay in another: that trains controlled and run by the government may be just as efficient as trains run by private companies; that individual liberties are highly valued in one system but that the interests of the group or the state are more esteemed in others. The student who reads about the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, or China begins to gain perspective on his own political system, to re-examine attitudes and practices long taken for granted, and to scrutinize his own political institutions and those of others. Habit and intellectual conformism give place to critical evaluation and appreciation, the mark of an educated man.

Political differences, naturally, raise questions of "why." Why did Marxism strike such firm roots in the Soviet Union? Why have so many underdeveloped Asian societies flirted with Marxism or established one-party governments? Why has the parliamentary system brought stability to British politics but not to French politics? Why so many parties in France but only two in England or, for that matter, in the United States and Japan? Why do certain peoples accept readily the notion of state ownership and management of their economy and hold this compatible with democracy and freedom, while others do not? Finally, why do some political systems repudiate democracy and representative institutions while others deem them essential? To answer these questions, it is not adequate simply to recognize and list the individual differences that separate one political system from another. Descriptive identification of national differences is important, but not enough. We must also explain them. We must search for regularities and differences in political behavior and try to account for them. We must strive to develop a scientific outlook on politics.

The types of explanation we give to the national political differences we note may vary. In some cases, similarities or differences may

be explained in terms of the history of the countries involved. For instance, it may well be that parliamentary institutions developed a remarkable viability in England because they were established before the Industrial Revolution. In France and Germany, on the other hand, industrialization preceded any very significant experience with parliamentary institutions. This is an essentially historical explanation.

Complementing the historical explanation, we have what may be called the structural-functional explanation. It views all political systems both in terms of certain common indispensable functions which must be performed—recruitment, communication, the maintenance of order, adjudication of conflicts, etc.—and in terms of certain structures or institutions which perform them. In different political systems, a given function may be associated with quite different structures and institutions. For example, the adjudication of conflicts may be handled by a formal judiciary in one society and by private mediators, village elders, or a priesthood in others. Such differences may in turn be accounted for by variations in social and economic organization, in value systems and prevalent ideologies or—this approach is far from incompatible with historical explanations—in specific historical circumstances.

If we were to compare, for instance, the political systems of certain underdeveloped countries that had formerly been colonies, a knowledge of the traditions and institutions implanted in each by their former imperial masters would be indispensable to an understanding of present differences. Thus present political differences between Malaya and Indonesia to some extent relate to differences in the histories of the British and Dutch colonial systems. But, beyond this they also relate to differences in social structure, population characteristics, levels of literacy, leadership characteristics, and economic circumstances in the two states. Similarly, differences between French and British parliamentary institutions relate to contemporary ideological variances, relative degrees of industrialization, different configurations of interest groups, and a variety

of other factors in addition to historical differences.

The structural-functional approach, in other words, strives toward a sophisticated definition in depth of political systems, the identification of the most important institutions in each system, and the classification and explanation of their political differences and similarities. On the basis of such analyses, it hopes ultimately to establish a comprehensive science of politics capable of developing general laws or statements of regularity about political behavior. As in the natural sciences, such laws would be stated in the form of hypothetical generalizations involving a series of conditions. For instance, it might be posited that in societies lacking serious ideological conflicts and possessed of single-member district, majority electoral systems, two-party systems will tend to develop. Or, it might be said that within a given society industrialization and prosperity will, all other conditions being equal, lead to a decrease in political conflicts over abstract or general issues and the development of a political system primarily concerned with the solution of concrete and specific problems. Again, it might be hypothesized that significant and sizable groups which are systematically denied access to positions of status and influence within a political system will, all other things being equal, eventually seek to gain these by violent means.

Such hypotheses can be tested against historical and contemporary evidence and may be modified or rejected accordingly. Research and empirical observation are indispensable elements of valid comparative political studies, just as they are in all forms of scientific inquiry. It is through empirical observation that we enrich our knowledge of conditioning factors, the presence or absence of which lead to the validation or rejection of our hypotheses. For instance, if we propose that wherever there is A (e.g., a single-member district, majority electoral system) that B (a two-party system) will follow, only to find that this is so in one country but not in another, then we must seek empirically the reasons for this disparity. We do so usually through a search for further relevant factors (X, X1, X2, X3,

X4, etc.). Once discovered, our hypothesis is then qualified to read that B will follow A, *provided* factors X1, X2, or X3 (e.g., social, religious, or regional factors or others depending upon field observation) also obtain. In this manner, a more comprehensive and refined explanation accounting for the differences between the two systems can be formulated.

It is at this point that comparative political analysis becomes particularly challenging and at the same time frustrating for the student. He would like to be able to identify quickly the regularities and differences between systems and to come up with a simple explanation for them. But rarely, if ever, can this be achieved in practice. All political systems possess certain characteristics which are unique, that is, which cannot be duplicated. In fact, we will find it virtually impossible to verify any hypothesis or develop definitely any generalization that is valid for all political systems at all times. Invariably we will be forced to lengthen the chain of conditioning factors (X's) for each and every political system, and note that the generalizations proposed must be carefully qualified in terms of a variety of individual and idiosyncratic factors. Thus, at the very moment when we propose to develop general laws, we seem to bog down in the enumeration of unique situations. In despair, we tend to fall back on the facile explanation that uniqueness is the only rule of politics, that comparative study cannot really explain political differences, and that the degree of indeterminacy in political behavior is so great that no generalizations are possible.

It would be a serious mistake to accept such an explanation. We have been careful to point out that, if one proceeded in the manner suggested, political uniquenesses are identified and explained. This is a point of crucial importance. We had to start from the general in order to identify and explain the unique. Unless we started with general political con-

cepts and hypotheses, not only would we have been unable to generalize, even in qualified fashion, but we would not even have been able to distinguish between particular political differences, much less try to account for them. After all, how can one tell what is different and unique without first knowing what is general, or at least first being aware of the existence of a relevant general concept? Power, for example, is a general political concept which is variously manifested in different

### III

We must begin by stating what we believe a political system to be and what factors we hold to be relevant to the comparison of political systems. This will involve the identification of those qualities and problems which we will treat in the case of the individual political systems under consideration.

A political system is a mechanism for the identification and posing of problems and the making and administering of decisions in the realm of public affairs, an area which is variously defined by different societies. The official machinery by which these problems and decisions are legally identified, posed, made, and administered is called government. Government provides both an official and authoritative mechanism for the identification and posing of problems and the making and administering of decisions and a means of formalizing and bestowing legitimacy on the products of this process. In practice, it does more than this; by providing a context and an apparatus for the taking of official decisions, it also in time comes to influence the types of problems which are posed and decisions which are taken.

Government—in the sense of society's legislative, executive, judicial, and bureaucratic machinery—is not, however, the sole concern of students of comparative politics. It is only

societies—through, for example, symbols of religion, magic, property, or pomp—to name just a few. But, without first grasping the notion of power as a general concept, we would be unable to relate these symbols to power as particular manifestations. This leads to the heart of our problem, namely, what general concepts shall we use in order to compare different political systems and to explain the similarities, differences, and uniquenesses that we observe in them.

a part of a larger political system. Government interacts continuously with this less formalized and broader social phenomenon called “the political system.” This includes government, but also includes such additional informal or unofficial factors that affect the functioning or products of a society's problem-posing and decision-making apparatus in the realm of public affairs as: (1) its historical heritage and geographic and resource endowments; its social and economic organization; its ideologies and value systems; and its political style; and (2) its party, interest, and leadership structure. Government plus these two categories of related and mutually affective factors thus constitute the political system of a society.

The first step in the analysis of a given political system is to ascertain and describe those aspects of a society's historical, geographical, social, economic, and ideological heritage and endowment—listed under category (1) above—which are significantly related to its political decision-making system. This will provide at the same time a picture of the working environment of politics and an inventory of a system's basic problems, resources, attitudes, groups, political alignments, and styles of action which relate in some operational fashion to political decision-making. For this reason, we refer to such factors in the chapters which follow as “the foundations of politics.”

In practice, it is not easy to agree, for a given society, on just which of its many characteristics are of present and primary political



importance—and, in this sense, “foundational”—and which are of only historical or secondary importance. They are not necessarily the same from country to country, nor are they constant for different stages in the history of a single society. Their satisfactory identification and evaluation in any given case is itself a matter calling for considerable study and sophistication and about which judgments will differ. In general, however, the more unfamiliar, non-Western, and underdeveloped the political system under consideration, the greater the need we find for explicit and detailed treatment of these foundational aspects of politics. American students simply do not bring to the study of Asian politics a fund of relevant information or a semi-intuitive “feel” for the situation in any way comparable to that which they bring to the study of their own or some Western European political system. Finally, it should be emphasized with respect to these “foundations of politics” that, although they are here distinguished one from the other, categorized, and treated separately, in fact they constitute a unified, national, interrelated, and interactive complex. Their dissection here for expository purposes should not lead one to forget this fact.

The interaction between these foundational aspects of a political system and the governmental organs of that system constitute what we call “the dynamics of politics.” Social, economic, political, and ideological claims and supports rising from these foundational aspects of a system are constantly being presented to officials and organs of government with the demand that they be converted into public policy. Political parties, interest or pressure groups, and political leaders play the role of conveyor belts between the makers of such claims and the organs of government which make official decisions and establish public policy. They thus serve as active or dynamic agents within a political system, sifting and choosing among its claims which demand action, formulating these in actionable terms, gathering support, and presenting the results in the form of demands for political action. These so-called dynamic factors of politics—political parties, interest or pressure groups,

and political leaders—thus bridge the gap within a system between political foundations and the formal decision-making organs of government. Actually, the word “gap,” because it implies discontinuity, is perhaps an ill-chosen term. These are all interpenetrative and interactive components of a political system, and the distinctions we are here making between parties, interest groups, and leadership on the one hand and government on the other are more analytical than real.

The third major component of political systems is government, which is the formal and legitimacy-conferring machinery for the identification and posing of problems and the making and administering of decisions in the realm of public affairs. More specifically, it is the legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative or bureaucratic machinery of state, and the constitutional and legal framework within which these operate. While distinctive functions and organs of these sorts are usually identifiable in most non-primitive societies, it should not be assumed that they will be neatly and individually packaged or institutionalized along the lines indicated by these traditional categories or that, if so, they actually perform the functions indicated. Legislative and executive functions, for example, are often combined, while modern legislatures in practice seldom really legislate in any very complete or classical sense of that term. Along similar lines, it should also be noted that where totalitarian systems, such as the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Peoples Republic, are concerned it is largely meaningless to attempt to distinguish between the governmental roles and powers of the Communist Party and the formal apparatus of state.

In studying any system, we are interested not only in the input aspects of its mechanism but also in its outputs. Consequently, for a given political system, we are interested not only in the above-described input process by which it poses, makes, and administers its de-

cisions but also in the nature, quality, and effectiveness of the decisions taken, that is, in the efficiency and performance characteristics of political systems as well as their mechanics. The output or efficiency of a political system can be gaged by its capacity to survive and its ability to make decisions that are widely accepted. Assessment of the former is relatively simple. Where the latter is concerned, in a democratic system it can usually be determined by the response such decisions elicit among social groups, interest groups, and other associations. In a totalitarian system, the test is similar, though the nature of the groups concerned and the manner of ascertaining their responses are different.

An efficient political system maintains a balance between stability and change. Change is an inevitable consequence of the competing political claims that arise among groups as a result of shifting technical, social, and economic conditions and the demands that such groups press as they struggle to gain access to positions of influence and power. Throughout the nineteenth century in Europe, for example, one major source of political change arose from the claims of the lower middle class and the workers for greater access to political influence, while in the twentieth century the attempts of these same groups to translate their newly acquired political influence into permanent socio-economic benefits have been of similar importance.

Efficiency, therefore, is a function of governmental response to such groups and demands. To be efficient, however, such a response must take place within a context of stable and generally accepted political institutions. Otherwise, emerging groups will attempt to gain power by revolutionary means, and this has disruptive effects upon the entire system. From this point of view, there is no guarantee that a democratic political system is more efficient than a totalitarian one. A totalitarian government might develop mech-

anisms of representation which can identify and quickly translate into public policy the claims of the most significant new groups. A democratic government might discover that its representative institutions are no longer able adequately to convert the claims of strong and competing groups into decisions on public policy or to provide a satisfactory synthesis of competing claims. It sometimes happens that democratic societies become victims of their own philosophy. By developing organs of representation that register accurately the demands of all groups and by attempting to satisfy the claims of all, it may in effect hand over to each group a veto power that leads to a national political stalemate in which no major political decisions can be made. This happened in France under the Fourth Republic.

In the chapters that follow, we will discuss this question of governmental efficiency primarily in terms of governmental performance viewed in two somewhat different lights. We are concerned first with matters of relatively short-term performance. How do the governments treated define their appropriate spheres of political concern and activity? How do they allocate their attention, funds, and resources among these spheres of concern? What has been the nature and efficiency of their performance with respect to such standard spheres of governmental concern and action as justice, social security, public works, economic planning, national security, and foreign relations? Beyond such relatively specific and short-term issues, however, we are also concerned with certain matters relating to the long-term performance characteristics of these political systems. How efficiently are they coping with the larger problems of political development or modernization? What forms of political organization and action--democratic, authoritarian, or some variant of these--are they finding most appropriate to their needs? In whose behalf is the system operating? These are the underlying and enduring problems of all political systems in our time. Their import and urgency will vary within a particular system as well as from system to system, but some combination of these prob-

lems is critical for all societies. Together, they provide major themes for the two volumes of this series. As such, they merit somewhat more extensive comment.

The problems of political modernization differ in important respects between "underdeveloped" and "developed" societies, but no political system is in a long-term sense free from the need of adapting its structure, attitudes, and practices to changes in technology and social, economic, and political needs and possibilities. In underdeveloped settings, effective political modernization in our time involves almost the total restructuring of the society. Illiteracy must be eliminated and elementary, advanced, and specialized education made available; family and local-centered attitudes and forms of social organization must be replaced by more national and individual patterns; the gap dividing city from village must be narrowed; new and far larger segments of the population must be involved in the political process; a professionalized bureaucracy must be recruited and trained; and the entire process of political decision-making must be rationalized and rendered more representative along lines quite antipathetic to traditional practice. These are formidable undertakings in their own right and, in reality, are rendered even more so by the fact that they constitute but a small facet of a larger modernization process involving an entire range of additional massive and linked changes in fields such as technology and economics. If one makes partial exception of such relatively advanced states as Japan and Israel, all other Asian societies are involved in the earlier stages of such a modernization process. Indeed, this struggle to modernize might broadly be said to constitute the major theme and problem of Asian politics since at least 1945. As such, it will receive a good deal of attention in the volume on Asia.

The problems of political modernization are different for so-called "developed" societies, such as the North Atlantic states, the U.S.S.R., and a few others. They have already achieved relatively high levels of performance in terms of their political, economic, and social systems. For them, the crucial ques-

tion becomes the continuing adaptation of political attitudes, structure, and practice to the national needs for economic growth and for a more equitable distribution of the national income among all sectors of the population. An examination of the efficiency and performance characteristics of political systems such as these becomes closely linked with questions about the role of the so-called "private" and "public" sectors in the national economy, and the advantages and disadvantages of a free market economy, nationalization, and economic planning. Of great importance also is the role of government as a purveyor of social and economic services and an instrument for the achievement of both social welfare and social justice. Issues of this sort will receive strong emphasis in the volume on Europe.

In both volumes, we are also concerned with one of the most crucial problems of our times—the world-wide competition between democratic and authoritarian forms of government and decision-making. Authoritarianism in this sense includes quite a broad range of political systems, ranging from truly totalitarian forms such as those in the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Peoples Republic to the less organized and more traditional forms of despotism or oligarchy found in a number of Asian states. Authoritarianism in this context means a political system in which the range of effective popular participation in the political decision-making process is officially curtailed, while that of some relatively small elite group or groups is exalted and maximized.

In practice, this usually involves a system in which a single political party or group representative of but a small segment of the population monopolizes the representative function and controls all organs of government and other social institutions deemed important. In its most modern and extreme form, the totalitarian state, the hallmarks of the authoritarian system are an extreme degree of

organization, mobilization, and centralization of authority viewed as normal qualities of the state. Despite its elitism and extreme authoritarianism, a totalitarian system is also one in which all citizens, young and old, are constantly engaged and activated politically in the service of the national goals of the moment. It is a highly mobilized system which exalts the rights and purposes of the state over those of individuals and recognizes few rights of privacy or non-participation, much less of opposition.

All democracies, on the other hand, despite a variety of forms, have one thing in common—a basic distinction between the individual and the state in terms of personal rights that the state normally cannot invade. These rights may be religious, political, social, or economic, but their “autonomy” is not contested. It is, furthermore, a political system in which dissent, opposition, and conflict between parties and points of view are not only taken for granted but are positively valued as an indispensable means of insuring representative, responsible, and viable government. In such a system, although the sphere of official as opposed to popular decision-making may be both large and expanding, a significant and autonomous sphere of decision and action is always reserved for private individuals and groups.

In our time, the most comprehensive and durable challenge to both the existence and the expansion of democratic political systems has been offered by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent development and spread of the Communist type of totalitarian political system. Politically, the Communist system rejects democracy in the name of some of its most important postulates—equality and freedom. Drawing upon the writings of Karl Marx, a great German scholar of the nineteenth century, the Russian Communist leadership and, more recently, Chinese leaders as well, have argued

that democratic politics as practiced in the West is simply a device for establishing and perpetuating the evils of a capitalist society under the rule of a minority bourgeois class dedicated to the subjugation and exploitation of the workers. They claim that capitalist democracy, born of class warfare, is also destined to perish through a class war in which the working masses will revolt to establish a society in which productive resources will be used for the benefit of all. This common benefit they identify with the expropriation of private property and the socialization and control of the means of production by the state.

As long as Communist claims were limited to philosophical criticism and advocacy, their danger to democracy, even if serious, was remote. But when they were reinforced by the power of a great modern state dedicated to their world-wide realization, the threat to democratic institutions became immediate and urgent. The Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin “built” a socialist state and achieved unprecedented economic progress in the course of a single generation. Russia industrialized at a rate hitherto unknown in the West. It was able to survive the German attack during World War II and thereafter to rebuild its war-devastated economy and attain a position of global power second only to that of the United States. To many underdeveloped peoples of the world seeking both independence from colonial status and a shortcut to modernization, this example of the strength and accomplishments of a socialist system became an inspiring and attractive model. But with this model went the central ideas and practices of Soviet Communism: one party government, totalitarian control of all channels of individual expression, and the ruthless harnessing of the individual to the achievement of state goals.

Thus from a philosophy of social protest and revolution, Communism has become, under Russian leadership, a potent instrument of global strategy in a world beset by an unprecedentedly dangerous conflict between the Communist and democratic systems. Active Communist Parties have been established throughout the world, while, with Russian

support, Communist governments have risen to power in all of the Eastern European and Balkan states except Greece and Turkey. In recent years, Communist strength and influence have also spread rapidly in Asia and the colonial world. In 1949, a Communist government was established in China, while strong Communist parties challenged existing arrangements in India, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Middle East. In all these areas, Communism holds forth the promise of quick realization of the local desires for industrialization and economic modernization.

During this period of the rise of Communist power, capitalism and the democratic political institutions with which it is associated have also markedly changed their character. Nineteenth-century ideals of free competition and a free market economy have been gradually replaced by a more socially oriented and responsible philosophy, emphasizing social security, full employment, medical care, and social and economic justice. In some instances, so-called capitalist economies such as England's have gone as far as the outright nationalization of critical industries. Again, the actual roles of trade unions, political parties, and legislative assemblies today give small support to the old Marxist charge that they are instruments for the preservation of the privileges of a narrow ruling class.

Capitalism and democracy are far different philosophies and systems in the 1960's than they were in Marx's day—a fact to which many Marxists are strangely blind. Despite such changes, however, in the realm of political values and organization, Communism and democracy remain far apart in both theory and practice. Despite the shedding of many of the political and economic ideas of the nineteenth century, democracies today still cling to their old political values of individual freedom, of argument and persuasion rather than indoctrination and force, and of gradual change based on broad acceptance and consent rather than that arbitrarily imposed by the few upon the many. These are values widely shared by the citizens of most democratic systems. They are part of the "ideology" of democracies and condition their political actions and performance.

This question remains, however: Which type of political system, the democratic or authoritarian, will prevail in world-wide competition? Particularly in Asia and the underdeveloped parts of the world is this competition intense and undecided. These societies can still choose institutions and practices that will gradually build toward democratic practices, or they can choose the false simplicities of the authoritarian, perhaps even the totalitarian, way. This is a problem of performance that will engage our attention in both volumes of this series. Which system, the democratic or the authoritarian, is more apt to meet the needs of contemporary societies in both Asia and Europe? The answer cannot be given in terms of individual preferences or value commitments. It must be given in terms of the categories of analysis we have spelled out.

So much, then, for the manner in which we visualize our task in the two volumes of this series. We have defined a political system as a mechanism for the identification and posing of problems and the making and administering of decisions in the realm of public affairs. We have established certain broad categories of analysis for such systems: political foundations, political dynamics, and the formal decision-making organs of government on the input side of the process, and governmental efficiency and performance considered over both the short and the long run, on the output side. In the chapters that follow, an attempt will be made to apply these categories in such a way as to illuminate the functioning and performance of a number of quite different political systems. Marked variations in the natures of these systems and in the extent and reliability of our information about them preclude the discussion of all of these systems in identical format, but in all cases an attempt has been made to apply these general categories and to answer the principal questions posed by them.



ROBERT E. WARD

Japan





# Introduction



Less than a hundred years ago, Japan was a little-known kingdom just emerging from a period of self-imposed national isolation that had lasted for almost two and a half centuries. Her territory was restricted to the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Her population numbered slightly more than thirty million, some ninety per cent of whom were peasants living in the countryside and working their small farms with tools and techniques differing little from those their ancestors had utilized for the preceding millenium. The national economy, though changing, was still semifeudal in character, while the total impression conveyed by the society is described by one authority as roughly comparable, in Western terms, to early Tudor times, that is, to the England of more than four hundred years ago.

Politically, the country was, in theory, an empire ruled by an emperor who claimed direct descent, through an unbroken line of illustrious predecessors, from Amaterasu-omikami, the goddess of the sun. In fact, the emperors had long been carefully cloistered in the Im-

perial City of Kyoto, ritually remote from all meaningful contact with the crude world of politics. Since 1603, Japan had actually been governed by a delicately balanced system, often described as "centralized feudalism," in which prime authority rested with a Shogun, the head of the great House of Tokugawa, who ruled from his family's historic capital of Edo (modern Tokyo).

Politics, like social organization, was carefully stratified along hereditary class lines, and only a small elite was privileged to participate in the making or administering of political decisions. Pre-Restoration Japan was, in short, a species of traditional Asian society: predominantly rural, agrarian, immobile, stratified, authoritarian, and oligarchic in its primary socio-political characteristics. From the Western viewpoint, it was strange and exotic to a degree perhaps most vividly portrayed in the period's favorite art form, the wood-block prints known as *ukiyo*e, which catch so faithfully the style, temper, and appearance of the "floating world" of late Tokugawa times.

When we move forward in the stream of Japanese history the space of only one long lifetime, some ninety years from the Restoration of 1868 which overthrew Tokugawa rule, we see an almost miraculously different Japan.

During this period, the isolated kingdom had become a great Empire, briefly dominating the whole of Eastern Asia, only to lose all its territorial gains in the catastrophic defeat of 1945. Its population, according to the 1960 census, had swollen to upwards of ninety-three million, a threefold increase within a single century, and the majority of the people now dwelt in cities rather than in the country. From small beginnings had sprung a modern industrial and commercial economy which remains the most advanced and productive in all of non-Soviet Asia and which, in some respects, rivals or even surpasses those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

Massive changes in social organization had also taken place: the rigid system of class stratification had been abolished; free, public, and universal education had become the norm; social and economic mobility and opportunities had been greatly enhanced and expanded; equality before the law had been established; and the national standards of living, well-being, and security soared to levels hitherto unknown in either Japan or Asia. Politically, the Emperor remained in Tokyo—rather than in Kyoto—but still as symbol rather than ruler. The Shogun and the old nobility had disappeared and been replaced by a popularly elected National Diet or Parliament, which operated through a responsible Cabinet. Universal adult suffrage had become the rule, and both national and local government were, to a significant degree, elective and representative. Public affairs were administered by a large, specialized, and professional bureaucracy, and public decision-making systems were predominantly secular, rational, and scientific. Thus change has overtaken Japan at a dizzying rate. When Westerners today visit Tokyo, Osaka, or Kobe for the first time and view the familiar sights of big-city life, they are often inclined to wonder if this can indeed be “the Orient.”

We do not have to seek far or delve deep, however, to discover the historic continuities that underlie and, to a large extent, channel the forces of change in modern Japan. Surrounding the Western-appearing cities, for example, lie the fields and villages of Japan, where social, economic, and political changes have been accepted more slowly and in more piecemeal fashion. It is an exaggeration to claim that in reality there are two Japans—urban and modern (or Western) on the one hand, rural and traditional on the other. The facts do not lend themselves to such neat categorizations. But there is enough truth to this proposition to make it both intriguing and challenging. In both cities and villages, the basic and most important unit of social organization continues to be the extended family, followed by the traditional community or some slightly more modern neighborhood or work group. Patterns of social thinking, of decision-making, and of conduct are still apt to owe more to these ancient and traditional loyalties or their contemporary analogues than to the insurgent force of individualism. These basic continuities, although less obvious than the changes, are of fundamental importance to any understanding of the over-all course and circumstances of Japan's recent development.

Japan's experience in solving, on the whole successfully, the myriad national, group, and individual problems that beset its attempts to modernize is a subject of vital interest for students of the modern world. In terms of the most meaningful indexes of modernization, Japan stands far in advance of the rest of Asia. It represents what might be termed Asia's sole exemplar of a “mature” society. Most of the other states of non-Soviet Asia—led by Israel, China, India, and Turkey—have only recently begun to perceive and deal systematically, and on their own responsibilities, with problems and programs that are sixty to ninety years old in Japan. Although the circumstances of these more recent attempts at modernization differ in significant respects from those confronting Japan in the latter part of the last century, such differences should not be permitted to obscure the important degrees of similarity that exist through-

out Asia in such spheres as social and economic organization, internal power relationships, status vis-à-vis the West, national aspirations, and selections of national goals and the means to their achievement. Because of such shared factors, Japan's experience foreshadows the experiences and problems of more recently modernizing Asian states and affords useful insights into such general phenomena as modernization, industrialization, authoritarianism, imperialism, and democratization. Indeed, it may be a particularly important exemplar of political modernization. In these times, when we hear so much about the political future of Asia being dependent on the outcome of a competition between the Chinese and the Indian paths to modernization, it should not be forgotten that there is also a Japanese path, which has led the Japanese to considerably more advanced and developed national circumstances than are enjoyed by either the Chinese or the Indians.

Another and more immediate reason why Japan today looms so large in our eyes is the fact that Japan's defeat in 1945 and the Communist victory in China in 1949 fundamentally altered the power situation in Eastern Asia and the world. Since 1949, the United States has been confronted with expanding responsibilities and commitments in Eastern Asia in the face of greatly increased Communist hostility and strength. Prior to 1945, Imperial Japan effectively checked Soviet Russian influence and ambitions in this area, while a weak and divided China, although generally favorable to the United States, was a negligible power on the international scene. The principal effect of the Allied victory in August, 1945, was to eliminate Japan as a force in East Asia and thereby to enhance greatly the power of the U.S.S.R. in the entire Sino-Japanese area.

With Mao T'se-tung's victory in the Chinese civil war and the rapid consummation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in February, 1950, Communist influence and strength increased tremendously throughout all of Asia, and the United States' position was reciprocally weakened. Since no friendly power was capable of checking Communist ambitions and aggres-


sions in Eastern Asia, the United States itself had to fill the resultant gap. Yet it could not do so effectively without local cooperation. We needed bases in Asia near the frontiers of Sino-Russian power, and we needed Asian friends and allies to contain the spread of the Communists. To some extent, these needs were met through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), through our various relationships and arrangements with the Philippine Republic, South Vietnam, the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan, and the South Korean Republic, and through the establishment of our postwar base on Okinawa. But all of these, while of individual and collective value, still left us in a relatively weak position in—or, rather, off the coast of—Eastern Asia.

Only Japan in the years 1948–50 had the potential of becoming a formidable bulwark against Communist strength in this Western Pacific area. A decision to ally ourselves with a recent and bitter enemy did not come easily, but the danger was growing rapidly. China, our traditional friend and ally, was lost. Only Japan, our erstwhile enemy, possessed the strategic position, the population, the established economic skills and capacity, the leadership, and the general developmental potential to give us sufficient strength in Eastern Asia. Conversely, it was feared that the defection of this Japanese potential to the Sino-Soviet cause would almost certainly propel Communist power to ascendancy throughout Asia. Consequently, since 1948–49 the United States has striven to establish our relationships with Japan on as firm and friendly a basis as possible.

From a defeated and occupied enemy, Japan has risen in eighteen years to become our most important and valued ally in Asia. In terms of cold war strategy, her position in Asia bears a close resemblance to that of West Germany in Europe. Like West Germany, Japan's economy and productive capacity are one of the

Western Alliance's greatest assets. Again, if Germany may be regarded as the western anchor of the chain of Allied military alliances and bases that ring the frontiers of Communist power from NATO through CENTO to SEATO and the so-called "island chain" off the coast of Eastern Asia, Japan may be considered the eastern anchor of this somewhat discontinuous and dubious chain of "positions of strength." Against this background, the

question of Japan's willingness to continue as our principal military base and associate in Asia has assumed international prominence. This, and the associated questions about alternative international arrangements which Japan may prefer, have today become major issues in United States foreign policy and world affairs in general. Japan, then, occupies a truly critical position in world politics as well as in Asian politics.



# History



A country's political system is a product of its total culture. Its politics does not develop separately from the geographic, social, economic, ideological, scientific, or historical sectors of that culture, but interacts with all of them as both cause and effect. In studying the Japanese political system, then, we should first examine its non-political determinants, or what are here referred to as "the foundations of politics." These factors together constitute the larger framework we call "Japanese culture," in which politics is only one element. In the chapters which follow, we shall investigate rather briefly the historical, ecological, social, and ideological foundations of the Japanese political system. Unfortunately, we must discuss these elements as if they were discrete entities, thus inevitably sacrificing some of the richness, color, and interdependence of reality. The reader is asked to bear in mind, how-

ever, that these are artificial divisions and that Japanese society, like any society, is actually a seamless web.

The modern period in Japanese political history dates from the series of events in 1867-68 known as the "Meiji Restoration." At that time, the Emperor Meiji assumed formal power over the state, an act that marked the end of the long rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867). Prior to 1867, the Imperial House had long since abdicated any pretense to actual authority. With very few exceptions, the Emperors of Japan have lacked any appreciable political power since roughly the ninth century A.D. During this long period, Japan was governed by a variety of aristocratic and feudal systems, which, since the latter part of the twelfth century, have normally been controlled by warrior groups. Japan, for much of this time, actually lacked any effective central authority. In 1603, however, after a series of fierce civil wars, Tokugawa Ieyasu<sup>1</sup> established the ascendancy of his House and imposed on Japan a much greater measure of national government and control (see Table 2-1). By modern standards, it was far from being a centralized government, for some three-fourths of the national territory and considerable political power were still held by over two hundred and fifty feudal lords known as *daimyo*. But it did constitute the most effec-

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this section, personal names will be given in Japanese fashion, that is, with last names appearing first.

tive and durable national political system Japan had ever known. It is from the breakdown of this system that the modern Japanese polity proceeds.

TABLE 2-1 *Brief Chronology of Modern Japanese Political History*

Date	Event
1603	Beginning of Tokugawa Period.
1867	End of Tokugawa Period.
1867-68	Meiji Restoration and beginning of Meiji Period.
1889-90	Promulgation and enforcement of the Meiji Constitution.
1894-95	Sino-Japanese War.
1904-05	Russo-Japanese War.
1912	End of Meiji Period and beginning of Taisho Period.
1924-32	Period of greatest strength and achievement by pre-war Japanese political parties.
1926	End of Taisho Period and beginning of Showa Period.
1931	Outbreak of the Manchurian Incident
1932-45	Period of growing military ascendancy and ultranationalism in Japanese politics.
1936	Military Revolt of February 26 in Tokyo.
1937	Outbreak of the China Incident.
1941	Outbreak of general warfare in the Pacific (Dec. 7).
1945	War in the Pacific ends (Aug. 15). Japan's formal surrender (Sept. 2).
1945-52	Allied Occupation of Japan (Sept. 2, 1945-April 28, 1952).
1946	Promulgation of new Japanese Constitution (Nov. 3).
1947	Enforcement of the new Japanese Constitution (May 3).
	Beginning of the cold war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
1950	North Korean invasion of South Korea (June 25).
1951	Treaty of Peace between the U.S. and a majority of the Allied Powers and Japan (Sept. 8).
	Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan (Sept. 8); revised in 1960.
1952	Allied Occupation ends and Japan regains her sovereign and independent status (April 28).

## The Restoration

The events of 1867-68 did not in themselves constitute a revolution, although their long term consequences were in the

deepest sense revolutionary. There was no sustained civil war or insurrection, no massive shift in the basis of political power, no reign of terror, and no sudden emergence of a new political or social elite. Still, it was far more than just a palace revolution. Most of the leaders of the Restoration Movement were members of the privileged military or samurai class, operating with the approval and sometimes the active support of their particular feudal lords and a section of the imperial court nobility. A majority of them came from four of the most remote and powerful fiefs in Tokugawa Japan: Satsuma and Hizen in Kyushu, Choshu in the extreme southwestern section of Honshu, and Tosa in southern Shikoku. They represented primarily these fiefs, not the contemporary samurai class or the anti-Tokugawa elements of the aristocracy as a whole, much less the population of Japan.

The motives of those who opposed the Tokugawa were many and varied. Historic clan enmities against the Tokugawa mingled with the dissatisfactions of the samurai at their deteriorating economic and social status. These feelings were reinforced after 1854 by the threat to Japan's security posed by the consequences of the Perry Treaty, which opened the country to foreign commerce and, it was feared, to Western imperialistic exploitations as well. Much of the blame was attributed, often unjustly, to the Tokugawa Shogunate.

The rebels hoped to legitimize their ambitions by restoring to the Imperial House its rightful position and power, which had long been denied it by the House of Tokugawa and its shogunal predecessors. Their program was, therefore, called the Restoration Movement and its immediate goals were well symbolized by the slogan *Sonno joi* ("Revere the Emperor; expel the barbarians"). Behind such slogans there lay, of course, a variety of more deep-seated and "historic" causes: the widely disruptive effects of the introduction of a

monetary system into the old rice-based economy of Tokugawa Japan; the increasing stresses stemming from the commercialization and industrialization of the economy; the very rigidity of the Tokugawa system in the face of cumulative challenges; growing dissatisfaction with the existing class system and relationships; the spread of urbanization and the resulting growth of new social and economic problems; and the development in the Japanese of a sense of nationalism. All these disruptive forces merged in 1867-68 to catalyze the successful movement to overthrow Tokugawa power, and produce the "Meiji Restoration," named after the regnal title of the fifteen-year-old boy who then ascended the throne.

Modern Japanese political history may be said to date from this series of events. The "Restoration" did not mean, however, that the Meiji Emperor was "restored" to the powers claimed by his eighth-century ancestors, who were vested by right of divine descent with absolute power over the state. The leaders of the Restoration never seriously considered such a step. In fact, their conception of the Imperial position in government probably did not become definite until the last half of the 1880's, when it was finally embodied in the Constitution of 1889. What did come of the Restoration, however, was the establishment of a new oligarchy, originally military in nature and regional in its political loyalties, with the Satsuma and Choshu clans as primary powers and the Tosa and Hizen fiefs as secondary ones. This new ruling group gradually solidified its control within Japan and launched the country on its difficult and perilous path to modernization. The new oligarchy was led by a truly remarkable group of men: Kido, Saigo, Inoue, Okubo, Iwakura, Ito, Yamagata, Matsukata, and Okuma—a veritable flowering of leadership such as occasionally appears at critical junctures in a nation's history. While in no sense "democrats," they were able to transcend limitations

of background and education and to comprehend the need for a strong and industrialized Japan. Their vision, ability, and strength contributed much to the creation of a new Japan.

## The Pre-Constitutional Period, 1868-1889

The twenty-two years that divided the Restoration from the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 were years of consolidation and experimentation. The first concern of the new oligarchy was for its own security. Its domestic enemies were many and powerful, and they were not finally overcome until the government's new conscript army put down the great Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. It also continued to fear economic and political intervention by the imperialistic powers of the West. For years, the Meiji oligarchy was preoccupied with plans to strengthen and modernize the country to prevent such intervention. Fear of the West spurred the development of Japanese nationalism and greatly affected the outlook and policies of the new Japan.

Old institutions were uprooted and new ones were introduced at an unsettling rate: the traditional four-class system of samurai, peasant, artisan, and merchant, along with the rights and privileges of the samurai and the Tokugawa fiefs, were abolished, as was the old land-tenure system; in their place came mass public education, conscription, equality before the law, railroads, modern industrial plants, technology, a merchant marine, and a modern army and navy. Politically, the period was marked by experimentation with various forms of government, with no particular one winning out. A professional bureaucracy was established to cope with the expanding needs of the state. A small number of educated Japanese gained their first insight into the political philosophies and systems of the West. Some, led by the Meiji oligarchs, preferred the authoritarian strain in Western thought, perhaps best exemplified at the time by the Prussian state and the dominant Austro-



Prussian school of constitutional law. These seemed to the oligarchs to be both more congenial to their native tradition and better suited to the urgent needs of the Japanese state for strong leadership and unchallenged national unity.

Other political leaders, mostly from the ranks of the political dissidents, preferred some version of the liberal tradition in Western thought and studied closely the writings of Mill, Bentham, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many others. Members of this latter group organized the first political parties in Japan during the 1870's and launched demands for limited suffrage, more representative government, and a national parliament, to contest the continued dominance of the oligarchs from Satsuma and Choshu. This was a seminal period in Japanese political history, for, although characterized by change and experimentation, it gave birth to both the authoritarian and the liberal traditions which have since constituted the two main streams in Japan's political development. Many of the issues, personalities, and styles of political competition that were to dominate the Japanese political scene for decades clearly emerged during these twenty-two years prior to 1889.

## The Meiji Constitution, 1889–1890

The years 1889 and 1890 were years of decision in Japanese history, a political watershed marked by the adoption of the Meiji Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889 and enforced in 1890. This remarkable document served as the legal basis of government in Japan for fifty-five years, until Japan's defeat and occupation in 1945. It was formally superseded only by the present Constitution, which was adopted in 1947. In the Meiji Constitution, the oligarchs incorporated their view that a permanent and modern system of government was needed for effective domestic control and international security. No resuscitated form of the shogunate under Satsuma and Choshu auspices was practicable, although it was considered.

The Constitution also reflected the natural desire of the oligarchs to perpetuate their own authority and that of their selected successors. They justified this provision on the grounds that Japan needed the decisive leadership which only they could supply. Finally, the Constitution adopted those minimal concessions to the doctrine of representative government which its framers judged necessary to placate international public opinion and mounting domestic political opposition. Although scarcely ideal as a foundation for a liberal political system, at least by present-day standards, it should not be forgotten that the Meiji Constitution and governmental system were not notably illiberal in terms of prevailing European practice in 1890. They did mark a major departure from earlier Japanese political institutions and processes.

The Constitution was secretly drafted and ratified and on February 11, 1889, the 2,549th anniversary of the legendary founding of the Japanese state, it was publicly presented to the Japanese people as a token of the Imperial benevolence. The system of government thus established rested on a theory of the state, referred to by the Japanese as *kokutai*. This meant that the Japanese state was intelligible only in terms of its Imperial institution and that, for both theoretical and legal purposes, the Emperor, as the successor of an unbroken line of divinely descended ancestors, embodied the Japanese state. The reigning emperor, therefore, was the sole ultimate repository of all state powers—executive, administrative, legislative, and judicial. To this authority was added the spiritual authority that derived from his position as a lineal descendant of the sun-goddess. He was thus the central figure in the nation's major cult—if not religion—State Shinto. In theory, then, the Meiji Constitution resulted in a system of government that was centralized to a degree unprecedented among the major states of the modern world.

In practice, however, the situation was quite

different. Only Meiji, of the three Emperors who reigned under this Constitution, normally played a significant political role. The personal intervention of the present Emperor that brought about the acceptance of the Allied terms and Japan's surrender in 1945 was, as far as we know, unprecedented. The actual power of the sovereign, therefore, was normally not too different from that of most of his pre-Restoration forebears. He lent legitimacy and an aura of sanctity to the political decisions of his ministers and advisers, and simply authenticated their policies through ritualized acts. One should not, however, conclude that the Emperor had no real political significance. On the contrary, since 1868 he has been of basic importance. He provides the Japanese with their sense of historical continuity and serves as their symbol of national identification and as the moral basis and justification for the existence and powers of government. These prerequisites for a stable system of national government did not effectively exist in pre-Restoration Japan, and it is a credit to the Meiji oligarchy's brilliance and leadership that they were able so effectively to use the symbol of the Emperor as a means of unifying the country and building a modern political system.

Power under the Meiji Constitution did not, therefore, reside with the Emperor. In practice, his authority was delegated to a complex array of offices and officials. These delegations were seldom precise or clear-cut, and the resultant system of authority and responsibility was a maze of overlap, duplication, obscurity, and rivalry. Reduced to simplest terms, however, the following were the main elements of the government. The Emperor's executive and administrative authority was divided into military and non-military components. The military component was apportioned to the General Staffs of the Army and Navy for command and operational functions and to Ministers of the Army and of the Navy

for administrative functions. Military responsibility was further confused by the establishment of several other military boards and offices with vague and sometimes overlapping functions. The Emperor's non-military authority was delegated largely to a Prime Minister and Cabinet composed of Ministers of State who were in theory responsible to the Emperor.

The national military and civilian authorities were supreme. Local governments had no significant autonomous authority, but functioned under centralized ministerial control. Legislative authority was bifurcated, residing in part in a bicameral legislature and in part in the Cabinet, which could rule by executive order and decree. The Emperor's judicial authority was assigned to a dual system of courts, judicial and administrative, subject to extensive supervision by the Ministry of Justice. The entire government was staffed by professional military and civilian personnel, technically responsible to the Emperor, who were distinctly elitist in training and spirit. In addition, a large staff ministered to the Imperial house and the Emperor himself. This staff often seems to have had a voice in major political decisions.

Even from this brief description, it is apparent that the Meiji Constitution was not intended to establish a democratic political system in Japan. It was frankly conceived by its framers as a means of perpetuating the type of authoritarian rule with which they were personally identified, and this it did with great success for many years. Still, for reasons indicated earlier, it did make certain minimal concessions to popular rights and representative government. These proved to be of greater importance than their drafters anticipated, for they provided the legal and institutional foundations for the subsequent development of political liberalism in Japan.

Among the most important democratic concessions contained in the Constitution were significant grants of civil rights. Although shrewdly hedged about with protective clauses, they did assure Japanese subjects much greater freedom of speech, publication, association, and religious belief than they had

ever enjoyed. The most important concession of all, however, was the national parliament or Diet, and its lower House of Representatives in particular. This House was a popularly elected body intended to represent the people of Japan. It was given qualified powers, shared equally with a conservative and aristocratic House of Peers, to initiate legislation, pass laws, query Ministers of State, levy taxes, and approve the national budget. Through persistent and clever exploitation of these powers, the leaders of Japan's political parties were able, over a period of thirty-odd years, to liberalize appreciably the political institutions inherited from the Meiji oligarchs. But this process of liberalization was slow, difficult, and piecemeal, and, after a brief period of modest ascendancy between 1918 and 1932, it succumbed to the resurgent forces of Japanese authoritarianism.

A prime reason for this failure was the strong authoritarian and antipopular bias systematically built into Japan's basic political institutions by a Constitution that encouraged an elaborate imperial myth and created a powerful but irresponsible cabinet system of government, an equally irresponsible and ultimately more powerful military apparatus, an able but elitist bureaucracy, and no really effective means of coordinating or controlling these disparate elements. The Meiji Constitution provided Japan with a satisfactory and markedly effective government for many years, but it proved fatally inadequate to meet the national needs during the turbulent 1930's and 1940's.

## Post-Constitutional Developments, 1890–1932

The time period within which one chooses to analyze a segment of history can greatly affect one's emphasis and conclusions. For example, if we examine only the forty-two-year period of Japanese political history from the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1890 to April, 1932, the month before the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai, we could reasonably conclude that Japan's politi-

cal system was slowly "evolving" along relatively liberal and democratic lines. To be sure, such a judgment would have to lean heavily on the developments of the last eight of these forty-two years, and skirt with caution a number of embarrassing questions posed by the actual quality of so-called "party government" in post-1924 Japan and by the direction and implications of the nation's foreign policies. Such a case, however, could still be made and often has been. Considered in a larger historical perspective, though, it is more accurate to say that Japanese political history during these years was largely a product of two major streams of domestic development: one authoritarian and the other parliamentary and at least proto-liberal. Throughout most of the period, authoritarianism was actually in the ascendancy, and it was to remain so until Japan's defeat in 1945.

Political power was shared during these years among the following major contestants: (1) the Meiji oligarchs and their direct successors in top civilian positions; (2) an increasingly distinct and professionalized group of military leaders; (3) the higher ranks of the civil bureaucracy; (4) leaders of the larger and more important conservative political parties; (5) a big business group usually known as the *zaibatsu*; and (6) an hereditary peerage, many of whom held high posts in the Imperial Court, in the Privy Council, or in the House of Peers. This classification is somewhat arbitrary in view of the many shifts in political roles and allegiances that took place throughout the period, but it does afford a rough framework for analyzing the major developments of the time.

The Meiji oligarchy was, to begin with, largely of samurai background and martial tradition. In the early days, it provided both the civil and military leadership in Japan, and there was little differentiation between the two. It was split along clan rather than functional lines, and such lines were of some

importance until as late as the 1920's. During the 1890's, however, the civilian and military wings of this group began to develop along increasingly distinct paths. This was due partially to a natural process of specialization in a rapidly modernizing society, and partially to the Meiji Constitution, which distinguished sharply between civil and military leadership. By 1900, two separate successor groups to the original Meiji leadership had appeared: one primarily civilian, the other military. Although they often disagreed, the gap that separated them on most major issues was usually neither wide nor continuous, and they generally cooperated more than they competed. With time, the connections of both groups with the original Meiji oligarchy declined in importance and, with the deaths of such elder statesmen as Yamagata and Matsukata in the early 1920's, disappeared almost completely. Thereafter, it becomes difficult to distinguish second and third generation leaders in these groups from the professionalized bureaucracy.

The social background of Japan's bureaucracy, like that of the Meiji oligarchy, was predominantly samurai and martial. This segment of the population both needed employment as a result of the abolition of their former class status and possessed the educational and administrative skills essential to a modern bureaucracy. As the need for trained civil servants grew, however, more recruits were drawn from the general population and educated at the new state and private universities and technical schools, especially at Tokyo Imperial University. A relatively small, cohesive, and professionally trained higher bureaucracy thus was created. Originally closely affiliated with the Meiji oligarchy, in more recent times it has succeeded to much of their political power.

The career leaders of the major political parties constituted a fourth leadership group. Many of the party presidents came from the

ranks of the oligarchs, the bureaucracy, and even the military, but below this level was a large number of party professionals. Although these party leaders were ideologically conservative, they were usually at odds with the civil and military oligarchs and, to a lesser degree, with the higher bureaucracy and the peerage over issues of political position and power. From the 1870's on, the parties demanded a larger role in the decision-making process than was allotted them either before or after the Meiji Constitution. In practice, they continuously attempted to place their members in the premiership and in the non-military Cabinet posts and tried in this fashion to force the Cabinet to recognize its responsibility to the party-controlled lower house of the Imperial Diet. Success in this endeavor would have greatly increased their political power.

The *zaibatsu*, a collective term for the great cartels that controlled a major sector of Japan's economy, also figured prominently, if indirectly, in her politics. Their very size and wealth made it inevitable that they would maintain close association with the government. Their political affiliations varied. All had active bureaucratic connections, and they usually cooperated with both the civilian and the military oligarchy. In fact, they regularly provided sinecure posts for government officials upon their retirement from public service. It was not until after the First World War that some of the largest *zaibatsu* began to ally themselves closely with the major conservative political parties. Political campaigns and elections were very expensive, especially after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1925, and the *zaibatsu* contributed large sums to campaign funds, which enabled them to exert a substantial amount of political influence.

For our last group of leaders, the hereditary peerage, the most obvious route to power lay through the upper house of the Imperial Diet, which they could control. The House of Peers, however, did not normally play a very positive role in policy determination. As a legislative body in a cabinet-centered governmental system, it suffered from many of the same disadvantages as did the party-controlled lower

house. But certain elements of the peerage were active in two other capacities which were of great political significance. The first was the Privy Council, an appointed body charged with advising the Emperor on state affairs, which, from 1890 to the early 1930's, constituted practically a third house of the national legislature. The second agency was the Imperial Household Ministry, which surrounded and served the person of the Emperor. The most important of these men was the Lord Privy Seal. Since he and his associates controlled access to the Emperor and advised him on Japanese and world problems, these officers possessed considerable political power, especially on such critical occasions as the selection of a new Prime Minister.

These six principal leadership groups clashed over many issues in the period 1890-1932, but one in particular merits our attention. This was the continuing struggle by the political parties for greater political power. The Meiji Constitution had carefully restricted the parties to a minor and largely negative role in the governmental process. As the sole formal political spokesmen for the Japanese people, they felt entitled to a much more important and, ultimately, to a dominant role in the decision-making process. They were aided in their struggle by the rising educational standards and political expectations of the Japanese people, by the advance in political participation by certain major sectors of the population, and by the general growth of democratic views and practices in other parts of the world.

But within Japan, those who would have to give up their power to the parties—particularly the civil and military oligarchies, the bureaucracy, and the peerage—were bitterly opposed to any significant expansion of party power. The party leaders, entrenched in their constitutionally sanctioned, if weak, position in the lower house and purporting to speak for "the people," fought back tenaciously and with gradually increasing success. They were able to demonstrate that the Meiji system of government could not operate smoothly or effectively over any considerable period of time without the positive support of a working

majority in the House of Representatives. In the most orthodox of Japanese traditions, the party leaders cleverly exploited a position of seeming weakness and eventually achieved a greater share of political power. By 1924, they were beginning to speak of "true parliamentary government" as having almost been achieved in Japan. In fact, the years from 1924 to 1932 are frequently referred to as a "parliamentary" or "democratic" period in Japanese history and as a happy climax to the long struggle between authoritarian and liberal forces that had been launched even earlier than the Meiji Constitution.

Although the slow emergence of a more broadly based system of government through the rise of political parties was certainly one of the most notable developments of the 1890-1932 period, it would be a serious error to regard this as a triumph of "liberalism." The programs and performance of the parties that achieved a brief victory in the late twenties were not very liberal by either American or Japanese standards. Ideologically, these parties were quite conservative. They were much more interested in achieving and exploiting power than in implementing democratic policies, either domestically or in foreign relations. They produced few outstanding leaders and, by neglecting or outraging major sections of Japanese public opinion, they contributed to the authoritarian resurgence of the thirties. Their accomplishments were few, but any other outcome would have been truly remarkable. By 1924, they were only thirty-odd years of age, and they had to operate in a society that had been steeped in authoritarian and antidemocratic traditions for many centuries. In those thirty years, they were embroiled in a constant struggle for survival and petty advantages, with little opportunity to broaden their perspectives or acquire a mature sense of public responsibility. Under such circumstances, their shortcomings scarcely appear surprising. The early history

of political parties in the West is not notably different.

## The Authoritarian Resurgence, 1932–1945

The fourteen-year period, 1932–45, is somewhat embarrassing for those who claim that Japan was gradually evolving into a democratic society. It lasted too long to be shrugged off as merely an episode; it was too dramatic and disastrous in its consequences to be ignored. It marked a reversion to authoritarian and militaristic ways that were certainly far more in the main stream of Japan's political traditions than were the brief years of "liberalism."

The period began, symbolically, with the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, on May 15, 1932. This was merely the most conspicuous of a number of such incidents that represented protests against widespread economic—especially agrarian—distress, the corruption and self-seeking of the party politicians during the years of "parliamentary democracy," and a foreign policy held by many to be insufficiently nationalistic and aggressive. These dissatisfactions were exploited by resurgent forces of Japanese militarism and ultranationalism, who felt threatened by the increasing powers of the political parties and the attendant development of a parliamentary system. The militarists and ultranationalists also believed that these were years of unique opportunity for Japan. With intelligence and courage, they held, Japan could become a world power and create an empire that would ultimately dominate all of Eastern Asia. But, if this opportunity were missed, Japan would have to resign itself to a slow process of national attrition leading inevitably downward to an insecure and second-class status among the powers.

Since the party and civilian leaders of the

day showed few signs of being equal to this challenge, both military and civilian ultranationalist groups in the early 1930's plotted to expel the political parties and replace them by more honest and more aggressive leaders drawn from the ranks of the military or their civilian supporters. The plotters were in disagreement as to both ends and means, but through the years they acquired sufficient force and momentum to bring about great changes in Japanese politics. It is perhaps symbolic of the real role of the imperial institution in Japanese politics that they initially cloaked their opposition under the guise of working for a "Showa Restoration," in other words for returning true "political power" to the Emperor as in the days of the Meiji Restoration—this despite the fact that the present or Showa Emperor was apparently opposed quite strongly, although helplessly, to most of what these groups stood for.

During these years, the deterioration of democratic institutions in Japan was steady and rapid—so much so, in fact, that one is inclined to question the extent to which they had really acquired popular support in the preceding period. Domestically, plots and assassinations multiplied, culminating in the famous Young Officers Revolt of February 26, 1936, when some fourteen hundred troops of the First Division seized and held the central districts of Tokyo for three days, while their cohorts attacked seven and assassinated three of the leading statesmen of the day. The principal objects of these attacks—party leaders, big businessmen, and eminent elder statesmen and imperial advisors—tried vainly and ineffectually to salvage what they could from the situation. They sought support from each other, from the Emperor and the Imperial Court, and even, as a last resort, from the military themselves—in short, from everyone except the Japanese people. Ultimately, they failed and, after 1936, the military once more determined national policies. The other leadership elements—the bureaucracy, *zaibatsu*, nobility, even the party leaders—were not eliminated from the scene. They simply accepted the inevitability of military ascendancy, compromised with the new circum-

stances, and formed new combinations and working arrangements.

After 1936, Japan is often said to have become a fascist state. Such a judgment, however, is highly dubious when applied to Japan—at least, if one regards Nazi Germany as the prototype of a fascist society. Many similarities existed, of course, between Germany after 1933 and Japan after 1936. Doctrines of racist mythology, national superiority, and divinely sanctioned imperialism were found in both countries. Both planned to expand into neighboring areas. Between 1937 and 1940, Japan, building upon her earlier acquisitions in Manchuria, pressed forward first in North China, then into the remainder of China, and on down into Southeast Asia in her attempt to establish a nebulously defined Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Japanese guidance and control. This route to empire led in fact to Pearl Harbor, World War II, and finally to defeat and ruin.

Domestically, these were years of growing regimentation, of expanding governmental control over politics, business, and people's lives in general. In these respects, Japan might possibly have been regarded as a fascist state, but it still differed in a number of important ways from European-style fascism. Nothing in Germany or Italy compared with the imperial institution in Japan. Japan had no "Führer," no "Duce," in any way comparable to Hitler or Mussolini. And there was nothing in Japan like the Nazi or Fascist parties. Such "national parties" as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association or the Political Society of Japan were relatively negligible in importance. Japan never really succeeded either in establishing a true dictatorship or in organizing her economy or her politics along truly totalitarian lines. Her experience was thus considerably closer to that of Italy than to that of Germany.

The shattering defeat in 1945 was a stunning blow for Japan, whose modern political history had been composed of little but spectacular successes. The reactions of the Japanese people to this catastrophe varied from class to class, and from individual to individual. Some regretted—and perhaps will strive

to recapture—the nation's lost status and power; some welcomed the emancipation from the old order and the expanded opportunities offered by their new circumstances; others, probably a majority, were acutely aware that disaster had struck and that this was not unconnected with the rash policies followed by Japan in the thirties. Thus, although the political consequences of the war and defeat are hard to specify precisely, it does seem probable that the experience significantly increased the people's general involvement in and concern about government and politics. In fact, this is perhaps the greatest political change wrought in Japan by the fourteen years of "authoritarian resurgence."

Prior to the intensification of governmental intervention in economic, social, and political activities following 1937, it had still been possible for many Japanese to live lives that were only lightly or intermittently affected by the national government. This included most of the peasantry and a surprising proportion of urban residents as well. Japan's invasion of China in 1937 and the Second World War brought with them massive conscription, increased taxes, regulation of the labor market and of consumers' expenditures, crop requisitioning, import and export controls, industrial mobilization campaigns, patriotic rallies, etc., all of which extended the government's activities deeply into the lives of the people. The greater political awareness and new political interests which resulted have in the post-war years provided a more substantial foundation for the ambitious political reforms of the Occupation era. Such a process of mass "politicization," of course, is bound to have piecemeal and uneven effects, but, strangely enough, the most durable political consequence of the years of authoritarianism was probably the very considerable heightening of political consciousness and interest that took place at the lower levels of Japanese society.

## The Allied Occupation, 1945–1952

At the time of Japan's surrender in August, 1945, the nation was confronted with the awesome costs of the war. Combined military and civilian casualties totaled about 1,800,000 dead; civilians alone were 646,000 known to be wounded or missing; roughly twenty-five per cent of the national wealth had been destroyed or lost; some forty per cent of the sixty-six major cities subjected to air attacks had been leveled to the ground; about twenty per cent of the nation's residential housing and almost twenty-five per cent of all her buildings were obliterated; thirty per cent of her industrial capacity, eighty per cent of her shipping, and forty-seven per cent of her thermal power-generating capacity were destroyed; forty-six per cent of her pre-war territory had been lost, some of it only temporarily, however. Other more intangible costs were harder to calculate: the long-term economic significance of the loss of the Empire; the consequences of being reduced to a second- or third-class power; the effects of being cut off from established trading partners; the consequences of facing world suspicion and opposition to any revival of Japan's pre-war eminence in Eastern Asia. Japan's immediate prospects were ominous and alarming. What was to become of the country? How was it to be reconstructed and rehabilitated?

Many of the immediate problems were taken out of Japanese hands by the Allied Occupation of the country. The Allies formally ruled Japan from the time of the surrender ceremony aboard the *U.S.S. Missouri*, on September 2, 1945, until April 28, 1952, when the Treaty of Peace signed at San Francisco in September, 1951, became effective. Japan was required to surrender unconditionally all her armed forces and to accept

the arrangements stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration for the establishment of a military Occupation. It was made clear that "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender." At the stroke of a pen, a system of foreign military control was established in Japan that had practically unlimited legal authority to direct all aspects of national life.

In theory, this Occupation was an Allied responsibility, but, in fact, it was an almost exclusively American operation, which made a few minor gestures in the direction of Allied participation. The Occupation leaders chose to exercise their authority indirectly rather than directly. Americans did not themselves take over or replace the existing governmental machinery in Japan. Administration continued in Japanese hands, but it was made subject to American direction and supervision. General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to act as the agent in Japan of the victorious powers in general and of the United States in particular. And in September, 1945, an episode began that was unique in modern history—a humane, systematic, and prolonged attempt by a victorious power, vested with plenary legal authority, to remold along more democratic lines the basic political, social, and economic attitudes, institutions, and behavioral patterns of a defeated enemy nation.

The goals and major reform programs of the Occupation were not created out of a void during the fall of 1945. They had been under consideration in the Department of State since at least April, 1942. By the time of the Japanese offer to surrender in early August, 1945, a large number of position papers on the postwar treatment of Japan had been drafted and approved, and by August 29, 1945, a comprehensive statement of the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan had been sent to General MacArthur by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. This document established our basic policies toward



Japan in considerable detail and, in elaborated form, became a policy directive to General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the simplest possible terms, it set forth the two primary objectives of the Occupation:

1. "To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world."

2. "To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which . . . should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people."

In practice, these two goals were commonly called demilitarization and democratization.

It is one thing to set such broad and sweeping goals, quite another to achieve them. Demilitarization was a relatively simple problem. It involved arrangements for the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces at home and abroad, the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of Japan's arms-making capacity, the repatriation of Japanese military and civilians from all of Eastern and Southeastern Asia, and the complete demobilization and return to civilian life of all members of the armed forces. All these tasks were speedily and efficiently performed by the Occupation authorities. By the end of 1948, Japan had been completely demilitarized, and over six million soldiers and civilians had been brought home. In addition, a provision was written into Article 9 of the New Constitution that was subsequently to cause much controversy. It renounced war and even denied the nation the right to threaten or use force as a means of settling international disputes. It also seemed to obligate Japan never again to maintain land, sea, or air forces or other war potential. Never before in modern history had a great power been so thoroughly demilitarized.

Democratization was a far more subtle and complicated problem. It raised enormously difficult issues: Whether democracy could be imposed by the orders of a military occupation? What was really meant by "a democratic

society"? What aspects of democracy could be successfully transplanted to a society with as different a political tradition and background as Japan? The Occupation authorities did not approach these questions with any very detailed plans for their accomplishment. But, under the pressing needs of the moment, an over-all strategy gradually took form. Essentially, it was based on the proposition that any democratization program would not long survive the end of the Occupation unless sizable and critically placed elements of the Japanese population were convinced of its value. The basic Occupation strategy, therefore, was to involve a large section of the Japanese people in supporting and implementing the reform programs. The Japanese interests that benefited from the major programs are listed on the right below:

<i>Reform Program</i>	<i>Japanese Interest Served</i>
1. The purge of ultra nationalist officials from designated public and private offices.	Those who succeeded to the offices thus vacated.
2. Expansion of the franchise.	All adult Japanese women plus all men from 20 to 25 who had earlier been denied the right to vote.
3. The grant to labor of the right to organize and bargain collectively.	Japanese labor in general.
4. Land reform.	The some seventy per cent of farm households that had been tenants or part owners and part tenants before the war.
5. Legal reforms of the traditional family system.	Women and the younger generation in general.
6. Decentralization of the powers of government.	Local and regional interests.
7. Educational reforms.	The youth of Japan.

The intent was, first, to create new interest patterns in Japanese society by granting new rights for which there already existed a substantial national demand and, second, to integrate these new interest patterns into a system of interdependent parts. The hope, then, was that each segment of the population that benefited by a particular reform program would, in its anxiety to protect its particular gain, rally to the defense of the entire system when any portion of it was attacked, lest partial revision at any point lead eventually to an assault upon all reforms including their own.

Partially because of this strategy and partially because of a wise recognition of the fact that any viable democratic system must consist of far more than the formal institutions of government, the Occupation approached its task on a very broad front. Political prisoners were set free. Politicians and officials who supported ultranationalism or the old regime were purged from office, and over two hundred thousand individuals were forbidden to hold public office or certain high managerial positions in private business. The suffrage was expanded to include women as well as men above the age of twenty. New political parties were encouraged. All antidemocratic laws of the old regime were revised. Labor unions were legitimized and encouraged to organize and protect the interests of their rapidly increasing members. The years of compulsory education were increased from six to nine, while the entire educational system was drastically overhauled, democratized, and decentralized; at the same time, educational opportunities at all levels were greatly expanded. Vast quantities of land were purchased at practically confiscatory prices from absentee, non-tilling, and large landowners and made available to tenant farmers for nominal prices. The highly centralized government of pre-war times was radically decentralized, and considerable autonomous power was conferred

on the prefectures, cities, towns, and villages. The great pre-war cartels, known as *zaibatsu*, were deconcentrated, and their holdings were broken up into independent and competing units. New and unprecedented fair trade laws and regulations to protect consumer interests were enacted. Public health standards and practices were modernized and improved. New and far-reaching social welfare and social security legislation was devised and enforced. All these and many more "programs of democratic reform" were launched by the Occupation authorities in their broad onslaught on the authoritarian Japanese political tradition.

To anchor these reforms in some durable political form, a new Constitution was adopted on November 3, 1946 (it took effect six months later, on May 3, 1947). This was a most remarkable document. The nature of the political system it established in Japan will be described later in some detail. For the present, it will suffice to note: (1) that it was originally drafted in complete secrecy by Americans on the staff of SCAP's Government Section; (2) that the Japanese government was subsequently persuaded to adopt the American draft, under circumstances involving some degree of coercion; (3) that the spirit and institutions of the new Constitution were unmistakably Anglo-American in nature; (4) that the general system of government provided by the Constitution was, technically, among the most democratic in history—the document itself, for example, is considerably more democratic than is the Constitution of the United States; and (5) that the expansive civil rights chapter of the Constitution guaranteed procedural and substantive safeguards that provided basic legal protection for many of the Occupation's democratic reform programs.

The Occupation lasted until April 28, 1952, a total of six years and eight months. Surprisingly, the Japanese were uniformly docile, and frequently friendly and cooperative with their conquerors. It was perhaps the friendliest occupation in recent history. It may also prove to have been one of the most effective.

Japanese reactions to particular reform programs varied widely, but the remarkable thing is the extent to which they adopted the majority of them, made them their own, and have continued, even since the end of the Occupation, to support and abide by them. The Occupation's programs in some spheres, however, have either been abandoned or seriously qualified: *zaibatsu* deconcentration, many aspects of the local autonomy program, and the decentralization of control over the educational and police systems. But, on balance, it is the Occupation's successful features, rather than its failures, that stand out. The Occupation did bring important political changes and a notable development of democracy to Japan. General MacArthur and his staff deserve great credit for their share in these accomplishments. They served as an essential catalyst at a time when the Japanese people were in a state of unusual flux and receptivity to change, when they were defeated, impoverished, uncertain of the future, desperate for guidance, and lacking in leadership. Once the Occupation had ended, of course, it was primarily up to the Japanese whether they wanted to sustain these changes or not.

Japan's political history during these years was powerfully affected by developments on the international scene and in the United States. Several factors converged in 1947-48 to produce an important change in the United States' attitude toward Japan. The first was the sweeping and surprising success of the Occupation during its early days. It seemed to most observers that the Japanese had sincerely embraced the cause of reform and were making very promising progress toward a thorough democratization of their society and government. It was also felt that at least a reasonable degree of economic security, with some prospects for future improvement, was essential to the continuance of this democratic progress in Japan. For these reasons and because the Occupation was costly to the American taxpayers, our official attitude toward the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy began to shift decisively during the summer of 1947.

The issue most directly involved was that of reparations: should Japan be forced to bear a sizable share of the over-all cost of the war through the payment of international reparations and, if so, to whom and in what form should they be paid? Although the American Occupation leaders agreed in principle to the justice of such reparations, it proved impossible to obtain any acceptable international agreement on the scale or method of payment. Any reparations payments that were made seemed ultimately to take place at our expense, since the Occupation had to make good any serious deficits in the Japanese economy in order to maintain viable economic conditions. It was also impossible to induce Japanese enterprise to invest in their own economy as long as they feared that the fruits of their investment could be seized at any time as reparations. In addition, American official circles were increasingly convinced that Japan was no longer a military threat but was, instead, rapidly becoming a peaceable democratic society. Our attitude toward Japan then began to shift from being fundamentally punitive and distrustful to being motivated by the desire to extend assistance toward the political, social, and even the economic rehabilitation of Japan.

Another factor strongly reinforcing this trend was the fact that the United States' relations with the Soviet Union had been deteriorating steadily since the last days of the war. With our decision to provide military and economic aid to Greece in the spring of 1947, the cold war was joined in Europe. At roughly the same time, hope of a negotiated settlement between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government was abandoned, and the civil war in China entered its final stages, presenting the serious threat that a Communist victory in China would extend the cold war to Northeastern Asia. Although this dire event did not actually materialize until the fall of 1949, it affected the United

States' view of Japan at a considerably earlier point. If China were lost as an American ally, who could replace her? Obviously Japan was the prime, although an embarrassing, choice. By 1949, we no longer considered Japan as a recently defeated and still potentially dangerous enemy, but as a budding democracy of great promise and an increasingly important, if informal, ally in the cold war.

This shift in attitude directly affected the domestic affairs of Japan. All the basic "reform" programs were conceived and launched in the early stages of the Occupation, when most of the formal orders by SCAP to the Japanese government were promulgated. During these years, SCAP exercised stringent and continuous control over Japanese political and governmental activities. But the year 1948 marked a watershed in the history of the Occupation. After that date, our regulatory efforts steadily slackened and Japanese initiative and activities increased until, for most domestic purposes, Japan again became practically a sovereign power. This was particularly true after General MacArthur was relieved of his post in April, 1951. By the Occupation's end in April, 1952, Japan had, in fact, long since regained her autonomy in many spheres.

## In Retrospect

As we look back over the ninety-odd years of Japan's political history since the Restoration (1868), two major themes emerge to give some measure of continuity to the confusion of events. The first is the long struggle between the authoritarian, although not totalitarian, tradition and the more liberal groups that stood for some form of constitutional and parliamentary government. The particular issues varied with the times and the contestants, but a constant power struggle was waged between the Meiji oligarchs and

their successors and opposition elements, who usually advocated causes considered liberal for the day: a Constitution, a parliament, expanded suffrage, Cabinet responsibility, etc. Until 1945, the authoritarian forces invariably held the advantage. But the opposition was never eliminated, never totally overcome. It displayed an amazing tenacity and capacity to survive; witness the prompt re-emergence of liberal groups after 1945. Throughout the pre-war years, these groups had won few battles, but they did succeed very gradually in altering the basic terms of political competition to their advantage. They obtained a Constitution, a parliament, and universal manhood suffrage, and, for a brief time in the late 1920's, seemed on the verge of establishing some degree of Cabinet responsibility and a party system that actually worked. Thus the pre-war political history of Japan is not one of unrelieved authoritarian ascendancy, particularly if we compare the Japanese record to that of any other Asian state. There was a gradual, if piecemeal, conditioning of the people in at least some of the basic institutions of a democratic society. In 1945, therefore, Japan entered a period of democratic reform with a considerable heritage of useful political experience.

The second major theme running through Japanese political history is the country's attitude toward Western nations. Since 1854, this attitude tended to swing through cycles of hostility and receptivity. Periods characterized by xenophobia and aggressive nationalism regularly alternated with periods of admiration for and imitation of things foreign and Western. Thus relations with the West, and specifically with the United States, opened on a note of hostility with the Perry missions of 1853-54. This continued through the Restoration of 1868, to be gradually replaced in the 1870's and 1880's by a period of emulation of the West that was often carried to ridiculous lengths. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 marked another high point in nativism and nationalism, which in turn gave way after World War I to a period of *demokurashi* (democracy), when Western

ways were all the rage in Japan. The pendulum then swung back to the opposite extreme during the ultranationalist and aggressive days of the 1930's and early 1940's, while, since 1945, Japan has displayed new and exceptionally friendly attitudes toward the West and the United States in particular. But, in

the light of history, how reliable and how durable are these feelings? Signs of a growing anti-Americanism have been too frequent and conspicuous for comfort. It is difficult not to speculate about the possibility of Japan "reversing course" once more, as she has done so often in the past.

# Ecology



The ability of political systems to create and control the environment in which they exist is limited. As they inherit a particular political history or social structure, so, too, do they inherit a particular set of geographic, economic, and demographic circumstances. These may be alterable, in part at least, by social planning and controls, but at any given moment in a nation's history, they restrict the range of decisions which that particular political system can realistically make. They thus comprise simultaneously a set of limiting factors of fundamental importance and a set of basic operating resources. Viewed in this light they are among the prime elements which determine the performance of political systems. Let us, then, examine the Japanese endowment in the areas of geography, economics, and population.

## Geography

To Americans, the most obvious geographic facts about present-day Japan are that it is small and it is insular. Its total area is 369,661 square kilometers. Compared to the United States (9,363,389 sq. km.), the U.S.S.R. (22,402,200 sq. km.), or China (9,561,000 sq. km.), this is small. Compared to the United Kingdom (244,022 sq. km.), West Germany (247,960 sq. km.), or France (551,208 sq. km.) it is not. One must beware of American-centered judgments in this respect. In Japan, however, there is an important distinction between the total area of the country and the generally useful or arable land. Only about fourteen per cent of Japanese territory is arable. In terms of this more meaningful index, Japan suffers a great handicap, for the United States has twenty per cent arable land, India has forty-nine per cent, the United Kingdom twenty-nine per cent, West Germany thirty-five per cent, and France thirty-nine per cent. Among the major states, only the Chinese People's Republic (11 per cent arable land) and the U.S.S.R. (9 per cent) may be in less advantageous positions, although the current accuracy of these percentages is somewhat dubious.

To make matters worse, Japan's national territory has greatly decreased as a result of her defeat in the Second World War.

Japan lost Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and the South Seas Mandated Islands—all of which were formerly a part of the Empire (Manchukuo was technically independent). Beyond this, there is little possibility that Southern Sakhalin or the Kuriles will be voluntarily returned by the U.S.S.R., although Japan has not yet formally accepted this loss. Finally, the United States—although acknowledging Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu and the Ogasawara Islands and having announced its intention to return them in the future—continues to occupy and administer both these areas. Japan has thus lost 311,514 square kilometers or forty-six per cent of her total pre-war territory. This amounts to some eighty-four per cent of her present territory. Historically, few states have accommodated themselves readily or with resignation to territorial losses on such a scale.

The bulk of Japan's present territory is accounted for by the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. There are also more than 3,400 smaller islands within the national boundaries. Japan is a country of islands and mountains, a fact that has profoundly affected the political character of the country. In the first place, it shapes the political unity of the country. Most Americans tend to assume that because Japan is a relatively small state, it is also unified and homogeneous. In fact, this is not so. The islands and the mountains have historically made land communications rather difficult and have produced well-developed patterns of regionality. These regions have traditions and histories of their own and have usually had some sort of political identity as well. In modern political terms, Japan was not really effectively unified until the Restoration (1868), and, even today, this long history of political decentralization and localism has identifiable political importance and consequences.

Second, the insularity of the country seems to have affected its political history in several significant ways. It has, for example, given to Japan a sharply defined national frontier, so unlike the broad and shifting bands of terri-

tory which have historically constituted China's frontiers. This has tended to give to the Japanese a sense of group identity, against outsiders at least, and—when joined with the development of a serious foreign and imperialist threat to their collective security, as was the case after Perry had reopened Japan in 1854—has provided fertile ground for the rapid emergence of strong nationalist feelings. Some would go further and claim that this historic isolation from extensive foreign contacts, made possible by Japan's insular condition, also partly accounts for certain narcissistic qualities in Japanese culture, as well as for their alleged inability to view either themselves or their relations with foreign countries objectively. National isolation may also explain the Japanese tendency to alternate between poles of aggressive self-assertion and a sort of collective inferiority complex in its relation to Westerners and Western culture.

Whatever the merits of such speculations about the Japanese national character, it is certainly true that geography has endowed Japan with a degree of national security that is practically unique in the history of the greater states. It is approximately 130 miles across the Straits of Tsushima to Korea, which is Japan's closest continental neighbor. It is about 475 miles across the Yellow Sea to the Chinese coast. Japan's safety from invasions from the continent is thus far greater than that of Great Britain, lying 20 odd miles from the shores of France. Prior to 1945, no one had successfully invaded Japan since the ancestors of the present Japanese race did so in prehistoric times. This fact has had two prime consequences for the Japanese. First, it has enabled them to turn on and off almost at will the stream of intercourse with the Asian continent or the rest of the world. It made possible for example, the effective adoption of a deliberate policy of national seclusion for almost 250 years prior to 1854. Second, it has enabled the Japanese to concentrate exclu-

sively and almost fiercely on domestic political issues, domestic power struggles, and internecine strife, with little or no concern for the effect this might have on the external safety of the nation. National security carried to this extent is unparalleled among the other great states of modern history. It is hard to specify with assurance the consequences of this unique national experience, but the question ought certainly to be posed.

## The Economy

In basic resources, Japan is in many respects a poor country. In recent years, she has had to import all her bauxite, all her natural rubber, ninety-nine per cent of her phosphate rock, ninety-eight per cent of her crude petroleum, eighty-nine per cent of her iron ore, eighty-five per cent of her antimony, thirty-seven per cent of her copper, and eleven per cent of her coal. She suffers similar deficiencies in food, although she has in the past few years succeeded in reducing her rice imports to a negligible proportion of total consumption. She continues, however, to import ninety per cent of her sugar needs, seventy per cent of her soy beans, sixty-four per cent of her wheat, and thirty-nine per cent of her barley.

Against this apparent poverty of resources, however, stand Japan's impressive accomplishments in the general field of economic development (see Appendix, Table III). In 1960, for example, she produced fifty-two per cent of the electric energy known to have been generated in all of Asia excluding the U.S.S.R., far more than France or Italy and almost as much as West Germany. In the production of crude steel, she ranked fifth in the world, behind the United States, the U.S.S.R., West Germany, and the United Kingdom. In cement production, she held fourth place behind only the United States,

the U.S.S.R., and West Germany, while in the production of merchant shipping she led the world. These achievements are truly remarkable when one considers the condition of Japanese industry at the end of the war. As early as 1955, in fact, Japan's official indexes of industrial activity, public utilities, industrial production, and manufacturing in general had all broken through their pre-war and wartime ceilings and have since gone on to unprecedented highs. The gross national product has risen from a postwar low of \$3.6 billion in 1947 to upwards of \$47 billion in 1961. During the same period, the nominal national income on a per capita basis rose from \$34 to about \$399. Even when adjusted in light of changes in the general price index, this still means that real national per capita income has increased more than 150 per cent since 1947 (Table 3-1). Both production and consumption have risen enormously. As in the case of West Germany, defeat has proven to be but a prelude to the greatest spurt of economic development in recent Japanese history. One is tempted to conclude that, in an economic sense at least, it sometimes pays to lose wars.

The contrast between Japan's poor resource endowment and her flourishing industrialized economy immediately suggests the importance of foreign trade to her economy. Most of the raw materials for Japanese industry must come from abroad. They must be imported in large quantities, processed in Japan, and then either consumed at home or exported to foreign markets to obtain the foreign exchange necessary for the purchase of additional raw materials. The Japanese economy is thus like a throat or funnel into which imports are poured, in which manufacturing and processing take place, and out of which flow finished products for domestic consumption and the export trade. Let us examine this process in somewhat greater detail, first on the import and then on the export side.

In recent years, judged in terms of value, Japan's eleven major imports have normally been: cotton, crude petroleum, iron ore, wool, wheat, lumber, nonferrous ores, raw rubber, soy beans, scrap iron, and steel. Together



these account for upwards of fifty per cent of the total national imports. They come primarily from the United States, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Malaya, the Philippine Islands, Mexico, Kuwayt, and Formosa. The United States has been by long odds the most important supplier of Japan's overseas purchases, usually providing about a third of all Japanese imports, at a cost of upwards of one billion dollars in an average year. Japan has for some years been the United States' second best foreign customer, standing behind only Canada in this respect. To meet the cost of these imports, Japan's most important exports have been: ships; cotton, rayon, and silk fabrics; iron and steel products; clothing; marine products; radio sets; and toys. Such items account jointly for approximately fifty per cent of Japan's total exports. They have been sold primarily to the United States, Liberia (almost entirely ships), India, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Formosa, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, Singapore, and Canada. Again, the United States accounts for a top-heavy proportion of this, taking in recent years anywhere from a fifth to about a third of Japan's total exports, at a price of from half a billion to upwards of a billion dollars.

This flourishing pattern of imports and exports has in postwar times resulted in an adverse balance of visible trade for Japan. Her imports normally exceed her exports by annual amounts ranging in recent years from \$143,000,000 to \$1,426,000,000. This deficiency has been compensated for in practice by Japan's special dollar earnings. These are sums outside of the normal trade statistics which accrue to the Japanese account because of the country's special relationship to the United States. During the Occupation period, they included chiefly a series of very sizable direct grants for relief and rehabilitation, large payments for Japanese logistic and service support of the hostilities in Korea, and sums spent by the American forces in Japan. Since 1952, they have largely taken the form of United States payments for the so-called "special procurement" of goods and services of a military and economic assistance nature

in Japan plus the funds spent there by the American naval and air force establishments remaining in Japan. In all, it is estimated that such special dollar earnings amounted to about six billion dollars during the ten years following the end of the war. Since then, they have been gradually tapering off from a 1959 figure of \$471,000,000. This combination of an unfavorable visible trade balance and dependence on American sources to offset it has created special and unusually important economic relationships between Japan and the United States. Japan would undoubtedly prefer to reduce the extent of this dependence on American policy and the American economy, but, under present circumstances, it is most difficult to find a satisfactory alternative.

The Japanese economy is thus heavily dependent on foreign trade. Still, it is by no means unique among major states in the degree of this dependence. If we express degrees of dependence in terms of the percentage of national income accounted for by foreign trade, we will find that in recent years West Germany, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and Italy have all been more dependent on foreign trade than has Japan (Appendix, Table VI). Still, the survival of the Japanese economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade, and the global conditions and decisions affecting the volume and terms of that trade are largely beyond Japan's sphere of control. Any marked decrease in the global volume of foreign trade is almost certain rapidly to affect economic conditions in Japan. Since 1950, the Japanese economy has become increasingly prosperous, but this should not obscure the fact that the stability of the Japanese economy is notably vulnerable to external pressures and influence. At present, this vulnerability is most pronounced vis-à-vis the United States, but before too long the Chinese Peoples Republic and the U.S.S.R., singly or jointly, may be in a position to bring very appreciable economic pressure to bear

TABLE 3-1  
*Japan's National Income by Industries and Real National Income<sup>a</sup>* (In billions of yen)

Fiscal Year	National income	Domestic national income							
		Primary industry				Secondary industry			
		Total	Agriculture	Forestry	Fishery	Total	Mining	Construction	Manufacturing
Average 1934-36	14.4	2.9	2.4	0.2	0.2	4.4	0.3	0.5	3.6
1930	11.7	2.0	1.6	0.2	0.2	3.1	0.2	0.5	2.5
1935	14.4	2.8	2.4	0.2	0.2	4.5	0.3	0.5	3.7
1940	31.0	7.5	5.9	1.0	0.6	11.1	0.9	1.0	9.3
1944	56.9	10.1	7.8	1.3	1.0	22.9	1.4	2.2	19.3
1946	360.9	140.1	112.3	18.0	9.8	95.1	10.9	24.9	59.3
1950	338.5	879.4	717.3	66.0	96.1	1074.8	98.7	136.6	839.5
1951	4527.7	1128.4	898.3	111.1	119.0	1464.7	167.6	171.5	1125.6
1952	5084.9	1217.7	958.5	123.1	136.1	1618.9	201.8	217.5	1199.6
1953	5747.7	1266.6	941.5	160.1	165.0	1839.5	170.6	273.0	1395.9
1954	6022.4	1324.2	1008.0	154.3	161.9	1872.5	150.8	294.0	1427.7
1955	6714.0	1519.6	1202.2	146.3	171.1	2060.8	129.5	339.6	1591.7
1956	7574.5	1454.9	1089.3	172.9	192.7	2517.1	166.8	382.7	1967.6
1957	8219.6	1532.0	1127.0	200.7	204.3	2766.2	200.4	418.8	2147.1
1958	8504.5	1561.2	1155.0	188.1	218.1	2773.9	177.7	459.8	2136.4
1959	9991.2	1656.7	1220.7	194.5	241.5	3452.4	182.4	555.7	2714.3

<sup>a</sup> *Nihon Tokei Nenkan*, 1960.

<sup>b</sup> In 1934-36 yen.

TABLE 3-1 Japan's National Income by Industries and Real National Income (Continued)

Domestic national income (cont.)														
Tertiary industry														
Fiscal Year	Total	Wholesale and retail trade	Finance, insurance, and real estate	Transportation, communications, and other public utilities	Services	Other unclassified	Government service	Net income from abroad	National income by distributive shares A	Total population (in thousands) B	Nominal national income per capita (yen) C = $\frac{A}{B}$	General price index D	Real national income E = $\frac{A \cdot D}{C}$	Real national income per capita (yen) F = $\frac{C}{D}$
Average 1934-36	7.1	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.1	0.5	-0.0	14.4	68,647	210	1.00	14.4	210
1930	6.6	1.8	1.3	1.6	1.4	0.1	0.4	-0.0	11.7	63,872	183	0.96	12.2	191
1935	7.1	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.2	0.5	-0.0	14.4	68,662	210	1.01	14.3	208
1940	12.3	3.7	2.1	2.7	2.6	0.4	0.8	0.1	31.0	71,400	434	1.93	16.1	220
1944	23.7	3.9	3.0	5.1	3.9	0.3	7.6	0.2	56.9	73,800	771	3.70	15.4	208
1946	125.7	38.5	9.1	15.8	56.0	56.0	6.3	—	360.9	75,325	4791	43.9	8.2	109
1950	1429.5	559.5	109.0	250.1	510.9	510.9	—	-2.2	3381.5	83,167	40,659	241.7	14.0	168
1951	1934.6	792.0	145.9	330.7	666.0	666.0	—	-2.5	4525.2	84,475	53,569	293.4	15.4	183
1952	2259.3	832.0	217.5	413.1	796.7	796.7	—	-11.0	5084.9	85,750	59,299	300.5	16.9	197
1953	2652.6	912.3	300.5	494.3	945.5	945.5	—	-11.1	5747.7	86,983	66,078	321.7	17.9	205
1954	2854.2	962.6	310.7	546.5	1034.4	1034.4	—	-28.5	6022.4	88,200	68,281	327.1	18.4	209
1955	3158.9	1039.0	370.6	613.5	1135.8	1135.8	—	-25.3	6714.0	89,242	75,234	327.4	20.5	230
1956	3634.8	1203.9	455.7	716.0	1259.2	1259.2	—	-32.3	7574.5	90,200	83,975	339.7	22.3	247
1957	3960.0	1262.6	517.2	831.6	1348.6	1348.6	—	-38.7	8219.6	91,050	90,276	344.1	23.9	262
1958	4204.5	1306.8	594.7	885.0	1418.0	1418.0	—	-35.1	8504.5	91,968	92,476	336.1	25.3	275
1959	4921.0	1553.7	757.4	1028.0	1581.9	1581.9	—	-38.9	9991.2	92,928	107,515	341.8	29.2	314

upon Japan. The postwar Japanese economy has not yet been faced with a serious test of this sort nor by the sort of unplanned test represented by a prolonged depression. It is by no means easy to foresee either the economic or the political consequences of such an experience.

## Population

The 1960 census population of Japan was 93,418,501 (Table 3-2). This is approaching three times the national population of 1870 and is just double the population of 1905. Japan thus has the seventh largest pop-

TABLE 3-2 *Increases  
in Japan's Population, 1920-1960<sup>a</sup>*

Year	Population	Increase over preceding census or estimate	
		Number	Percentage
1920	55,391,481	—	—
1925	59,179,200	3,787,719	6.8%
1930	63,872,496	4,693,296	7.9
1935	68,661,654	4,789,158	7.5
1940	72,539,729	3,878,075	5.6
1945	71,998,104	-541,625	-0.7
1950	83,199,637	11,201,533	15.6
1955	89,275,529	6,075,892	7.3
1956 <sup>b</sup>	90,300,000	1,024,471	1.1 <sup>c</sup>
1957 <sup>b</sup>	91,100,000	1,200,000	0.9 <sup>c</sup>
1958 <sup>b</sup>	92,000,000	900,000	1.0 <sup>c</sup>
1959 <sup>b</sup>	92,630,000	630,000	0.7 <sup>c</sup>
1960	93,418,501	4,142,972	4.6

<sup>a</sup> Adapted from *1960 Population Census of Japan and Nihon Tokei Nenkan, 1960*.

<sup>b</sup> Estimate in mid-censal period.

<sup>c</sup> Percentage increase over preceding year, rather than over the preceding five years.

ulation of any modern state—ranking behind China, India, the U.S.S.R., the United States, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The population distribution is 252 people per square kilometer of present national territory, or—a somewhat

more meaningful figure—1,805 per square kilometer of arable land, the highest density among the major nations. Male members of this population had, in 1960, a life expectancy at birth of 65.37 years and females had an expectancy of 70.26 years, figures which compare quite favorably to our own.

The postwar population history of Japan is unique. Immediately after the war, as a result of the demobilization of the armed forces and the repatriation to Japan of some six million Japanese soldiers and civilians resident in other parts of Asia, the national birth rate per thousand of population soared to 34.3, a figure very close to the 1920's record high of 36.3. Thereafter, it has declined steadily to 18 per thousand in 1959, one of the world's lowest rates and well below the United States figure of 24.3. Along with this rapid decline in the birth rate has been an equally impressive decrease in the death rate per thousand—it dropped from 14.6 to 8.0 per thousand between 1947 and 1959, largely owing to improved medical services and a national health insurance program. Again, this death rate is appreciably better than the 9 to 12 per thousand recently characteristic of the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany. The result of such developments has been a sharp decline in the rate of natural annual increase of the Japanese population, from a postwar high of 21.6 per thousand in 1948 to 10.0 by 1959. Thus a population which was increasing by such fantastic annual increments as 4.99 and 3.04 per cent in the 1946-47 period of repatriation has in recent years been increasing only at a rate of one per cent or less per year (Table 3-2). The official projections indicate that small increases may continue until the population peaks at some 105 million about 1990, after which it might decline.

So abrupt a decline in national rates of natural increase is unprecedented in modern demographic experience. It was due in the first instance to the economic hardships of early postwar days plus the enactment in 1948 of a Eugenics Protection Law which legalized abortion and made it readily and cheaply available to persons desirous of limiting the

sizes of their families. For a number of years now, there have been over one million registered abortions annually in Japan. If one adds to these the sizable number of unregistered abortions, the resulting figure may well come close to or surpass the total number of live births occurring annually in Japan. Since 1952, the increasing popularity of contraception as a means of limiting family size has reinforced this effect of abortion on the declining birth rate.

With these developments, the basic nature of Japan's population problem has been changing in recent years, and the nature of the political and economic problems which it poses have changed accordingly. The difficulties associated with a rapid over-all increase of population with no end in sight are being brought under control. They have been replaced, however, by the new problem

of a population weighted toward the working ages (15 to 60), a segment of the total population which is now increasing at twice the pre-war rate. Between now and 1965, Japan needs approximately one million new jobs per year to meet this demand. It is anticipated that this type of pressure will remain acute until about 1970, when the nation will begin to confront the quite different economic and political questions presented by an unusually large and increasing portion of the population aged sixty or more. This will greatly inflate the present need for social welfare, old-age insurance, and so on. Massive changes such as these in population balance and characteristics pose basic problems about management of Japan's economy. They also help define the underlying issues of politics and determine in important measure the general content and style of the political power struggle.

# Social Structure

## IV

Any government or political system inherits and has to work with a population possessed of certain basic social characteristics. Its people may be analyzed and described in terms of prevailing social and class structure, social and political mobility, ethnic and religious composition, income distribution, literacy and education, generational differences, urban-rural distribution, and a great variety of other important categories. The particular configurations which these assume in a society at any given time are closely linked to and help define the power structure and the terms of political competition within that society. Of equal importance, they also delineate a large part of the fundamental problems which a political system must face and solve. Let us look briefly at contemporary Japan in these terms.

### Ethnic Characteristics

Japan has a remarkably homogeneous population. Although hybrid in their historic origins, the latest available statistics indicate that of a total population of 92,630,000 in 1959, only 686,609 (0.7 per cent) belonged to registered minority groups. Of this number, 619,092 (90 per cent) were Koreans, 45,255 (7 per cent) Chinese, and 10,673 (1½ per cent) Americans. The figures for all other nationalities were insignificant. Although these figures exclude foreigners who have assumed Japanese citizenship, there is no other major nation with so small an admixture of identifiable minority elements. This helps to explain the strong nationalism frequently displayed by the Japanese in modern times. Their geographical isolation, common language, and long history combine with racial identity to facilitate the development of a very strong "in-group" feeling against foreigners. The result is a nation, which although subject to a number of domestic cleavages, has in the past usually presented a strong and united front to the rest of the world.

### Sectionalism

We must distinguish, however, between Japan's outward-facing and inward-

facing character. Racial homogeneity and nationalism have not precluded the development of a rather pronounced political, cultural, and economic sectionalism. We must not forget how close to the present Japan's pre-modern past lies. The Restoration occurred less than a hundred years ago. Most of her national history before that was more local than nation-centered. Geography conspired with feudalism and the limitations of pre-modern communications to insure such a result. The Restoration itself was originally a conspiracy centering about four principal southwestern clans, which is to say about specific regions or sections of the country. Until well into the present century, the new system of government established by the Meiji oligarchy was denounced by its opponents as clan-dominated. Sectionalism has thus played a continuous and important role in Japanese political history. Today, sectionalism is still important to an understanding of Japanese politics but in a somewhat different guise. Clan affiliations are largely forgotten. But domestic differences in language, culture, tradition, and economic characteristics and interests reinforce the distinctly regional quality of most politicians' sources of political support in a way which enhances the role of sectionalism in the political process. As politicians grow more responsive to local interests and pressures, the importance of such sectional considerations may increase rather than diminish.

## Urban-Rural Distribution and Employment Characteristics

Throughout much of Asia, the distinction between city-dwelling and country-dwelling is of fundamental importance. Asian societies are predominantly agrarian, and most of the people are farmers living and working in the countryside. Cities, while by no means new, usually account for but minor proportions of the total population. Yet as the modernizing process takes hold in these countries, the urban sector of the population steadily grows in size and changes its social character-

istics. Industrialization occurs first in the cities; migrants flow in from the surrounding countryside; foreigners and foreign ideas gain a foothold and old ways and old social relationships begin to break down; in short, the city becomes the vanguard of the change from a traditionally organized to a modernizing society, while the countryside—less directly subject to many of the forces of change—tends to cling more closely to the established and traditional ways. This process has political as well as economic and social consequences. In Japan, for example, the urban population has definitely been more receptive to political innovation than has the rural population. Liberalism, socialism, Communism, the local autonomy movement, and many other new political movements have been primarily identified with the urban population.

The urban portion of the Japanese population has steadily increased. When the first really modern census was taken in 1920, only 18.1 per cent of Japan's total population lived in cities (Table 4-1). By 1930, this figure had increased to 24.1 per cent, by 1940 to 37.9 per cent, by 1955 to 56.3 per cent, and, according to the most recent census of 1960, to 63.6 per cent. To be sure, the Japanese statistic-gathering system somewhat overstates the truly urban segment of the population, but, even so, it is still true that in forty years the distribution pattern has altered from one in which upwards of four-fifths of the population dwelt in the countryside to one in which over half live in cities.

These figures are generally confirmed by an analysis of the occupational characteristics of the Japanese working class (Appendix, Table II). The 1959 statistics, for example, indicate that only 36.5 per cent of the total labor force of 43,700,000 was employed in the primary or typically rural industries (agriculture, forestry, and fishing). Of the remainder, 26.0 per cent was employed in the secondary industries (mining, construction,

TABLE 4-1 *Urban-Rural Population Distribution*<sup>a</sup>

Census year	Population			Percentage		Area in square kilometers			Population per square kilometer	
	Total	All cities	All rural	All cities	All rural	Total	All cities	All rural	All cities	All rural
1920	55,391,481	10,020,088	45,371,443	18.1	81.9	379,420.77	1,367.80	378,052.97	7,326	120
1925	59,179,200	12,821,625	46,357,575	21.7	78.3	379,422.79	2,173.94	377,248.85	5,898	123
1930	63,872,496	15,363,646	48,508,850	24.1	75.9	379,878.62	2,943.09	376,935.53	5,220	129
1935	68,661,654	22,581,794	46,079,860	32.9	67.1	380,159.18	5,086.97	375,072.21	4,439	123
1940	72,539,729	27,494,237	45,045,492	37.9	62.1	380,159.18	8,844.45	371,314.73	3,109	121
1945	71,998,104	20,022,333	51,975,771	27.8	72.2	368,451.43	14,520.07	353,931.36	1,379	147
1947	78,101,473	25,857,739	52,243,734	33.1	66.9	368,469.86	15,894.42	352,575.44	1,627	148
1950	83,199,637	31,203,191	51,996,446	37.5	62.5	368,284.15	19,815.28	348,326.69	1,575	149
1950 (read-justed) <sup>b</sup>	83,403,737	44,659,770	38,743,967	53.5	46.5					
<sup>c</sup>	—	34,043,318	—	40.8	—					
<sup>d</sup>	—	10,616,452	—	12.7	—					
1955	89,275,529	50,288,026	38,987,503	56.3	43.7	369,765.89	67,722.62	300,869.45	743	130
<sup>c</sup>	—	40,547,138	—	45.4	—					
<sup>d</sup>	—	9,740,888	—	10.9	—					
1960	93,418,501	59,333,171	34,084,057	63.6	36.4					

<sup>a</sup> Derived from the 1955 *Population Census of Japan*, Vol. 1, and 1960 *Population Census of Japan, Final Count of Population*.

<sup>b</sup> Indicates the 1950 population of all cities and all rural areas according to the boundaries as of October 1, 1955.

<sup>c</sup> Indicates the population of all cities having 50,000 inhabitants or more and its ratio to the total.

<sup>d</sup> Indicates the population of all cities having less than 50,000 inhabitants and its ratio to the total.

and manufacturing), while the other 37.5 per cent was in tertiary industries (trade, finance, communications, government, services, etc.). Thus, in 1959, 63.5 per cent of Japan's total labor force was engaged in the more modern secondary and tertiary sectors of industry. This is quite a contrast from conditions in 1920, when some 54 per cent of the Japanese labor force was still employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Basic changes of this sort in employment characteristics and urban-rural distribution mark a profound change in the socio-political qualities and potentialities of the Japanese people.

## Income Distribution

The economic characteristics of a nation's population vitally affect the country's political attitudes and behavior. Economic dissatisfaction is conducive to political dissat-

isfaction which may, under appropriate circumstances, lead to political instability and change. In the case of Japan, there can be no doubt that the country's remarkable prosperity in recent years has had a great deal to do with the stability of its political system. Should these economic circumstances change markedly for the worse, corresponding political changes would undoubtedly follow, although it is difficult to foresee their specific nature.

The gross facts of income distribution in Japan are as follows. National income has risen steadily and sharply during the postwar years (Table 3-1). From 1,961.6 billion yen, in 1948, for example, it had climbed by 1959 to 9,991.2 billion yen, an increase of 409 per cent in eleven years. Not all of this represents a real increase, however, since it was accompanied by some measure of inflation, but if we compensate for this by including changes in the general price index, we find that real national income increased by 186 per cent during this period. Even on a per capita basis, real national income increased about 147 per cent from 1948 to 1959 and far exceeded its pre-war high. The most recent figure available for national income per capita is 143,686 yen



(\$399) for fiscal 1961. These steady rises in national and per capita income figures have been accompanied by real improvements in the average standards of living in both the cities and the countryside. Spending for consumer goods has increased markedly, especially in such "non-essential" categories as increased education, recreation, and luxury or semi-luxury purchases, including refrigerators, washing machines, and television sets—often humorously referred to in Japan, as "the three national treasures" of the 1960's. Beyond this, the Japanese people as a whole benefit from the vastly expanded welfare and social security programs which constitute so important a part of recent national budgets. The government now provides several types of public assistance and social insurance programs, spends a good deal of money for child welfare programs, and operates both a national health insurance plan and several medical treatment plans. These programs, although new and still far less than adequate for the national needs, represent a notable social improvement achieved in a very short space of time.

A number of serious inequities in the distribution of this unaccustomed national prosperity exist in postwar Japan, for not all parts of the population share equally in these improvements. This is particularly true of that large sector of the economy which the Japanese refer to as "small and medium industries." These are still seriously depressed. In this and other sectors, a great deal remains to be done to improve average living circumstances, but on balance the remarkable fact has been the tremendous improvements in standards of living which the 1950's brought to Japan. Measured against Japan's previous experience, this has truly been a time of "the greatest prosperity since the emperor Jimmu," i.e., since the legendary foundation of the empire in 660 B.C.

education were required for all Japanese children as early as 1886. In 1908, this was increased to six years, and, since 1947, nine years of combined elementary and junior secondary education have been compulsory. Practically universal literacy (97–98 per cent) and a very respectable minimum level of modern elementary education are, therefore, the rule. In addition, Japan has one of the most modern and complete systems of secondary and higher education to be found anywhere in the world (Appendix, Table II). In 1957, for example, there were 3,376 senior secondary schools, with a total enrollment of 2,897,646 students; 269 junior colleges with an enrollment of 73,137; and 231 colleges and universities with a total of 564,454 students. About 1 out of 12 Japanese in the 18–21 age group was regularly enrolled in a college or university, a very high figure by any but American standards.

Japan's consumption of the mass media is correspondingly high (Appendix, Table III). In 1958, for example, the Japanese were purchasing 398 daily newspapers per 1,000 of population—a figure considerably in excess of our own figure of 328—and published some 25,299 separate titles of new books and reprints—a figure almost double that for the United States. They also produced more feature-length films than any other country in the world. Practically every household had a radio, and two in every four households had a television set. Japan is literally saturated by the outpourings of the mass media, most of which devote a considerable amount of space or time to subjects directly or indirectly related to politics. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to sustain the Western stereotype of the average Asian as both politically ill-informed and apathetic. Whatever his political views and behavior, the average Japanese is exposed to a very substantial amount of political information and stimulation, even by Western standards.

## Literacy and Mass Media

Japan is one of the world's most literate nations. Three to four years of elementary

## Generational Differences

A deep rift has opened between the political attitudes and behavior of the older and younger generations in Japan. Since adequate research is lacking on this subject, it is difficult to say with any precision just where the boundaries should be drawn and what the dimensions of this split are. But there is general agreement that members of the wartime and postwar generations—roughly children born since 1937—are considerably more apt to have socialist or Communist political views and allegiances than are their elders. Estimates vary with the commentator and the particular youth group under consideration. Most would probably agree that approximately 60 per cent of Japan's university students support Left-wing—or, as they are called in Japan, “progressive”—political programs and parties. Others say that a majority of the new voters coming of age every year vote socialist or Communist at their first opportunity.

It is quite obvious that two organizations that reflect the political views and activities of many students are themselves rather rigidly and militantly Marxist—*Zengakuren* (the National Association of Student Self-Government Associations) and *Nikkyoso* (the Japan Teachers Union). College and university students, although a small minority of their age group, are among the most vocal, active, and, occasionally, violent supporters of Left-wing causes. The political sympathies of other elements of the youth group—such as rural as opposed to urban youth, or high school as opposed to college students, or workers as opposed to students in general—are less certain. But polls do indicate that the “progressive” parties and candidates have the support of a disproportionately high segment of the younger voters, especially among the student

and urban youth contingents, whereas a top-heavy proportion of the older voters are of “conservative” political allegiances.

The reasons for this phenomenon are moot. Some observers note that political interests and activities—often radical or revolutionary in nature—are a part of the student tradition in Asia. Some simply say that radical political views are characteristic of youth in most modern societies, especially in disturbed postwar or cold war times. Others attribute this radicalism to the influence of the allegedly unsettling and ill-advised changes in the national school system introduced by the American Occupation, in combination with the radical sympathies and indoctrination of many of the present teachers. The major question, however, is this: With maturing years, will most Japanese youth retain or discard their Left-wing political loyalties? Again, the evidence is inconclusive, but there is increasing reason to believe that a large number become more conservative as they grow older, and change their voting habits accordingly. Were this not so, socialism would be sweeping Japan. Recent election results, however, do not confirm such a trend.

## Religious Affiliations

Religious attitudes and persuasions do not seem to have an appreciable effect on present-day Japanese politics. This is a rather surprising development because of the political uses to which prewar Shinto was put, because of the seeming importance of organized religion in postwar Japan, and because many Westerners expect a peoples' religious affiliations to affect their politics. The symbols of religion are everywhere in Japan—temples, shrines, priests, and pilgrims—and the average Japanese is a registered member of some faith. In fact, he is usually a member of two faiths—the Buddhist and the Shinto—at the same time (only a bit more than one-half of one per cent of the population is Christian). But this dual allegiance normally carries with it rather modest doctrinal and spiritual commitments. Religious considerations do not seem

to bulk large in the average person's decision-making, particularly where political decisions are concerned.

There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. The political militancy of national Shintoism before the war, with its systematic emphasis on the divine descent of the Emperor, on Japan's world mission, and on the citizen's duty to be unquestioningly loyal and obedient, is found today in a scattering of small Right-wing bands. And a few of the so-called "new religions" do have strong political views or programs which they strive to impart to their followers. The Sokagakkai, for example, even advances its own candidates in national elections, and with some success. These are exceptions to the general rule, however.

## Class Structure and Mobility

Despite all the attempts to analyze Japanese society in Marxist or class-oriented terms, it is still impossible to describe the structure of this society on the basis of its social classes with any accuracy. In Japan as elsewhere, we lack satisfactory definitions of precisely what is meant by such terms as upper, middle, and lower classes—or their many variants—and we do not have enough information to determine what proportions of the population should be assigned to which classes. We can, therefore, discuss the class structure of Japanese society only in a very broad way.

Whatever may be its precise characteristics, present Japanese class structure is the product of a series of quite unusual historical forces. To begin with, less than a century ago Japanese society was very rigidly stratified into a four-class hierarchy, ranging from the samurai or warrior class at the top through the peasantry and artisans to the merchants at the bottom. While this ranking frequently did not accord with the actual distribution of wealth or influence in late Tokugawa times, it did represent a very important aspect of the status and value system of the time. It was legally abolished only after the Restoration

of 1868. Then came the social and economic tumult of early and mid-Meiji years (roughly 1868–1900), which brought with it very considerable changes in class structure.

A new form of hereditary aristocracy was established in 1885. Numerous elements of the old samurai class were ruined, both financially and socially, through their inability to adjust to the new economic circumstances; many others sought refuge in business, the bureaucracy, or the new armed forces and managed to survive in the upper strata. In the countryside, a new sort of status system based on a variety of landlord and tenant or laborer relationships began to emerge, while in the cities there was a comparable ferment among the artisan and merchant classes. Out of this period of pronounced social flux and mobility gradually came a new and more modern system of class relationships. Important elements of the old pre-Restoration class system remained, but new avenues of upward social mobility appeared—through commerce, industry, the bureaucracy, political parties, or the armed forces. Noble or samurai descent, however, continued to be of appreciable social importance. By the 1930's, this new system had pretty well jelled.

Then came the Second World War and Japan's defeat and occupation. This brought with it another great period of social change which is still in process. At the upper levels of society, the hereditary aristocracy and the military elite were eliminated from positions of leadership. The big business element was shaken up. Many political leaders were purged from politics, at least temporarily. Only the bureaucracy remained largely immune from the most drastic aspects of this great reconstitution of Japan's political elite. At lower social levels, even more massive and important changes have taken place. Before the war, the Japanese middle class was, by Western standards, small in both numbers and socio-political importance. Since the war,

it has expanded enormously in both size and importance. In the cities, this development has resulted from the postwar growth and diversification of Japanese industry, commerce, and government, the improved status and welfare of employees in general, and the economy's great prosperity since 1952. In the countryside, it has been the product of land reform, technical improvements, and unprecedented prosperity. As the middle class has expanded, the lower class has diminished. It now constitutes a much smaller proportion of the total population than was the case before the war.

Precise information is lacking, but income statistics, consumers' purchases, the results of polls, biographical data, and a variety of other indicators testify that recent years have witnessed an almost unprecedented amount of upward social mobility in Japan. The specific political consequences of this social

surge forward are rather hard to identify, however. Class by itself does not, in Japan, provide a very satisfactory explanation of popular political attitudes or behavior. Major segments of the population are not particularly class conscious politically. Conservative political allegiances are by no means based primarily or exclusively on "the middle class," nor are radical allegiances very closely correlated with "lower-class" or "proletarian" status. Given the general trend of recent developments, one wonders, furthermore, whether class consciousness is apt to become a major political determinant. It doubtless could be a significant factor in Japanese politics, and, if a major depression or other disaster were to befall Japan, it might become a crucial one. For the present, however, we must look elsewhere for the key to a fuller and more adequate understanding of Japanese politics.

# Ideology



Politics also has its psychological dimensions. Ultimately, what men do politically is determined by what they think and feel and by their apprehension of what is desirable, what is feasible, and what is safe for themselves, their families, and their communities. The political decisions involved are sometimes reached rationally and self-consciously, but usually they seem for most people to be based on a combination of reason and a broad range of half-perceived or dimly intuited assumptions about authority, government, politics, the state, and the nature of the good society. These beliefs and assumptions, whether explicitly held or vaguely apprehended, constitute the ideological foundations of a political system. They differ remarkably from society to society and from time to time. Their appeal, their authority, and the extent of their acceptance have a potent effect on the stability and the effectiveness of the political system concerned. Such qualities as patriotism, self-discipline, and a sense of public interest spring from such ideological sources. Collectively, and without pejorative

intent, we often find ourselves referring to these basic beliefs and assumptions as the political myths of a society.

In modern times, the political myths of a society seldom command universal allegiance. They change, and the attitudes of people toward them also change. At any given moment, some portion of the population is apt to dissent more or less strongly from any particular proposition generally held by the population. This is definitely true of postwar Japan. Before its defeat, the nation was far more unified in support of its myths than it is today. The major watershed in this respect was the year 1945. Defeat, the American Occupation, and the over-all course of postwar liberalization and democratization have discredited many of the pre-war myths in whole or in part. In many ways, Japan is today a nation in search of new and more satisfactory political myths. This complicates our problem, for it is hard to tell which myths are now obsolete, which are on the way out, and which will probably retain viability and appeal for substantial segments of the Japanese people. The present situation, therefore, is unclear and can only be described in mixed and qualified terms.

## Legitimacy

Under this heading, we are concerned with a variety of fundamental questions. First, how do the Japanese view their form of government from the standpoint of its legitimacy? Does its authority over them seem to be based on some right and proper title, or is it simply a result of the government's control of such instruments of mass coercion as the police and the armed forces? The mass of the population, now as before the war, does not seem to entertain serious doubts or reservations on this score. The average Japanese seems to conceive of government in general, including his own, as part of the fundamental order of things, as natural indeed as the family system, after which the earlier Japanese political system was systematically modeled in both Tokugawa and post-Restoration times. This is quite a different basis for legitimacy than the theories of social contract or general will encountered in the West, but it seems reasonably efficacious in Japan. The basic assent on the part of the Japanese people to their form of government, however, is no longer as general as it was before the war, when the entire conception was more closely identified with the "divinity" of the Emperor. Today, for example, the legitimacy of the government is challenged by dissident Marxists, by those who regard the present form of government as imposed upon a helpless Japanese people by the American Occupation, and by those on the extreme Right who advocate a return to imperial rule in Japan. But at present, these are minority elements and sentiments.

## The Emperor

We are also concerned with those mythical or symbolic elements in Japanese

culture which affect the political solidarity of the Japanese people. Apart from the fluctuating issues and controversies of current politics, what basic attitudes and assumptions on the part of the Japanese people make for national political unity or consensus? What attitudes produce conflict and dissension? One of the factors that increases national cohesion, as we have already mentioned, is the insular nature of Japan, which gives the Japanese a common identity and unites them against all outsiders, all non-Japanese. To this must be added the role of the Emperor and the Imperial family as a unifying symbol.

Before 1945, the official myth, systematically contrived in early Meiji times from bits and pieces of ancient Japanese history and rigorously instilled into the people by all possible means, was that the Emperor was descended in direct and unbroken line from Amaterasu-omikami, the pre-eminent goddess of the sun, and that rule over Japan was divinely entrusted to him through his ancestors. Under these circumstances, the Emperor was—in crude translation—"divine," or, as the Japanese say, he was a *kami*. A more appropriate modern rendering would be that he was a superior and awe-inspiring personage of more than natural attributes. The official interpretation proceeded from this basis to state in vague and deliberately mystic and mystifying language that the Emperor was somehow fused with the Japanese "state," that the two concepts could not, in fact or theory, be disentangled from one another—they mutually informed and gave meaning and substance to each other. Somchow, the Emperor was the "state" and, as such, was a "divinely" descended, all-powerful, sacred, inviolable, and absolutely sovereign figure. This was the basic theory of the state in post-Restoration Japan, known officially as the doctrine of *kokutai* or "the national polity." It was also the basis for numerous assertions, official and otherwise, that the Japanese were a unique and superior race with a "divine" mission to spread the blessings of their culture to lesser breeds of men, especially in Eastern Asia.

To us, this entire belief is apt to appear spurious, fantastic, and quite incomprehensible on rational grounds, but in fact it is little if any more nonsensical than other political myths that have commanded the impassioned support of millions of dedicated followers within the twentieth century. How well do the mythical bases of Italian fascism, German Naziism, Russian Communism, or, in a different genre, the social contract aspects of democratic theory withstand rigorous logical analysis? In any event, this interpretation seems either to have been believed or accepted by a substantial majority of Japanese before the war, and, as a consequence, the emperor became the basic symbol of the legitimacy and the unity of the state. The public authority was wielded in his name and with his sanction, governmental acts were construed to be manifestations of his will, and the loyalty and patriotism of most of the people were fiercely and sincerely focused on his person—all this, despite the fact that in practice the Emperor actually possessed very little political power and usually had but limited influence on the formulation or execution of public policy.

Since Japan's defeat and the enactment of a new Constitution in 1946, the legal and theoretical position of the Emperor has been drastically changed, although his actual power remains negligible. Early in 1946, he formally and publicly renounced any claims to divinity or superhuman status which might have been made on his behalf. The new Constitution carried this further by stripping him of all vestiges of sovereign power and political authority of any sort; it specifically declared him to be no more than "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people, with whom resides sovereign power." Thus the pre-war position of the Emperor has been completely inverted. Despite this, he remains the single most powerful symbol of the political identity and unity of the Japanese people. He is a different sort of symbol to be sure—less awesome, more human and democratized—but he is still the focus of most

popular political loyalties, although these too seem to be considerably less ardent and demonstrative than before the war. There are also more people who challenge the imperial institution. Many younger Japanese and numerous intellectuals abstractly favor the abolition of the monarchy, charging that it is outdated, anachronistic, and useless. Until, however, it can be replaced in the minds and hearts of most Japanese by some other equally strong symbol of their unity and nationhood, it would be dangerous to eliminate the Emperor.

## Nationalism

Another basic factor contributing to the political solidarity of the Japanese people is their nationalism. Prior to 1945, the ardency and aggressiveness of Japanese nationalism had long been one of the most conspicuous features of Japanese culture. It has provided the strongest sort of mass support for both the domestic and foreign programs of the Japanese government and, in particular, for the series of generally profitable overseas campaigns and wars that began with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and culminated disastrously with the Second World War. Defeat and postwar developments in general have worked strange changes in the quality of Japanese nationalism, however. What was a strong flame now seems to be but a dim and flickering light. Pre-war martial and aggressive qualities seem to have been replaced by a general spirit of pacifism, internationalism, and an absorption with commercial and peaceful pursuits.

Some observers—including many Japanese—conclude, therefore, that Japanese nationalism is a dead or dying force or that it is in the process of being replaced by a new spirit of internationalism. But such a judgment seems premature. Japan's national circum-

stances since the war have been markedly peculiar and, in general, not of a type conducive to the re-emergence of Japanese nationalism. To begin with, there were the massive facts of defeat, devastation, and national collapse, both economically and spiritually. This was attended by about seven years of American military occupation, followed by a period of very close attachment to the American side in international affairs. These were also years during which Japan was a constitutionally disarmed nation, supporting only the weakest and scantiest of military establishments masquerading under the name of "self-defense forces." During this postwar period, Japan has not really played a prime or prominent role on the international scene or in the cold war. In foreign policy, she has operated along only limited lines and from an unusually protected and secure position on the fringes of the Western camp—somewhat similar to that of West Germany in Europe.

This sheltered or removed quality, plus a widespread and sincere desire to avoid becoming involved in any military or diplomatic arrangements that could lead to war, has convinced many Japanese that no real threat to their national security exists at present. It is perhaps this feeling that accounts for the present quiescence of Japanese nationalism. Nationalist sentiments often flourish only against a background of some real or apprehended threat to the national security or ambitions. Most Japanese today have no overseas ambitions of the pre-war sort and many—unrealistically, we would say—see no real threat from abroad. If these circumstances change, however, as they probably will, it is quite likely that we will witness a re-emergence of some more conspicuous form of Japanese nationalism. It seems highly doubtful that nationalism has ceased to exist as a basic unifying force in Japanese politics; rather, it is merely quiescent.

## Monism

Some peoples conceive of government as a supreme and exclusive form of social organization whose power and authority should, when legally exercised, override and control almost all competing claims. Such governments in modern times are apt to play a very positive and extensive role in their societies. Others think of government as one among a number of social organizations—such as the family, the church, and a variety of economic, professional, and cultural organizations—possessed of a unique and, for some purposes, superior type of power and authority but with no right to control or perform all social functions within its boundaries. Governments so conceived tend to play a more restricted role in their societies and to leave many major functions largely to other social organizations. For our purposes, we shall call the former a monist and the latter a pluralist view of government and its functions. The Japanese have typically adopted a monist view.

The concept of either individual or institutional rights as in any way removed from or immune to governmental control is completely alien to the Japanese tradition. No real or meaningful sphere of private decision or action was legally or theoretically recognized in Japan until the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1947. It was generally assumed that government could do whatever in fact it had the power and the inclination to do. This right was qualified on occasion by authoritative statements as to how a virtuous ruler or government should deport itself, but these were often of more theoretical than practical consequence. Since 1947, the law has changed in this respect, but public consciousness in general would still seem to lag considerably behind. Changes are occurring as particular minorities are moved to challenge the government's authority and interpretations on such controversial matters as rearmament, foreign policy, etc., but it is still probably fair to say that most Japanese accept and



usually endorse a very wide range of governmental action and control. The seeming prominence of private enterprise in Japan, therefore, is decidedly misleading. The government is heavily involved in a great variety of ways in what seem to be private operations in the economic and social spheres.

## Political Participation

In making a political analysis of a people, we should also know how they regard acts of political participation. Are such acts considered the exclusive prerogative of a particular social class, or does the average man regard himself as having some significant rights of participation in the political decision-making process? Again, where Japan is concerned, the verdict must be mixed. The Japanese traditionally have looked upon politics as an activity reserved to the upper classes. In post-Restoration times, this restriction was somewhat abated by the grant of a very limited and sterilized suffrage in 1890 and by its subsequent expansions. It was not until 1925, however, that universal manhood suffrage was introduced and, even this, owing to the very limited authority of the elective lower house of the national parliament, did not really mark the advent of effective popular participation in politics. Particularly in the case of the peasantry, there seems to have been little effective assimilation of the concept of the vote as a means of participating in and controlling major public decisions. Government continued to seem to be something which was done to such people by their superiors, rather than something done in any part by themselves. It is hard to accustom a people to the idea of effective political participation when they have for so long regarded politics as the exclusive domain of their superiors.

Since 1945, women, too, have been given the vote, and new and more meaningful forms of popular political participation have been established. Still, some of the pre-war difficulties persist, especially in the countryside and among certain segments of the urban popula-

tion. Most Japanese basically do not regard government as in any sense the servant of the people. Consequently, it is difficult for them to accept and act effectively on the Western conception of informed and responsible individual political participation as the fundamental means of asserting and enforcing their collective mastery.

## Egalitarianism

The popular Japanese conception of equality is closely related to their view of political participation. Are men generally regarded as political equals, possessed of basically the same rights and responsibilities, or are some regarded as superior or more privileged than others? The answer is complex. Traditionally, of course, Japan had an unequal or elitist society. Relatively few people, all in the upper classes, had any political rights. Under these circumstances, political equality was a concept which simply did not occur to the Japanese. There was nothing in their experience and apparently little in their aspirations to sustain such a notion. After the Restoration, however, the idea of political equality was borrowed from Western writings by some of the early party leaders and political thinkers, but it was usually applied in a highly restrictive fashion to members of the "better" classes only. Gradually, however, the concept of equal political rights was expanded until today all adult Japanese subjects have substantially equal political and legal rights. This particular type of equality has, therefore, been established in Japan.

But, in political attitudes and behavior, numerous vestiges of traditional elitism still survive. There is still a strong tendency among large segments of the population—particularly among farmers and the poorer and less-educated urban classes—to regard politics as beyond their proper sphere of concern.

Their inclination is to look to someone more sophisticated and experienced than they are for advice on political decisions of all sorts. As a consequence, the political boss, often in the form of a respected local figure whose political advice is widely followed, is a very common phenomenon in Japan. Such individuals, in effect, control very sizable elements of the Japanese electorate on a highly personalized basis. This practice, of course, seriously detracts from the real significance of the equality which is legally guaranteed to all electors.

Another type of political inequality is also prevalent in Japan. It concerns the individual's relationships with and attitudes toward government and government officials. Since the Japanese generally do not regard government as the servant of the people and since Japan did not experience anything comparable to the American or French Revolutions in her history, most Japanese assume that both the government and government officials have superior status and rights. This feeling is fully shared by the great bulk of the officials themselves. The concept of bureaucrats as "public servants" has small reality in Japan for either the average citizen or the bureaucrats. The background, training, and spirit of the bureaucracy is normally elitist. As a consequence, a citizen usually approaches the government diffidently, not assertively. This fact also diminishes the possibilities of a meaningful egalitarianism in Japan.

### "Personalism"

There are two major types of political allegiance: programmatic or personal. Programmatic allegiance is based on considerations of policy, personal allegiance on affection for or loyalty to a particular political leader. In modern non-totalitarian states, both types are usually present to some extent. If we classify

societies in terms of the degree to which their members' political allegiances are determined by programmatic or personal considerations, Japan would rank towards the personal end of such a scale. Until rather recently, political programs—reasonably intelligible and meaningful statements of policy—did not have much to do with determining the political attitudes and behavior of the vast majority of Japanese.

With the advent, after the war, of sizable Socialist and Communist Parties that provided some measure of real policy choice to the voter, this situation was somewhat altered, and it seems probable that the policy or programmatic content of Japanese politics is still slowly increasing. But, on balance, the mass of the population seems more responsive to personal than to policy appeals and loyalties. Politics in Japan has always been a highly personalized process, in which individual, family, and clan relationships have been of predominant importance. The aspirant to political office normally joined *someone* rather than some cause or policy-oriented movement. In general, this continues to be the case—and within the seemingly more modern and program-oriented Left-wing parties as well as in the more traditional conservative ones. As a consequence, the nation's prevailing image of politics is predominantly personal rather than programmatic.

### Decision-Making

Different peoples also have different views about how political decisions should be made, and these affect the form and operations of their political system. In the United States, for example, we tend to believe that public issues are best decided by an adversary process in which representatives of competing political groups present alternative proposals to the public or their representatives. A majority or plurality of the group then decides the issue, usually by voting, and the defeated minority is expected to acquiesce in the decision or, at least, to engage only in legally

recognized forms of protest against it. The traditionally approved form of decision-making in Japan is quite different from this. It operates by consensus, which is to say by unanimous consent. Consider what happens when an issue is posed before a group for decision. The problem is discussed at length, but in a non-adversary context. Care is taken to minimize open conflict or debate between the sponsors of alternative solutions. Instead, the group will talk around the issues until at last the nature of a compromise solution acceptable to all parties emerges. This will then be formulated by some senior member as a proposal for action, which will then be accepted by the group by unanimous agreement.

In such a process, there is no open confrontation of groups or parties, no voting in the sense of distinguishing "yeas" from "nays," and, consequently, no open identification of majority and minority elements. The "face" of all participants is guarded, and no one is labeled as being opposed to the solution adopted and, thus, as having broken the harmony of the group or community. Obviously, this is, in theory at least, quite a different system from our own. We assume the existence of majority and minority elements on any serious problem and try to build a constructive role for the minority into our decision-making system. The Japanese system abhors the element of contention involved in the Western system, has no place for open minority elements, and prefers to proceed by compromises that will permit at least the show of unanimity.

This traditional preference for decision by consensus has, of course, long been breaking down in Japan. Particularly in postwar times, the creation of a semi-British type of parliamentary structure and procedure has introduced openly partisan debate, voting, and other adversary techniques into the National Diet. Still, behind the scenes at the national level and far more openly at the local level, it is surprising to see how strong the traditional preference for decision by consensus is. When the opposition forces in Japanese politics complain so bitterly against "tyranny by

the majority," they are saying, in effect, that majorities, even when acting by a perfectly legal process, have no right to make a decision which ignores or overrides the views of the minority. The appeal is clearly to the traditional Japanese doctrine of decision by consensus. Not infrequently, aggrieved minorities will resort to violence and rioting in support of such an interpretation.

We should note briefly two other characteristics of the Japanese system of decision-making which are related to this matter of consensus. One is the Japanese preference for collective decisions rather than individual ones. The Japanese seem to feel much more comfortable with decisions that are the product of committees or groups than with those of some single leader. The difference is, of course, one of degree, but there is decidedly less emphasis on individual "leaders" and "leadership" as a means of decision-making in Japanese culture than in our own. Their political system is even more committee-ridden and group-oriented than is ours. From this system flows the second characteristic: in Japanese politics, blurred compromises often take the place of forceful decisions. This again is true of many modern political systems including our own, but the role of consensus and committees in Japan makes it particularly conspicuous there. Thus clear-cut decisions are difficult to achieve in Japan on any but the most urgent issues.

## Political Violence

Peoples vary, too, in their conceptions of the role of violence in politics. In the United States, we usually deny that private violence has any proper place in politics, although recent developments in the segregation controversy cast some doubt upon this. Assassination, in particular, seems to most of us a particularly reprehensible political tactic.

The Japanese political record is a strange mixture of docility and violence. Japan's history was strongly militarist in its values, of course, for many centuries prior to 1945. Violence and the use of armed force to accomplish political ends have a long and honorable tradition, which is by no means limited to pre-Restoration times. The phrase "government by assassination" gained broad currency in Japan as late as the 1930's, and with considerable justification. Furthermore, it is hard to deny that a very large segment of the populace viewed with tolerance, if not active approbation, the allegedly patriotic assassinations of those days. Such approbation was even more probable if an assassin expiated his crime in the traditionally approved fashion of suicide, preferably by *seppuku* (i.e., *hara-kiri*), or if he protested sincere and patriotic motives.

This type of sincerity is of the greatest importance in Japanese politics. If one acts sincerely, that is, through pure and personally disinterested motives, and if one is willing to pay an appropriate price for such action—such as suicide or execution in more serious cases—there is in Japan a traditional inclination to approve both the actor and his act. It is hard to say that this attitude has disappeared in postwar Japan. The violence of numerous so-called "demonstrations" by opposition elements both in the streets and on the floor of the National Diet would seem to indicate that it is still very much alive. "Sincerity" continues to excuse a great deal in Japanese politics.

## Tradition versus Change

All societies, including even the most tradition-bound, are constantly changing. Strictly speaking, it is, therefore, somewhat misleading to pose tradition versus change as if the former implied a rigidly static and un-

changing community. But societies differ greatly in their rates of change, the areas and sequences in which change takes place, and, most importantly, in their views of the possibility of change. In Japan, there has certainly been a spate of profound and basic changes during the last century, and especially since her defeat in 1945. Japanese culture as a whole has definitely not been inhospitable to change. Despite this, however, a surprising amount of the traditional survives in Japanese culture, more perhaps in attitudes and behavior than in institutions and more in the political sector of the society than elsewhere. A mounting struggle has been going on since the end of the war between traditional and modernizing elements in the Japanese political system, and this has profoundly affected national attitudes toward the possibility of political change.

Postwar Japan has seen a rapid acceleration of change. In pre-war politics, the balance of power lay normally with conservative and traditionally oriented forces, which were opposed to any significant alterations in the basic institutions or power relationships of the Japanese political system. Postwar Japan has experienced a thorough shaking up of these earlier power relationships, and circumstances far more favorable to political change and innovation have appeared. While large segments of the population are still apathetic and traditional in their attitudes toward further political and social transformation, a great if slow-moving process of fermentation has been set in motion. More and more Japanese are beginning in fragmentary but important ways to conceive of politics as amenable to some degree of popular influence and control, and, in so doing, they are slowly beginning to think that political change is a natural or, at least, possible goal of political life. This is quite a change from the political apathy, conservatism, and traditionalism which so successfully opposed political innovations in pre-war times. It is also a very important fact about current Japanese politics.

The Japanese people are in the process of changing their minds about so simple but

basic a proposition as the possibility and desirability of political change. It is still too early to say what the results will be. The developments may not in the long run be either democratic or progressive from our point of view. But the Japanese no longer regard the existing political situation as a part of the

order of things, as fixed and unalterable. A more activist attitude is gaining currency, and more and more of Japan's political leaders are becoming aware of this and adjusting their policies and actions accordingly, thus introducing profound changes in both the style and content of Japanese politics.

# Political Dynamics

## VI

Between the foundations of the Japanese political system described in the last chapter and its formal decision-making apparatus lies a gap which is bridged in practice by several types of political actors or agents. In this chapter, we will distinguish three major types of such actors: political parties, political interest groups, and political leaders. In most societies, these institutions serve as links between the population, which has certain historical, ecological, social, and ideological characteristics, and the official machinery of government. They bring the great welter of public interests and desires to the attention of the government which is then called on to deal with these demands. These institutions thus serve as transmission belts for transforming interests and issues into political action—a role of the greatest political importance.

### Elections

Among the most conspicuous of these political actors are political parties. Parties are primarily instruments for mobilizing votes and choosing among aspirants for public office. Since the activities of parties are closely tied to elections, which decide their success or failure, we will discuss parties and elections in tandem, describing first the electoral system in postwar Japan and then the Japanese political parties.

Japan has had a national election system since February 11, 1889, although, in the beginning, the suffrage was drastically restricted by tax and residence qualifications to a very small portion of the adult male population. Thereafter, it was gradually liberalized; universal manhood suffrage was adopted in 1925, and universal adult suffrage—for women as well as for men—in December, 1945. Prior to the Second World War, however, general elections were not of primary political importance in Japan. They determined membership in only the lower house of the National Diet or Parliament, and that house played but a subsidiary and carefully controlled role in the making of public policies. Since Japan's defeat and the enactment of a new Constitution in 1947, however, this situation has changed radically. Elections are now a fundamental aspect of the Japanese political system.

There are many levels and varieties of elections in contemporary Japan, but by far the most important and dramatic are the general elections of the entire membership of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Diet that has steadily increased in significance in postwar Japan. Control of a majority or plurality of its seats is tantamount to control of the entire national executive and administrative machinery of the state, and, in practice, it is victory in a general election that determines which party will succeed in achieving this cherished goal. As a consequence, general elections are both tense and gala occasions in Japan. Tremendous sums are expended—legally and otherwise—on campaigning, publicity, entertainment, and other means of garnering votes and support. All the media of modern mass communications are called into play, and the public is incessantly entreated and harassed in noisy attempts to gain its support for this or that candidate and party. When on election day the Japanese voter finally declares his choices, it is a decision of the gravest political consequence, comparable in importance to the results of a British General Election or the combination of presidential and congressional elections in this country.

### *The Electoral System*

Among the several levels and types of elections which exist in Japan today, we will here confine our attention to general elections for the House of Representatives. There are at the national level, in addition to these, elections of somewhat different types: (1) those that determine membership in the House of Councillors, i.e., the upper house of the National Diet, (2) regular referendums on the holders of Supreme Court justiceships, and (3) special referendums or elections on proposed constitutional amendments, although postwar Japan has not yet had such a case. At the local level, the governors and assemblies of prefectures and the mayors and assemblies of cities, towns, and villages are regularly chosen by public election, while provision is also made for special types of elections or referendums in connection with

initiative and recall measures. These other national or local elections are not, however, truly central to the Japanese political process in the same degree as are the general elections of the House of Representatives.

The present general electoral system in Japan is based on the Public Offices Election Law of April, 1950, which consolidated several earlier laws in this field. It guarantees the right to vote to practically all Japanese citizens, male or female, who have reached the age of twenty. Candidates for office must be twenty-five. In the case of the House of Representatives, the Constitution prescribes four-year terms for all members. In fact, no postwar Diet has served this full term; the Cabinet has always dissolved the lower house at some earlier date and thus brought about general elections at intervals ranging from six and a half months to three years and eight months. For the purposes of such elections, the membership of the lower house is presently set at 467. Candidates are returned from a total of 118 so-called "medium-sized" election districts, each one of which returns from three to five members, with the exception of the special district of the Amami Islands which is represented by but a single member. Despite the fact that several members are returned from all but one of these districts, each elector casts but a single vote. The system has no multiple-voting or proportional representation aspects. It is technically a multi-member constituency, single-vote system. Campaigning is legally restricted to a period of thirty days preceding the election, and almost all facets of campaign practice—including finance, personnel, campaign offices, speeches, advertising, and publicity in general—are rigidly, although somewhat ineffectively, regulated by law.

This type of electoral system gives rise to a number of problems and practices that are unfamiliar to Americans. It produces a wide range of rather exotic problems for the practi-

cal politician. If, for example, a politician is managing a general election campaign for the majority party in a given election district which returns five members, how many candidates should he run—five, four, three, or some smaller number? If he runs too many in proportion to the party's probable popular support in that district, he takes a serious risk of dividing the party's strength too many ways and thus of losing one or more seats to less powerful parties and candidates who mass their smaller total support behind just one or two candidates. If he runs too few candidates, he is, in effect, wasting those votes which exceed the number required to elect this smaller number of candidates, and this excess may be enough to elect still another candidate.

Once having determined the optimum number of candidates for a given district, how does the politician insure an optimal distribution of his party's total vote among his several candidates? Any excess votes polled by the party's strongest candidates over the number required to insure their election can only detract—and perhaps fatally—from the votes available to the party's weaker candidates in that district. This creates some very nice problems in the proper apportionment of the vote. The system thus contains a sort of built-in bias in favor of weaker parties and candidates. It forces the majority party to calculate its chances optimistically and constantly tempts it to run too many candidates, thus splitting its strength, while at the same time the system encourages weaker parties to concentrate their smaller support more effectively behind one or two candidates. These are problems not encountered in our own type of single-member constituencies.

Along more familiar lines, the Japanese electoral system, like our own, has failed to keep abreast of large-scale shifts in residence within Japan. There has been no reapportionment of seats to compensate for the much more rapid growth of population in the cities

than in the countryside. The population of the city of Tokyo, for example, more than doubled in the ten years between 1950 and 1960, whereas that of many of the more rural prefectures and election districts showed scarcely any change in population. Yet there has been no increase at all in the number of members representing Tokyo in the House of Representatives. As a consequence, the actual political value of a Japanese elector's vote varies enormously depending on where he lives. It is worth, for example, approximately three times as much if he is a resident of Hyogo Prefecture's rural and stable Fifth Election District than if he lived in Hyogo's First District, which is the great and rapidly growing city of Kobe.

### *Electoral Participation*

Among nations where voting is not compulsory, Japan has a very high rate of electoral participation. The great majority of those who are eligible do ordinarily vote. The latest available compilation of the national list of qualified electors, that of November 20, 1960, shows that a total of 54,312,993 Japanese were then entitled to vote (Table 6-1). This represented nearly 58 per cent of the total population of Japan. Of this number 39,923,469 or about 73.5 per cent actually cast ballots in the November, 1960, general election. This was the lowest turnout for such an election since 1947. It still compares very favorably with the 60–64 per cent or so of our own adult population who have voted in the recent presidential elections.

By American standards, it is also interesting to note in Table 6-1 that rural voting turnouts in Japan are uniformly and appreciably higher than urban, and that electoral participation increases as one goes down the scale from national through prefectural to local elections. In both cities and countryside, a local assembly election has usually brought out anywhere from 85 to 95 per cent of the eligible voters. Both of these phenomena reverse the usual American experience. The higher voting rate in the countryside is primarily explained by the greater political docility of farm as opposed to city voters, plus the fact that non-



TABLE 6-1 *Percentage of Qualified Voters Participating in Postwar Elections*

Election	House of Representatives			Number of qualified voters	House of Councilors		Prefectural assemblies			Local Assemblies			
	Percentage voting				Percentage voting		Percentage voting			Percentage voting			
	Total	Urban	Rural		National constituency	Local con-situencies	Total	Urban	Rural	Assemblies of the five great cities	City assemblies	Town and village assemblies	
1947	67.95			40,907,493	60.93	61.12	81.65			— a	— a	81.17	
1949	74.04			42,105,300									
1950					72.19	72.19							
1951							82.99			72.92	90.56	95.92	
1952	76.43			46,772,584									
1953	74.22	66.06	80.23	47,090,167	63.18	63.18							
1955	75.84	71.90	80.60	49,235,375			77.24			62.26	85.00	92.33	
1956					62.10	62.11							
1958	76.99	74.19	81.18	52,013,529									
1959					58.74	58.75	79.48	76.41	84.75	65.09	85.81	92.50	
1960	73.50			54,312,993									
1962					68.22	68.22							

<sup>a</sup> These figures are included in the town and village figure for 1947.

voting, which is socially disapproved, is hard to conceal from one's friends and neighbors in the countryside, whereas urban residence provides a measure of anonymity in this respect. The greater appeal of local elections also seems to be due to the survival of traditional views of one's village, town, fief, or other local unit as the arena of most meaningful political interests and loyalties. These older identifications have not yet been effectively superseded by a more modern focus on the nation as the prime claimant of popular political interest and allegiance. Such a transfer is gradually in process, however.

### *The Electoral Record*

Against this background, let us examine the results of the seven general elections held in Japan since the enactment of the new Constitution in 1947 (see Table 6-2). There have, of course, been a number of political parties involved during this period and, as the result of splits and amalgamations, some of these no longer exist as independent units. For introductory purposes, therefore, it may be more satisfactory to talk first in terms of "conservative" versus "progressive" or Left-wing parties and consider these as units, and then define the parties more precisely.

The most notable fact about the Japanese electoral record is the continuous and strong predominance of the conservative vote. This was even more true before the war. Since 1947, neither the conservative share of the popular vote—which, in fact, includes the great bulk of the independent and minor party votes as well as those cast for specifically conservative parties—nor the number of seats in the lower house controlled by conservatives has fallen below sixty per cent of the total. The combined "progressive" or Left-wing opposition parties share the remaining popular vote, which ranges from about twenty-five to thirty-nine per cent, and the remaining seats in the House of Representatives, which range

from nineteen to thirty-five per cent. The difference in the strengths of the two groups is thus very large. In recent years, the conservatives have normally controlled slightly less than two-thirds of the popular vote and seats, while the progressives have held slightly more than one-third. Although the curve of progressive strength has gone up slightly since 1947 and that of conservative (including independent) strength has declined a bit, the change has been too slight to have a significant effect on the distribution of political power. In this fact lies the present dilemma of Japanese socialism.

This conservative predominance in the lower house of the National Diet is substantially duplicated in the upper house. The electoral system for the House of Councillors is more complicated than that of the House of Representatives, and a direct comparison of popular voting patterns for the two houses would take some time. In terms of percentages of seats won in recent elections for the upper house, however, the progressives have certainly done no better than they have in the lower house. The conservatives have normally controlled slightly less than two-thirds of the total number of seats here, too. In the elections for prefectural governors and assemblies and for city, town, and village mayors or assemblies, the conservative cause is even stronger. At these levels, independent candidates and voters are almost uniformly conservative. It is not surprising, then, that the records of recent elections show that at the prefectural assembly level in the postwar years the progressive parties have never polled more than twenty-five per cent of the national vote nor controlled more than twenty-two per cent of the seats. Their average strength has been appreciably lower than this.

It is at the lowest level—city, town, and village assemblies—however, that the greatest display of conservative strength is found. Here the best showing by progressive candidates amounted to thirteen per cent of the votes cast nationally and five per cent of the seats at stake. At these local levels also, the curve of progressive strength has been slowly mounting in recent elections, but conservative

strength continues to be overwhelming. As one descends the scale of elections in Japan, therefore, from national through prefectural to municipal or local elections, conservative strength, dominant to begin with, is seen to increase markedly at each step downward, while progressive strength—socialist plus Communist—diminishes *pari passu*. The electoral record will also demonstrate that conservative strength, while dominant even in the cities, is most strongly entrenched in the rural areas of Japan. The cities, and particularly the ranks of organized labor, provide the strongest electoral support for progressive candidates and causes, while the real heartland of conservative political strength lies in the countryside.

Where particular party strengths are concerned, Table 6-2 will make clear the nature of the electoral record in postwar times. Since 1955, the conservative cause has been represented by a single party—really a loose congeries of factions—called the *Jiyuminshuto* or Liberal Democratic Party. This group dominates the electoral scene today, as, in a variety of earlier forms, it has done almost continuously since 1945. The dimensions of its strength have been described above. The progressive vote is somewhat more complicated to analyze. Socialist and Communist components have always been identifiable within the progressive bloc, and frequently several types of Socialist organization and strength have been prevalent under the progressive banner. Since January, 1960—after some five years of dubious unity—it has become necessary to separate the electoral record of the *Shakaito*, or Socialist Party proper, from that of the *Minshu Shakaito*, or Democratic (Right-wing) Socialist Party. The former emerged from the 1960 elections as much the stronger of the two Socialist groups, winning twenty-eight per cent of the vote and thirty-one per cent of the seats, as opposed to the latter's nine per cent of the votes and four per cent of the seats. The Democratic Socialists are, for this period at least, no more than a splinter party.

The Communist Party has never had much electoral strength in Japan. It has normally

polled only between two and three per cent of the votes in general elections and held less than one per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives. The one occasion, in 1949, when it significantly improved on this performance occurred under most unusual circumstances and is not to be considered as an accurate representation of the party's actual strength. This low level of popular support for Communist candidates has not changed appreciably since the 1949 election.

Political independents and minor parties, other than the Communists and Democratic Socialists, do not at present play a significant role in Japanese elections at the national level. There have been several minor parties, such as the *Kokumin Kyodoto* (People's Cooperative Party) in the conservative camp and the *Ronoto* (Labor-Farmer Party) on the progressive side, which have since the war managed to survive for appreciable periods of time, but the dynamics of the recent political process have run against them. Unlike the Communists, they have lacked both a readily distinguishable program with stable appeal to at least a significant minority and an effective party organization. It remains to be seen, incidentally, whether the Democratic Socialists can come up with an effective program and organization. The other minor parties have tended to represent the personal followings of individual politicians organized into cliques of more than usual independence and durability rather than parties in the present Japanese sense of the term. They have disappeared through absorption into the major conservative and progressive parties, a normal fate for recent minor parties in Japan.

The role of the independent candidate in national elections is also no longer very significant. Practically all such candidates are conservatives, who, because of real or fancied tactical advantages in their particular districts, choose to campaign as political independents. Once elected—and few are—their normal prac-

TABLE 6-2 Results of Postwar General Elections for Japan's House of Representatives

Party	23rd General Election (1947)				24th General Election (1949)				25th General Election (1952)				26th General Election (1953)			
	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats
Conservatives (subtotal)	16,111,014	58.0	281	60.3	19,260,500	63.0	247	74.5	23,307,671	66.1	325	69.6	22,717,348	65.7	310	66.5
Jiyuto (Liberal Party)	7,356,921	26.9	131	28.1	4,798,352	15.7	69	14.8	10,938,221	47.9	240	51.4				
Minshuto (Democratic Party)	6,889,646	25.0	121	26.0												
Kokumin Kyodo (People's Cooperative Party)	1,015,947	7.0	29	6.2	1,041,879	3.4	14	3.0								
Mishin Jiyuto (Liberal Party)					13,420,269	43.9	264	66.7								
Keihinto (Progressive Party)									6,420,460	18.2	85	18.2				
Hokoku Jiyuto (National Liberal Party)													6,186,232	17.9	76	16.3
Yoshida Jiyuto (Yoshida Liberal Party)													3,054,688	8.8	35	7.5
Jiyu Minshuto (Liberal Democratic Party)													13,476,428	39.0	199	42.7
Progressives (subtotal)	8,178,842	29.9	147	31.5	7,721,414	25.2	90	19.3					10,209,311	29.5	144	30.9
Shakaito (Left-wing Socialist Party)	7,175,939	26.2	143	30.7	4,129,794	13.5	48	10.3	8,664,826	24.5	115	24.7				
Saba Shakaito (Left-wing Socialist Party)																
Uda Shakaito (Right-wing Socialist Party)									3,598,597	9.6	54	11.6	4,516,715	13.1	72	15.4
Rengokai (Labor-Farmer Party)									4,108,274	11.6	57	12.2	4,677,833	13.5	66	14.2
Minshu Shakaito (Democratic Socialist Party)					606,840	2.0	7	1.5	261,190	0.7	4	0.9	358,773	1.0	5	1.1
Kyokanto (Communist Party)	1,002,903	3.7	4	0.8	2,984,780	9.7	35	7.5	896,765	2.6	—	—	655,990	1.9	1	0.2
Minor Parties	1,490,057	5.4	25	5.4	1,602,486	5.2	17	3.6	940,036	2.7	7	1.5	152,050	0.4	1	0.2
Independents	1,580,844	5.8	13	2.8	2,008,109	6.6	12	2.6	2,355,172	6.7	19	4.1	1,523,736	4.4	11	2.4
Totals	27,361,657	100.0	466	100.0	30,592,519	100.0	466	100.0	35,336,705	100.0	466	100.0	34,602,445	100.0	466	100.0

TABLE 6-2 Results of Postwar General Elections for Japan's House of Representatives—(Continued)

Party	27th General Election (1955)				28th General Election (1958)				29th General Election (1960)			
	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats	Valid votes	Per- centage of votes	Seats	Per- centage of seats
Conservatives (subtotal)	25,385,502	63.2	297	63.6	22,976,846	57.8	287	61.5	22,740,272	57.5	296	63.3
Jiyuto (Liberal Party)	9,849,457	26.6	112	24.0								
Minshu Jiyuto (Liberal Party)	15,556,044	36.6	185	39.6								
Kokumin Kyodo (People's Cooperative Party)												
Minshu Jiyuto (Democratic Liberal Party)												
Kokumin Kyodo (People's Cooperative Party)												
Hatoyama Jiyuto (Hatoyama Liberal Party)												
Yoshida Jiyuto (Yoshida Liberal Party)												
Jiyu Minshuto (Liberal Democratic Party)												
Progressives (subtotal)	11,905,639	35.2	162	34.7	22,976,846	57.8	287	61.5	22,740,272	57.5	296	63.3
Shakaito (Socialist Party)												
Saba Shakaito (Left-wing Socialist Party)	5,683,312	15.3	89	19.1								
Uda Shakaito (Right-wing Socialist Party)	5,129,594	13.9	67	14.3	14,106,028	35.5	167	35.7	15,508,005	39.2	165	35.2
Rengokai (Labor-Farmer Party)	357,611	1.0	4	0.9	13,093,993	32.9	166	35.5	10,887,134	27.5	145	31.0
Minshu Shakaito (Democratic Socialist Party)												
Kyokanto (Communist Party)	733,121	2.0	2	0.4	1,012,035	2.6	1	0.2	3,464,148	8.7	17	3.6
Minor Parties	496,614	1.3	2	0.4	287,991	0.7	1	0.2	1,186,723	2.9	3	0.6
Independents	1,229,081	3.3	6	1.3	2,380,795	6.0	12	2.6	141,941	0.3	1	0.2
Totals	37,014,837	100.0	467	100.0	39,751,661	100.0	467	100.0	39,509,123	100.0	467	100.0

tice is to make at once the best possible deal with the Liberal Democratic Party leadership and formally become members of this parliamentary group, thus exchanging their independent status for that of loyal conservative party followers. At the level of prefectural and, particularly, local elections, i.e., for mayors and assemblymen in cities, towns, and villages, where national party labels are far less useful and meaningful, there continues to be a great number of "independent" candidates, the vast majority of whom are conservatives in fact. The 1959 local elections, for example, awarded about sixteen per cent of the seats in prefectural assemblies and eighty-nine per cent of those in city, town, and village assemblies to such so-called "independent" candidates.

Japan's postwar electoral record is marked, therefore, by a heavy and continuous dominance of conservative candidates and causes at all levels of government. It should not be assumed, however, that this is an immutable characteristic of Japanese society. Such circumstances as the American Occupation, which continued officially until 1952, Japan's peculiar relationship to the Korean conflict, from 1950 to 1953, and the increasing prosperity of the revived Japanese economy after 1952 have spurred this conservative political ascendancy. During this period, Japan has been unusually sheltered from the full stress of the cold war and its attendant international tensions. She has yet to experience, in post-Occupation times, a serious or prolonged economic depression. Still, under what have been for them seriously disadvantageous circumstances, the "progressive" or Left-wing parties have managed to acquire slightly more than one-third of the popular vote and of the seats in the powerful lower house of the Diet. This gives them, incidentally, the important power to prevent any adverse amendments of the Japanese Constitution, since such proposals require the concurring vote of two-thirds or

more of all the members of each house of the National Diet. This degree of success by the Socialist Party in particular is not to be depreciated. It is impossible to predict the effects on the Japanese electorate of a prolonged depression or a really serious international crisis involving Japanese interests, but the possibility that this would work in favor of the "progressive" cause cannot be discounted.

## Political Parties

Political parties are not a postwar innovation in Japan. In one form or another, they have existed since at least 1874. The antecedents of the present conservative party, the *Jiyuminshuto* or Liberal Democratic Party, can be traced back to the early 1880's, while those of the *Nihon Shakaito* or Japan Socialist Party go back to at least 1925. The Japanese Communist Party (*Nihon Kyosanto*) was established in 1922. It is, therefore, primarily the status and power of Japan's political parties which have altered in postwar times. From groups competing for the control of membership in a House of Representatives possessed in pre-war times of largely negative and carefully restricted political power, they have advanced since 1947 to the status of groups competing for the control of membership in a House of Representatives which has itself become the basic source of both legislative and executive authority in a new and more democratic system of national government. The difference is of vital importance. The role and importance of Japan's political parties have fluctuated with the role and importance of the lower house of the National Diet. The postwar development of these political parties is described in Fig. 6-1.

In this discussion of the organization, programs, and general characteristics of Japan's political parties, we will limit ourselves to the four parties that are most important at present—the Liberal Democratic, Socialist, Democratic Socialist, and Communist Parties. Although we cannot be sure how long a given constellation of parties will survive the constant pressures for fission and reconstitution,




FIGURE 6-1 LINEAGES OF MAJOR POST-WAR POLITICAL PARTIES. \*Numbers indicate date of party's establishment, e.g., 10-45 = October, 1945. (Based on chart appended to Nihon Kindaishi Jiten. Tokyo: Toyoshimposha, 1958.)

these four parties represent the major types of organization, programmatic appeals, support patterns, financing, and leadership which have characterized Japan's postwar political parties.

*The Liberal Democratic Party*  
(Jiyuminshuto)

It should be made clear at the outset that the Liberal Democratic Party, despite its great strength at the polls, is not essentially a mass membership organization. Although possessed of a national party apparatus which looks most impressive on an organization chart, its formal membership is relatively small. In June, 1959, for example, it claimed a total registered membership of about 1,500,000. Most commentators believe that a figure in the neighborhood of 300,000 would be more accurate. Indeed, one finds at the local level that formal party membership is a vague and not too meaningful category. The party maintains branch organizations in every prefectural capital and in an increasing number of other cities, towns, and villages. In 1959, in fact, its National Organization Committee claimed to have a total of 2,200 local branches covering about 54 per cent of the 4,104 political subdivisions of Japan plus some 12,000 to 13,000 "party organizers" scattered throughout Japan. This degree of local coverage may be true if applied to those working for its candidates during election campaigns, but it probably has little meaning beyond this. The party is trying to strengthen its prefectural and local organizations throughout the country and thus to establish more meaningful and dependable relationships with the average voter, and it seems to have made some progress along these lines. But, in general, most of its local branches and the great bulk of its membership are concerned primarily with elections and become active or involved as a group only during campaigns.

The heart and head of the Liberal Democratic organization is found in Tokyo, where

the vast majority of the party's business is transacted. In fact, for purposes of most policy decisions and day-to-day business, the party is almost exclusively controlled by its higher membership normally resident in Tokyo. The party's central organization is complex. Ultimate authority is wielded by a party congress composed almost exclusively of professional political leaders. The congress meets in Tokyo and selects a party President, the most eminent and powerful of party posts. Of great importance also are the Secretary-General, the day-to-day director of party activities, and the chairman of the Executive Committee and the Political Research Committee. The general meeting of the party's members holding seats in both houses of the National Diet is also influential in party councils. Through this organizational apparatus, especially the Political Research Committee, the party determines its policies and attempts to translate them into legislative actions through its delegations in the National Diet. Once agreement has been reached within party circles, the discipline imposed on its members in the Diet is very strict. Voting conformance is practically automatic, under pain of expulsion from the party.

The almost complete absence of reliable information about party finances in Japan does not inhibit public discussion of them, usually in rather sensational terms. The general assumption about the Liberal Democratic Party is that a very substantial measure of control over its policies is wielded by its financial supporters, and that these are to be found almost exclusively in the ranks of big business, particularly among the *zaibatsu* or great cartels of Japan. Few persons familiar with Japanese politics would deny that the party's connections with big business are very close, or that the bulk of its support comes from business firms and associations. But the details of this relationship and the extent of the influence or control over party policies by business interests are very vague and imprecise. The average commentary on the subject tends to overestimate the unity of the political views of "big business" and, consequently, to oversimplify the Liberal Democratic Party's relationship to business.

Party politics—particularly election campaigns—is still a very expensive operation in Japan as elsewhere. We can get some idea of the size of the funds involved from the official reports of political contributions which the parties are required by law to file with the Local Autonomy Ministry. These indicate that in 1958 the Liberal Democratic Party received political contributions amounting to 2,379,790,000 yen (\$6,610,528), while during the first half of 1959, when both a House of Councillors election and local elections were held, it received 1,260,500,000 yen (\$3,501,388). Sixty per cent of this sum came in the form of single contributions, each totaling 10,000,000 yen (\$27,778) or more, from business firms or groups. The remainder also came largely from business sources. Even by American standards these are not unimpressive amounts, particularly when we realize that they constitute but an unknown fraction—perhaps only half—of the total political funds available to the party during the first half of 1959. In addition to these open and publicized contributions, a large amount was probably raised covertly by the party, and all factions within the party and most individuals had access to their own private sources of campaign funds. The actual total, then, although not ascertainable, is certainly formidable. One recent commentator, for example, estimates the total expenditure of the Liberal Democrats in the 1960 general election campaign at about 4,000,000,000 yen (\$11,111,111) or an average of 10,000,000 yen (\$27,778) per candidate. Clearly, it costs a great deal of money to conduct effectively the affairs of a major political party in Japan.

It is particularly difficult to describe accurately the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party. Superficially, the party is led by its President who, since this is normally the majority party, also is apt to be the Prime Minister of Japan. But when we look more closely, we soon see that the Liberal Democratic Party really has no single leader. In fact, it is in some ways more accurate to view it as a loose coalition of factions united for purposes of campaign and legislative strategy, rather than as a unified national party. In

1962, for example, when Ikeda Hayato was party President and Prime Minister, the party was actually divided into at least eight major factions. These groups were composed of members of the party holding seats in the lower house of the National Diet, and they ranged in size from about sixteen to fifty-five individuals. Practically all of the party's delegation in the House belonged to one or the other of them. These factions were led by prominent politicians who regarded themselves as quite the equal of Mr. Ikeda, and most of them aspired to both the party presidency and the premiership. One, Kishi Nobusuke, had in fact preceded Mr. Ikeda in both these posts.

The balance of power within the party—and, consequently, the immediate explanation of most party policies and appointments—is determined primarily by shifting combinations and agreements among the leaders of these eight groups. It normally takes a common front among at least four of them to carry any important decision. As a result, their leaders are very important figures. Four or five of them in combination can normally make or break a Cabinet. From this we can conclude, first, that a successful party President and Prime Minister must accommodate their advice and wishes, second, that party leadership is really more a collegial than an individual matter; and, third, that most major decisions taken by the party on issues of policy or appointment represent rather complicated compromises. On most important questions, a sizable and organized element within the Liberal Democratic Party is certain to be actively dissatisfied with prevailing party policy. Such opposition, although it may occasionally abstain or absent itself from the House, will seldom be carried so far as to produce a vote against the party line. This might lead to the disintegration of the party which, at present, few seem to desire. But the existence of a constant minority does serve to keep



the party in a volatile and uncertain state. Decisive or durable individual leadership over a period of time is very difficult under these circumstances.

The leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party—as represented by its members holding seats in the lower house of the National Diet—may also be analyzed in terms of the members' social and professional backgrounds.<sup>1</sup> A recent survey based on the membership of the lower house that was elected in 1958 and dissolved in 1960 yields the following information, which is fairly typical for recent years. With allowances for multiple and overlapping backgrounds, about twenty-six per cent of the party's House delegation of 298 individuals were former career bureaucrats who had held high office in the national or prefectural governments. Some eighteen per cent had once served as prefectural assemblymen, and twenty-six per cent had held elective offices at the city, town, or village level. Whatever their previous experience, the Liberal Democratic members of the lower house in 1958–60 had been elected to this office on an average of 4.6 times. They were experienced professional politicians. A large number, fifty-two per cent, had business backgrounds, usually as presidents, auditors, or directors of firms. Considering the agrarian basis of the party's support, surprisingly few representatives professed agricultural backgrounds, only nineteen per cent in fact. Only one individual had a labor-union background and he had been associated with a farmers' union. Eighty-one per cent of the group were college graduates—forty-eight per cent from the national or public universities or colleges and the remainder from private schools. Among the national university graduates,

those from Tokyo University were predominant. For the entire group, 1901 was the average year of birth, making the average age fifty-seven at the beginning of this Diet.

These figures point up several matters that are widely discussed in Japan today. Besides the alleged domination of the party by business interests many claim that ex-bureaucrats, especially those from Tokyo University, wield an undue and dangerous influence in the higher councils of the Liberal Democratic Party. It is undoubtedly true that former bureaucrats, because of their professional skills and associations, have been notably successful within the party. In fact, all conservative Prime Ministers in postwar times, except Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Ishibashi, have been former career bureaucrats. Critics of this phenomenon charge that the experience of these individuals in the pre-war bureaucracy has made them authoritarian in training and temperament, reactionary in political persuasion, and generally undemocratic in their methods and policies. While there is undoubtedly some truth in such claims, we should not forget that the largely socialist critics differ fundamentally with the conservatives over the nature of a democratic society.

The program of the Liberal Democratic Party, of course, changes with the issues that are current at any given time. It also represents the product of numerous compromises and is in many respects as cautiously vague in its stands and promises as are the programs of our own major parties. It is not, by American standards, a notably conservative document. During the 1960 general election, for example, its major planks called for: the maintenance of a nine per cent rate of annual economic growth (as opposed to less than four per cent in the United States) and a satisfactory balance of international payments; full support for the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and an international policy based on the United Nations and the American and Western Alliance; doubling the national income by 1970; resuming trade with Communist China on a private basis; the launching of a five-year program of road construction and improvement;

<sup>1</sup> These and the comparable data on the Socialist leadership are taken primarily from Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 161–177.

increasing the credit available to small enterprises; and the establishment of political neutrality in the national educational system. Of these, by far the most controversial stands were those favoring the Security Treaty, the continued close association with the United States, and the elimination of the teaching of partisan views in the schools. In general, the program was solicitous of public welfare, pointed with pride to the general prosperity which the party's regime had brought to Japan, and promised to produce more of the same. The neutralist opposition of the Socialists was directed mainly at the program's call for close ties with the United States and other Western nations.

*The Japan Socialist Party*  
(Nihon Shakaito)

Although socialist and Left-wing political parties existed in Japan before the war, they were of small electoral or parliamentary consequence. Only since 1945 have they constituted the major opposition to the dominant conservative groups. For one brief nine-month period in 1947-48, they were even able to obtain the leadership of a weak coalition Cabinet for their leader, Katayama Tetsu. The Japan Socialist Party in its present form dates from October, 1955, when its formerly separate Left- and Right-wing factions were merged into a single party. The party remains more or less unified, although a portion of the Right-wing contingent seceded in January, 1960, to form the Democratic Socialist Party. Like the conservatives, the Socialists are not a mass party. A recent report indicates a total party membership of about fifty thousand, organized in 1,320 local branches, special districts, and factory branches throughout Japan; local organizations exist, therefore, in somewhat less than one-third of Japan's 4,104 cities, towns, villages, and districts. These membership claims are probably somewhat inflated, if we apply a regular dues-paying test. The inadequate contacts of the party with the voting populace, particularly in the villages and countryside, is a source of serious concern to the party, and it is taking modest steps to improve this situation. So far, these

have not paid any very spectacular dividends, but slow progress is doubtless being made.

Like the apparatus of their Liberal Democratic rivals, that of the Japan Socialist Party is highly centralized in Tokyo, where an elaborate party headquarters is maintained. The party has no president but is headed by the Chairman of its Central Executive Committee. Its administrative chief is the Secretary-General, while the chairman of its Policy Council plays an important role in the setting of basic party policies. Ultimate authority within the party resides in an annual party congress, which is usually a far more lively and controversial affair than its Liberal Democratic counterpart. The congress elects the party's chief officers and it debates vociferously such long-standing policy issues as whether the party should represent national interests or class interests, i.e., those of the proletariat and farmer; what attitude it should adopt toward Communists and the Japan Communist Party; and what relationship the party should maintain with the unions and federations of unions which provide the bulk of its support. In addition to the party congress, the association of party members who hold seats in the National Diet also plays an important role in the party councils. As with the conservatives, this body—once a party policy has been established—is under rigid obligation to provide loyal and unanimous voting support for the party's legislative program in both houses.

The Japan Socialist Party obviously does not command the financial resources or support that the Liberal Democratic Party does. The available figures are incomplete but they indicate, for example, that during the first six months of 1959—a period which included the holding of local elections throughout the nation and just preceding the House of Councillors election—the Socialist Party received a total of 134,180,000 yen (\$372,722). This does not compare very favorably with the 1,260,500,000 yen (\$3,501,388) in campaign funds

reported by the Liberal Democrats during the same period. A recent report on campaign expenditures during the 1960 general election estimated that the Socialist Party probably spent in the neighborhood of 460,000,000 yen (\$1,277,777) or about 2,500,000 yen (\$6,944) per candidate. The total is only 11 per cent of the estimated expenditures of the Liberal Democrats in the same campaign.

The pattern of contributions to the Socialists' campaign funds is also different from that of the Liberal Democrats. The largest single contributor by far was *Sohyo*, the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions, which gave 21,360,000 yen (\$59,333) or 16 per cent of the reported total. Only one other group, an organization of big business interests for the purpose of centralizing and regulating business' campaign contributions, gave as much as 15,000,000 yen (\$41,666), while the remainder of the large contributions fell between 5,300,000 yen (\$14,722) and 3,000,000 yen (\$8,333). In all, about 53 per cent of the reported funds came in contributions of more than 3,000,000 yen (\$8,333), while the remainder were mostly much smaller contributions. An undetermined but major portion of the party's financial support comes from labor unions, but a number of big businesses also contribute—though much less heavily—to the Socialists as well as to the Liberal Democrats. Thus the businessmen hope to maintain credit in both camps. Ideally, the Socialist Party hopes to improve its shaky financial position by recruiting as many as a million members willing to pay annual dues of 200 to 300 yen (56 to 83 cents), but to date they have not had any striking success in collecting a small annual dues from even their present membership of 50,000.

Within the Japan Socialist Party, several factions are constantly vying for control. At present, at least five or six such factions are readily identifiable. Although these factions resemble somewhat those in the Liberal Dem-

ocratic Party, ideology is far more important in distinguishing one faction from another in the Socialist Party than in the Liberal Democratic Party. In fact, the socialist groups range from the Right through the Center to the Left of the socialist spectrum. The party's factions thus continue to reflect the pre-1955 situation when the Socialists were actually split into separate Left- and Right-wing parties. The party leadership is still unstable, and the clashing ideological stands of the several factions symbolize a serious lack of unity on both doctrinal and tactical matters within the party. As with the Liberal Democrats, policy in the Socialist Party is a product of continual pulling and hauling among the leaders of the conflicting factions.

An examination of the backgrounds of the Socialist leaders reveals that they have quite different careers from those of their Liberal Democratic rivals. Among the 168 Socialist members of the lower house in the 1958-60 period, only four per cent were former career bureaucrats. A sizable group—twenty-nine per cent—had served as prefectural assemblymen or elected officials in cities, towns, and villages. Many members had had experience in national legislative service having been elected to the lower house an average of 3.8 times. Eighteen per cent of the 168 had some form of business background, while ten per cent had served as leaders of agricultural cooperative associations or had some other type of agricultural affiliation. By far the largest number, however—some fifty per cent—had risen from union backgrounds, most from labor unions but a fair number from farmers' unions as well. Sixty-two per cent were college graduates, divided almost equally between national and private universities. Their average year of birth was 1906; thus their average age was fifty-two at the beginning of this Diet.

This profile of the average Socialist representative points up some of the principal differences between the Socialists and the Liberal Democrats. Where the former come primarily from union backgrounds, the latter come from the ranks of business. Again, former bureaucrats are very prominent and influential among the conservative group but almost lacking in

the Socialist ranks. The Socialist leadership group is also generally several years younger than their Liberal Democratic counterparts. On the other hand, both groups tend to be college-educated, to underrepresent the agrarian sector of the population, and to contain a substantial element of former local assemblymen and officials. Members of both groups have also become highly professionalized and experienced as party leaders. In most cases, party office is a career for them, not an avocation.

While the Socialist Party has gone to some pains to develop a rounded program covering both domestic and foreign matters, its foreign policy has attracted the greatest attention and proved to be both its greatest asset and its most controversial plank. For many years, the Socialist Party has opposed the fundamentally pro-United States and pro-Western orientation of Japan's official foreign policy. It would prefer to maintain friendly political, economic, and cultural relations with both the United States and the Chinese People's Republic and the U.S.S.R. There is some difference of opinion about how this policy of "positive neutralism" should be activated and at what pace, but in recent years the Socialist Party has officially advocated the abrogation of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty, the complete withdrawal of American armed forces, and some rather vague measure of demilitarization and disarmament for Japan. The party also favors the admission of mainland China to the United Nations, Japanese recognition of the Peking government, and the conclusion of a formal treaty of peace with China and the Soviet Union (neither of which are signatories of the Treaty of San Francisco which in 1951 concluded the war with Japan).

Since all these steps run counter to the policies to which the Liberal Democratic government of Japan is officially committed at present, there have been frequent and dramatic encounters between the Socialists and the government on all of these scores. Mass demonstrations, riots, and violence have erupted in both the streets and the parliament, and have spurred a great deal of

popular interest and debate both in Japan and throughout the world. The domestic policies of the Socialist Party have attracted less attention. The party advocates some measure of nationalization of basic industries, the improvement of general living conditions through the reduction of defense costs, a minimum monthly wage (in 1960) of 8,000 yen (\$22.22), the reduction of taxes on small enterprises, a more equitable balancing of income and living standards between rural and urban areas, and opposition to "big business" and national economic policies which favor such business interests. This is, in general, a social welfare program which in practice has not been able to compete effectively with the mass prosperity that has characterized the Japanese economy in the late fifties and early sixties, and for which the Liberal Democrats claim the credit.

#### *The Japan Democratic Socialist Party* (Nihon Minshu Shakaito)

In January, 1960, the heated dispute over both doctrinal and tactical issues that had long been seething below the surface of the Japan Socialist Party came to the boil. The party split in two, in a break of the sort that has been common among Japanese political parties of both the Left and the Right. On this occasion, the extreme Right-wing faction of the party, led by Nishio Suehiro, plus a few members of the Kawakami Faction, walked out and established a party of their own known as the Japan Democratic Socialist Party. At the time, the dissidents had the support of some thirty-five socialist members of the lower house of the National Diet, a number which increased to forty before the general election of November, 1960. They fared poorly in this election, however, and emerged with only seventeen seats, a drastic reduction in their parliamentary strength. Their survival and future strength remain uncertain at this writing.

The organization of the new party resembles that of the Socialist Party. At the head of the party is the chairman of its Central Executive Committee, and a Secretary-General is in charge of party administration. A party congress possesses ultimate authority and, in practice, the council composed of its members holding seats in the National Diet wields great influence. Since its members were for the most part experienced politicians to begin with, they individually and collectively had independent sources of financial support. In fact, during the 1960 election campaign, they were perhaps somewhat better off in this respect than were the bulk of their former colleagues in the Socialist Party. One source estimates that they probably spent about 5,000,000 yen (\$13,888) per candidate, or a total of 520,000,000 yen (\$1,444,444) for this campaign. The Democratic Socialist's leadership differs in important respects from that of the Center and Left-wing elements of the Socialist Party. It includes a higher percentage of former prefectural assemblymen and elective local officials and a somewhat smaller proportion of former union leaders and college graduates. Many of them are pre-war socialists of a slightly older generation. Their union associations are with *Sodomei* and *Zenro*—that is, with the politically moderate labor federations rather than with the more radical *Sohyo* groups—and their backgrounds and experiences distinguish them rather sharply from their Left-wing associates.

The moderate and pragmatic socialism of the Democratic Socialist Party strives for a middle ground between the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists. Thus, while rejecting the policy of neutralism, the party advocates the gradual modification of the Security Treaty with the United States and the eventual withdrawal of American troops from Japanese soil; it favors also a foreign policy based on cooperation with the free world through the United Nations and a more cautious

China policy than that of the Socialists. Domestically, it places strong emphasis on the national or "mass" basis of socialism, as opposed to an exclusive working-class basis, looks forward to doubling the national income and improving the living conditions of the needy through an eight-year plan, and advocates equality of educational opportunities for all Japanese and political neutrality in the content of education. Its program thus represents a middle way, but, some would say, in doing so it has sacrificed drama, controversy, and the ability to influence a large number of voters. Whatever the reason, the party's candidates did poorly in the 1960 general election. It remains to be seen whether or not this brand of moderate socialism can attract and hold the support of any sizable segment of the Japanese electorate.

#### *The Japan Communist Party* (Nihon Kyosanto)

The Communist Party has been a legal political party in Japan since General Douglas MacArthur released its leaders from prison in October, 1945. Although its top leaders went underground for a time during the Korean conflict, the party has run candidates in every general election since 1946. Its electoral and parliamentary successes have been modest. Normally, Communist candidates poll between two and three per cent of the popular vote in a general election and obtain from none to three or four of the lower house's 467 seats. The party does not, therefore, constitute a serious political force at the parliamentary level. It has no official influence on the determination of Japan's domestic or foreign policy. What political strength it has is exerted along other lines and, in particular, through its ability to infiltrate its members or sympathizers into positions of influence in particular unions or organizations. This ability gives it a significant, but indirect, political strength.

The Japan Communist Party is probably the most tightly and effectively organized of any of Japan's political parties, although it has certainly not been free from factionalism and doctrinal strife. Ultimate authority within the party is theoretically vested in a party con-

gress, but actually is wielded by the Central Committee under the current leadership of Nozaka Sanzo. The number of members in the party is difficult to ascertain with accuracy, because of its practice of maintaining both registered and nonregistered members. Membership is down from its postwar peak of 100,000, reached in March, 1950, and is thought to be about 90,000 today. Its hard-core electoral support, i.e., those who vote the Communist ticket in local as well as national elections, has never since the war exceeded 571,000 in an electorate now numbering about 56,000,000.

The party's finances are something of a mystery. It is estimated that the party spent about 1,000,000 yen (\$2,778) per candidate in the 1960 elections, or a total of about 120,000,000 yen (\$333,333). The sources of these funds are not known, but are generally reported to be in part Chinese and Russian in origin and in part derived from a party-operated smuggling operation between Japan and North Korea, as well as from more normal sources. The current party program advocates abrogation of the Security Treaty with the United States, the withdrawal of American forces from Japan, recognition of the Chinese People's Republic, friendship and closer relations with China and the U.S.S.R., and a number of domestic measures calculated to improve the economic circumstances of the less well-off elements of the Japanese population. Its dominant theme, however, is anti-Americanism.

#### *General Characteristics of Japanese Parties*

If we look at the political party situation in Japan in over-all terms, several characteristics stand out. First, none of the parties are truly mass membership organizations. They notably lack solid bases in popular involvement and support. They normally operate in Tokyo and among circles limited almost exclusively to professional politicians and administrators. They are essentially parliamentary parties. Their prime focus of interest is the lower house of the National Diet and what goes on there. Only during election campaigns do they engage in massive and sustained contact with

the people. They are increasingly aware of the unsatisfactory nature and the dangers of this sort of relationship with the electorate and are seeking more meaningful forms of association. So far they do not seem to have found them. This is true of both conservative and progressive parties.

Second, the major parties are unstable and internally disunited. Both the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists are really congeries of factions held together primarily by the tactical requirements of effective campaigning and parliamentary competition. Within both parties, there is a great deal of disagreement on major issues of policy and program. Where the Liberal Democrats are concerned, neither the party nor its several factions may be said really to have a basic program. The party's politics are pragmatic and professional rather than ideological. The Socialists, being primarily ideological in their orientation, share some common theoretical ground among themselves, but differ so fiercely over the all-important means of translating theory into practice that they are in fact at least as disunited as their opposition. Indeed, it seems to be easier for the practically oriented conservatives to reach agreements on particular political issues than for the more theoretically oriented progressives to do so. The results of such a situation within each party are constant instability and strife. The first concern of a party leader must be the careful nursing of the factional coalition which supports him in power; the loss of even one element may well be fatal to his leadership. These are not circumstances conducive to strong, continuous, or courageous party leadership. As a consequence, while the parties—or, more specifically, their leadership elements—do increasingly discuss and suggest national policies and formulate these as bills for parliamentary adoption, the policies concerned are almost certain to represent the end product of an elaborate series of compromises. Between the

two major parties, the differences in their political orientation produce a marked and dangerous lack of common ground. A rigorous, theoretically oriented approach to politics confronts a hostile and pragmatically oriented approach. The terms and levels of discourse are different, and, on issues judged to be basic, both sides are inflexible. Pitched battles rather than parliamentary processes are not infrequently the result.

Finally, it should be clear that although the party situation since 1955 has resulted in the emergence of two major and competing political parties, Japan does not have a two-party system in our sense of the phrase. Only once since 1945, and then briefly, have the Socialists been able to form a Cabinet—and that a weak coalition. Under present circumstances, they do not have the votes or the parliamentary strength to come to power. They seem, temporarily at least, unable to raise the number of their seats in the lower house much beyond the one-third point. The result has been aptly described as a “one and a half party system,” that is, a situation in which the Liberal Democrats, as long as they preserve some measure of party unity, are apt to remain in power and continue to provide the Cabinets which rule Japan, while the Socialists are consigned to the role of a more or less permanent, if not “loyal,” opposition. It would, however, be risky to predict that such a condition will last indefinitely. It has been true since 1955, but we must remember that these have been years of unexampled prosperity and freedom from national crises in Japan. A drastic change in these circumstances could readily alter the “one and a half party system.”

## Political Interest Groups

As societies grow more complex and modern in their social, economic, and political

characteristics, so, too, do the promotional and regulatory interests and activities of their governments expand. More and more individual and group actions are significantly affected by the decisions of legislators and bureaucrats, and, as a consequence, public interest in and involvement with government increase. In non-totalitarian societies, the public's desire and ability to influence such governmental decisions also increase. One way in which this is done is through the popular election of legislators to represent the interests and desires of their constituents in the decision-making process. But this alone is not adequate under modern circumstances. No one legislator can even begin to represent effectively the variety of urban, rural, industrial, commercial, financial, labor, women's, local, national, social, cultural, and other interests represented by a geographically defined constituency of several hundred thousand people. To fill this deficiency, interest groups provide a second level of representation and a more precisely focused means of representing the views and interests of a particular group to political parties, legislators, administrators, or the public. No society lacks some form of interest-group activity, but in pre-modern societies such activity is normally inclined to be more personalized, episodic, private, local, and diffuse, whereas in modern societies it is more apt to be systematically organized, relatively impersonal in style, continuous, public, and focused on larger targets.

### *Types of Interest Groups*

Japan in the 1960's is rapidly approximating this “modern” sort of interest-group structure, although the pace of social change has been slower and more piecemeal in the countryside than in the cities. The farmers are more traditional minded and usually more difficult to organize into interest groups than are city dwellers. The villages do not lack interest groups (e.g., the almost universal and flourishing irrigation cooperatives), but they are not nearly as common or conspicuous as in the cities. Most important among the nationally organized agricultural interest groups are probably the Japan Farmers' Union (*Nichino*),

the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Purchasing Associations (*Zenkoren*), the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Associations (*Zenhanren*), a similar National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Mutual Insurance Associations (*Kyosairen*), and the Japanese Forestry Association (*Nichirinkyo*). These are all postwar organizations, except the Japan Farmers' Union, which was founded in 1922 and has a long history of struggle for the rights of tenants and small farmers against landlord interests; it has also had close connections with a variety of socialist causes and parties.

The several national federations of agricultural cooperatives were formed in large part as a means of securing favorable consideration from the government for the economic interests which they represent. They regularly engage in lobbying and other forms of political pressure. One of them has been charged with outright bribery of officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Another type of interest group that might be added to this list is local and rural if not specifically agricultural in character: the National Association of Towns and Villages (*Zenkoku Chosonkai*) or the National Association of Chairmen of Town and Village Assemblies (*Zenkoku Chosongikai Gichokai*). There are similar organizations at the city and prefectural levels. A significant part of their activity is also devoted to the representation of local interests before the national government, particularly in the fields of subsidies and grants-in-aid. In general, however, such formal and systematically organized interest groups are a recent addition to the rural scene in Japan. Their relations to the average farmer are still largely tenuous, and the countryside is still notable more for the absence than the presence of modern interest-group activities.

The cities of Japan present a completely different picture. Systematically organized groups with well-defined political interests and programs flourish. Take, as a rather typical example, the Minami District of Osaka City. The District Office issues annually a directory of organizations within its boundaries that in some way direct their activities

toward the public. It takes seventy closely printed pages in a recent edition simply to list the names and top officers of these groups and their branches. The entire city may in this way be viewed as a web of such groups organized along both geographical lines (e.g., by shopping districts, streets, or blocks) and functional lines (by industry, trade, or specific interest). Particularly active in local, and sometimes in national, politics are such groups as the Red Cross Service Organization (*Nisseki Hoshidan*), the Federation of Housewives (*Shufuren*), the League of War Widows (*Mibojinkai*), and many others. A list of this sort could be prolonged indefinitely.

The really major operators, however, are the representatives of organized business and organized labor. Most active politically among the business contingent are the Japanese Federation of Employers' Organizations (*Nikkeiren*) and the Japanese Political League of Small and Medium Enterprises (*Chuseiren*). The first of these is an association of employers' associations and represents upwards of twenty thousand of Japan's largest employers. It frequently propagandizes the government and the public on policies affecting business and labor relations, and is said to serve as a means of communication between business interests and the conservative parties. It is widely regarded as one of the most influential pressure groups in Japan. The Political League of Small and Medium Enterprises attempts to play a similar role on behalf of this seriously depressed segment of the Japanese economy. It works in particular for tax relief and expanded credit facilities for its members. Other national business organizations, such as the Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keidanren*) and the Japanese Management Association (*Doyukai*), also work politically on behalf of business interests.

The General Council of Japanese Labor



Unions (*Sohyo*) is by far the most active and powerful of labor's interest groups. A federation of unions with some three million eight hundred thousand members representing approximately half of the total number of unionized workers in Japan, its interests are more political than economic. It is the 'mainstay of the Japan Socialist Party in both electoral and financial terms, and has taken an extremely strong and aggressive stand in favor of neutralism and closer relations with Peking and Moscow, and against the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, American bases in Japan, atomic weapons, increases in the power of the police, and all conservative Cabinets. It has also nominated and backed candidates in election campaigns. Its normal policy might be described as Left-wing socialist, though this has somewhat moderated recently.

*Sohyo's* major rival as a labor interest group is a second federation of unions known as the General Council of Japan Labor Organizations (*Domei Kaigi*)—formerly called *Zenro*—which represents about one million four hundred thousand members, perhaps eighteen per cent of organized labor. Its interests are more centered on economic matters and are thus less political than *Sohyo's*. Being closely linked with the Democratic Socialist Party, however, it favors a more moderate brand of socialism. Certain individual unions and associations also maintain very active political interests and programs. The Japanese Teachers' Union (*Nikkyoso*) and the National Association of Students' Self-Government Associations (*Zengakuren*), for example, have campaigned constantly, and sometimes violently, for a variety of political causes espoused by the Socialist and Communist Parties.

#### *Interest Groups in Politics*

Japan thus has a large and increasing complement of interest groups. Our knowledge of their structure and activities still leaves a

good deal to be desired, but the following generalizations might be ventured. At both the national and local levels, the majority of them seem to be involved in politics. Their involvement is of at least two different types. The first is electoral in nature. It flows from the fact that the secret of success at the polls in Japan lies in skillfully appealing to units or blocs of voters and in garnering adequate financial support. To the practical politician, an interest group represents primarily a potential and accessible bloc of votes plus a source of campaign contributions. Many interest groups, on their part, are not loathe to play such a political role for selected politicians in return for preferred access to his attention and influence once he is in office. In one arena or another, then, the average Japanese interest group does support candidates for election to local or national office.

How effective such support is we do not know in general, but in particular cases it is quite obvious that certain members of the National Diet owe their seats almost entirely to the support of certain interest groups. A 1959 study of labor interest groups, for example, concludes that 49 of the 467 members of the lower and 48 of the 250 members of the upper house were, in effect, there primarily as the representatives of particular unions—25 for *Nikkyoso* (the Japan Teachers' Union) alone, for example. This practice, of course, represents an extreme variant of the more normal situation in which a given interest group is simply one of many groups supporting a particular candidate. In the case of these labor unions, they in effect constitute themselves as a sort of *ad hoc* political party and support their own candidates for office.

The second type of interest group political action is directed toward particular political figures, primarily high-level administrators. In Japan, the relations between the Ministries and high administrative offices of the national government and their organized public clienteles are apt to be very close, e.g., between the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the organized farm groups throughout Japan, or between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the organized busi-

ness groups which it ostensibly regulates. In fact, the Ministry, to simplify its administrative relationships with such clientele groups, is sometimes responsible for their establishment in organized form to begin with. The resultant relationship is complex. Once in existence, such an organization will perform the functions of a political interest or pressure group, but its representations will be made to a group of officials in Tokyo with whom it maintains the closest and most cordial relationships. This is particularly true of interest groups of a business, agricultural, technical, or professional nature. Labor unions and Left-wing affiliated interest groups are apt to have more problems.

As an outgrowth of this sort of relationship, however, the interest groups commonly provide important—and sometimes sinecure—positions for the high officials of their particular Ministry, when these men choose to retire from governmental service, normally about the age of forty-nine. The retired and experienced bureaucrat then becomes a leading employee of the interest which he formerly regulated and serviced and, at the same time, its representative in charge of negotiations with the Ministry, office, or bureau which he formerly headed. It is often claimed that arrangements for such positions are made clandestinely before the bureaucrat's retirement and that he consequently becomes an undercover agent within the government for the interest group involved. A good deal of administrative corruption is alleged to result from such practices. Not infrequently, such former bureaucrats also proceed to organize local political support for themselves on the basis of their interest-group affiliations and to run for national elective office, particularly in the House of Councillors.

The political targets of most Japanese interest groups have traditionally been the government administration rather than the legislature. The reason is simple. Executives and bureaucrats rather than legislators have made most of the important decisions in Japanese politics and administration, or, if they have not made them, they have at least interpreted and applied them, which is apt to be of equal

importance. Since the war, as the political role of the House of Representatives has gradually increased in importance, interest groups are perhaps paying greater attention to the legislature and its committees, but their stress remains heavily on the higher bureaucracy. Members of the legislature still seem to serve primarily as intermediaries between interest-group representatives from their constituencies and high officials of the national government and, perhaps to some degree, as a means of bringing favorable budgetary or other pressures to bear on such officials.

We lack any very extensive or reliable information about the predominant style of Japanese interest groups' activities before bureaucrats and legislators. The press is largely convinced that in many cases the lobbies depend heavily on corrupt and illegal techniques. Public trials and investigations have demonstrated the truth of such claims in specific cases, but we lack the evidence to generalize about more serious forms of bribery and corruption. Quite obviously, the minor corruptions represented by *geisha* parties, elegant meals, and expensive entertainment for strategically placed individuals flourish in Tokyo as in other capitals. Equally obvious, and perhaps more serious, is the practice of providing positions for retired bureaucrats. There does seem to be a tendency, however, for some of the major Japanese interest groups to place increasing emphasis on "educational materials" and appeals for broad popular support. These might forecast some sort of shift away from the older and more personalized techniques of influence.

Political interest groups have definitely established a firm and expanding role for themselves in the Japanese political system. On balance, they have almost certainly enabled many interests to have more effective representation before the government. They have probably advanced, if largely inadvertently, the cause of more popular and respon-

sible government in Japan. Indeed, the degree to which they flourish today is one of the basic factors distinguishing the postwar from the pre-war political scene in Japan. More needs to be done, however, to give all interest groups equal access to the government, for at present some groups seem to get preferential treatment. To a certain degree this is inevitable in a party system of government, but if some interest groups are denied access to the government, the long-term political consequences might be very serious.

## Political Leadership

The characteristics and quality of political leadership in postwar Japan are particularly difficult to assess. As we have seen, both Japanese tradition and practice place far less emphasis on individual "leaders" and "leadership" than does our own culture. This tendency is reinforced by the multi-factional nature of political party leadership and the prevalence of committee and consensual techniques of decision-making. Under such circumstances, it becomes peculiarly difficult to assign meaningful responsibility for particular political policies or actions and thus to determine what any given "leader" may have contributed to a particular decision. Despite such problems, we can, of course, still identify certain persons who occupy positions of leadership in the Japanese political system. Among these, we have already described the members of the Liberal Democratic and Socialist contingents in the 1958-60 sessions of the House of Representatives. Let us now look at a still more selective and important leadership group, the Cabinet, which represents the top level of politically conservative leadership. The characteristics of the top socialist leadership do not vary notably from those of the party's Diet delegation described earlier.

An examination of appointments to recent

conservative Cabinets will demonstrate the impact of war, defeat, and the American Occupation on the nature of Japan's political leadership. The military figures and the representatives of court circles and the aristocracy so prominent before the war are no longer encountered. Among the pre-war elites, only the party politicians, the bureaucrats, and the representatives of business have survived. The onus of defeat, the American-enforced purge of military and ultra-nationalist elements from public office, and the provisions of the new Constitution combined to drive the traditional leaders from office; in the resulting vacuum of leadership, new faces—or, at least, new looks—appeared in the higher ranks of the conservative parties and for the most part remain there today.

The standing of these leaders is not based on their appeal to the masses. Just as Japan's political parties are largely associations of professional politicians rather than mass membership organizations, so too are the ranks of her leaders filled by private and closed means rather than by any sort of popularity contest. In conservative circles, it makes very little difference whether a given person is an accomplished public speaker or possessed of a personality with wide popular appeal. The criteria are more apt to be length of political service, abilities as a fund raiser, skill as a tactician, administrative ability, possession of useful connections, and a personal reputation for loyalty and sincerity. Such a system tends to bring to the fore men of experience, caution, and a generally conservative approach to political problems rather than more brilliant or venturesome types. Almost all the conservative leaders have had long experience in government. Article 68 of the Constitution requires that a majority of the Ministers of State, i.e., the Cabinet, must be chosen from among the members of the Diet, and custom decrees that the overwhelming majority hold seats in the lower house during their Cabinet service. In recent years, an average of eighty-three per cent of the Cabinet have held seats in the lower house, while another eleven per cent have been members of the upper house. Cabinet appointments from outside the mem-

bership of the National Diet are thus very rare, almost never amounting to more than one or two in a given Cabinet.

Reliable information about the members of recent conservative Cabinets is not readily available. The published data leave a great deal to be desired. A survey of the initial membership of the nine Cabinets holding office between 1954 and 1961, however, yields some relevant information. The average age of the group upon taking office has been just under sixty, with a range running from thirty-nine to seventy-eight. The Prime Ministers themselves have had an average age of sixty-two, with Mr. Ishibashi, at seventy-two, being by far the oldest and Mr. Kishi at sixty the youngest. During this period, only one woman was appointed to Cabinet office, a post which she held for less than five months. The educational level of the ministers was uniformly high. Of the some 153 posts involved, only two were filled by persons who were not graduates of a university, college, or higher commercial, technical, or normal school. Among the schools concerned, Tokyo University, and especially its Law School, was predominant. Sixty-two ministerial posts—some forty-one per cent of the total—were filled by the graduates of this single university. The universities with the next highest number of Cabinet graduates were Waseda and Kyoto, each of which had approximately fourteen per cent of the total.

A comparable analysis of the career backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers is more difficult. All the persons we are examining are, at this stage of their careers, primarily politicians. Their earlier careers are harder to characterize. Many have had several different types of employment and have combined these with political activities in varying proportions. Judgments about the dominant strain in a man's professional background will, therefore, differ. One recent survey of Cabinets since 1954, however, concludes that about thirty-five per cent of those holding ministerial posts have had primarily bureaucratic backgrounds, as career members of the national civil service, that another twenty-eight per cent might best be characterized as career politicians, while

twenty-three per cent came from the ranks of business and another twelve per cent had once been journalists. It is thus easy to understand the formula for political success commonly advanced in postwar Japan, i.e., that the path to the top leads from *Ichiko*, Tokyo's famous First Higher School, through the Law Department of Tokyo University, into the higher ranks of the national bureaucracy, and thence to the Cabinet. The relative prevalence of both Tokyo University graduates and ex-bureaucrats in recent Cabinets lends considerable plausibility to such a claim. In fact, the bureaucratic and, allegedly, undemocratic background of so many Cabinet Ministers is perhaps the most common and bitter complaint against recent political leadership encountered in Japanese circles today.

Another important aspect of Japanese Cabinets is the fact that the rate of turnover is very high. The average life of a Cabinet since the surrender has been only about ten months, and new Cabinets usually mean new faces. Only Prime Ministers and, occasionally, Foreign Ministers show any degree of longevity within the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is, in fact, under constant and strenuous pressure to rotate his Cabinet as rapidly as possible to accommodate an endless chain of the politically deserving. Ministerial status is widely regarded as the *summum bonum* of political life in Japan, and a successful Prime Minister, to preserve his own position, must spread these offices as widely as possible.

We now come to a deeper truth about political leadership in Japan. Since this merry-go-round of Ministers cannot readily hold the reins of power, political leadership actually resides with the Prime Minister, the leaders of the several factions in the majority party, and the somewhat more stable membership of the higher ranks of the professional bureaucracy. The backgrounds of these men are essentially like those already described for the Cabinet. Perhaps the most interesting thing

about them is their relative lack of conspicuousness. Only the Prime Minister stands forth prominently above the turbulent political waters. The factional leaders and the top bureaucrats operate largely below the surface. And below them lie still deeper levels of politicians and bureaucrats, whose range of influence remains largely conjectural. This covert and collective nature of the present political leadership in Japan, however, reflects one of the country's most venerable and tradi-

tional political characteristics. Throughout Japanese history, the people actually wielding political power have seldom been visible. They have usually been found in shifting combinations of groups and individuals lying several strata below the surface institutions of politics. The present combination of both visible power and real power in the person of the Prime Minister therefore represents a partial departure from the traditional arrangements.

# Decision-Making: The Organs of Government

## VII

The primary function of politics is to enable men to make and administer decisions in the realm of public affairs, an area which is variously defined by different societies. The machinery by which these decisions are formally made and administered is called government. Government provides both a mechanism for determining and administering public policies, and a process for bestowing legitimacy on the decisions and products of this mechanism. In practice, it does more than this; by providing a context and a structure for the making of official decisions, it also in time comes to influence the types of questions that are posed and of decisions that are made. Government—the formal political institutions of a society—thus interacts continuously with the broader and less formalized “political system” or “political process” of a given society.

The political system includes government, but also encompasses such unofficial components of a society’s decision-making apparatus as interest groups, the leadership structure, value systems, political style, etc. Since the government and the political system are inti-

mately linked and vitally affect each other, there is a constant struggle among interests and groups for control of some or all of the mechanisms of government. Whoever controls government controls the official apparatus for promulgating his views and promoting his interests and thus has a distinct advantage over his competitors. When reading the following exposition of the organization and functions of the Japanese government, keep in mind the stakes involved. Control of the machinery of government is the immediate issue in the political struggle in Japan. This machinery is the instrument of political achievement.

### The Constitution of Japan

Politics involves struggle and competition, and, to keep these within tolerable limits, societies agree on certain rules to regulate the game of politics. Some of these rules are adjudged to be more fundamental than others and are usually formulated into separate bodies of law known as constitutions. These regulations command greater status and veneration, are presumed to have more permanency, and are deliberately made harder

to change than the normal body of laws and ordinances.

Japan has in modern times had two constitutions. The first of these, usually known as the Meiji Constitution, was promulgated in 1889 and took effect in 1890. The second, known simply as the Constitution of Japan, was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and took effect six months later on May 3, 1947. Its origins were most unusual. These were the early days of the Allied Occupation, and General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), had, in effect, been charged with the democratization of Japan. The higher American officials involved in the Occupation generally agreed that the achievement of this goal would necessitate some rather substantial changes in the Meiji Constitution. The Japanese government was so informed, and, during the early months of the Occupation, the initiative was left in its hands. However, when by February, 1946, the committee established by the Japanese Cabinet to propose revisions in the Meiji Constitution showed no signs of recommending the types of democratic changes judged necessary by General MacArthur and his aides, the entire matter was secretly turned over to SCAP's Government Section, which was ordered to produce a model constitution incorporating the types of political changes General MacArthur considered necessary.

The decision to intervene directly and decisively at this time in the rewriting of the Japanese Constitution was probably due to the fact that the Far Eastern Commission, an international agency responsible for setting basic policies for the Allied Occupation of Japan, was scheduled to commence its activities in Washington on February 26, 1946. If the United States, or any of its agents such as SCAP, were interested in having a controlling voice in the contents of a new Japanese constitution, it was essential that they act before February 26. In fact, the decision to do so

seems to have been taken solely on General MacArthur's own authority in Tokyo, and the authorities in Washington appear to have known nothing about it until the first draft of the new Constitution was published in Japan on March 6, 1946.

In six days, between February 4 and 10, the Government Section produced, in English, the first draft of the present Japanese Constitution. This draft was first submitted to the Japanese at a small private meeting on February 13. During the nine days which followed, the draft was translated into Japanese, and sufficient pressure was brought upon the Japanese Cabinet to insure its reluctant adoption of this draft as its own. Thereafter, the Cabinet Draft—as it was now known—went through several revisions which resulted in some changes, largely minor in nature, after which it was submitted to the Imperial Diet as a proposal for the total amendment of the Meiji Constitution. After extensive debate, especially in the House of Peers, the bill of amendment was adopted by overwhelming majorities in both houses and subsequently promulgated by the Emperor. The circumstances were such that any other form of action by the Japanese was almost inconceivable. In this fashion, the present Constitution was drafted and put into effect.

The new Constitution, while almost twice as long as the Meiji Constitution, is reasonably brief as modern constitutions go—it consists of a preamble, 11 chapters, and 103 articles. The Constitution provides a system of government based essentially on a unique amalgam of British and American institutions (Fig. 7-1). It preserves the monarchy, but strips the Emperor of any semblance of political authority. It also retains a bicameral legislature, but completely reconstitutes the relationship and powers of the pre-war upper and lower houses. Superior legislative and financial powers are entrusted to the lower house. At the national level, executive and administrative authority is concentrated in a responsible Cabinet, and an independent American-style judiciary is vested with the power of judicial review. The Constitution places great stress on civil rights and includes what is probably one of the world's most detailed and




FIGURE 7-1 THE ORGANIZATION OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.  
(Adapted from Shokuinroku, 1960, Vol. I.)

ambitious constitutional statements of the rights and duties of the people. It further introduces into Japanese law for the first time the principle of local autonomy, involving decentralization of national power and a reciprocal increase in the rights and independence of local governments to a degree quite foreign to earlier Japanese practice.

One of the best-known and most controversial provisions of the Constitution appears in Chapter II, Article 9, the famous "renunciation of war" clause, whereby Japan renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, the Constitution seems to obligate Japan never to maintain land, sea, or air forces. This is the only known instance in which a major modern state constitutionally renounces war. The Constitution also specifically provides that it is the supreme

law of the land, and that no act contrary to its provisions shall have legal force or validity. Amendments to the Constitution require initiation by a two-thirds concurring vote of all members of both houses of the National Diet and ratification by the people through an affirmative vote by a majority of those participating in a referendum on the proposed amendment.

Taken all in all, this is an admirably democratic constitution. It introduces democratic rights, institutions, and practices into Japanese politics that undoubtedly go far beyond anything the Japanese themselves might realisti-



cally have been expected to establish, had they been left to their own devices. In fact, on the basis of text alone, it is a considerably more democratic document than is the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution is also a workable document, although it has flaws and does create problems. For example, any pronounced degree of local autonomy is probably impractical in Japan, judicial review has not proven particularly meaningful in practice, and some of the more ambitious civil and human rights and freedoms envisaged in Chapter III of the Constitution will probably long remain pious hopes rather than social or legal facts. On the other hand, the Diet, the Cabinet, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy are functioning with surprising efficiency along the general lines envisaged in the Constitution, and the country, operating under the Constitution, has successfully coped with most of its more pressing problems since 1947. Despite strong pressure from the conservative leadership to revise it in whole or part, the Constitution reads today as it did in 1947. No government has yet had the courage or the strength to launch an all-out campaign for its amendment. The fact that the 1947 Constitution stands unchanged, given its antecedents and the enormous political changes it imposed on a reluctant Japanese leadership—this is perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon of all. The Japanese have adopted a new and largely foreign set of political institutions with surprising ease and speed, and have so far displayed a considerable reluctance to exchange them for something more familiar and more Japanese.

Despite its lack of success to date, however, a strong revisionist sentiment continues to flourish, especially among the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party. They argue that the present Constitution does not really represent the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people," that it was imposed by foreigners, that it is 'un-Japanese in both spirit and

language, that it is poorly drafted, and that it needs changes in a number of particulars. Specifically, many of those who favor constitutional revision advocate such matters as a redefinition of the status of the Emperor, constitutional recognition of Japan's right of self-defense, some greater measure of limitation on individual rights when they conflict with the public interest, reforms in the composition and powers of the House of Councillors, the establishment of a special court to judge questions of constitutionality, an increase in the authority of the central government over the localities, and some easier system of constitutional amendment. None of these proposals tampers with the principle of popular sovereignty and none of them advocates—openly at least—any sort of across-the-board return to pre-war conditions. Most of the proposals are for fairly moderate reforms. An officially appointed Constitutional Investigation Commission has, since 1956, been carrying on an exhaustive investigation of the need for constitutional change, and the issue continues to be extremely controversial in Japanese political circles.

Finally, it should be noted that not all of the basic rules of Japanese politics are contained in the Constitution, which is supplemented in practice by a considerable number of basic laws. These put flesh onto the rather bare bones of the Constitution and prescribe the actual nature and operations of the country's primary political institutions. Examples of such laws are: the Imperial House Law, the National Diet Law, the Law of the Courts, the Cabinet Law, the Finance Law, the Public Office Election Law, and the Local Autonomy Law. Since these can be changed by normal statutes rather than by constitutional amendments, they add a desirable quality of flexibility to the structure of the state.

## The Emperor

As we have seen, in postwar Japan the Emperor has only a symbolic role in the Japanese political system. The Emperor does not have any specifically political or executive

functions of more than ritual or ceremonial importance. In the words of Article 1 of the Constitution:

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

The effect of this and the remaining articles of Chapter I is to deny the Emperor any "powers related to government" and to confine his official acts to such ceremonial functions as appointing the Prime Minister and Chief Judge of the Supreme Court (after they are designated by the Cabinet); promulgating laws, Cabinet orders, treaties, and amendments to the Constitution; convoking the Diet and dissolving the House of Representatives; attesting certain official appointments; awarding honors; receiving ambassadors and ministers; and performing certain other ceremonial functions. None of these involves any initiative, discretion, or influence on his part; he acts only at the behest of responsible governmental officials and in accordance with their decisions.

The Emperor is systematically informed about affairs of state and official policies, but his opinion about them is not formally solicited. Conceivably, on a few issues affecting the Imperial Family or in a moment of national crisis such as that posed in August, 1945, over the question of Japan's surrender—in which he did play a positive and critical role—the Emperor could exert influence, but this would be purely a function of his personal and institutional prestige. He has no legal or theoretical right to do so, and thus his official position is far weaker than that of the British monarch. Technically, he is not even "chief of state," but merely a "symbol of the state," a phrase which the conservative advocates of constitutional revision would like to change. Under these circumstances, the danger that the Emperor will once again become an effective screen for or political instrument of a revived militarist or ultra-nationalist faction seems remote.

The composition of the Imperial Family is rigidly and narrowly defined by law. It is limited to the legitimate and direct descendants of an Emperor. Adoption is not permitted

within the Imperial Family. At present, the Imperial Family consists only of the reigning Emperor and his family plus the families of his three brothers. Succession to the throne is by the eldest son of the Emperor, followed by the eldest son of the eldest son. Matters of succession and regency are regulated by an Imperial House Council, which is completely controlled by ex officio members representing popularly responsible representatives of the legislature, the Cabinet, and the Supreme Court. Before the war, the Imperial Family was extremely wealthy in its own name; its critics, in fact, sometimes referred to it as "the greatest of the *zaibatsu* (cartels)." Since 1947, it has been stripped of the great bulk of its extensive holdings, save for personal property, and is supported primarily by sums voted annually by the National Diet—in 1960 it appropriated about 475,000,000 yen (\$1,319,444) to cover the expenses of the privy purse, the Imperial Family, and the Imperial household.

It would be a serious mistake to conclude that because of his purely ceremonial position and negligible governmental powers the Emperor does not play a very important role in the Japanese political system. A nation needs powerful, loyalty-begetting symbols about which to forge its national unity. The absence of such a nationally shared emotional rallying point is one of the greatest problems confronting many of the new states of Asia and Africa. For Japan, such a focus is provided pre-eminently by the Imperial Family. It symbolizes two thousand years of "Japaneseness," of the unity of the people and their culture. Under present circumstances, there is nothing that can readily or effectively take its place. Its role is not to be discounted nor lightly discarded, and many thoughtful Japanese are, therefore, understandably troubled by the low regard in which the Imperial institution is held by important segments of Japanese youth.

## The National Legislature

The Constitution describes the Diet or parliament of Japan as "the highest organ of state power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State." It further states that the Diet shall consist of two houses, a House of Representatives (or lower house) and a House of Councillors (or upper house). These provisions are basic, and their significance becomes most apparent when we compare them with the comparable clauses of the Meiji Constitution. Under the terms of that document, the Emperor was more than the highest organ of state power; in a mystical way, he embodied the state and wielded its sovereign powers. And while laws, formally, were the product of the Imperial Diet, both the Emperor and the Cabinet had the power to issue decrees which had the force of law. The present Constitution vests sovereignty in the people and makes the Diet both the highest organ of the people's sovereignty and the sole source of law. These changes are basic to both the legal and the power structure of the Japanese state. The government has thus been transformed from an Emperor-centered to a parliament-centered mechanism, and the elected representatives of the people have become vastly more powerful.

The organization and powers of the two houses of the Diet differ considerably. The House of Representatives is a body of 467 members who are returned from 118 districts by an electoral system that has already been described. Its members are, in theory, elected for four-year terms, but in practice no postwar Diet has survived that long without dissolution by the Cabinet. Actual terms between general elections have ranged from six and one-half months to three years and eight months. The tenure of members is thus indeterminate, and depends in practice on the

relationship between the lower house and the Cabinet as well as on the internal political situation of the lower house.

The organization of the House of Representatives is quite simple. A Speaker, normally chosen from the ranks of the majority party, presides over its deliberations and maintains order. There is also a Vice-Speaker, who is frequently selected from among the membership of the opposition party. For deliberative purposes, the House functions either in plenary session or in committees. Under American influence, the latter have become the more important mode of operation. In 1960, there were some sixteen standing committees, with functions largely paralleling the principal divisions of the government's administrative organization, e.g., foreign affairs, finance, justice, education, agriculture, local administration, budget, audit, etc. A Ways and Means Committee and a Committee on Discipline deal with problems of internal house-keeping. Members are assigned to these committees, and their chairmanships are allocated in accordance with the relative party strengths in the House. Assignments are actually made by the parties. Special committees also exist on a temporary basis to deal with particular problems. The members each have a private secretary provided at public expense, and the House as a whole is serviced by an administrative and custodial staff numbering upwards of 1,500 in 1960. The majority of these are organized into a Secretariat and a Bureau of Legislation. The National Diet Library also supplies reference and legislative services to the members of both houses.

The upper house or House of Councillors is constituted along somewhat different lines. Originally, the American Occupation authorities favored a unicameral legislature, and the first draft of the Constitution was written in this fashion. The Japanese leadership objected strenuously to this proposal, however, and favored an appointive upper house or a corporative one representing the professions and selected portions of the electorate. The present House of Councillors represents a somewhat unsatisfactory compromise between these two viewpoints. It consists of 250 members popu-

larly elected from two different types of constituencies. One hundred and fifty are chosen from forty-six electoral districts—collectively called local constituencies—which are coterminous with the prefectures. The number of seats controlled by any one prefecture is roughly proportional to its population and varies from two for the smallest to eight each for Tokyo and Hokkaido. The remaining hundred members are chosen from the national constituency, which is to say that all Japan is regarded as a single electoral district where these members are concerned.

The terms of members are set at six years, and, since the upper house cannot be dissolved, its members usually serve for their full period. Terms are staggered, however, and in practice one-half the membership in the categories described above is chosen at elections held at regular three-year intervals. In such elections, each elector votes twice, once for a candidate running in his local constituency and once for a candidate running in the national constituency. The justification advanced for this unusual and complicated system is that it combines the advantages of informed local representation with those of a panel of nationally eminent candidates. It has not actually worked out in this fashion, however. While some men of truly national stature are elected from the national constituency, the bulk of those so chosen probably represent organizations having branches or influence in several heavily populated areas of Japan, e.g., labor unions, big business, and nationally organized interest groups. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising to find that the upper house has become practically as partisan a body as the lower house. Few independents are elected to either body; the great majority of the successful candidates run as party nominees. The party composition of the upper house closely resembles that of the lower, with the Liberal Democrats controlling in recent years slightly less than two-thirds of the total membership and the combined progressive forces slightly more than one-third. The internal organization of the upper house closely parallels that already described for the lower house.

The relations between the upper and lower houses of the Diet are prescribed by both law and the Constitution, which combine to make the House of Representatives far stronger than the House of Councillors. For example, the lower house may enact a law against the opposition of the upper house by passing it a second time by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present. Normally, however, legislative differences between the two houses are resolved by an inter-house conference committee. Again, on such important matters as the enactment of the budget, the selection of the Prime Minister, or the ratification of treaties, the House of Representatives can, against the Councillors' opposition, decide the issue by a simple majority vote. As a consequence, the legislative and political roles of the upper house have been distinctly subordinate to those of the lower house in both law and practice. Serious disagreements between the two houses do not often occur, however, and bills are normally processed by both without recourse to the above expedients. Under these circumstances, some Japanese feel that the upper house, as presently constituted, makes little if any positive contribution to the political process. This has led in recent years to arguments for its reform or reconstitution, particularly along corporative lines—i.e., by having it be composed of representatives of the professions and other elements of the electorate.

The operations of this bicameral legislature are too complicated to admit of more than summary treatment. Its principal function is, in theory, the making of laws. It is, the Constitution says, the sole law-making organ of the state. In practice, however, few laws of any significance originate in either house of the Diet. The vast majority are initiated and drafted in bill form by bureaucrats serving in the Ministries and other administrative branches of the government. Some originate with the Cabinet, and some are initiated by

the policy research committees of the political parties, which often work in collaboration with civil servants experienced in the field concerned. A recent survey of some 1,890 bills enacted into law by postwar Diets showed that 1,341 (70 per cent) were public bills, that is, they were introduced into the Diet and officially sponsored by the Cabinet, while only 549 (30 per cent) were private or members' bills, and of these many were actually initiated and drafted by bureaucrats or party sources and turned over to an individual Diet member for sponsorship and formal introduction.

In fact, therefore, the Diet and its members do not actually make many laws. They take projects of law originating elsewhere and then examine, debate, and publicize them; sometimes they amend them, and eventually they enact many of them into law. This is not far different from what other major legislative bodies actually do in most Western democracies. In this system, the most important legislative deliberations and decisions take place in the standing committees; plenary sessions usually just ratify such prior committee decisions. Party discipline is exceedingly strict on legislative matters, and the members of any given party almost always vote as a solid bloc in committee and in the Diet. Given the so-called one and one-half party system with its strong Liberal Democratic majorities in both houses, therefore, there is seldom any doubt as to the fate of a bill, once it has been brought to a vote. The opposition is very skillful in the use of obstructionist techniques, however, and the real problem is often how to bring a proposal to a decisive vote.

The Diet has other important functions in addition to legislation. Japan has a parliamentary system of government in most respects, and the Prime Minister must be selected from among the members of the Diet—in practice, from the lower house—by a formal resolution of the Diet. The House of

Representatives alone has the right to vote lack of confidence in the Cabinet and thus to bring about either its resignation or a dissolution of the House and a general election. The Constitution also entrusts the ultimate and sole authority to raise and spend money for public purposes to the Diet. All taxes that are levied and all payments from public funds must be authorized by law. Both of these activities are provided for annually in the national budget bill and its several supplements. These constitute the government's over-all income and expenditure plan for the year. Budget bills must be submitted first to the House of Representatives, where they receive the most extensive and careful of scrutinies. Probably no regular activity of the Diet is considered to be of more importance than its approval of the budget. Strangely enough by American standards, the houses usually attempt to raise rather than cut the estimated expenditures approved by the Cabinet. The Diet is also responsible for approving the government's settled accounts. An independent Board of Audit examines these for accuracy and legality, and its report must finally be examined and accepted by the Diet. Finally, both houses of the Diet have been given investigative functions by the new Constitution. They are empowered to appoint special committees which can call and hear witnesses and demand records in matters relating to the efficiency or honesty of government. The Diet in this way is supposed to exercise a continuing supervisory function over the quality of governmental performance.

This legal and organizational description of the National Diet does not, however, convey an adequate picture of its actual operations and its role in the larger political system. It has several other characteristics which should be noted. First, its internal political alignments reflect, of course, the relative strengths of the various political parties. The government party, currently the Liberal Democrats, controls almost two-thirds of the seats in both houses through the unremitting application of a rigorous system of party discipline over its Diet members. As a consequence, it can dominate proceedings both in committees

and on the floor whenever it wants to. The Socialist opposition parties are thus relegated to the difficult and trying position of a seemingly permanent minority. This creates very serious strains on normal parliamentary procedure. The dilemma for members of the opposition is this: what should they do when the government party attempts to enact a piece of legislation which runs directly counter to what they consider to be the vital interests of their party or the Japanese people? Their chance of coming to power themselves by normal electoral means seems negligible in the foreseeable future. Should they then abide by normal parliamentary practice and allow the Liberal Democratic majority to pass the legislation in question, or should they have recourse to filibustering and obstructionist tactics, climaxed perhaps by riots and the use of violence both on the floor of the Diet and in the streets?

In practice, when the stakes seemed important enough, they have chosen violence and the non-parliamentary path. In 1954, 1956, and 1959-60 in particular, they have engaged in systematically planned campaigns involving the use of violence on the floor and in the corridors of the Diet in desperate attempts to prevent the enactment of legislation affecting the powers of the police, the composition of local boards of education, and the revision of the security treaty between the United States and Japan. These are merely the most dramatic instances of minority obstructionism. The "confrontation," as it is called, of Socialist against Liberal Democratic policies in the Diet is continuous and bitter in the extreme. This is one of the most conspicuous and worrisome of the characteristics of the Japanese Diet. A sizable segment of its members are not really committed to the use of the parliamentary process.

A second characteristic is the rather close relationship that exists between the permanent committees of the Diet—which perform its most important legislative functions—and the Ministries and agencies charged with corresponding interests, e.g., the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of the same name, and the Committee on

Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. It is widely claimed that what are often called "clientele relationships" have been established which tend in practice to be controlled by the bureaucrats. This troubles those who believe that the professional bureaucracy in Japan tends to be an anti-democratic force and who conceive of the people's representatives in the Diet as providing an effective means of supervision and control over the Civil Service. This is, however, perhaps but another way of saying that in Japan, as in most modern states, the government is not in fact "parliament-centered," regardless of what the Constitution and basic laws may stipulate. The concerns and needs of a political system today have grown too vast, too complex, and too specialized for any body of elected popular representatives to provide effective control over anything but the broadest outlines of policy. We live in the day of the administrative state, and this is as true in Japan as it is in England, Russia, and the United States.

## The Cabinet

The Constitution vests executive power in the Cabinet. This is a group of political leaders, seventeen in number in 1962, headed by the Prime Minister. The Constitution requires that all members of the Cabinet be civilians and that a majority of their number, including the Prime Minister, be members of the Diet. In practice, this has meant that the overwhelming majority of the members of all Cabinets under the 1947 Constitution, invariably including the Prime Minister, have been chosen from the membership of the House of Representatives. A few—seldom more than three or four—might also be drawn from the upper house or from circles outside the Diet. The Prime Minister is selected by a formal resolution of the Diet.

On such occasions, it is customary for the several parties represented in the Diet to place the names of their respective leaders in nomination for the post. A majority of those present and voting is required for selection, and

Industry, Transportation, Postal Services, Labor, Construction, and Local Autonomy. The remainder lack "portfolios" or Ministries and are called Ministers of State. Actually, jobs such as the vice-premiership; the chair-

TABLE 7-1 *Brief Chronology of Postwar Japanese Cabinets*

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Prime Minister <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Terms</i>
Aug. 17, 1945–Oct. 9, 1945	Higashikuni Naruhiko	
Oct. 9, 1945–May 22, 1946	Shidehara Kijuro	
May 22, 1946–May 24, 1947	Yoshida Shigeru	First
May 24, 1947–Mar. 10, 1948	Katayama Tetsu	
Mar. 10, 1948–Oct. 15, 1948	Ashida Hitoshi	
Oct. 15, 1948–Feb. 16, 1949	Yoshida Shigeru	Second
Feb. 16, 1949–Oct. 30, 1952	Yoshida Shigeru	Third
Oct. 30, 1952–May 21, 1953	Yoshida Shigeru	Fourth
May 21, 1953–Dec. 10, 1954	Yoshida Shigeru	Fifth
Dec. 10, 1954–Mar. 19, 1955	Hatoyama Ichiro	First
Mar. 19, 1955–Nov. 22, 1955	Hatoyama Ichiro	Second
Nov. 22, 1955–Dec. 23, 1956	Hatoyama Ichiro	Third
Dec. 23, 1956–Feb. 25, 1957	Ishibashi Tanzan	
Feb. 25, 1957–June 12, 1958	Kishi Nobusuke	First
June 12, 1958–June 18, 1959	Kishi Nobusuke	Second
June 18, 1959–July 19, 1960	Kishi Nobusuke	Third
July 19, 1960–Dec. 8, 1960	Ikeda Hayato	First
Dec. 8, 1960–July 18, 1961	Ikeda Hayato	Second
July 18, 1961–July 18, 1962	Ikeda Hayato	Third
July 18, 1962–	Ikeda Hayato	Fourth

<sup>a</sup> All Prime Ministers except Katayama Tetsu have represented conservative political parties.

thus the post goes to the leader of the majority party or majority coalition in the lower house. The vote in the lower house is controlling and overrides any contrary decision that might be made in the upper house.

Once chosen, the Prime Minister then selects the other members of the Cabinet. Their numbers vary somewhat, and have ranged in recent years from fifteen to seventeen or eighteen. All are technically of equal rank but actually only twelve have "portfolios," that is, they preside over departments called Ministries: the Ministers of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Welfare, Agriculture and Forestry, International Trade and

manship of the Atomic Energy Commission; the director-generalships of the Administrative Management Agency, the Defense Agency, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Science and Technics Agency; or the chief secretaryship of the Cabinet are often parceled out among them. Although legally free to choose whom he wants to serve in his Cabinet, a Prime Minister is politically obligated to apportion these posts so as to maximize the support behind his own position. A very delicate weighing and balancing operation is involved. Once having selected his colleagues, the Prime Minister is also free to remove them from office at his discretion, provided, of course, that his political position is firm enough to survive the consequences. Strong Prime Ministers like Mr. Yoshida have both appointed and removed large numbers of Ministers.

Since 1947, Prime Ministers have been more durable than Cabinets (Table 7-1). Mr. Yoshida presided over five different cabinets, for example, from 1946 to 1954, Mr. Hatoyama over three, Mr. Kishi over three, and Mr. Ikeda was on his fourth in late 1962. The average life of a Cabinet during this period was only ten months, but the average term in office of the Prime Ministers from 1947 through 1960 was twenty-five months, ranging from Mr. Ishibashi's brief two months to upwards of seven years for Mr. Yoshida. During this entire period, there has only been one Cabinet headed by a Socialist—the Katayama government, a weak Socialist-conservative coalition that lasted for nine and one-half months in 1947–48. All the rest have been led by conservative politicians.

Cabinets fall, and new Cabinets arise, for complex reasons. Since the conservative dominance has been so complete, parliamentary successes by the opposition party or formal votes of lack of confidence in the lower house have seldom brought down a Cabinet. More often, intra-party and inter-factional differences on policy or personnel matters within the conservative camp make some reconstitution of the Cabinet advisable. Public dissatisfaction over government policy or scandals involving high party or governmental officials—cleverly nourished and exploited by the opposition—have also been common causes of the dissolution of Cabinets. And there is constant factional and intra-party pressure on all Cabinets to step aside in favor of other deserving colleagues. This pressure is so strong on any Prime Minister that frequent Cabinet changes are almost the necessary political price for his own continuance in power. This lack of stability at the Cabinet level does not, however, mean that there is a comparable instability in major national policies. The offices are rotated within the same party or at least within the general conservative camp. The Prime Ministership, and to some extent the Foreign Ministership, does not change with the same frequency. And the vice-ministers, who for the most part actually run the Ministries and agencies, are usually career civil servants of long service and experience. These

factors make for a considerable amount of policy stability in what otherwise might seem a highly unstable situation.

The Cabinet's functions might be described as both formal and informal. Some of the latter have already been mentioned. Under the guidance of the Prime Minister, for example, it serves as a leadership element for the political party or coalition of parties upon whose support its position depends. Again, Cabinets provide a vehicle for the recognition and reward of loyal or able party service. These are important functions, although less frequently noted than are its formal legal responsibilities. Chief among the latter is its role as the highest executive authority in Japan. It is the Cabinet that is by law responsible for such major executive tasks as preparing and submitting the annual budget—which means, essentially, planning the over-all activities of the state for the coming year—managing the nation's foreign and domestic affairs, administering the Civil Service and controlling the administrative branches of the government, submitting bills to the Diet, executing the laws, and regularly informing the Diet and the people of the state of the nation. It is thus a form of collective chief executive. And, since the Diet is actually incapable of providing policy guidance, its authority also extends to the formulation, or at least advance approval, of practically all major policies of state. Beyond this, it performs a number of other functions. It issues Cabinet orders in pursuance of law, it convokes extraordinary sessions of the Diet, advises the Emperor about the dissolution of the Diet and the proclamation of general elections, and appoints the justices of the Supreme Court. The Cabinet, therefore, possesses practically all the major leadership or executive powers of state at the national level.

Under the present Constitution, Japanese Cabinets exercise their formidable powers through a system of collective responsibility,



that is, all members of the Cabinet are jointly responsible for any policy or decision officially taken by the Cabinet. In practice, this means that the Cabinet acts by consensus or unanimous decision—the traditionally approved way of making group decisions in Japan. Formal votes are rarely, if ever, taken. Issues are discussed until some general agreement is reached and this then becomes the decision of the Cabinet. Any member seriously dissenting from this decision is expected to resign or face dismissal by the Prime Minister.

The Cabinet's relationship with the Diet is, of course, one of the most important aspects of any Cabinet's activities, especially since the Constitution has deliberately made them mutually interdependent. The relations between the House of Representatives and the Cabinet are particularly close. The House of Councillors, since it cannot be dissolved and has but secondary and inferior powers, stands in somewhat different circumstances. The Cabinet is, to begin with, the creature of the Diet—ultimately of the lower house—through the Diet's power to select the Prime Minister. Cabinet members are further made responsible to the Diet through their duty to attend sessions of both houses and their committees and to reply to questions about their policies when officially requested to do so by Diet members. Again, the Diet is legally free to accept, amend, or reject bills submitted by the Cabinet—in practice they accept the great bulk of them—or to grant or refuse the funds which are necessary for the implementation of the Cabinet's programs.

Either house of the Diet is also free to level resolutions of impeachment against individual Cabinet members, while the lower house may adopt a resolution of no confidence or reject a resolution of confidence in the Cabinet as a whole, or refuse to support some major piece of legislation sponsored by the Cabinet—which amounts to a vote of lack of confidence. A vote of no confidence or the

refusal to pass major Cabinet-backed bills are the most drastic means at the disposal of the lower house for the enforcement of ministerial responsibility to the will of the house. A formal expression of lack of confidence automatically presents the Cabinet with two choices—it must, within a ten-day period, resign en masse or it must dissolve the House of Representatives and call for a general election to select the members of a new House. If it does the latter, the Cabinet must still resign upon the first convocation of the new Diet after the election, leaving the members of this new Diet free to reinstate or replace the former Prime Minister as they see fit. These are all devices for insuring the responsibility of Cabinets to the Diet.

Responsibility runs both ways in this relationship, however. Since the members of the Cabinet are high party officials and dispensers of patronage through both legislative and administrative channels, they have substantial influence over the actions of at least their own majority party or coalition in the Diet. They can usually advance or hamper the political careers of individual members. In practice, too, party discipline is rigorously enforced against their delegations holding seats in the Diet. Serious backbench insurrections against Cabinet leadership—as distinguished from inter-factional squabbles—are practically unknown in the Japanese Diet. The ultimate weapon of the Cabinet against a refractory lower house, however, is the power of dissolution, which has the consequence of forcing all members to stand for re-election. Election campaigns are very costly in Japan, and the outcome is by no means always certain. Members of the House of Representatives do not lightly court the expense and uncertainty following upon dissolution and a new general election. To be sure, it is a cost and risk shared by the majority of the Cabinet itself, who are members of the lower house, but their financial connections are apt to be superior and their seats safer than the average. Considerations of this sort tend to make Diet members follow the Cabinet's leadership and loyally support its programs both in committee and on the floor of the house. What problems

occur in the ranks of the majority party are almost always the result of factional intrigues and maneuvering.

In executive-legislative relationships, therefore, the Cabinet is the dominant element. This does not imply, however, that the Cabinet by itself provides the ultimate leadership of the Japanese state, for the Cabinet's legal or formal role is qualified in several ways. One of the most important checks against unbridled Cabinet power is the existence of dissident factions within the majority party. To succeed, a Liberal Democratic Cabinet must maintain a delicate balance among what the Japanese call the "mainstream" factions (composed of party members who support the Prime Minister). In setting policy or making decisions, the Cabinet must always take into account the interests of these groups as well as those of the "anti-mainstream" factions (composed of members who, while belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party's delegation in the Diet, are opposed to its present leadership and are promoting their own candidate for the Prime Ministership). The Cabinet is thus subject to continuous influence and partial controls from elements within its own party. For quite different reasons, the Cabinet is also constantly influenced by the "advice" of the professional bureaucracy. The major Ministries of state are headed by career civil servants with the title of Vice-Minister. This group meets regularly and frequently with the Director of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Director of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation as a sort of "little cabinet"—and it is far better informed about most matters of policy and administration than are the members of the Cabinet.

As technicians operating in highly technical fields, these bureaucrats decide a great many matters, which are then sent up for fairly routine approval by the Cabinet proper. In this manner, the professional bureaucracy, through its own leaders, exercises a very considerable influence on many Cabinet actions. To some extent, this influence is counterbalanced by the extensive professional and technical staff that is attached directly to the Prime Minister. Known as the Office of the

Prime Minister, this staff contained upwards of 23,000 employees at the beginning of 1960. It serves as a professional staff for the Cabinet and somewhat reduces the Cabinet's dependence on the bureaucracy in the regular Ministries and agencies. In sum, primary political power in contemporary Japan rests with the Cabinet, and in particular with the Prime Minister; they probably perform more decision-making of major importance than any other formal unit of government. But, as we have seen, they are subject to constant interaction with and substantial influence from several other official and unofficial groups. There is no simple answer to this question of political primacy.

## The Bureaucracy

Ever since the Meiji Restoration of 1867–68—which might itself be described as a sort of bureaucratic *coup d'état*—the importance of the bureaucracy has bulked very large in the Japanese political system. The founders of modern Japan were not themselves democrats and they were not particularly concerned to establish a "civil service" in our sense of the term, that is, a politically neutral, professionalized service dedicated to the achievement of democratically set goals by means determined and supervised by the representatives of the people. The conception of a bureaucrat as a "public servant" was almost totally absent from both Japanese political theory and practice until it was inserted in Article 15 of the new Constitution by Americans in 1946. Before 1946, a Japanese bureaucrat was officially viewed as a chosen servant of the Emperor, a politically and socially superior being who derived status and privileges from his Imperial connection. The old Tokugawa adage, *kanson mimpi* ("officials honored, the people despised"), well describes the pre-war bureaucrat's attitude toward the

public. A tradition of this depth and intensity dies hard. Despite a number of postwar reform attempts, there is little evidence today that the average "bureaucrat" has successfully negotiated the transition to the status of "public servant."

As in many other countries, postwar times brought to Japan an enormous inflation in the size of her bureaucracy. Just before the war in 1940, for example, if we exclude the military and certain temporary employees, the Japanese national government had 231,898 employees. In 1960, the comparable figure was 1,428,049, a more than fivefold increase (Table 7-2). In 1960, the over-all size of the bureaucracy in Japan—including the civilian employees of both national and local governments and the military—was in the neighborhood of 3,000,000 persons; thus roughly one out of every fourteen members of the labor force worked for the government. This is a very sizable number, but for our purposes it is the higher civil service which is important. These higher civil servants may be loosely defined as those individuals who attain the first, second, or third grades in the administrative service. In 1960, there were only 4,525 such positions in the entire national government, of which perhaps half are really important. Access to these positions is usually restricted to persons who pass the higher Civil Service examinations. The higher bureaucracy is thus not a very large group; it probably numbers in all somewhere around four thousand people, and replenishes itself at a rate of slightly more than two hundred members at the bottom per year. Its training and preparation are rigorous.

Government service has always been and still is today regarded as one of the most desirable careers open to young Japanese. Access to its higher levels is achieved by an outstanding academic record. Influential connections also help. In elementary school, the brighter students are constantly faced with

TABLE 7-2 *Japanese Governmental Employees*<sup>a</sup>

A. National Government Employees

Fiscal year	Total		General account (except National Defense Agency)		Special accounts	Government corporations
	Total	National Defense Agency	National Defense Agency	National Defense Agency		
1949	1,567,638	—	424,408	495,503	647,727	
1950	1,578,585	75,100	431,813	498,922	572,750	
1951	1,488,401	75,100	428,000	493,124	492,177	
1952	1,507,345	118,953	413,678	335,505	639,209	
1953	1,528,442	123,153	416,849	339,918	648,522	
1954	1,503,334	164,540	347,083	334,139	657,572	
1955	1,535,810	195,811	340,709	335,031	664,259	
1956	1,565,248	215,004	340,657	338,938	670,649	
1957	1,580,264	223,502	341,213	341,042	674,507	
1958	1,627,240	242,718	352,279	353,955	678,288	
1959	1,665,868	254,800	362,087	366,932	682,049	
1960	1,691,254	263,205	358,649	380,914	688,486	

B. Local Government Employees (1958)

Classification	Total	Prefectures	Five large cities	Other cities	Towns and villages
Total	1,217,429	612,208	92,578	305,219	207,424
Regular personnel	1,112,624	559,586	87,162	267,523	198,353
General	877,198	340,270	82,735	259,330	194,863
School	26,681	20,602	889	2,793	2,397
Fire defense	32,603	7,251	6,714	17,301	1,337
Enterprises	82,971	24,476	33,330	24,938	227
Officials	434,127	164,280	20,860	116,573	132,414
Others	300,816	123,661	20,942	97,725	58,488
Education	113,999	97,889	4,427	8,193	3,490
Police	121,427	121,427	—	—	—
Temporary workers	104,805	52,622	5,416	37,696	9,071

<sup>a</sup> *Nihon Tokei Nenkan*, 1960.

the necessity of getting the highest possible grades in an endless series of difficult examinations. Brilliant performances in these provide entrance to the best high schools and ultimately to the best universities. The equivalent of an honors degree from a good university is particularly essential to anyone hoping to take and pass the higher Civil Service examinations. A few universities in pre-war times acquired a practical monopoly over access to these higher positions. The elite of the pre-war administrative service, for example, consisted of those who took and passed the higher Civil Service examination while still students, then graduated from Imperial universities, and went on to achieve the first or second grades of the Civil Service. Among these, 92 per cent were graduates of Tokyo Imperial University's Law Department and four per cent of Kyoto Imperial's Law Department.

The tests were largely set and graded by members of the law faculties of these schools, and their graduates, once in the higher services, were given preferential status and advancement by their fellow alumni of earlier classes and higher rank. This situation has improved since the war. One now encounters many more graduates of Kyoto, Waseda, Keio, Hitotsubashi, Nihon, and other colleges, but a pronounced "old-school tie" prejudice, still fostered by a Tokyo University clique, is readily discernible. In 1954, for example, 76.6 per cent of all Japanese higher civil servants were graduates of Tokyo University. It should also be noted that the courses of study and tests leading to a Civil Service career have been somewhat broadened in comparison with their excessively narrow and legalistic pre-war counterparts. A heavy emphasis is still placed, however, on the applicant's ability to recall legal and technical details.

A college graduate who has passed the higher Civil Service examinations normally enters the service as a sixth-grade employee. If possible, he will choose one of the more important Ministries that has promotional paths leading to the heart of political and administrative power in the Japanese system, and which may lead, after retirement, to a lucrative post in private business or perhaps to an elective political career. Since retirement comes early in most Ministries—at forty-nine or fifty on the average—and pensions are markedly inadequate, such post-retirement considerations are important. The most promising careers before the war lay in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Today, they are to be found primarily in the Ministry of Finance, and secondarily in the Ministries of International Trade and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, and, perhaps, in the recently re-established Ministry of Local Autonomy. To some, the Foreign Ministry is also attractive as a sort of special case.

Once having been accepted by a particular Ministry, the new civil servant's career is apt to lie largely within that Ministry. There is little lateral transfer between Ministries within the Japanese system, especially for the higher civil servants. Inter-Ministry rivalry and sus-

picion are acute, and administrative cooperation across ministerial boundaries is very difficult to achieve. Displays of individual initiative or brilliance on the part of junior employees are not highly valued. Loyalty and obedience to superiors, tact, anonymity, patience, and a capacity for the endless details and rituals of administration are the normal virtues. Personal and job security is complete; accountability to the public is practically nil. Yet, since the initial recruiting process is so rigorous and highly selective, intelligent and able men are obtained. And they normally move up with some rapidity toward the pinnacle of bureaucratic achievement, a vice-ministership.

The higher bureaucracy in Japan is deeply involved in politics for several reasons. First, such involvement is a solidly entrenched part of the Japanese tradition. Politics, even of the party variety, has been a prominent and constant concern of the higher administrators ever since the Restoration. Second, the fact that the national legislature is weak and ill-equipped to deal with the complex problems of a modern society has left a vacuum which bureaucratic expertise and enterprise has gladly filled. Third, in modern times, political decisions have become so inextricably mingled with problems of administration and technology that it is unrealistic to think of bureaucracy and politics as separate categories. The bureaucrats and specialists of Japan, for example, have a great deal to say about the incidence of taxation, the granting of licenses and permits, the determination of bank rates, the availability and allocation of credit and public subsidies, and the location and construction of public works. All of these are decisions which vitally affect the interests of important and organized sectors of the Japanese population—business, finance, labor, agriculture, etc. It is scarcely remarkable that these interests seek to influence critically placed bureaucrats, or that they try to reinforce this

influence by promises of sinecure jobs upon retirement, gifts of stock, lavish entertainment, or outright bribes. A good deal of corruption, on both major and minor scales, is present in such relationships. Proof lies in the annual reports of the Board of Audit, which showed in 1958 alone 355 cases of misappropriation of public funds totaling some 1,200,000,000 yen (\$3,333,333). The bureaucrats become involved in politics in this fashion, too.

But since the war, a fourth type of bureaucratic involvement in politics has become particularly notable. Upon retirement, substantial numbers of the higher bureaucracy have in recent years run for elective political office. In 1959, for example, 84 members of the lower house (18 per cent of the total membership) and 81 members of the upper house (32 per cent) were former career bureaucrats. In practically all cases, they were members of the Liberal Democratic Party. Again, some 35 per cent of the membership of the Cabinets holding office between 1954 and 1961 were former bureaucrats. These men have gained formal political status and power partially as a result of their own knowledge and ability. But they have often been greatly aided in doing so by the financial support of contacts made during their years of public service and the electoral support of groups associated with the work of their former Ministry. In this manner, large numbers of former bureaucrats—not noted as a group for their dedication to democratic causes—have gained Cabinet or parliamentary office. Once in office, their professional knowledge of particular aspects of government and their close connections with the bureaucracy have given them unusual prominence and influence. This might in some cases make for greater efficiency, but there is considerable concern in Japan about its effect on the democratic content and practice of government.

## Local Government

Prior to the effectuation of the new Constitution in 1947, Japan had an extremely centralized form of government, in two different senses. First, all political power was legally and theoretically concentrated in the person of the Emperor. Second, all political power was legally and actually concentrated at the national level; local governments enjoyed no autonomous rights. They were created and controlled by the national Government in Tokyo. The American authorities who controlled the Allied Occupation of Japan objected strenuously to the continuance of this system. Their political goal was the democratization of Japan, and they seem to have felt that democratic institutions and practices flourish in direct proportion to their closeness to the people. In other words, the Japanese system of government required drastic decentralization through the granting of extensive rights of local self-government to the prefectures, cities, towns, and villages of Japan. In this way, they could be made directly responsive to local desires and conditions and their democratic potential greatly enhanced.

Relatively little thought appears to have been given to any deleterious effects which such a decentralization of authority might have on the strength or efficiency of the national government. In fact, such a consequence was probably regarded as desirable. The result of such views on the part of the Occupation authorities was, first, the enshrinement of the principle of local autonomy in Article 92 of the new Constitution and, second, the enactment of the Local Autonomy Law on April 17, 1947. The combination of these with other related legislation provides the legal basis for the present system of local government in Japan. Judged by earlier Japanese standards, this is a highly decentralized system, although it is, of course, not as decentralized as the federally organized system that exists in the United States. Japan technically still has a unified system of government.

At its highest level below the nation, local government in Japan is organized into forty-

six prefectures (Fig. 7-2). The prefectures are governed, subject to national laws, by a popularly elected governor and a single-house legislature. The total territory of each prefecture is then further subdivided into cities, towns, and villages. These are the lowest units of self-government in Japan—with the exception of Tokyo's self-governing districts, which comprise a special case. There is nothing corresponding to our unincorporated territories in Japan. Each city, town, or village directly elects its own mayor and single-house assembly. All of these local governments, from the prefecture down, are semi-parliamentary systems, in which the chief executives and their assemblies are rendered mutually interdependent through their respective powers of dissolution and votes of non-confidence. The law also extends very considerable powers of local self-government to all these levels and units and, thereby, denies the exercise of such powers to agencies of the national government.

This is a brief description of the legal position of local governmental units in Japan. Their actual position deviates from this in several important respects. They are not really autonomous to anything like the degree anticipated by the law. In practice, local officials spend the bulk of their time administering the policies and business of the national Ministries at the local level. The laws and ordinances which they adopt are quite apt to be carbon copies of model statutes developed initially in Tokyo. Furthermore, few, if any, local governments are financially self-supporting. Twenty per cent or more of their essential revenues are normally derived from subsidies and grants-in-aid received largely from the national government. This pronounced degree of fiscal dependency plus the long-ingrained bureaucratic habit of looking to Tokyo and the national government for guidance detracts greatly from the actual degree of autonomy enjoyed by the prefectures, cities, towns, and villages of Japan.

greatly changed by the Occupation. Anglo-American common law principles were widely introduced into a system which had been largely European in derivation. The legal, civil, and political rights of Japanese citizens were greatly expanded; the government and its servants were made far more accountable for their actions; and, in general, a serious attempt was made to introduce into Japanese society the almost completely foreign principle of the rule of law. A series of basic reforms in the judicial system lay at the root of these attempts.

In pre-war Japan, the courts had been, in effect, an arm of the national government, administered by the Ministry of Justice. Under the Constitution of 1947, this was completely changed. Article 76 vests "the whole judicial power" in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. This provision creates a judicial branch of the government with an independent status that is substantially equal to that enjoyed by the legislative or executive branches. The Supreme Court is given complete administrative control over all inferior courts, and is further explicitly given the right of judicial review, that is, the power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act. The fifteen judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Cabinet, except for the Chief Judge who is appointed by the Emperor upon nomination by the Cabinet. The judges serve for life, subject to decennial referenda by the voters upon their records. Beneath the Supreme Court is a hierarchy of inferior courts ranging from 8 High Courts through 49 District Courts (with attached Family Courts) to 570 Summary Courts at the base of the pyramid. Together with a large number of civil and family conciliation commissions, each composed of one judge and two intelligent and experienced laymen and intended to provide facilities for the out-of-court settlement of disputes, these

## The Judicial System

The judicial system, like so many of the other institutions of pre-war Japan, was




FIGURE 7-2 THE STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

are the principal components of the present Japanese judicial system.

The courts, although in a technical sense they seem to be functioning reasonably well, do not play as important a role as might be expected. The Japanese are a rather remarkably non-litigious people. They are traditionally suspicious of the courts and of formal legal processes, and have a pronounced preference for settling disputes by informal methods of conciliation and mediation. These methods are highly developed, especially in the countryside, and normally recourse will be had to the courts only when the issue is very serious and these older folkish techniques of mediated settlement have failed.

From a political standpoint, few judicial issues have aroused more comment and controversy than the Supreme Court's American-inspired power of judicial review. This is completely foreign to the Japanese legal tradi-

tion and many have watched with interest to see whether or not the Supreme Court would actually make use of this power and occasionally declare an act of the Diet, of a Ministry, or of a local government unconstitutional, thus asserting its right to play a positive role in national politics in the way that the United States Supreme Court does. The latest available statistics show that, during the twelve-year period from 1947 to 1959, the Supreme Court considered 71 civil and 1,388 criminal appeal cases involving constitutional issues. In the civil, more political category, no ruling of unconstitutionality was handed down; in the criminal category, 232 judgments of unconstitutionality were reached, but all of them were related to legislation based on SCAP directives issued during the Occupation. No national or local law, ordinance, or regulation enacted since the end of the Occupation was declared unconstitutional during this period. In the light of such a record, it would seem highly improbable, under present circumstances at least, that the Supreme Court will ever make significant use of the power of judicial review.

# Governmental Performance

## VIII

Thus far we have been discussing what might be termed the "input" phase of Japan's governmental operations—the environmental and historical factors which condition the functioning of the government, the process by which those who influence or control its operations are selected, and the nature of the machinery by which decisions are made and administered. Yet, as with any productive process, one must ultimately be concerned with its product, with the "output" as well as the "input" phase of its operations. How effectively do the "products" of government meet the needs of the society's time and circumstances? How well do they satisfy the various demands that government must consider in its decisions? How do they affect the equilibrium of the political process itself? These are the tests by which a political system is ultimately judged both by its own members and by foreign observers. Let us then look briefly at this part of Japan's record.

In examining the output aspects of Japan's political system, what standards of evaluation should we apply? No very precise meas-

ure of accomplishment has been devised, and, consequently, we usually render our comparative political judgments in terms that are more resonant than they are accurate or informative. The problem is difficult, and we have no promising new formula to submit. But one thing we should definitely guard against is the facile tendency of many Westerners, and Japanese as well, to judge Japan's political performance against British or American standards of accomplishment—and even these not realistically stated but set forth in the idealized terms of the democratic theorist. Japan's modern political heritage and circumstances bear very faint resemblance to those of Great Britain or the United States. They are far closer to those of Italy or some of the more recently developing states of Eastern Europe.

If a society's cultural background, political history, and political forces are this different from those of the major democratic states of the West, we should not expect its political views and behavior to parallel those of these states. Yet this is precisely the assumption that is too often made by both foreigners and Japanese sitting in judgment on Japan's recent political record. Japan has an Asian culture and a primarily Asian heritage. Its significant



political associations with the West date back only about a hundred years. It is too much to hope that a hundred years of largely adverse political experience will soon, if ever, produce in Japan the type of democratic system that has been four hundred years or more in the making in Great Britain and the United States. It is far more fruitful and constructive to look on the Japanese political record as an example of what can happen to Asian and other underdeveloped societies and polities.

In describing the performance of a foreign political system, we who have always lived in a politically democratic society tend to concentrate on the degree to which the foreign system achieves certain fundamental values embodied in basic democratic theory. The phrase "popular and responsible government" sums up many of these values. In Japan's case, great pains have been taken to establish optimal conditions for the development of such a "popular and responsible government." To what extent has this been accomplished? Inevitably, the answer is complicated, and we perhaps had better examine first the "popular" element in the phrase and then the "responsible" element.

Few modern states can equal the scope of opportunities legally available to the Japanese people to vote for both national and local governments. The major political offices at all levels are elective, elections are held regularly, and the right to participate is as free and untrammelled by sex, age, residential, or other restrictions as one will find anywhere. Beyond this, a number of special methods of popular participation are provided for: popular plebiscites on constitutional amendments, regular referendums on Supreme Court judges, and rights of initiative and recall at the local level. Also, such informal types of political organizations as interest groups are rapidly increasing in numbers and importance and are assuming many of the forms familiar to us in the West.

The Japanese citizen has, therefore, numerous opportunities to participate in his political system, and he ordinarily makes good use of them. The Japanese voting rates, for example, are extraordinarily high, judged by either Asian or Western standards. But many Japanese and foreign observers ask: How well informed and how democratically meaningful is this high level of political participation? The answer has been disappointing. Factual studies indicate that in Japan—as in the United States, too, one should not forget—a great many voters and members of interest groups are primarily influenced by traditional loyalties, boss rule, communal solidarity, and other factors generally regarded as antipathetic to a democratic system. Japanese politics is thus a fascinating mixture of traditional, modern, democratic, and undemocratic elements. This mixture is to be found, incidentally, both in the conservative and in the more modern-appearing socialist camps, and it warns us against accepting this high rate of popular political participation as a sign of unqualified democratic performance.

When we come to evaluate the "responsibility" of Japanese governmental performance, we find that all the normal structural and procedural safeguards to insure that government is really responsible to the people have been elaborately built into the Japanese political system at all levels. These safeguards include elections, recall, referendums, initiative, votes of no confidence, rights of interpellation, governmental fiscal accountability, etc. Their introduction into what had been a distinctly oligarchical political system has appreciably increased the responsibility and accountability of Japan's elected political leaders to the public. Elected officials have become far more powerful in Japanese politics than they were before the war, and the importance of elections has risen correspondingly. To become Prime Minister or the governor of a prefecture or mayor of a town, a Japanese politician must usually run the gantlet of several successful election campaigns, and he obviously cannot flout or ignore public opinion as the pre-war leadership did. This increased need to win elections and to court public favor does

not tell the whole story, however. In practice, the elected leaders share political power with both the bureaucracy and the representatives of a variety of influential private interests. These two groups are not effectively responsible to public control in Japan, although to be fair, there are few political systems in which they are. In Japan, however, the relative weakness of the "public service" concept, the traditional ascendancy of group over popular interests, and the arbitrary spirit of the bureaucracy magnify these shortcomings in the degree of the government's responsibility to the people.

Since World War II, the Japanese government has displayed distinctly more interest in the economic than in the political aspects of its performance. There can be no doubt that its highest priority has been the economic rehabilitation and development of Japan. The reasons are self-evident. Postwar Japanese governments inherited a country devastated by bombing and blockade, an economy in shambles, a people in desperate need of food and jobs, and a world economic position and prospect that looked dire indeed. The enormity of the challenge was obvious. Successive governments, at first with Occupation prodding and assistance and, since roughly 1950, on their own initiative, have concentrated on improving the country's economic circumstances, and it is in this area that they have achieved their most spectacular successes.

One has only to look back to the situation in Japan at the end of the war to comprehend how dazzling the improvement in her economic conditions has been. In August, 1945, at least a quarter of the national wealth and a third of the nation's industrial machinery and equipment had been destroyed; production figures stood at about one-tenth the 1935-36 average. Inflation was rampant, and within a year prices for food and clothing on the free market rose from seventy to one hundred and forty times the pre-war averages. Expenditures for food comprised about eighty per cent of the total family budget, and the average city worker got only about 1,600 calories of food a day instead of the 2,150 calories required to keep him strong and healthy. People were

still living in air raid shelters, and necessities of every sort were in acutely short supply. The gross national product in 1947 was about \$3.6 billion.

In 1960, fifteen years after the end of the war, all major indexes of national and per capita prosperity had not only regained their pre-war averages but, in all cases, had greatly exceeded them. Japan's gross national product in fiscal 1960 was about \$36 billion. Her annual rate of economic growth, which had averaged 4.6 per cent for the years 1926-39, averaged 8.4 per cent for the twelve years from 1947 to 1958 and reached 15 per cent in 1959, one of the highest figures in the world. Japan's economic recovery since the war is rivaled only by that of West Germany, while her growth rate is superior to the rate claimed by such forced-draft and totalitarian economies as that of the Chinese People's Republic. This vast improvement in economic conditions is not only a statistic; it is reflected in the people's standard of living, which is now some thirty per cent above the best pre-war years. While it is still substantially below that of the United States and Great Britain, it is very high by Asian standards. What were once luxury items, quite unthinkable for the average budget, are now becoming commonplace—television sets, refrigerators, electric washing machines, high-quality foods, sizable quantities of meat and dairy products, etc. Even the body measurements of the Japanese have changed in response to an enriched diet and better living conditions; the average child is taller and more robust than were his parents. And his life expectancy is greater.

All these changes constitute basic improvements in the way of life of the average Japanese family. But they are not without their darker side. The incidence of economic prosperity has been uneven. Much of the labor force employed by medium and small-sized industries remains today in seriously depressed circumstances, as do many of that too-often

overlooked category of laborers known as "temporary employees." In recent years, the increase of prosperity in the countryside has lagged appreciably behind that in the cities. Another negative factor has been the government's failure effectively to regulate or police important aspects of the economy. The interests of the consumer and of the public are not infrequently slighted on behalf of some better-organized and more influential group, especially big business. A Fair Trade Commission has been established to police and regulate monopolistic practices, price-fixing, advertising, etc., but its powers are not extensive and its accomplishments to date, while helpful, leave much to be desired. A good deal remains to be done to distribute the benefits of Japan's present prosperity more equitably, but this should not be permitted to obscure the really remarkable improvements that have occurred in the basic economic circumstances of the Japanese people. It would be overly facile to assign the total credit for these to the Japanese government, but it would be equally wrong-headed to deny that effective political leadership has contributed heavily to the successes achieved.

Since the war, the government has also recognized an entirely new range of obligations in the field of social security. Before the war, the government took on very limited obligations in this area. It was primarily the duty of the family to support any of its members who became incapacitated because of injury, illness, old age, or adverse economic circumstances. In fact, much of the strength of the traditional family system derived from its role as a welfare agency. The new Constitution changed this situation. Article 25 states that "all people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" and that "in all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health." These are, of course, vague

statements, but they have served to make welfare and social security explicit responsibilities of the state.

The Japanese government has established a complex network of assistance programs which includes unemployment, health, old-age, survivors', seamen's and industrial accident insurance plans. These are supplemented by government-supported vocational guidance and training centers, employment exchanges, a child-welfare program, and aid for the physically handicapped. The sum of all these services scarcely amounts to a cradle-to-grave security program. Many of the programs, for example, are applicable only to the regular employees of establishments employing five or more workers, thus excluding the large portion of the labor force who happen to be engaged in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and service or family industries. Also, the financial benefits involved remain markedly inadequate to the needs of those concerned. Still, by 1956, upwards of twenty million persons were receiving some form of family or individual assistance under the Daily Life Protection Law, and more than thirty million were covered by National Health Insurance. By 1958, the government was devoting about twelve per cent of its annual budget to the support of social security and related matters. This represents rather commendable progress in a brief space of time, and a tremendous change over pre-war attitudes and practices.

Another basic concern of the postwar government has been public education. Here again, partially at the behest of the Occupation authorities, the changes since the war have been startling. The elementary and compulsory levels of education were well developed before the war, and the changes that have taken place have been largely designed to liberalize and democratize the system. At the higher levels, however, there have been great expansions of enrollment and changes in structure. In 1940, under the old system, there were a total of forty-seven universities with 81,999 students; by 1957, these figures had risen to 231 and 564,454, respectively. Because of structural changes in the system, these two sets of figures are not totally com-

parable, but they do give some indication of the expansion in the opportunities for higher education which have taken place in Japan. A higher proportion of the population attends college in Japan today than in almost any other country except the United States. Still, numerous problems remain. Critics of the regime complain bitterly that the government is trying to recentralize control of the educational system under the national Ministry of Education, that it is also trying to indoctrinate Japanese youth with traditional morality and nationalist sentiments through the reintroduction of so-called "morals courses," and that it is systematically repressing freedoms of speech and political opinion on the part of both teachers and students. The entire issue of politics in education is highly controversial and partisan, but, again, it should not be permitted to obscure the great advances which have taken place in this area.

Foreign relations constitute another major field of concern of the government. Actually, however, the Japanese did not take over responsibility for their own foreign policy until the end of the Occupation in April, 1952. Since then a succession of Liberal Democratic governments has tended to follow a policy of close relations with the United States and its Western allies, supplemented by a strong emphasis on the United Nations as a means of settling or ameliorating international disputes. Normally, the government has placed primary emphasis on economic development and the foreign trade upon which Japan's prosperity depends. Postwar governments have also been reluctant to build up Japan's military strength beyond a minimal level, or to push very strongly for the return of the small portion of Japan's lost pre-war territories which were considered to be domestic rather than imperial, i.e., Okinawa and the Bonins from the United States, and the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin from the U.S.S.R. The success enjoyed by these foreign policies has been variable. In the vital economic sphere, especially in the field of foreign trade, Japan has generally done well. She is normally able to obtain the raw materials she needs from overseas and to sell enough abroad to pay for them. Her problems in this

area are never-ending, however, and range from tariff and other discriminations against Japanese goods in foreign markets to the new forms of trade competition presented or threatened by the modernizing economies of her Asian neighbors.

It is far more difficult to determine her degree of success in the foreign-policy field. So much depends on future and unforeseeable developments. Yet, with American aid, Japan has been able to liquidate most of the political costs of defeat. The Treaty of San Francisco restored her to a condition of peace and equality with the majority of her former enemies. A diplomatic agreement with Russia in 1956, while less than a formal treaty of peace, renewed official relationships between the two countries. The negotiation of reparations agreements with her former enemies in South-east Asia has restored relations in this area. Only the Chinese People's Republic, North Korea, and North Vietnam continue to present serious problems in this respect. Beyond this, Japan has gained admission to the United Nations and participates in a normal number of international conferences and actions as a fully sovereign nation.

These are not negligible accomplishments for a country which was defeated in 1945 and occupied as recently as 1952. Still, Japan has regained none of her lost territories, and her government's basic policies on armaments and her pro-American and pro-Western alignment in the cold war have precipitated some of the most spectacular and deep-seated domestic controversies in her postwar history. It is difficult, therefore, to say how effective Japan's governmental performance has been in the foreign-policy area. Perhaps we should limit the verdict and only say that it has so far met and coped satisfactorily with its major and most pressing problems, albeit not to the satisfaction of a sizable segment of the Japanese population.

It would seem from the foregoing account

that the over-all output or performance of postwar Japanese governments has been reasonably good. But one would never reach this conclusion from reading the Japanese daily or periodical press or from talking with the majority of her intellectuals. The predominant impression to be gained from such sources is that practically all conservative governments are compounded from a recipe in which the principal ingredients are scurrility, rapacity, reaction, corruption, and inefficiency, and the record of the conservatives is condemned as reflecting such qualities. To a certain extent, this criticism is rooted in the normal irresponsibility of a partisan group not themselves in power. The political press in Japan has until recently been overwhelmingly anti-government in tone and often sympathetic to socialists and socialist causes. And many people actually believe all that is said about conservative politicians, professional bureaucrats, and big businessmen—the unholy trinity that many think really operates the government almost exclusively for its own benefit.

Behind this belief lies a certain amount of solid evidence. Japanese politics obviously suffers from considerable corruption, graft, and favoritism, and many conservative leaders do feel that Japan, under American influence, has swung too far away from her own past and native course of development. Since these conservative leaders would like to re-

store some of the older ways and institutions, many Japanese fear that today's conservatives are not significantly different in ideology or action from Japan's pre-war leaders. Opposition political leaders are frustrated because they feel they have been denied their role in the shaping of national political decisions.

The most important source of opposition, however, lies in the fact that there is a fundamental disagreement between conservatives and progressives over the proper goals, structure, and activities of the state. Japan's intellectuals are largely philosophical Marxists—among the most doctrinaire in the world—and thus tend to be practicing socialists in their politics. The conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen who control the Japanese government represent very different political views. Between the two lies a yawning chasm. While recognizing the shortcomings of the conservative governments and the justice of some of the charges against them, we should not overlook these governments' amazing records of solid accomplishment in many areas of basic concern to the Japanese people as a whole. There have been a number of fundamental, almost revolutionary, political changes in Japan since the war. They may have been largely initiated by the American Occupation, but they have been carried on by the Japanese people and their government.

# Problems and Prospects

## IX

It would be misleading to discuss Japan's political problems without first emphasizing the level of accomplishment the country has already achieved. Japan is a modern state, and this fact sets her apart from all other Asian countries. Her people are literate and fairly prosperous; her economy is specialized, complex, and advanced; her administration is skilled and professional; her citizenry are politically informed and, increasingly, politically involved as well; and her government is popularly elected and relatively responsive to majority demands. These are not commonplace attributes in contemporary Asia. They both mark the level of Japan's accomplishments and set the context of her present political problems.

Japan's two primary political problems concern the stability and the form of her political system. How stable is it? And, since some change is inevitable, will this be along democratic or authoritarian lines? Although we cannot give a precise answer to such complex questions, we can identify some of the factors that will undoubtedly determine the

ultimate answer in the years that are to come.

One problem that calls for a remedy is the rigid polarization of the political system between conservative and progressive extremes. The leaders of Japan's conservative forces are mostly elderly men of long experience and considerable ability. They strongly support a mixed economy of private enterprise and very substantial governmental participation. They are closely identified with business and with the professional bureaucracy, and although they accept many of the democratic reforms introduced into postwar Japan, they also favor revising the Constitution and increasing national and governmental authority at the expense of local and popular rights. They distrust and strongly oppose Marxism and Marxists. Yet the leaders of the "progressives," the political opposition in Japan, are almost all Marxists of some sort. These progressive leaders tend to perceive both society and politics in rather narrow and fixed theoretical terms, and this doctrinaire view has not yet been altered by the sobering effects of responsibility in office. They consider the conservatives not only political but class enemies. The result is what the Left-wing likes to describe as a "confrontation" between the forces of reaction and the forces of progress.

In such a situation, there is distressingly little room for maneuver or compromise. On issues of major importance, both sides usually take a fairly inflexible stand, and thus impede the functioning of the parliamentary process. The conservatives, with almost a two-thirds majority in both houses of the National Diet, are legally in a position to enact what policies or laws they please. The Socialist Party, therefore, is faced with deciding whether or not to abide by the results of normal parliamentary procedure. In a disturbing number of cases, they have decided not to do so, and have obstructed the parliamentary process by abstaining en masse, by seizing control of the rostrum by force, by immuring the Speaker in his chambers so that he is unable to open or to close a session, and by physically attacking members of the opposition. These tactics on the floor of the Diet are occasionally supplemented by mass demonstrations in the streets, which sometimes erupt into violence, all designed to put additional pressure on the conservative majority.

These systematically planned activities by the major opposition party pose questions about the very foundations of the present Japanese political system. How is public policy to be decided, if not by the normal functioning of a duly established parliament? What is the appropriate political role for a minority party that seems unable to achieve power by legal means in the foreseeable future? What are the merits of the Socialists' charge that they are subjected to a "tyranny of the majority"? On specific issues, it is possible to sympathize with the Socialists, but on the principles involved, it is hard to approve their stand. All parties must abide by the country's Constitution and basic laws if a democratic political system is to be maintained. The Socialists in Japan have refused to follow parliamentary procedures on certain vital issues of foreign and domestic policy. And on such questions as the powers of the

police, the abolition of locally elected boards of education, the renewal of the Security Treaty with the United States, and the revision of the present Japanese Constitution, they have either resorted to illegal means to forestall action by the conservative majority or threatened to do so. So far, these tactics have produced spectacular and worrisome results but not catastrophic ones. Usually, they have neither prevented the conservative majority from taking its desired action nor seriously disrupted the operations of government. But in a situation in which the majority and minority parties so notably lack common ground, serious questions are raised about the future of democracy and the stability of the political system.

Under present circumstances, the danger is perhaps not great. The conservatives are strong enough at the polls, in the Diet, and in their relations with the bureaucracy to overcome the tactics of the opposition with but temporary inconvenience and embarrassment. Up till now, the Socialist Party has confined its obstructionism to particular issues and relatively brief spans of time. But what would happen if Socialist electoral and parliamentary strength were to increase to approximately that of the conservatives? Although improbable at present, this could happen. Underlying the conservative political dominance in Japan is the unprecedented and broadly shared prosperity of recent years. The conservatives assert that this is their accomplishment and undoubtedly reap great political benefits from this claim. Yet the Japanese economy is by no means immune to recessions, especially since it is heavily dependent on foreign trade and other factors beyond Japan's control. A serious and sustained depression, perhaps originating abroad, could greatly increase Socialist political strength and could even bring a Socialist government to power. The lack of political consensus between the two major parties could then become a far more serious issue than it is today, and the democratic process might suffer accordingly.

Another potential source of trouble is the weakness of the myths and beliefs which underlie Japan's unity and solidarity. Before

World War II, the common, even fervent acceptance of the Imperial system provided effective support for Japan's nationhood. But defeat and occupation weakened this sense of unity. These are times of skepticism and spiritual drift in Japan. Many, particularly among the younger generations, are disenchanted with the Imperial myth, and prefer a more rational political symbolism. But the new constitutional system and the spirit of democracy have not yet become firmly enough established

in the minds and hearts of the people to provide a satisfactory substitute for a divine Emperor. Given time and enough prosperity, perhaps they will, but until then, Japan's adherence to democratic values and processes will remain tentative. Such uncertainties aside, however, the most notable facts about the Japanese political system undoubtedly are its high degree of modernization, its stability, and the astonishing increase in its democratic content that has taken place since 1945.



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
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ALLEN S. WHITING

China



# Introduction



Seven hundred million Chinese, united under the most authoritarian and totalitarian government in China's two thousand years of recorded history, may dominate the future of Asia. Led by a determined, disciplined Communist regime that proclaims the United States as its chief enemy, the People's Republic of China (PRC) commands our attention. During its first decade of power, the PRC intervened in the Korean War to inflict the most humiliating defeat American forces have suffered in this century. It assisted the Viet Minh armies in Indochina against their French opponents, forcing the conclusion of an armistice which left a divided Vietnam. Twice it brought international tensions to the boiling point by bombardment of the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, which are occupied by the rival Chinese Nationalist government that is based on Taiwan but lays claim to all of mainland China. It has nibbled at the Burmese border and invaded far beyond its customary frontier with India. In addition to amassing the largest jet air force in Asia, the PRC has begun to de-

velop atomic bombs and aims at an eventual thermonuclear weapons' capability.

This by no means exhausts the areas of activity in which Peking intends to stake out spheres of influence and interest. In Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, the Chinese Communists have launched political and economic programs designed to spread their influence. Among the various causes of tension in the Sino-Soviet alliance, a primary source of friction has been Mao Tse-tung's ambition to provide the ideological leadership for the entire Afro-Asian and Latin American world. Although excluded from the United Nations, Peking's voice has been heard, if not heeded, on virtually every major postwar political problem, from Korea to Berlin, from Laos to Cuba, and from Algiers to the Congo. "Friendship delegations" travel between Peking and capitals the world over. Chinese economic-aid teams operate in neighboring Burma and far-off Yemen. As founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Tse-tung advocates his revolutionary strategy and tactics as the model for all Communist action, whether in Indonesia, India, or Iraq.

Yet this sudden emergence of China as a self-proclaimed great power in the 1950's was

not the culmination of a technological revolution in a long-established, unified political system, such as that which occurred in Soviet Russia or the United States. So far as its economic capacity is concerned, China stands far behind the world's leading powers. By any statistical yardstick, Peking's claim to great-power status has credibility only by comparison with its Asian neighbors, and even here it falls second to Japan.

Nor has China long known the political unity and modern political institutions which mark its rival claimants for world status. In the century prior to the Communist victory, the effective control of the central government over the vast territory of China was tenuous at best. China was threatened repeatedly with fragmentation and foreign occupation as the transition from imperial rule to republican institutions and then to Communist rule brought successive regimes to power; all the governments prior to the present one failed before the magnitude of the problems confronting them. Out of this century of turbulence, and indeed out of the two millenia of civilization which preceded it, has come a new pattern of political authority in the China of Mao Tse-tung. Before looking at the present and assessing the future of this latest stage in China's evolution toward political modernization, we might review the past in an attempt to increase our understanding of how the Communists came to power and to gain some insight into whether they will succeed or fail in coping with the difficulties that lie ahead.

## China's Political Past

We cannot hope to recapitulate China's entire political past since 211 B.C., when Ch'in Shih Huang Ti—China's first emperor—consolidated the many scattered feudal states into an empire which was to last in more or

less continuous form until the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. However, we can note the essential characteristics of China's traditional political system and recall some of the events of the last hundred years which set the stage for one of the truly great national revolutions of our era. This background will help us to understand certain aspects of Chinese Communism and its appeal to the Chinese people.

For almost two thousand years, *Chung Kuo*, or the Middle Kingdom as it was called, flourished under a succession of dynasties which preserved a central core of governmental tradition and authority while permitting considerable self-rule at the village level. Although the emperor was, in theory, absolute in his powers, his trusted civil service, extending through some eighteen or more provinces and down to the district level, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. The Confucian system of beliefs provided the basis for the comprehensive examinations required of all candidates for government office. Thus assured of an over-all uniformity of behavior by officials throughout the country, the emperor could safely tolerate considerable discretion by middle-level and lower officials in carrying out their responsibilities in such matters as tax collection, registration of land titles, preservation of protective walls around city and village, and the maintenance of dikes and roads.

The village governing bodies were comprised of respected elders whose prestige often rested on their education and wealth. Not only did these men share the Confucian values of the bureaucracy but their families provided the majority of government officials, since only the wealthy could afford to educate their children in preparation for the difficult examinations. In this way, the Confucian doctrine and the civil-service examinations combined to link the most remote areas with Peking and to preserve a continuity of thought and behavior through centuries of successive dynasties.

This description, of course, is necessarily over-simplified and, to a certain extent, idealized. Emperors varied in their willingness to tolerate independent action and in their

ability to rule authoritatively without becoming despots. Lower officials often exploited their paternalistic powers for corrupt purposes. Subtle transformations in the interpretation of Confucian doctrine produced, over time, basic changes in belief. When such political deficiencies coincided with natural disasters or a breakdown in the extensive irrigation system, peasant outbreaks occurred. Local armed insurrection spread, sometimes accompanied by foreign invasion from beyond the Middle Kingdom's borders. As these symptoms of dynastic decline mounted, popular opinion held the emperor to have lost the "Mandate of Heaven." Revolt was thereby sanctioned, not to bring about changes but to restore the traditional Confucian order.


It was in precisely such a period of dynastic decay that the Western world came into its most important—and disruptive—contact with China. To be sure, Cathay, as it was known in Marco Polo's day, had long sent its silks and spices to European markets and occasionally had received missionaries and other visitors from the "lands of the barbarians." However, not until the Ch'ing or Manchu Dynasty (1644–1912) did Western military and economic power penetrate the great barrier of political isolation which had separated China from the mainstream of European developments. The coincidence of this Western intrusion with internal weakness resulted in cataclysmic changes which, in the course of a century, swept away imperial China and spawned Communist China.

The Opium War of 1839–42 brought to China the first foreign gunboats, which initiated an era of aggressive foreign intervention that chipped away bits of China's sovereignty and shattered Chinese confidence in the superiority of Middle Kingdom civilization. Britain's success at this time in forcing the first major concession from Peking through a relatively small application of military power prompted others to stake out political and economic spheres of influence in China during the next eighty years. By the end of the nineteenth century, China was regarded as "the sick man of Asia" by the statesmen of Russia, Germany, Britain, France, Portugal,

and especially nearby Japan. They debated how to preserve China as a nominal entity while in practice dividing it up among themselves. Only its size and the conflicting imperialistic interests kept China from becoming a full-fledged colony. Thus each of these countries wrested concessions from the crumbling Manchu dynasty. Sometimes they employed punitive military expeditions, as in the Anglo-French march on Peking in 1860 and the eight-nation occupation force which entered the venerated capital in 1900. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95 ended with China relinquishing Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. Not until Japan's defeat in World War II were they recovered, only to become the focus of dispute in 1949 when the islands provided refuge for Chinese Nationalist forces fleeing from the Chinese Communist armies.

Small wonder that the Chinese sense of cultural superiority, induced by centuries of isolation, gradually became transformed into modern-day nationalism, with all the determination to advance and the resentment against foreign oppression that the term implies. The Chinese Communist ability to capture this nationalistic fervor and channel it toward domestic reconstruction and foreign aggrandizement underlies much of the challenge and threat which Peking presents to the entire Afro-Asian world.

In addition to these external pressures, internal discontent eroded the foundations of the Manchu Empire. The mid-nineteenth century saw a vast peasant uprising sweep out of south China to overrun much of the country. From 1851 to 1865, the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion forced Peking to invite foreign assistance in order to reassert its authority. Shortly thereafter, Moslem revolts in Sinkiang compelled Peking to send an expeditionary force to this innermost province while Russian troops moved across the border to assist in pacification. In desperation, the Man-



chu court experimented briefly with political modernization and superficial reforms, to no avail. In fact, by ending the complicated examination system for government service, it struck an additional blow at one of the remaining factors of cohesion in the old system.

Finally, Chinese students who found remedies abroad for the ills of their country returned to spark a successful revolution aiming at wholesale change. Various provinces in south China established an independent authority and, on October 10, 1911, demanded an end to the Manchu Empire. The main figure in this revolutionary movement was Sun Yat-sen, known thereafter by his countrymen as the father of the Republic of China, which was officially proclaimed on January 1, 1912, immediately prior to the formal abdication of the Manchu dynasty.

## The Republican Period

China's internal and external problems did not end with the birth of the Republic, however. Sun Yat-sen founded the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party but failed to make it an effective political force during the first decade of the new regime. He expounded a theory of political tutelage designed to bring China's illiterate millions through successive stages of development, culminating in parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, Sun lacked the power to keep the new government on this path. He permitted a military officer of the old regime, Yüan Shih-k'ai, to head the country. Yüan soon made a mockery of the provisional constitution, dissolved the National Assembly or parliament and, in 1915, attempted to re-establish the monarchy with himself as emperor. His death in 1916 removed this threat, but a new problem arose in the guise of a pseudo-parliamentary regime. Powerful generals manipulated decisions behind the screen

of a legal government in Peking, which was complete with all the trappings of respectability including a President, a National Assembly, and, perhaps most important, international recognition.

Peking soon became host to a shadow government that lay claim to all of China but lacked authority beyond the immediately adjacent provinces. One general after another exploited control of the capital for his own ends, only to be expelled by another ambitious war lord. Meanwhile, a minority of the National Assembly delegates repudiated the central government and set up a rival regime in Canton where, in 1921, they elected Sun Yat-sen President of China. Failing to extend his power beyond the Canton area, Sun tried to negotiate his way back to Peking, where he died without accomplishing his goal in 1925.

Before Sun's death, however, he sowed the seeds of a successful revolution that was to restore some measure of unity and confidence to tortured China. His tree bore mixed fruit in its temporary fusion of Communist and Nationalist movements, but so long as he lived Sun succeeded in merging China's diverse, modernizing, revolutionary forces into a coalition that could build on genuine mass enthusiasm. To further his cause, Sun solicited help from the young Soviet regime, just as he had sought assistance from the United States, Britain, and Japan. Lenin responded with alacrity, sending money, munitions, and, most important, advisers. Chief of these was Michael Borodin, whose imprint on the Kuomintang can be seen to this day in its structure and precepts, frankly modelled on those of the Soviet Communist Party.

While war-lord factions contended in the north, a minuscule Chinese Communist Party merged with the well-regarded but relatively powerless Kuomintang in the south to build the political and military foundations for a march northward in 1926. Although this coalition broke apart before the new leader, Chiang Kai-shek, could proclaim Nanking as the capital of the Republic of China in 1928, its revolutionary fervor left a mark on the memory of many young nationalistic Chinese. To



be sure, Borodin and the other Soviet advisers returned to Russia at Chiang's command, after they conspired with the burgeoning Chinese Communist Party to seize power from Chiang and his Right-wing Kuomintang cohorts. The Left-wing faction of the Kuomintang broke into splinters; the Chinese Communist Party went into open revolt. Yet the role of Russia and of the Communists at this critical stage of modern China's development impressed many intellectuals, and when Chiang Kai-shek's regime was later tarnished and discredited, they switched their loyalties to Mao Tse-tung.

While the establishment of Chiang Kai-shek's regime in 1928 formally ended the warlord regime in Peking, he failed to consolidate his authority throughout the country. Instead, some provincial governors continued to control their own soldiers, print their own currency, and carry on clandestine relations with foreign powers. In addition, Chiang never smashed the tough core of the Chinese Communist Party despite repeated military campaigns against its bases in Kiangsi province and later in its hilly stronghold of Yen-an. Compared with the Peking government that preceded it, the Nanking regime represented a major step toward political modernization and unification. But it failed to supply the needs of nationalism and of the contemporary nation-state. To understand this failure better, we must turn to the external pressures which continued to plague the Republic of China. In World War I, it fought on the side of the victorious Allies only to be denied a victor's reward at the conference table. By secret treaty, Japan's entry into the war had been previously purchased by the Allies by an offer to Japan of the former German holdings in China. On May 4, 1919, this news triggered widespread demonstrations among Peking university students in the largest, if not the first, genuinely nationalistic demonstration in China up to that time.

Japan did not abandon its ambitions on the Asian continent, despite divided counsels in Tokyo over the wisdom of expanding its empire at the point of a bayonet. The China prize was too tempting, given its continued

vulnerability, and in 1931 Japanese troops moved into Manchuria. Gradually extending their hold over northern China, the Japanese avoided a formal declaration of war. Chiang was left in the unenviable position of fighting his internal enemies, the Communists, and his external Japanese foes. Finally, in December, 1936, Chiang's military commander for the northeast, in league with the besieged Chinese Communists, kidnapped Chiang and forced him to end the civil war and to unite all patriots against the foreign invader. Soviet Russia soon backed this new government with a non-aggression pact and military assistance. Japan, undeterred, struck with full force in 1937. After seizing the rest of north China and the valuable coastline, including all the major coastal cities, the Japanese armies bogged down in the vast interior. With their rear areas vulnerable to Chinese Communist guerrilla warfare, they ran up against Chiang's Nationalist forces in the mountainous interior.

Having fought one another for ten years, neither the Communists nor the Nationalists saw the 1936 agreement as anything but a temporary truce in the face of the Japanese threat. Once that threat was contained, the civil war resumed with a vengeance born of bitter memories and fed with fresh antagonisms. In 1941, America's entry into the war assured Japan's eventual defeat. Mao and Chiang again opposed one another as armed rivals, only now the accumulative pressures of prolonged war hurt the established government more than its insurrectionary opponent. At the time of Japan's defeat in 1945, Chiang's troops were being airlifted by American planes to surrender points far behind the lines while Mao's armies raced to cooperate with Russian forces in Manchuria and to secure communications lines there before the Chinese Nationalists could occupy Manchuria. When Soviet forces evacuated the area, they left large stocks of captured Japanese arms and munitions for the Chinese Communist

troops. In short, although China once again was on the side of the victors, it was in even worse shape than it had been after the previous global conflict, and no solution to its economic and political problems was in sight.

In the next four years, Mao's armies spread through the length and breadth of China. They turned their wartime experience against Chiang's forces, outwitting and in some cases outwaiting Nationalist commanders who holed up in key cities or who were denied necessary supplies and authority by the over-centralized and under-informed central command. Skyrocketing inflation demoralized urban groups and undermined further the disillusioned bureaucracy. Corruption among the venal and defection among the idealistic brought governmental action to a standstill. Students demonstrated against these and other ills, only to suffer police repression which made them increasingly sympathetic to Communist blandishments. Mao's cadres promised land reform and political freedom. Chiang's regime, wearied by years of foreign invasion and civil war, offered nothing more tangible than another constitution and faded symbols.

By this time, few thoughtful Chinese could see any hope in further attempts at a coalition government, nor had they much faith in Chiang's promises of a "new life" once Communism was defeated. If Mao did not win the positive support of key groups, at least Chiang lost it. This loss of a political foundation signaled the end of Sun Yat-sen's Republic of China, as ruled by his successors and his party. As Communism was winning battles on the military front, it was also winning the war in the political arena.

## Problems of Political Analysis

Against this background, many questions immediately come to mind. Is Communism any more likely to meet China's needs

than did the previous regimes whose failures mark the past century? Can it successfully suppress dissent and marshal the active support of its seven hundred million subjects? Have provincialism and warlord rule been wholly eliminated? Can the Chinese Communist Party remain united after Mao Tse-tung passes from the scene?

These are but a few of the key problems we must wrestle with if we are to assess the future power of Communist China and its place in world affairs. In addition, its domestic politics may prove relevant for understanding political developments elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and perhaps Latin America. Wherever Communist Parties are struggling for power, the doctrines and accomplishments of Mao Tse-tung's countrymen are under examination for possible answers to the staggering problems of revolution and modernization that confront Communist and non-Communist alike. Peking's success or failure in uniting and advancing China toward status as a world power will have far-reaching consequences for political developments in the decades to come.

Here a wholly different set of questions arises. What pre-Communist conditions facilitated the triumph of authoritarian over democratic institutions in China? How compulsively have Mao and his colleagues copied the political and economic practices of Russia? Put another way, is it possible to differentiate the Chinese from the Communist components of politics? If so, can their relative effectiveness be evaluated? To the extent that such questions can be answered, now or in the future, we will be able to assess the degree to which the People's Republic of China can serve as a viable model for political modernization and industrialization in other parts of the world.

The urgency of our need to plumb Chinese Communist politics is matched by the obstacles that confront us in penetrating the "bamboo curtain." As in any Communist state, the government closely controls all communications media. Thus any information issued by Peking's press or radio must be considered with circumspection. Data may be falsified.

Anything that reflects too unfavorably on the regime may be suppressed. No independent newspapers or journalists report or analyze developments. No scholarly inquiry can probe contemporary problems, at least for publication, if the findings are not satisfactory to the government. As we shall see later, this situation does not exclude Communist communications media as a source of information. On the contrary, sophisticated analysis of Chinese Communist newspapers and broadcasts provides us with fruitful material for understanding some of what goes on in the PRC. But we must confess our problems of analysis in advance, lest our findings appear to have a higher degree of certainty than in fact they possess.

For Americans, a second major limitation in analyzing the PRC political process has been the absence of trustworthy sources of observation. Since its founding in 1949, the PRC has remained unrecognized by the United States. Without consular protection, most American citizens have not been permitted to visit Communist China. Those few who have gone there, with rare exceptions, have lacked the training and experience necessary for political analysis, or were so controlled in their travels as to make the visits of marginal utility for our purposes. In contrast with post-Stalin Russia, then, we are without the vital perspective of American observers to supplement our analysis of printed, controlled materials.


A third barrier to research is the language. The two or more years of concentrated study required to master two thousand Chinese characters, essential for a reading knowledge, dissuade many from the effort. Moreover, the majority of China specialists in the United States are found in the fine arts and the humanities, not in political science. This barrier is overcome to some extent by the existence of a wealth of translated materials, particularly those issued by the American Consulate

General in Hong Kong. These provide full translations, without editing or comment, from leading Chinese Communist newspapers and magazines. In addition, the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service monitors Chinese radio stations, and the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service translates key articles on political and economic affairs. These materials may be found in leading university and municipal libraries.

Nevertheless, exclusive reliance on translations for political analysis is obviously an unsound procedure over a long period of time. They represent a selection from a wide range of material, which leaves the analyst dependent on the judgment of another person as to what is relevant and what is not. Furthermore, the translations appear out of context, making it impossible to evaluate an item's location, its relative weight in a general body of material, or the way in which the regime chose to emphasize or obscure its importance. Finally, the translations may miss meaningful nuances of the original language, especially where, as with both Communist and Chinese writings, elliptical allusions play an important role. Perhaps no more challenging or vital task lies before American social scientists than the mastery of Chinese, as a step toward unraveling the puzzle of Peking's politics.

It is obvious from these remarks that this essay will differ from the others in this book, because the accuracy of the available data on China is questionable and the scope of our perspective is thus necessarily limited. Our conclusions will be few and tentative. More questions will be raised than answered, not only because the evidence is scanty but also because the relatively short time in which China has been under Communist rule precludes sweeping generalizations and long-range prognostication. Having said all this, we can now approach our analysis of the People's Republic of China with a feeling of excitement, curiosity, caution, and humility.

# Ecology and History



One of the recurrent debates among analysts of the politics of the People's Republic of China turns on this question: Are the leaders in Peking more Chinese or more Communist? To answer this meaningfully, we must separate the various components that influence the politics of Communist China. Such factors as environment and historical heritage confront Nationalist and Communist alike, but the ideology of Marxism-Leninism sets the Maoist elite apart from its predecessors as well as from its rivals. Geography and history appear as constants, while leadership, organization, values, and attitudes are variables that interact with these constants to determine the course of politics. The recent history of China affords a fascinating example of the operation of this process.

## Geographical Foundations

Although it is usually a distortion to attribute any complex result to a single cause, there is no denying the important role geography has played in shaping Chinese political institutions and practices. It has posed similar challenges to centuries of successive regimes, whose ability to cope with floods, famines, irrigation needs, and foreign invasions was the mark of their success. The land has also enabled China to support the most populous nation on earth while preserving a continuous civilization in the face of repeated foreign incursions. While it is true that the physical features of any country—its mountains, rivers, deserts, coastline, etc.—are relatively fixed constants, their impact on history varies considerably depending on the human factor in the equation. For instance, the Yellow River is known as “China’s Sorrow” because of its periodic floods that have laid waste to millions of acres and drowned thousands at a time. Yet centuries of cooperation between the central government and district and village authorities have raised miles of dikes, enabling eighty million inhabitants to occupy the surrounding 125,000 square miles of rich land left by silt from the river’s flow and its many changes of course. It is no accident that the area along the river’s course formed the heart of China’s great civilization. Thus what

was a bane in one period proved a boon in another, depending on how the regime responded to the crisis.

Indeed, so pronounced an influence have China's rivers had on political institutions and attitudes that Professor Karl A. Wittfogel has characterized China's historic dynasties as "hydraulic societies." According to his theory, the overriding need of families and villages for effective irrigation and flood control forced acceptance of an authoritarian central government, capable of building an extensive water system along thousands of miles of river banks. This is seen by Professor Wittfogel to affect both theory and practice. First, it subordinated the individual and the village to the state; it all but snuffed out any pioneer spirit or concept of individual liberty. Instead, group activity under the over-all direction of a central authority became the accepted norm. Second, the smoothly functioning water system was so obviously life-giving that the populace came to believe in the benevolence of government. Imperial will was regarded as a positive good, rather than as a necessary evil.

It would be wrong to exaggerate this point. The Chinese peasant resented the burden of military service and heavy taxation as did his counterpart the world over. And the fact that the government was authoritarian did not give it license to be totalitarian. On the contrary, as we shall see later, prescribed limits defined the respective spheres of activity for family, clan, village, district magistrate, and the central regime. As a traditional saying put it, "heaven and emperor are far away." But in general terms, Chinese attitudes on the nature and scope of government differed basically from those of Western societies, in part because of the government's active role in irrigation and flood control.

The geography of China provided two additional stimuli for central as opposed to local rule. In the first place, the central government had the prime responsibility for defending the country against invasion. China was shielded from the established routes of world migration and invasion by the ocean on its

east and high mountains to the south and west. In the north, however, there was no natural barrier and the fertile northern plains were vulnerable to "barbarian attack." Tensions increased in the second century B.C. when a newly unified China under the Ch'in dynasty pushed up into nomadic pasture lands. To preserve these gains, the emperor Shih Huang Ti rebuilt and unified the frontier defenses into the celebrated 1,500-mile-long Great Wall of China.

An additional instance of geography's influence on politics arose from the need for cheap north-south transportation. While China boasts three of the longest rivers of the world in the Yangtze, the Yellow, and the Amur, with respective lengths of 3,430, 2,900, and 2,700 miles, virtually all its major streams flow from west to east. The absence of north-south routes prompted the construction of canals between the large rivers. Along the eastern plain, many smaller canals were linked up by successive dynasties from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries A.D. to form the 1,286-mile Grand Canal. This reportedly employed the services of as many as a million laborers at a time. The construction of the canal, and of the temporary dams and numerous locks it required, all demanded the strong authority vested in a central government.

Although historic parallels are often misleading, we can safely point out that these gigantic construction projects of the past provide a precedent for the mass manpower that has been mobilized by today's Communist rulers for the building of dams, roads, and railroads. We have no public opinion polls to tell us the views of those who have recently been pressed into service on such projects, but we might surmise that along with the laborer's understandable resentment against the heavy work he must perform, he is also conscious of a continuity with China's past and entertains a hope for China's future

which combine to offset his resistance to this government-directed activity.

Geography has affected political and social developments in still other ways, only a few of which can be noted here. For instance, not all of China's 3,650,000 square miles of land have proved equally accessible or cultivatable. The mountains and plateaus of Tibet, ranging from an average of 12,000 feet in altitude to over 28,000 feet in height, have isolated roughly 350,000 square miles with more than 1,000,000 non-Chinese inhabitants from what was known as China Proper. Similarly, the relative ease of farming in the coastal areas as compared with the arid, mountainous hinterland led ninety per cent of the population to settle in one-sixth of the country. Thus, a concentration of 10,000 persons per square mile in the Yangtze delta contrasts with an average of 6 persons per square mile in Sinkiang and Tibet. These conditions enabled outlying territories to retain a high degree of autonomy compared with the strong governmental authority that existed in the heavily populated coastal regions.

In addition, China Proper (all of China except Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria) contains no major physical barriers separating one region from another. Despite the many dialects and ethnic groups found between Peking and Canton, or between Shanghai and Chengtu, a far greater degree of cultural unity developed in this area than did, for instance, in the Indian subcontinent of similar size. To be sure, the huge river systems and the absence of an extensive network of roads left China a country of innumerable sub-cultures, with considerable variety in folkways, mores, dialects, and degrees of economic self-sufficiency. But the written language, the Confucian ethic, and the emperor's edicts extended with fairly equal weight throughout the vast region bounded by Tibet, Sinkiang, and Mongolia. This did not eliminate cleavages between north and south,

nor did it spawn an early sense of nationhood as opposed to provincialism, but it created a consciousness of Han—or Chinese—unity that justified regarding this area as the cultural entity called Chung Kuo, the Middle Kingdom.

## Economic and Demographic Foundations

We have already touched on the salient features of China's economy, but they should be restated here, since they so vitally affect China's political development. The most striking economic fact of twentieth-century China is the disparity between its claim to world power and its low level of economic development. Peking insists that no problems in Asia can be settled without its participation. Yet we can see in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 how it ranks below Japan, and far below Great Britain and the United States, in per capita output of such items as steel and iron, and in the total production of electricity and in railroad mileage.

It is impossible to overemphasize the political import of China's low economic level. As long as the Middle Kingdom was cut off from world affairs, it could maintain confidence in its superior civilization as compared with that of the "barbarians" outside the Great Wall and beyond the seas. Nor was this entirely an ethnocentric myth. During the first millenium A.D., China's political, social, and cultural achievements rivaled those of any civilization in the world. Not until the Western Renaissance and Reformation, capped by the Industrial Revolution, did China fall behind Europe in key areas of human endeavor. So wide was the gap by the twentieth century, however, that it was almost a traumatic experience for the Chinese to discover how inferior their political and technical advances had become compared with those of Japan, Russia, Britain, France, and the United States.

This discovery accelerated the collapse in 1911 of the Manchu dynasty, which was under increasing internal pressures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It shook

TABLE 2-1 *Industrial Production, 1959<sup>a</sup>*

Area	Popu- lation (in millions)	Pig iron		Crude steel		Coal		Electric power		Crude oil		Refined petroleum	
		mil. m.t.	per cap. kg.	mil. m.t.	per cap. kg.	mil. m.t.	per cap. kg.	bill. kwh	per cap. kwh	mil. m.t.	per cap. kg.	mil. m.t.	per cap. kg.
PRC	675	20.5	30	13.4	20	348	516	41.5	61	3.7	6	3.9	6
U.S.S.R.	211	43.0	204	60.0	284	507	2,402	265.0	1,256	130.0	616	107.0	507
U.S.	177	55.1	311	84.8	479	393	2,220	844.0	4,768	348.0	1,966	382.0	2,158
UK	52	12.8	246	20.5	394	210	4,038	123.0	2,365	0.08	2	36.0	692
France	45	12.7	282	15.2	338	60	1,333	67.0	1,489	1.6	36	28.0	622
Japan	93	9.8	105	16.6	178	49	537	99.0	1,064	0.4	4	31.0	333

<sup>a</sup> Compiled by Sam Fishback. (mil. m.t. = in million metric tons, per cap. kg. = kilograms per capita; bill kwh = in billion kilowatt-hours)

TABLE 2-2 *Transportation Comparisons, 1959<sup>a</sup>*

Area	Railroad mileage (trunk lines)	Railroad freight (in tons)	Highway freight (in ton-kilometers)	Merchant fleet (in gross registered tons)
PRC	19,000	542,000,000	10,000,000,000	400,000
U.S.S.R.	79,000	1,764,000,000	88,000,000,000	2,800,000
U.S.	220,000	1,173,000,000	538,000,000,000	24,200,000
UK	19,000	238,000,000	40,000,000,000	19,000,000
France	24,000	213,000,000	26,000,000,000	4,300,000
Japan	13,000	173,000,000	9,000,000,000	5,300,000

<sup>a</sup> Compiled by Sam Fishback.

the confidence of the Chinese in their traditional institutions, which had endured for so many dynasties only to crumble before the challenge of foreign missionaries and gunboats. It stimulated new political as well as economic demands, manifested by experiments with parliaments and constitutions. Isolated schemes for railroad and arsenal construction were followed by Sun Yat-sen's grandiose plan for bringing world capital to develop the entire economy of China.

In short, the economic disparity between China and the outside world triggered the search for a political system that could restore China's place in the sun. This ambition confronted China's aspirants for political leadership—whether emperor or war lord, Nationalist or Communist—with staggering problems. Here was a nation with only rudimentary industrialization, limited risk capital, and few known resources to attract foreign investment. A marginal agrarian economy kept the bulk of the population on so low a level of subsistence that there was insufficient surplus

agricultural production to exchange for badly needed industrial imports. To further complicate matters, ninety per cent of the populace was illiterate and mired in peasant superstitions.

Small wonder that successive efforts to modernize and industrialize the nation met with frustration, and often failure. A major obstacle, of course, was the absence of prolonged peace under a strong central government throughout the Republican period from 1911 to 1949. Civil war between north and south, between Nationalist and Communist, and between provincial armies prevented any accumulation of revenue for extensive capital investment. Moreover, China's major ports and even some of its key railroads, such as those crisscrossing the industrial province of Manchuria, lay under foreign control. Finally,

in the 1930's, Japan's seizure of the more advanced economic areas in the northeast and along the coast denied these assets to the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Naturally enough, many of China's basic problems remain to plague Peking today. For example, how is capital accumulation possible in a predominantly agricultural society where the mass of the peasants live at near-subsistence levels? If left to their own volition, the peasants will raise enough to eat. But beyond this, material incentives must persuade them to produce a surplus for market exchange. Since China lacks those incentives, only by direct control over the peasant's consumption can the regime hope to divert his farm products to urban and world markets. Although this was certainly not the only reason that the Communists eliminated private land ownership and collectivized agriculture, it provided a major impetus to such a move. In 1958, the collectives were merged into so-called communes, in which a wholly regimented peasant life aimed at complete control over all activity, from the morning meal to day-end sleep. Regardless of the political costs in such regimentation, Peking may well find some variant of this institution necessary to assure the production and distribution of agricultural surpluses vital to rapid industrialization.

More than any other problem, however, the population pressure in China has so far defied solution, especially now that the death rate has been reduced through improved facilities for births, inoculation against disease, and mass campaigns against filth and pestilence. These steps permit more persons to live but do not guarantee them the means for living. Again, this is not the only reason for Peking to maintain a large standing Army. However, it provides an economic rationale for what, in effect, is a large body of conscripted labor which, together with millions of "volunteers," can carry out construction

projects with only token payment. As in the old days, authoritarian methods have been adopted to get essential work done, but now pushed with a frenzy that stems from the regime's realization of how far behind China is—and from its conviction that Marxism is certain to lead China to industrial power.

Indeed, Chinese economic ambitions provide a driving force that has probably been unparalleled in modern times, even in Bolshevik Russia. As we shall see, Mao's totally regimented society surpasses anything experienced in Stalin's time. Certainly at the beginning of the Chinese Communist revolution, China was at a markedly lower stage of development than was Russia at a comparable stage in its political revolution. Nor did Russia ever have anything like China's pressure of population on the land. Even by 1963, only about eleven per cent of China's land was under cultivation, with almost one-third of this officially described as of poor quality. It is not choice or lack of incentive that has required China to resort to intensive utilization of so small a proportion of its land. Despite endless dreams and schemes for extending China's farmlands, erosion and aridity force seven hundred million persons to depend on essentially the same area of cultivated land that supported half that amount only two hundred years ago.

With the population increasing at between two and three per cent yearly, the annual increase in grain output will have to more than double the average increases of 1950–60 if China is to improve its living standards and also produce enough agricultural support for its industrialization program. Agriculture provides the prime source of exchange for imports of machinery, since Peking has so far lacked long-term foreign credits to cover industrial imports, except for less than \$500 million extended by Soviet Russia during the early 1950's. However, this, coupled with \$2.0 billion of Soviet military credits, imposed payment obligations on Peking which in the 1960's made export surpluses necessary to pay back China's debt owed its Communist ally. The gap in China between "what is" and



"what ought to be" as spelled out in Mao's Marxist credo may remain wide enough to compel ever more drastic political measures in lieu of satisfactory economic solutions. Thus the China of 1980, with more than one billion inhabitants, is unlikely to be markedly more relaxed or less authoritarian than it is today.

Increasing economic and demographic pressures have still other political consequences, for they reawaken traditional animosities between the Chinese and the minority peoples within the Middle Kingdom. Throughout Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria, non-Chinese peoples predominated up to the time of Communist takeover. In some cases, as with Sinkiang, the populace is racially, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally alien to the point of practically constituting a separate country. In other areas, such as Inner Mongolia, past migration and political gerrymandering by Peking have left the Chinese dominant, at least in the cities, while a significant non-Chinese minority lives on the plains. And in the northwestern provinces, especially in Kansu, Chinese Moslems follow cultural patterns so dissimilar from their non-Moslem brethren that they are regarded as apart from the "great Han race."

Later we shall examine the nationality problem in detail. Suffice it to say here that the historic conflicts between nationalities, aggravated by Chinese expansionist ambitions, receive a new impetus from goals of economic development. Underlying the bloody suppression of the 1959 revolt in Tibet and the costly railroad penetration through Sinkiang is a constant drive to develop resources, wherever they may be, with a maximum investment of manpower and a minimum amount of capital. Mao Tse-tung reportedly told a Tibetan delegation in 1958 that Tibet must support ten million people, instead of one million. Obviously this increase would be overwhelmingly Chinese, not Tibetan. Additional millions of persons have been moved into the heretofore barren northwest, where industrialization will hopefully utilize oil, coal, and iron deposits to make a new population and economic center. But these goals run afoul of recurring

tensions between Han and non-Han, raising old political problems in a new guise.

Thus to understand Chinese Communist politics, we must fully grasp the country's economic problems and prospects, for, as we have seen, no governmental actions, whether it is the organizing of communes or the initiating of mass migrations, are purely political in their origins nor purely economic in their effect. And failure in these actions may compound the problem, forcing the regime to substitute new political measures for abandoned uneconomic policies.

## Historical and Ideological Foundations

### *The Unique Present*

We have already sketched in briefly the salient events of the past century preceding Communist rule, but we might take another look backward to see the setting within which Mao's China emerged. There are those who decry so short a perspective, given two millennia of Chinese political institutions. They claim that these institutions and their attendant ideology will reassert themselves once the present phase of Communist fanaticism has passed. These observers argue, with good reason, that only those aspects of the People's Republic of China that prove compatible with ancient customs can survive, while those imposed by Russian dictation or Chinese Communist desire to ape the Bolshevik revolution will inevitably disappear as did alien practices of the past conquerors of the Middle Kingdom.

This argument, however, underestimates two important phenomena. First, the period between 1840 and 1950 had an impact on traditional institutions and ideology that was far more profound than the times of turmoil that historically marked the decline of each of China's great dynastic reigns. Although it

would be an exaggeration to say that Mao Tse-tung found a *tabula rasa* on which to write the Communist credo, if we compare the shattered tiles of 1949 with the political mosaic of the Manchu empire, it is evident that there was little for the Communists to destroy except, perhaps, in some isolated areas. If anything, the main impact of the Communists was not to destroy a viable political system but to lay the foundations for one.

A second fact making the Communist revolution different from those that recurred throughout China's history stems from technological advances, especially those in communications. The totalitarianism of the twentieth century is unlike any previous experience of mankind in the degree to which it penetrates every aspect of a person's life. Although previous dynasties might have engaged in book-burning and in censorship, mass mobilization of forced labor, and authoritarian practices, the totality of Communist rule has no precedent. Nor could it, since there were technological limitations on earlier regimes that restricted even the most ambitious despot.

Another, more fundamental difference between the Communists and the older dynasties is the manner of rule. The Mongols, for instance, and even more the Manchus, were content with managing China through the existing bureaucracy. The primary aim of each regime was to secure internal order and thereby to preserve dynastic rule. To the extent that prosperity was a prerequisite for domestic peace, the government supported public works, to assure relative contentment in the countryside. When, in any dynasty, hereditary rule brought the inevitable decline in ability, and corruption began to rot administrative efficiency, the regime fell amidst rebellion and disorder. Its successor, however, would restore order on the foundations of the *ancien régime*, thus facilitating the continuity of Chinese civilization.

Not so with the Chinese Communists. Their avowed aim was nothing less than the radical restructuring of society, the wholesale transformation of values, and the promulgation of a new order. Nor did they plan to experiment piecemeal with a trial and error approach, as had their predecessors from 1911 to 1949. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) consciously adopted the institutions and ideology of Marxism-Leninism, as evolved in Leninist-Stalinist Russia. Its goal was to fashion a "new China." While ideology and practice had to be adapted to the "national conditions" of China, Mao and his colleagues initially followed guidelines laid down by the Soviet Union "as the leader of world revolution and of world Communism."

This conscious determination by the new leaders to start anew enables us to examine the People's Republic of China as a new species rather than as a bastard offspring of a tradition-laden family. Of course, this begs the question whether the present regime is more Chinese or more Communist. Is it primarily shaped by its environment or by the Marxist model it emulates? In this essay, we accept the regime as discontinuous from the past in the sense that its institutions and values are so essentially and explicitly different from those of a century before. In this respect, the PRC is Communist rather than Chinese. The year 1949 is more than a benchmark; it is a watershed in the development of modern China. At the same time, however, the PRC is inevitably influenced by its geographic, economic, and demographic environment and by a people whose memory antedates the introduction of Communism. To this extent, it is Chinese. Peking is no copy of Moscow; it is not even properly called a satellite. The sense of "Chineseness" instills a nationalistic consciousness which, together with the environment, makes for striking dissimilarities as well as differences of opinion between the two great Communist allies.

Our immediate task is to re-examine those aspects of pre-Communist China which we surveyed briefly in Chapter I to determine which factors facilitated the establishment of Communism and which ones pose continuing

obstacles to effective Communist rule. We shall not trace the origins of Confucianism, the basic philosophy, as it has evolved over time. Nor shall we analyze in detail the political and social institutions of the Ming and Ch'ing periods. Our modest aim is only to discuss those factors that appear most relevant for an understanding of our subject: political behavior in the People's Republic of China.

### *Heritage from the Past*

One important characteristic of traditional China that eased the Communists' rise to power—or at least failed to pose obstacles to it—was the acceptance of authoritarian rule in a group-oriented society. Concepts of democracy and of individual liberty as we know them were wholly alien to the Confucian system, in which the hierarchical relationships extending from the emperor to the lowliest subject stressed obligations over rights, and authority from above over representation from below. The great political and philosophical truths being asserted in ancient Greece and Rome found no echo in the China of that time, just as the struggle over limiting the rights of kings and winning universal liberties had no parallel in latter-day China. This is not to denigrate the traditional political system of China. It was by no means totalitarian in the modern sense of the word; neither was it brutal or oppressive. It placed limitations on authority and emphasized rule by persuasion rather than by coercion. In this sense, it differed drastically from Communism. At the same time, the superior-inferior pattern of relationships and the predominance of the group over the individual put Western democratic principles at a disadvantage against Communist doctrine.

Under the Confucian system, the fundamental goal of government was to create harmony and unity among men, and between man and the spiritual world. Provided that the emperor exemplified ideal behavior by acting according to the Confucian precepts, all lesser persons would voluntarily emulate him and thereby insure harmony in the social order. Confucius modeled his social and po-

litical structure on the family and evolved five sets of relationships to define all lines of obligation and authority. These included son to father, wife to husband, and younger brother to older brother, to which he added friend to friend and subject to ruler. Thus the district magistrate—the lowest representative of the throne—was literally known as the “father-mother official” in recognition of his all-embracing paternalistic relationship over the citizenry. Similarly, the emperor ruled as the symbolic head of his extensive family, the Chinese people.

Obviously, such idealistic theory was violated in practice. Paternalism periodically became despotism, and subjects occasionally revolted against their rulers. But, as we have noted, revolt was not entirely proscribed. An important check against the emperor whose conduct belied his role as the model leader was the concept of the “Mandate of Heaven.” According to this doctrine, the ruler held his office, not by divine right or by brute force, but because he embodied the characteristics that would insure harmony between man and the universe. When corruption and mismanagement affected the propriety of his rule, the emperor lost his claim to leadership. Under such circumstances, a victorious rebellion “proved” that the “Mandate of Heaven” had shifted to a new dynasty. In practical terms, nothing succeeded like success. Although this right to revolt served as an effective sanction against unlimited authoritarianism, it should not be thought of in the Western sense of articulating “the will of the people.” Since it was “proper” to revolt only when a regime failed to follow the rules of the game as dictated in “heaven,” the rebels were obliged to restore observance of those rules, not to change them or debate them. In short, rebellious leaders had to act as agents of a universal, not a popular, will.

At the lower levels of society, the authority of superior over inferior was almost absolute,

as with father over son and elder brother over younger brother. To be sure, an ample code of ethics guided behavior in such relationships, but no "Mandate of Heaven" sanctioned rebellion against those who violated the code. This gave a special strength to the groups with particular status in this rather hierarchically arranged society. The court, the bureaucracy, and the gentry enjoyed special privileges, elegant dress, opportunities for travel, and other advantages that were denied the peasants, artisans, merchants, and soldiers. To be sure, the peasants were not serfs, except in certain areas such as Tibet. They could flee from abusive treatment or seek redress by publicly proclaiming their grievances outside the district magistrate's gates.

But the ruling oligarchy of gentry, scholars, and bureaucrats that dominated traditional China foreshadowed in many ways the elite of the Communist Party who now monopolize leadership in government and society. Just as the party is open to all and, in theory, promotes members according to their performance, so the elite of traditional China remained accessible to any who could pass the examinations required for entry into the bureaucracy. Actually, these examinations became so scholastic an exercise that students required years of tutorial preparation to pass them. This limited the candidates to the sons of wealthy families that could forego the earning power of the boy while paying for his education. Although villages were occasionally known to pool their resources for the promising son of a peasant, privilege tended to beget privilege, severely limiting social mobility.

The interaction between the official bureaucracy and the gentry reveals how well entrenched was the concept of oligarchy in the life of traditional China. As Professor Franz Michael has shown, in the nineteenth century 40,000 governmental positions were

available through examinations, whereas between 1,100,000 and 1,500,000 persons were entitled to gentry status as holders of degrees which were usually awarded through the examinations but occasionally came by purchase. The degrees outnumbered available positions, but all degree-holders enjoyed special status in their local community, district, or province. In both practical affairs, such as the construction and maintenance of dams, dikes, and bridges, and in cultural pursuits, such as the propagation of Confucian doctrine and the upkeep of temples, the gentry supervised local activity. In return, the gentry was granted legal, social, and, above all, economic privileges, including exemption from *corvée* (forced labor) and from many forms of taxation.

One might argue that the gentry's privileged position was justified because they were responsible for preserving the continuity of China's civilization and public administration through centuries of dynastic change. But the fact remains that their economic interests tended to buttress bureaucratic rule against the interests of the peasant masses. Moreover, as long as this elite dominated the country's government and its economic activities, no decisive role in the political process was possible for the bulk of the population. This situation proved relevant to the success of Communism in two ways. First, since China had long known class rule, the Marxist call for "class struggle" struck a responsive chord. True, the old examination system was abandoned at the turn of the century, and the Republican government of 1911 adopted some of the procedures of parliamentary rule and the principles of popular self-government. However, vestiges of class privilege remained, especially in the countryside, a ripe target for Communist propaganda. This proved of particular importance for arousing peasant discontent. Peasant armies had always been available in China, especially when economic conditions worsened. But when Communist leaders articulated peasant grievances against the oligarchy, these crudely armed rustics became far more dangerous than they had been in earlier rebellions when the local gen-

try recruited troops to enhance their own power or to launch an attack against the central government.

In the second place, the centuries of hierarchical rule prevented democratic concepts from taking root. The peasants might recognize that they were being exploited, but popular self-government as a remedy would never occur to them. Neither among the elite nor among the masses did an understanding or advocacy of democratic processes arise. Even Sun Yat-sen, after examining various forms of Western government, believed that a prolonged period of "people's tutelage," with one-party rule, was required before placing the responsibility of government in the hands of popularly elected representatives.

Still another impediment to the acceptance of democratic concepts was the submersion of the individual in various groups: family, clan, guild, and village. As we have seen, these were not democratic organizations; their hierarchical structure accorded power on the basis of status and seniority. But the individual seldom considered himself suppressed, since the Confucian doctrine, transmitted from generation to generation, postulated that deference to one's betters was in harmony with unimpeachable universal laws. Moreover, submission to the group was rewarded with group protection and help. The free-floating individual who exercised his will against that of his associates both suffered greater risks and could hardly be tolerated in a society that existed largely at just a subsistence level and where cooperation could spell the difference between disaster and survival.

### *Communism and Confucianism*

As we have noted, Communism and Confucianism justify authoritarian rule that imposes order from above—from the party, on one hand, and from the emperor, on the other. Neither recognizes the Western principle that an individual has inalienable rights, among which is protection against government. Neither posits any barrier between government and citizen beyond which neither government nor citizen might venture without upsetting the balance between obligation and

right. Neither bases government in any explicit way on the expressed desires of the people. And both ideologies are strikingly similar in their utopian assumptions, in their belief that human behavior is perfectible. For the Communists, the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, if properly put into effect, can transform the world into a perfect—i.e., strifeless—society. For the Confucians, the study of the rules and emulation of the correct officials enable man to conduct himself in accordance with universal laws. Thus both philosophies have a pronounced optimistic bias.

Between the two systems, however, stand pronounced differences. Confucianism stresses the harmonious nature of the universe and urges compromise as the best means of achieving harmony. The tensions induced by Communism are seen by its proselytizers as beneficial and the Communists' insistence upon struggle and conflict differs markedly from the subdued, almost quiescent character of a stable Confucian society. We shall see that this is carried further in the Chinese Communist demand for "self-criticism" and personal inner-struggle, to a degree unparalleled in other Communist systems. A more subtle but nonetheless important difference lies in the implicit limits on power inherent in the two approaches to rule. The Communists claim unchallenged authority for a single entity, the party, in contrast with the Confucian concept that power may be taken away from a tyrannical emperor when the "Mandate of Heaven" gives the right of revolt to the people. The total subordination of private life to Communist Party regulation has no parallel in the Confucian system, where the individual has considerable leeway as long as he does not disturb the equilibrium that has been established—at least as a theoretical goal—in his community.

It would be wrong to assume that the Chinese people, at least in the large, ever made

so explicit a comparison between Communism and Confucianism. Revolutions are seldom if ever made by such conscious choices between belief systems. The Confucian order crumbled long before the Communist system replaced it. Such vestiges as remained, in thought and deed, had been so transformed that a direct comparison is virtually impossible. And yet if deeper levels of national consciousness exist where some unspoken residue of past beliefs remains, this memory of ancient ways may lie behind some of the difficulties that the Communists are encountering in their efforts to rebuild an entire society in the space of a single lifetime.

*The Republican Period:*  
1911-1949

We have already sketched the turbulent history of the years that spanned the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the rise of Mao Tse-tung. Certain aspects deserve recapitulation, however, to complete our background of the pre-Communist period. Just as Sun Yat-sen embraced certain concepts of one-party rule and "people's tutelage" which left democratic practices to the distant future, so his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, placed greater emphasis on authoritarian rather than on democratic principles. First through the advice of Borodin and his Soviet colleagues, and then through his own amalgam of Confucian-oriented and militaristic advisers, Chiang came increasingly to see the needs of his country in terms of rule by one party with a self-appointed elite under his personal direction. In the last analysis, the choice between his rule and that promised by Mao Tse-tung lay not so much in clear alternatives of self-government as opposed to dictatorship. Rather it lay between living under a decaying oligarchy or participating in a promising rejuvenation of material and political life. To be sure, this choice proved, to a considerable degree, illusory. However, to the degree that

such alternatives were actually believed to exist, especially among bureaucrats, intellectuals, and youth, they worked a powerful effect on the course of the revolution in the years 1945-49.

Thus the Republican period made few inroads on authoritarian tendencies in China while doing much to discredit Western democratic procedures. New constitutions were continuously being drafted and abandoned. Repeated promises were made that the franchise would be broadened. But political control came increasingly into the hands of a few cliques who manipulated power so as to preserve their own interests and enhance the leadership of the Kuomintang. Secret police, extra-legal punishment, censorship, para-military youth organizations, and enforced adulation of "the Leader" provided Republican China with all the accouterments of twentieth-century totalitarianism.

Yet despite these efforts to rule with a strong hand, the Kuomintang reaped few of the benefits of totalitarian rule. It was unable to overcome the deprivations of Japanese invasion and Communist insurrection in order to deliver to the Chinese people an efficient and expanding economy, even if established through non-democratic means. Nor were its political controls successful in throttling opposition. Had the regime been harsh enough, it might have survived the Communist challenge. Instead, halfway measures only exacerbated the discontent and drove many of Chiang's critics into the camp of Mao's spurious "new democracy." We must not ignore the fact that some of the failure to institute thoroughly ruthless and successful repression lay in the opposition within Kuomintang circles to an uncompromising acceptance of authoritarianism. Many Western-trained intellectuals and bureaucrats held out for a gradual evolution toward the popular self-government envisaged by Sun Yat-sen and promised by Chiang Kai-shek. In addition, outside influences, especially during World War II, insinuated Anglo-American concepts of individual freedom and democracy into the Chinese environment.

Seen from this perspective, there was far

more progress toward parliamentary democracy by the end of Chiang's mainland rule than was recognized by observers or conceded by his opponents. Yet it was his inability to sustain this progress rapidly enough to satisfy the desires of those whose appetites had been whetted by political promises and by the infusion of Western democratic concepts which proved to be Chiang's most vulnerable failure. Against the semblance of "people's rule" offered by Communist guerrilla areas and the grandiloquent if misleading promises of "new democracy" offered by Mao's propagandists, Chiang turned increasingly to repressive and restrictive measures and to the advocacy of outworn, empty slogans. We are not attempting to strike a balance-sheet between the two sides that contended for control of China. Nor can we hope to plumb the full scope and depth of developments which contributed to the triumph of Communism. Our only aim is to identify some of the basic factors in pre-Communist China that helped, or hindered, the Communists in their rise to power and that affect present Chinese political behavior.

In conclusion, we can risk a few broad generalizations about China's immediate past. For one thing, mass discontent in this century has not bred mass demand for participation in the political process. During the various twentieth-century revolutions, mass grievances were voiced but their redress was always considered the responsibility of the elite. Even when the country had a parliament and groped toward some sort of constitutionalism, the overwhelming majority of China's inhabitants concerned themselves with little more than their rice bowls. This is not meant as a criticism but as a simple description of the facts of life at the mass level. Political representation and participation ranked so low on the scale of personal needs as to be expendable or deferrable; as a result, the state or its claimants usurped all political power.

No groups that competed for power, except the Communists, had a coherent and systematic body of belief that could serve as contemporary Chinese political theory. The intellectual borrowing from East and West on the part of the Republic prompted Pro-

fessor Nathaniel Peffer to dismiss such eclecticism as "intellectual chop-suey." Ideas from Jefferson and Lincoln, Marx and Lenin, Dewey and Russell were merged with quotations from Confucian classics to form a literature of search without solution. Thus in the absence of clear demands from below or consistent direction from above, it is no wonder that China's political system before 1949 was dominated by pragmatists who employed their military and economic strength to pursue their own private interests. Certainly this was true for all but the very highest figures in the Republican period, and the dedication of the few proved insufficient to overcome the defects of lower officials.

Gradually the system degenerated into constant maneuvering by cliques behind a façade of accepted institutional and constitutional devices. Such maneuvering did not serve the needs of legitimate groups in the society, as it often does in Western political systems, even in those that may not practice all of their avowed theoretical precepts. Rather it existed apart from and in opposition to the needs of the society. Juxtaposed one against another, the contrast between the competing Communist and non-Communist elites came not so much in the realm of values, authoritarian versus democratic, as in the realm of political achievement—which group could most effectively meet the modern needs of China?

In this context, Communist doctrine, with its concept of historical progress and its claims to scientific validity, had virtually no competition from the amalgam of old and new theories, derived from the East and West, offered by the Kuomintang. Not only did the Communist doctrine appeal strongly to those groups so long demoralized by the futile search for a political philosophy that could do for modern China what Confucianism had done for the Middle Kingdom, but it also gave the Communist elite a sense of direction


and a feeling of confidence. This sustained Mao and his colleagues in their twenty-year struggle for power and then gave them a ready-made program which they could initiate the moment they took over the country.

It has been argued, especially by the Communists themselves, that much of the appeal of Communism in China stemmed from the fact that the Chinese people were tremendously impressed by the success of Soviet Russia in moving a backward, peasant nation into the forefront of world industrial and political power. The Russian example unquestionably did exert a great influence, but we should not exaggerate the importance of this factor. Japan's modernization antedated that of the Soviet Union, and its proximity

to China, both physically and culturally, should have awarded Japan an equal, if not greater, influence than that of Russia. Japan, however, did not have an all-encompassing economic and political theory that could be exported as well as Communism could be transplanted from Russia to China. Passive emulation could not compete with active proselytizing and subversion, to be sure, but China's needs went beyond technical and material assistance. It would seem, therefore, that it was Communist doctrine per se, adapted and advanced by a highly gifted, cohesive revolutionary elite, which brought about the People's Republic of China as the culmination of a century of political ferment and revolution.



# Chinese Communist Ideology



## The Importance of Ideology

Ideology is properly regarded as a root force that determines the development of a government. It strongly affects the view of the world held by both the elite and the masses and vitally influences their reaction to that world. Put differently, ideology formulates the goals of society and the means of attaining those goals. In politics, it determines the "rules of the game," the strategy and tactics for the attainment and utilization of power. Upon this foundation stands the organization of government, whether in Washington, Peking, the Vatican City, or Conakry.

Crude explanations of Communist behavior have tended toward one of two extremes. Some observers impute a mechanistic determination to the role of ideology, regarding Communist elites as "fanatic" believers in a rigid code who compulsively follow Marxist maxims regardless of external reality. Others deny that these elites are more than pragmatic power-seekers, cynically manipulating their

professed beliefs in accordance with the dictates of expediency. Neither approach does justice to the role ideology plays in shaping the successes and failures, the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary Chinese Communism. Were ideology a rigid, deterministic force, the regime would long since have experienced internal collapse or engaged in frenzied aggressions, given the obstacles confronting realization of its avowed domestic and foreign goals. More difficult to disprove is the hypothesis that China's rulers constitute a wholly manipulative, cynical elite. However, by now they would certainly have exposed something of this nature, were this true, through repeated violations of their professed values. Yet, as we shall see, Chinese Communist practice conforms so closely to its ideological postulates that we are probably justified in concluding that the ruling elite accepts these postulates.

One of the most succinct statements of the importance placed by the Chinese Communists on ideology came from Mao Tse-tung in his celebrated essay, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." Written in 1957, it declared: "Not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul." Given the assumptions of

Marxism-Leninism, this proposition is valid. Communist ideology insists that determinable laws govern the interaction of all forces within society, the outcome of which is subject to man's will, provided he correctly analyzes the forces and understands the laws governing their interaction. On the basis of his "scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis," the Communist Party member is morally obliged to advance the world toward a utopia of universal peace and plenty. According to this doctrine, practitioners of Marxism-Leninism have a monopoly on the insight as well as the inspiration needed to create the good society, desired by all mankind but realizable only through the aegis of the Communist Party.

With all beliefs, experience tends to confirm or deny *a priori* assumptions. For the Chinese Communists, the forty years since the first CCP congress in 1921 have proven the ideology's utility, not only as a means to power but for the accomplishment of desired ends. During almost half of this period, the CCP struggled in the wilderness, enjoying a brief heyday of rapid rise and success between 1921 and 1925, only to be driven out of the "United Front" with the Kuomintang and smashed into splinters by Chiang Kai-shek in 1926-27. The next decade saw it ridden with factions, pursued throughout the length of China by Nationalist troops, and isolated from the mainstream of politics.

Whatever doubts Mao's colleagues may have entertained in Yen-an as a result of these setbacks, the next ten years more than justified renewed confidence in the "truth" of Communist doctrine. From 40,000 members in the mid-thirties, the CCP expanded to more than 1,000,000 disciplined adherents by 1945. The ideology proved a binding force on this vastly enlarged organization. Scattered over thirteen provinces of war-torn China and initially united around the single cause of resisting Japan, the separate guerrilla "gov-

ernments" became a single entity through the ideological impact of the so-called "Cheng Feng" or "rectification" movement of 1942-44. In this movement, CCP leaders or "cadres" worked with groups of a dozen or so recruits in whatever spare time was available amidst the rigors of wartime existence, systematically discussing the documents and doctrine of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and especially, Mao. More than mere propaganda lectures, these "study-groups" transformed members from free-floating "fellow-travelers" into dedicated, disciplined party stalwarts. Since belief literally dictated action, conversion brought a change not only in attitude but in response as well, so that Communist political power surpassed that of its Kuomintang opponent whose numerically superior forces lacked any comparable unity of direction or purpose.

The essentials of this experience, i.e., control through persuasion rather than through force, and emphasis on ideology rather than on personal gain, led to a concept called "the mass line." By this is meant what every ward politician in the West has learned the hard way: a successful political movement must maintain constant contact with the needs and aspirations of persons at the grass-roots level. Yet for China this was a wholly new concept. No one at the center had bothered with the peasant except to order him into work and military service. Mao recognized, however, that a tremendous latent power existed in China's millions if only they could be brought actively, positively, and "voluntarily" into the modernization process. His guerrilla armies had proven this by going beyond mere destructive action against the enemy and developing local industries, local government, and local lines of identification that transformed the village society which had existed for centuries past. Through the binding force of ideology and through admonitions contained within the ideology, Mao hoped to build on the foundations of a "mass line" so as to mobilize the people's power and to avoid the people's hatred.

But success in the scattered guerrilla areas of wartime did not promise similar success on the vastly wider political front which faced

the new elite in 1949. Without the external threat of Japan, how could five hundred million illiterate peasants be wielded into a responsive body directed from Peking? Incredible as it appeared from abroad, the leadership set out to repeat its experiment in "ideological remolding," first on the CCP, which leaped from 5.8 million members in 1951 to 17 million in 1961, and then on the entire nation, which grew from 500 to 650 million persons in the same period. To be sure, the regime substituted "United States imperialism" for Japan as the external threat, to spur an unquestioning obedience to authority. Physical violence and terror, too, were an important means of control during the early 1950's. Basically, however, ideology alone and its application have permitted Peking to organize and channel, almost at will, the energies of its vast but backward populace.

As a concrete illustration of the political utilization of ideological concepts, we might take the role played by the concept of "class struggle." Long dominant in Marxism-Leninism, "class struggle" has taken on new importance in the writings of Mao Tse-tung and his chief theoretical colleague, Liu Shao-ch'i. This does not mean that class warfare, in the nineteenth-century use of the term, characterized the CCP climb to power. Mao did not crudely pit the "proletariat" against the "capitalists." However, he did manipulate the concept of classes and class warfare to exacerbate existing socio-economic tensions, while offering the CCP a means of identifying itself with groups far from its power base and alien to its ideology.

An authoritative use of the class concept, revealing its relationship to CCP strategy, is provided by Liu Shao-ch'i's *On the Party* (May, 1945). Marxism-Leninism had maintained that Communist Parties rested on the proletariat, i.e., the industrial working class, and provided "proletarian leadership" to the revolution. Liu, however, frankly admitted that "the overwhelming majority of Party members are of peasant and petty-bourgeois origin." How was this apparent contradiction to be resolved so as to enable the CCP to

remain in the correct Marxist-Leninist lineage?

Liu made two theoretical modifications in order to utilize ideology for his political purposes. First, he argued that "the aggregate of Party members of proletarian and semi-proletarian (poor peasant) origin" constituted the majority of the CCP. By substituting "semi-proletarian" or "poor peasant" for Lenin's terms, ideological purity could be maintained while narrowing the gap between city and country, at least semantically. In fact, this semantic shift had some justification, since the poorest peasants did constitute a reserve labor force for nearby cities, especially in winter when farm income or employment could not support the large population in the countryside. However, Liu's formulation was not empirically derived. Rather it rationalized the inability of the CCP to build its main base among urban workers and thereby maintained the fiction that the Communist Party was necessarily the vanguard of the proletariat.

Liu's second adjustment was more profound. He significantly shifted the basis of class determination from socio-economic origin to individual attitude. In his words, "The social origin of Party membership cannot alone determine everything. The determining factor is . . . its ideological education and its ideological and political leadership." On the one hand, this permitted Liu to deny that workers as such necessarily constituted the cream of the revolutionary force in a society. By illustration, he attacked "the Labor parties in certain European countries" as "not representing the working class although the majority of their members come from the working-class." On the other hand, this formulation placed equal if not prior emphasis on indoctrination and "thought reform"—dominant elements in CCP theory and practice.

Thus the concept of "class struggle" has a real meaning, albeit altered from its original form, for Chinese Communist politics. It has

assisted in fragmenting and reorganizing socio-economic groups. Its reformulation has provided a clue to an important and pervasive means of control. Small wonder that its "scientific validity" is accepted by the leadership in Peking. In this sense, the ideology offers an "objective truth" which is reinforced by experience and intensive indoctrination as the "class struggle" proceeds toward the proletarianization of the entire society.

CCP words and actions not only justify our emphasis on the role of ideology, but the regime's behavior suggests that without understanding its belief system, a rational explanation of certain policies is impossible. In foreign affairs, for example, the new elite violated the traditional Chinese method of using "barbarians to control barbarians," of playing off one country against another. Instead, Mao concluded an exclusive alliance with Stalin, binding China to Russia against the non-Communist world for a decade or more to come. Regardless of subsequent strains in Sino-Soviet relations, Peking has at no time mitigated its basic hostility to Washington, much less actively played one side against the other. This abandonment of a traditional, and logical, Chinese policy must be understood within the framework of ideology, not of circumstances. Just as the "class struggle" posits conflict within societies, so it appears omnipresent in the international arena and, according to the Marxist analysis, remains a constant in relations between "socialist" and "capitalist" countries. By definition, then, Mao saw Stalin as his only ally and the United States as his permanent enemy.

Similarly, in domestic matters, certain seemingly irrational actions become intelligible only if we view them within the framework of the ideology rather than from an outsider's point of view. The Chinese Communists enjoyed the growing support of the intelligentsia between 1940 and 1950, only to alienate

this important group in the next decade through systematic repression and "remolding" campaigns. Similarly, Communism's attraction for the peasantry lay in the moderate land reform programs put forward in the 1940's. In 1955, Mao gambled on peasant loyalties by instituting collectivization which took away the newly won holdings, and further abused his power by establishing the highly regimented communes in 1958. Within a few years of winning power, then, the new elite adopted policies whose negative impact on group loyalties should have been anticipated, or at least immediately recognized after the event. Yet once again the assumption of "class conflict" and "struggle" as omnipresent in society disposed the leadership to accept the disruptive consequences of their actions as inherent in the situation, if not positively desirable. Moreover, the adoption of these policies, particularly the collectivization of agriculture, stemmed from the belief in their necessity as postulated by the Marxist-Leninist credo.

Still another factor underlying the importance of ideology is the dominance of myth-makers in the People's Republic of China. Both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, chairmen respectively of the party and the government, have written volumes of essays which, for all their shortcomings, properly deserve the title of political theory. If this theory is more practically oriented than most non-Communist writings in this genre, it is still a body of cohesive doctrine, employing *a priori* assumptions and principles as a foundation for both analysis and action. More than opportunistic lip-service underlies the Chinese acceptance of "Study Chairman Mao" movements. Despite the megalomania surrounding the more exaggerated claims for his writings, there is no denying their contribution in making Marxist-Leninist doctrine a powerful force for Asian Communists. As Liu Shao-ch'i once remarked, "Mao Tse-tung has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism. His great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from its European to its Asiatic form. He is the first who has succeeded in doing so."

### *Problems of Analysis*

Before we examine Chinese Communist doctrine in detail, certain observations are in order. First, Mao's emphasis on "the unity between theory and practice" requires us to place statements in a precise context of time. Obvious as this might seem, it often escapes the casual observer who mistakenly imputes unchanging meaning to terms that recur from time to time in party pronouncements. To be sure, such epithets as "right opportunism" and "left deviationist" are rich in Communist tradition which imbues them with a special meaning. By their association with past struggles for power and over policy, they usually signal a definite type of party schism. But Mao's "strategic principles of war" cannot have the identical message for its audience in the thermonuclear sixties as it did when originally advanced twenty years previously. We must avoid, then, an exegesis of Maoist writings divorced from the historical context within which they appear.

Because of this avowed link between theory and practice, Chinese Communist theoretical analysis is almost always directed to a particular problem. Thus a treatise on party responsibility is not written *in vacuo* but to counter an undesirable development within the movement. As such, it is the captive of its time but it is also written to have maximum impact at the moment. Liu Shao-ch'i's essay *How To Be A Good Communist* addressed itself to certain problems when first offered as a series of lectures in Yen-an in 1938. Liu's revised version was republished with considerable fanfare in 1962 after three years of economic difficulty had raised new problems of morale in party ranks, and his revisions met the changed situation accordingly. This shows the continuity of doctrine at the highest level and simultaneously the leadership's awareness that rigidity or "dogmatism" can lead to intellectual sterility and political impotence. The analyst of Chinese Communist doctrine, then, must examine its development over time if he is to determine trends rather than pick isolated readings out of context.

Finally, we must recognize that Commu-

nist doctrine has a vocabulary all its own. Where terminology is borrowed from the outside world, it often has a special meaning considerably at variance with that of its non-Communist counterpart. When Mao describes China as "semi-feudal," for instance, he is not alluding to the socio-economic relationship between lord and serf or between lord and prince which existed in Europe during the Middle Ages. Instead, he is referring to pre-industrial China, where landholders and moneylenders dominated an agrarian economy and enjoyed a small but privileged position at the expense of the peasant society. This endowment of words with a particular meaning creates an initial gap between Communist thinkers and a non-Communist audience. For our purposes, however, it is essential that we become familiar enough with the party vocabulary to make repeated explanations of the terms unnecessary.

Still another analytical problem raised by the Communist vocabulary is its intentionally provocative tone. Words are often used—or better, abused—not to explain a phenomenon but to incite the reader toward a particular attitude or action. "Colonialism" and "imperialism" are more than descriptive terms. In the twentieth century, their pejorative connotations justify, from a Communist standpoint, their indiscriminate use to designate the "enemy." Similarly, praise for the "peace-loving socialist camp" may precede demands for "a militant struggle for world revolution." For the Communist, words are weapons. He is not engaged in scientific discourse, but is mobilizing groups to overthrow the non-Communist world. Therefore, our analysis gains little by focusing on how such terms are semantically distorted, except to show how they serve a political purpose for the elite or reflect a certain characteristic of the elite.

But if all this is true, is not the ideology reduced to a propagandistic tool, pragmatically manipulated as the occasion dictates? There

is no denying its occasional use in this fashion, nor is it wide of the mark to describe this as a persistent, corrosive tendency with the maturing of Communist politics. Indeed, this may be a universal phenomenon. Aging ideologies in other areas and times have become similarly corrupted, as sophistication combines with self-interest to strengthen cynicism at the expense of idealism. And yet, as we shall see, the Communists seem to be quite aware of this danger. Lenin's concept of periodic purge and Mao's insistence on "repeated rectification campaigns" aim at the rejuvenation of belief in a bureaucratized elite. If we must err in our analysis, it should be on the side of overrating ideology as a driving force in Chinese Communist politics, lest underestimation lead to a dangerous discounting of the regime's capabilities and intentions.

## Ideology and Politics

### *"On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People"*

Rather than survey the vast array of literature that forms the ideological core of Chinese Communism, we can more readily see the relevance of party theory to political behavior through an analysis of a particular writing and the problems it purports to solve. In addition, we can understand the dynamic approach to ongoing problems which still plague the regime if we comprehend an article which serves as a constant point of reference for party members. An ideal essay for this purpose is Mao Tse-tung's "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," delivered originally as an unpublished speech in February, 1957, and subsequently revised by Mao for publication in June of that year. This work represents Mao's most fully developed analysis of the domestic political problems that appeared during his first decade of rule. Its unusually comprehensive scope sets

it apart from his shorter statements on agriculture, party affairs, and world politics. Its timing also gives it a particular significance, the full import of which can best be grasped by a brief sketch of the preceding and succeeding developments within China and elsewhere that are relevant to comprehending Mao's effort.

In early 1956, the entire Soviet bloc was shaken by the political reverberations of Khrushchev's "secret speech" denouncing the crimes of the dead Stalin, delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow. The ensuing riots in Poland and the revolution in Hungary, the latter suppressed by Soviet tanks, raised vital questions throughout the international Communist movement about the balance between dissent and repression compatible with building a new society. China was not as remote from these European uprisings as its geographic distance from them might indicate. News of the workers' revolt in Budapest and of Warsaw factories being barricaded against possible conflict with Russian forces triggered a wave of meetings, especially among Chinese students and intellectuals, who questioned the basis of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. Coming on top of de-Stalinization, which proceeded less dramatically but nonetheless had disturbing effects in China, this crisis prompted many to look more critically at the PRC itself. Coincidentally, the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September, 1956, had examined its rosters to find a membership overwhelmingly recruited in the post-revolution environment. Without the elan of military fighting and triumph in a civil war, this portion of the CCP lacked ideological conviction and had slipped into objectionable bureaucratic behavior, even showing signs of corruption and sloth.

Finally, China's leaders had come to recognize the limitations of attempting wholesale modernization and an overnight industrialization program exclusively by Communist management, which lacked the experience and training necessary to this complex and vast undertaking. After January, 1956, systematic

wooing of scientific personnel and managerial experts had marked Peking's approach to non-Communist intellectuals. This program, launched under the slogan of inviting "a hundred schools of thought to contend," was not aimed at downgrading the importance of Marxism-Leninism but rather sought to win the active, voluntary support of a key sector in the populace by encouraging their non-political criticism and advice.

But in the context of domestic and foreign troubles, the CCP found itself faced with a widening circle of dissent and no clear guidelines on how to respond. Mao's essay was designed to meet this need. To anticipate developments, however, we must note that it failed in this regard. Originally intended to make credible the invitation for criticism of the CCP and to provide a framework for CCP responses, the speech sparked a series of public attacks against the party, as well as against a number of its policies. The pressures which had accumulated during the previous years of Communist rule and which had intensified in the turbulence of the 1956 developments elsewhere in the Communist bloc proved almost unmanageable when released at Mao's initiative. Especially among the students, traditionally the vanguard of revolt in China, these criticisms took an ominous turn in view of the regime's claim to universal support among the youth as the leaders of "new China." This backlash triggered a repressive reaction as the leadership turned from its own "rectification" campaign to an intensive "anti-rightist struggle" against all its critics.

This historical résumé shows that Mao's essay was no academic effort. That it failed in its immediate purpose does not deny its importance in revealing the basic approach of Peking to political problems which remain present today. Indeed, during the critical economic and political conditions of 1960-61, it won renewed attention as an answer to the need for rewinning support from key groups while repressing opposition from those basically hostile to the regime's goals or unsusceptible to its pressures and blandishments.

### *The Origins and Limits of Dissent*

"Our general subject is the correct handling of contradictions among the people"—thus begins Mao's theme. For "contradictions," we can read "differences" or "conflicting views." His term "people" proves to be more elusive, for Mao notes, "The term *people* has a different meaning in different countries, and in different historical periods in each country." The word does not have a fixed meaning for Mao, but covers different sectors of the populace according to time and place, unlike Lincoln's famous dictum "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." This lack of constant meaning derives directly from Marxist concepts of relativity, which claim that socio-political relationships must change as the mode of production and economic relationships change—as in the development from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism.

Mao, however, goes beyond the classical Marxist emphasis on production relationships and makes clear that his category, the people, changes in composition according to political as well as economic factors. He states: "During the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, all those classes, strata, and social groups which opposed Japanese aggression belonged to the category of the people while the Japanese imperialists, Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements belonged to the category of enemies of the people." Similarly, in the civil war of 1946-49, "the United States imperialists and their henchmen—the bureaucrat-capitalists and landlord class—and the Kuomintang reactionaries, who represented these two classes, were the enemies of the people." All others comprised "the people." And in 1957 he declared that "at this stage of building socialism, all . . . who approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the

people, while those social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution, and are hostile to and try to wreck socialist construction, are enemies of the people."

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this elastic and elusive definition of "the people." As will be clear shortly, the difference between "the people" and "enemies of the people" spells the difference between lenient and violent means of suppressing opposition. Yet the designation of groups or individuals as one or the other is exclusively the prerogative of the elite, the Chinese Communist Party. Assignment to one or the other category is usually only temporary, depending not only on the attitudes and actions of each subject, but also on the changing political and economic conditions that determine the basis of allocation.

Mao gives an unusually frank exposition of the unlimited power in totalitarian rule and of the individual's insecurity under that rule. He does not indulge in sophistry by trying to impute "self-decision" to "the people." In essence, Mao's passage quoted above warns, "either you support us or you are against us; there is no in between position." Yet Mao does not silence all criticism so flatly and simply. Indeed, his entire essay attempts to outline the limits both of dissent and of authority. But all the subsequent passages must be read against these opening remarks which spell out the "rules of the game" between government and governed, to the obvious disadvantage of the latter.

Mao continues, "Contradictions between ourselves and our enemies are antagonistic. Within the ranks of the people, contradictions among the working people are non-antagonistic." This dichotomy is crucial, implicitly sanctioning one type of dissent while prohibiting another. Mao concedes, "Quite a few people fail to make a clear distinction between these two different types of contradictions . . . and are prone to confuse the two. It must

be admitted that it is sometimes easy to confuse them." Once again, he eschews a simplistic approach in favor of a more realistic handling of the problem.

Tolerable differences are ever present: "contradictions among the people have always existed, but their content differs in each period of the revolution." They even persist under socialism because of conflict "between the interests of the state, collective interests and individual interests; between democracy and centralism; between those in positions of leadership and the led; and contradictions arising from the bureaucratic practices of certain state functionaries in their relations with the masses." Mao's catalogue of contradictions was unique among high-level Soviet and Chinese Communist writings, for it admitted that conflicts of interest exist between "the people" and "the vanguard of the proletariat," i.e., the Communist Party. As Mao himself noted, "Many people refuse to admit that contradictions still exist in a socialist society." In this very period, Khrushchev was one such person, explicitly denying the universal validity of Mao's dictum when queried by American television commentators. Since this time, Soviet writings have paid increased attention to the subject of "contradictions," although rarely in Mao's precise formulation and usually without acknowledgment of his stimulus.

Having built on the shifting foundation of a changing category, "the people," and conceding that one can "confuse" tolerable with intolerable dissent, Mao adds still another complication to the problem of political communication and control. In describing the dynamics of dissent, he warns, "Under ordinary circumstances, contradictions among the people are not antagonistic. But if they are not dealt with properly, or if we relax vigilance and lower our guard, antagonism may arise." The consequences can be serious, since "the reactionaries in a socialist country, in league with the imperialists, take advantage of contradictions among the people to foment disunity and dissension and fan the flames of disorder in an attempt to achieve their conspiratorial aims. This lesson of the Hungarian events deserves our attention."



In short, the tolerable may become intolerable. For the elite, this poses an obligation to move swiftly and correctly lest the situation worsen. For the "people," it suggests prudence in defending the "interests of the led" against those of "the leaders," lest the latter's patience become exhausted. Yet it would be misleading to dismiss these as intentionally slippery formulations, merely designed to mislead the masses while leaving elite action unlimited. All of the evidence at the time and since indicates that Mao's speech represented a sincere effort at disentangling the problems of dissent and repression from the tangled web of "leftist" and "rightist" errors which blotted the pages of Communist political history. Certainly since 1957, his regime has continued to experiment with ways of winning public support and of soliciting public criticism without recourse to the blunt and brutal use of terror which proved so necessary to Soviet rule during similar periods in its political and economic development.

### *The Response of the Regime to Dissent*

Later we shall examine specific manifestations of the role of persuasion as opposed to terror and repression in the People's Republic of China. At this point, however, it is important to examine Mao's public rationale of policy for its overt and its covert implications as a theoretical guide to his followers. Mao explains the political consequences of the fact that there are two different types of dissent: "Since the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people differ in nature, they must be solved in different ways." And further, "Two different methods, dictatorial and democratic, should be used to resolve the two different types of contradictions." Once again, however, words are not used in their familiar Western context as absolutes or as fundamental attributes. Instead, Mao qualifies such concepts as freedom and democracy by juxtaposing them against overriding considerations of party control. He warns, "Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract regard democracy as an end and not as a means. . . . Both democ-

racy and freedom are relative, not absolute. . . . Within the ranks of our people, democracy stands in relation to centralism and freedom to discipline. They are two conflicting aspects of a single entity, contradictory as well as united, and we should not onesidedly emphasize one to the denial of the other." And again, "This freedom is freedom with leadership and this democracy is democracy under centralized guidance. . . . The people enjoy a wide measure of democracy and freedom, but at the same time, they have to keep themselves within the bounds of Socialist discipline."

Reading this seemingly balanced formulation, we can readily see that the balance is persistently tipped in favor of the regime and control, as against the individual and freedom. Thus "centralism" and "discipline," like "leadership" and "guidance," take priority over "democracy" and "freedom" in determining who can do what and to whom in the Communist political game. It is significant that the terms "freedom" and "democracy" recur so frequently, suggesting that they represent symbols of appeal and reflect expressed demands among key groups in Communist China. By changing the content of these words, the regime seeks to adopt them for its own ends. In so doing, it opens the door to controlled criticism while reminding its followers that the door can be slammed at will.

Mao calls for persuasion among "the people" and coercion against "the enemy." However, we must remember that the initial definition of these categories makes this a weak reed to support open dissent. As he puts it, "In no sense do we mean that coercive measures should be taken to settle ideological matters and questions involving the distinction between right and wrong among the people." Such an approach would be "not only ineffectual but harmful." With realistic candor, Mao warns, "We cannot compel people to give up idealism, any more than we can force

them to believe in Marxism." Again it must be remembered that "idealism" connotes something quite different in Communist jargon from that implied by customary Western usage.

At another point, he asks: "Can Marxism be criticized? Certainly it can. . . . Will it do to ban incorrect ideas and give them no opportunity to express themselves? Certainly not. It is not only futile but very harmful to use crude and summary methods to deal with ideological questions among people. You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will still be there. On the other hand, correct ideas, if pampered in hot-houses, without being exposed to the elements or immunized from disease, will not win out against wrong ones." Therefore, the "democratic method of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education" implements the formula of "unity-criticism-unity" so as to "foster correct ideas, overcome wrong ideas, and really settle issues." Thus are "contradictions among the people" resolved. Mao contrasts this permissive approach to that of "left doctrinaires" who advocate "ruthless struggle and merciless blows." Provided that dissent comes from "the people," its "nonantagonistic" nature permits it to be handled through discourse, not by dictate.

To the degree that Mao's theories are realized in practice, they differentiate the People's Republic of China from fascist, and even Stalinist, totalitarian systems. True, Mao posits no absolute guarantees against the abuse of authority, and the permissible bounds of dissent are so vaguely defined as to permit arbitrary action by the government. Yet he specifically abjures police-state methods and sheer force as means for coping with criticism, not on humanitarian grounds, but for the pragmatic reason of being "not only ineffective, but harmful." Looking back on the oppressiveness of Stalin's personal dictatorship and the explosive forces which had built up in Eastern

Europe under those who emulated him, Mao had good reason to try to find new ways to achieve consensus, lest the indiscriminate use of authoritarian controls cause a similar crisis in China. This ideological framework explains why some groups that might otherwise be driven to revolt by persistent terror and brutality actively support the regime. Explicit emphasis on these themes in 1962 continued to signal Mao's confidence that despite serious and extended economic disasters, he could still gamble on persuasion rather than terror for insuring the desired responses from the populace.

Mao's essay goes even further in exploring the limits of dissent, conceding that "steps have been or are being taken to correct mistakes which have already been discovered in the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. Those not yet discovered will be corrected as soon as they come to light. Decisions on exoneration and rehabilitation should receive the same publicity as the original mistaken decisions." While this was of small comfort to those who had been "wrongly" killed in the mass executions of the early 1950's, it established some curbs on police power and some inhibitions against extra-legal procedures.

Curiously enough, Mao's promise that "a comprehensive review of the work of suppressing counter-revolution will be made . . . to foster a spirit of righteousness and combat unhealthy tendencies" appears never to have been fulfilled, at least judging from materials subsequently published. Perhaps this was one of the casualties of the "anti-rightist campaign" resulting from the criticisms that followed Mao's speech. Perhaps it also grew out of his caution against "pouring cold water on the large number of functionaries and activists who took part in the work" of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. Obviously, those who had participated in mass executions and arrests were not going to confess their errors, and the caution which Mao himself showed may have been used as an excuse by others not to weaken the control apparatus by bringing it into public disrepute.

Moreover, Mao calls for continued vigilance

against "the hidden counter-revolutionaries still at large" and the "secret agents" whom "the United States imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique are constantly sending in to carry on wrecking activities." In 1957, resistance to Communist policies in the countryside and the presence of Chinese Nationalist forces not only in Taiwan and the offshore islands but along the border areas in Burma and Laos gave these fears some basis in fact. In addition, the persistent paranoia characteristic of Communist thinking, rooted in theoretical assumptions of universal conflict and from experience in revolutionary struggle, underlined Mao's warning: "Even when all the counter-revolutionaries in existence have been routed out, new ones may emerge. If we drop our guard we shall be badly fooled and suffer for it severely." Despite these ominous passages, on balance, his speech justified some relaxation of repression, for it contained frequent reassurances such as this: "There are not many counter-revolutionaries. You will not find them everywhere and in every organization."

What differentiates constructive criticism from counter-revolution? Mao offers six criteria, noted more for their restrictiveness than their permissiveness. "We believe that, broadly speaking, words and actions can be judged right if they: (1) help to unite the people of our various nationalities and do not divide them; (2) are beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction; (3) help to consolidate, not to undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship; (4) help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism; (5) tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party; and (6) are beneficial, not harmful, to international socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world. Of these six criteria, the most important are the socialist path and the leadership of the party."

The obvious vagueness of these criteria caution against hailing them as a Bill of Rights for Communist China. Even more relevant for potential dissenters is the specific command that "the socialist path and the leadership of

the party" override all other considerations for determining "right from wrong words and actions." In essence, this reduces the other criteria to whatever Mao's colleagues wish to make of them, since challenges to their interpretation are tantamount to "weakening the leadership of the Communist Party."

This is an appropriate point to suspend our analysis of Mao's "rules of the game," at least as applied to "the people" as a whole. Later we shall examine practice as opposed to theory. Before moving on to his specific handling of classes and groups, however, we might note once again the dualistic nature of Mao's persistent effort to find a suitable formula which will permit criticism while preserving the party's privileged position as an authoritarian elite. When faced with a choice of emphasis between dissent and its repression, he hedges his apparent decision in favor of dissent by relativistic terminology and qualifications which give the ultimate sanction to repression.

#### *The Party and the Class Struggle*

Perhaps no greater difference between Confucianism and Communism exists than in their differing assumptions concerning the basic state of human relations. For Confucius, it was one of harmony and unity. For Mao, as for Marx, it is one of conflict and struggle. Thus, according to Mao, "Marxism can only develop through struggle—this is true not only in the past and present, it is necessarily true in the future also."

The struggle is not only between "the true, the good, and the beautiful" against "the false, the evil, and the ugly" as Mao so poetically puts it. It is "the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie . . . the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country." This will continue "for a long time to come because of the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who come from the old society." It

will also come because "remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes still exist, the bourgeoisie still exists, and the petty bourgeoisie has only just begun to remold itself." By "comprador," Mao referred to those Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs whose power rested on their relationship with foreign investors and foreign trade.

Two observations are in order. First, the subjective definition of such terms as "proletariat" and "bourgeoisie" makes Chinese Communist categorization a subject for study in itself. It matters little that China's urban workers comprised less than one per cent of the population and that their political role was so emasculated by Chinese Nationalist curbs on trade unions that they played virtually no role in the final CCP drive to power. To remain in the Marxist lineage, Mao must claim to represent "the proletarian revolution."

Second, by positing the "class struggle" as omnipresent, now and in the foreseeable future, the party becomes indispensable as the enlightened arbiter of the conflict. This role makes its ideological purity of prime importance. Rigid adherence to ideology, however, engenders "dogmatism." Ignoring ideology gives rise to "revisionism." Of the two, "revisionism" is "more dangerous than dogmatism," for while the latter leads to the blind suppression of dissent, "revisionism attacks the most fundamental elements of Marxism . . . [i.e.] the people's democratic dictatorship and the leading role of the Communist party." Mao warns against any tendencies which dilute the party's pre-eminent power: "Some people ask for the two-party system of the West . . . but this is nothing but a means of maintaining the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." Instead of this, China "is a people's democratic dictatorship, led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance." Given Mao's initial definition of "people" and "democratic," this formula seems

unambiguous only with respect to the term "dictatorship."

In accordance with his predilection for "class analysis," Mao examines various areas of "non-antagonistic contradictions within the people," in such groups as the peasantry, industrialists, and intellectuals. This analysis offers a crude parallel to Western studies that focus on group interests and political pressures. The separate identification of "intellectuals" suggests that economic relationships alone are an insufficient criterion for determining cleavages within the body politic. Stalin anticipated this development when he earlier designated the intellectuals as a special "stratum" with a legitimate status alongside the traditional "classes." Since Mao's essay was to reform and rally the intellectuals, one of the prime purposes of according them a special position was pragmatic as well as theoretical.

Mao speaks of the intellectuals with obvious ambivalence: "Most have made marked progress . . . many are diligently studying Marxism, and some have become Communists." Those who "are sceptical of socialism or who do not approve of it . . . are in a minority." Yet to "shed their bourgeois world outlook and acquire a proletarian world outlook . . . is fundamental, and up till now it cannot be said that most of our intellectuals have accomplished it." The penalty for failure in this respect is only implied. "We hope they will not stop halfway, or, what is worse, slip back; if they do, they will find themselves in a blind alley." Perhaps for expediency, Mao cautions against dismissing all intellectuals as expendable. "There are bound to be some who are all along reluctant, ideologically, to accept Marxism-Leninism and Communism. We should not be too exacting in what we expect of them; as long as they comply with the requirements of the state and engage in legitimate pursuits, we should give them opportunities for suitable work."

Here, as in some other portions, Mao's speech was soon dated by events which it failed to anticipate. As we have noted, the wooing of intellectuals had begun in early 1956 with the colorful admonition, reviving a classical saying, "let a hundred flowers

bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." After Mao's speech, thousands of "blooming and contending" critics of the regime were summarily sentenced to forced labor as "bourgeois rightists." Strictures against "poisonous weeds" won priority of emphasis over "fragrant flowers." The lack of specific guidelines for criticism, the sudden release of long-suppressed views, the absence of an adequate precedent to serve as an example, and the political naiveté of many intellectuals all combined to create a series of miscalculations by the critics and rising alarm among those criticized. The situation got out of hand between the time of Mao's original speech and the publication of his revised version. Open denunciations of Marxist theory, scathing attacks against party practices, questioning of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and even threats of possible violence against the established order dotted the debates in the daily press. Those who had doubted the wisdom of Mao's initial invitation for criticism joined those whose vested interests were threatened to unleash a crushing rebuff to the daring dissenters. Small wonder that Mao's remarks struck a mixed note of optimism and pessimism when dealing with analysis of China's intellectuals.

Similar miscalculation seems to have occurred in his estimate of relations between the central government and non-Chinese minorities, especially in Tibet. Mao in his speech announced that "democratic reforms"—meaning the imposition of Communist institutions—would be postponed in Tibet for at least five and perhaps ten years. His promise was forgotten, however, when in 1958–59 CCP persecution of lamaist monasteries coincided with the collectivization of landholdings and herds in Yunnan and Tsinghai, adjacent to Tibet. Revolt spread, and in 1959 all Tibet flamed into open rebellion.

Finally, Mao's speculation that another two to five years would be needed to "consolidate" the cooperatives, which had been formed in 1955, gave no hint that in 1958—only eighteen months later—the cooperatives would be junked in favor of the radical commune experiment. This wholesale transformation of socioeconomic relations in the countryside proved

to be the regime's most signal blunder, yet despite its ramifications, Mao's speech gave no forewarning of the commune movement.

Thus an essay originally designed as a response to dissension among intellectuals, national minorities, and peasants introduced an era of even greater strain between Peking and its public. In the case of Tibet, "non-antagonistic contradictions" became antagonistic. Yet the persistence of Mao's maxims and the regime's efforts to ameliorate its authoritarian tendencies in 1963 suggest that the search for a safe balance between the preponderance of authority and the possibility of dissent continues up to the present time. For this reason, Mao's analysis of "contradictions" may serve as a reference point in Chinese Communist politics for some years to come.

## Communist Theory and the Process of Modernization

The doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism offers both advantages and disadvantages for achieving the modernization China has been groping for over the past century. Its political appeal, vital to winning mass support for the sacrifices inherent in industrialization based on inadequate resources of capital and technology, won a striking response from the Chinese people down to the economic debacle of 1959–62. The reasons are several. For one thing, the doctrine appears as part of the new world of science, since it claims to have discovered universal laws of human behavior that embody "scientific truth." This identification with the technological revolution is strengthened by the fact that Soviet Russia serves as the font of the new order. Russian sputniks symbolize the triumph of a backward peasant society over the demands of modernization. Whether intellectual or peasant, all Chinese who hope

to bring their personal life and their political society abreast of the advanced nations can look to the Russian experience for hope and inspiration in this respect.

But contrary to Western belief, Marxism-Leninism promises more than material, technological gains. It offers spiritual satisfaction when the Communist society is realized and such onerous aspects of government as dictatorial rule and instruments of coercion disappear. Just as the "state will wither away," to be replaced by the "administration of things, not of people," so payment according to work will be replaced by the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." These appeals aim at basic desires—utopian, to be sure—which are found in all societies and civilizations, whether the most primitive or the most advanced.

In addition to these domestic spurs to discipline, unity, and obedience which are to be rewarded by material and spiritual benefits at some future time, the ideology posits external threats inherent in "international capitalism and imperialism" which drive the populace toward greater self-sacrifice in support of industrial and military development. This "carrot and stick" combination of promise and threat creates a sense of dedication and urgency that facilitates the consolidation of political power and the direction of that power toward economic mobilization and modernization.

Whether totalitarian means achieve this modernization more rapidly than other political approaches is a subject of continuing debate and one that goes beyond the scope of this essay. It is generally agreed, however, that some controls are needed over consumption, capital accumulation, and investment if a less developed society is to overtake the more advanced industrial countries. China's pronounced shortage of capital for investment as compared with its surplus of labor argues for central direction of manpower, if all resources

are to be harnessed for intensive development.

For these reasons, certain aspects of the Communist credo seem well suited to China's needs as defined by the present elite as well as its predecessors. Of course, the goals might be differently arranged. There is no obvious reason why overtaking other countries in the output of iron and steel should have top priority over raising the living standards throughout the country. Yet to a considerable degree, the modernization which Mao Tse-tung has promised to China bears striking resemblance to that offered both by Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen.

We shall examine the workings of the CCP later, but it is worth noting at this point that its ideology places a premium on asceticism and self-regeneration. This sense of dedication and sacrifice provides both discipline and drive for the new elite which, in the absence of legal opposition, might easily succumb to the temptations of power and privilege. Indeed, many observers feel that in the Soviet Union, a growing emphasis on consumer goods indicates a "mellowing" of the second-generation Communist elite, toning down its revolutionary fervor. There is even reason to believe that the Chinese Communists share this view of their fellow ally. Against this trend, however, are built-in checks which the ideology explicitly or implicitly offers its followers, such as self-criticism, purges, and ruthless surveillance for "counter-revolutionary activity." These may offset the debilitating force of bureaucracy and keep alive the ends for which the party originally seized power. At least at the working levels, the ideology provides stimulus and cohesion through its clarity of goals, while its injunctions against "back-sliding" seek to assure a consistency of effort in striving toward those goals.

Against this impressive array of assets, we must list some important liabilities. Despite their insistence on adapting Communism to China's "national characteristics," Mao and his colleagues still suffer from the strictures placed on them by ideology and by the reinforcement of these strictures by Soviet practice. Collectivism, for instance, is a Marxist fetish, the economic benefits of which remain

in doubt and the economic liabilities of which, at least in agriculture, have been proven through more than forty years of Soviet failure to keep rural productivity growing sufficiently to satisfy industrial and consumer needs. Collective farms may control peasant consumption of foodstuffs and even facilitate the checking of peasant dissidence, but in the crucial realm of output, they still disappoint and bewilder Soviet planners. With China's intensive agriculture, collectivization holds considerably less promise, since the benefits of mechanization—possible only through the merging of small plots into larger holdings—seem impossible to achieve, especially in the wet-rice areas. Yet Peking pushed collectivization to the extreme in its first decade of power, seemingly blind to the economic setbacks experienced by Soviet agriculture.

Another shortcoming attributable to the impact of ideology is the inhibition, if not the prohibition, against criticism from lower ranks against decisions taken by top levels of the Communist Party. The emphasis on discipline and centralized decision-making, coupled with injunctions against factionalism and threats from outside conspiratorial elements, tends to mute necessary and vital complaints from below. Thus the failures which result from the incorrect transfer of institutions from Soviet to Chinese conditions, or from miscalculations by Mao's leadership, may be checked only when their disruptive consequences have done serious, if not irreparable, harm. Mao's criteria for distinguishing "right words from wrong" make "the leadership of the Communist Party" the final arbiter of any dissenting views. We find no public criticism of Mao, Liu, or their immediate colleagues, nor do we know of any private attacks upon them which have been successfully mounted within the CCP. If Soviet precedent serves as an example, such criticism occurs only during a struggle for power. Even at lower levels, per-

sons who attack their superiors often appear to do so only upon instruction from above, as part of a planned program of criticism and correction, not as individual fault-finders acting on their own initiative.

This inhibition on criticism, combined with the imitation of certain Soviet practices, makes rigid what otherwise might be an extremely flexible and adaptable ideology. The point must not be exaggerated, of course. We shall see how Peking has been able to adjust its policies in response to adverse or unanticipated consequences. At the same time, Communism seems to place certain sectors of the society under tremendous pressures, to the point where any effort to reduce pressures—by a "decompression" process—is a difficult and hazardous task. Three such sectors evident in China, as throughout the Soviet bloc, are the intelligentsia, the national minorities, and the peasantry. Sometimes, as in Tibet, this effort at decompression is too little or too late, and revolt occurs. More often, especially amongst the peasants, the threatened explosion is signalled by the murder of Communist Party members and the burning of government graineries. This can alert Peking, which then may attempt, through a combination of repression and decompression, to provide temporary, if not permanent, relief.

In the last analysis, this problem of disruptive tension and its easement may prove to be the most critical one inherent in the Communist credo. Certainly it offsets many of Communism's advantages in achieving modernization. Against the long background of pre-Communist history, the People's Republic of China is still in its infancy after a dozen short years. Its future cannot be predicted with certainty. But the evidence to date suggests that the Communist ideology has basic strengths and weaknesses that are relevant in assessing the foundation of political power for the Chinese Communist Party.

# Political Dynamics:

## The Communist Party of China

### IV

The General Program of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declares: "As the highest form of class organization, the party must strive to play a correct role as the leader and core in every aspect of the country's life." In the politics of China, the CCP is clearly the decision-making center and implementing organization which brooks no rival in its monopoly of power. Its members staff all key positions in government and society. Explicit injunctions weld them into a disciplined body under central direction from party organizations and officials at parallel or higher levels. Its leaders decide government policy, regardless of their titles or constitutionally vested responsibilities. Its ideology is the only officially propagated doctrine, mandatory for non-member and member alike. While the CCP is not identical with the government, it controls the government in the

fullest sense of the term. This creates problems strange to democratic systems.

Unlike the Soviet Communist Party, the CCP has revealed little of its inner workings to the outside world. In part this is because of the cohesiveness of the party leadership. Mao's only high-level rival to leave China, Chang Kuo-t'ao, did not, like Trotsky, expose party machinations from exile. So far, no de-Stalinization speech, such as Khrushchev's in 1956 and again in 1961, has rattled skeletons in Mao's closets, although we may presume that they exist. This extreme secrecy may be one of the traits that distinguish the Chinese from their Russian counterparts. Admittedly, the difference is one of degree, since Moscow has attempted, with some success, to keep party politics a private matter. Yet compared with what we know from Soviet debates of the twenties, the trials and purges of the thirties, and the post-Stalin revelations of the fifties, our knowledge of activity inside the CCP remains largely dependent on the doctored reports that Peking releases for our perusal.

Whatever the explanation, the result of this secrecy is to force us back on such facts and figures as the CCP chooses to publish. These data inevitably raise more questions than they answer. However, by framing our observations as hypotheses instead of conclusions, we may focus future research on specific gaps in our knowledge and gradually reduce the area of our ignorance.



## The Membership of the Chinese Communist Party

In 1921, thirteen anarchists, radicals, and avowed Marxists met clandestinely in a private girls' school, protected by the French concession in Shanghai. This inauspicious gathering declared itself the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1951, thirty years later, the thirteen had grown to 5.8 million party members. In another decade, this number more than doubled, to 17 million CCP followers in 1961 (Table 4-1). Although it is the largest Communist Party in the world, this organization still comprises only two per cent of China's population. Yet despite its rapid growth and its staggering size, the CCP gives credence to its claim of "monolithic unity." Acting as a disciplined army under the skilled direction of an elite located in the Political Bureau of its Central Committee (Politburo), the Chinese Communist Party manipulates the illiterate masses of China almost at will.

Obviously, it takes more than a few men in Peking to accomplish this. Without a broadly based membership, Mao and his immediate colleagues could not successfully subject China's 700 million inhabitants to the propaganda and production campaigns which characterize their regime. Our knowledge about this bottom level of the CCP is very superficial, although some pioneering research in this area has been undertaken by Professors Franz Schurmann and John Lewis. Basically, however, our information comes from intermittent reports released by Peking, such as those of the Eighth Party Congress in September, 1956. Since such a meeting is scheduled every five years according to party rules, the Ninth Congress should have met in 1961. It did not do so. Until it does meet and its reports are available, then, we must rely on the earlier data and modify our findings as new information emerges from the works of Schurmann and Lewis, or from the next party congress.

In 1956, more than two-thirds of the then

ten million CCP members were between twenty-six and forty-five years of age. In terms of their "class origin," almost seventy per cent came from peasant backgrounds, while workers comprised only fourteen per cent, intellectuals almost twelve per cent, and "other" groups made up the rest. These figures are highly revealing, especially when viewed against the tasks confronting the party. For one thing, most of the CCP has little memory of the pre-World War II period and lacks any first-hand experience of the difficult decade, 1927-37, when the CCP and KMT were locked in bitter struggle. This gap in experience between the elite, which was formed during the 6,000-mile "Long March" of 1934-37, and the rank and file is exacerbated by the fact that more than half the party membership joined after the final Communist victory in 1949. This sudden and late growth loaded the party rosters with career-seeking persons who had scant familiarity with the driving asceticism that characterized the earlier members' lives in Yen-an. The party also contained many well-meaning patriots whose aspirations to build a "new China" included little or no anticipation of the "revolutionary struggle and class warfare" which was to be expected of them. Finally, this membership explosion came when the CCP leadership was burdened with rebuilding and industrializing war-torn China. Administration took priority over indoctrination of new members, with a resulting dilution of discipline and a lowering of ideological awareness. Thus, on the tenth anniversary of victory, in 1959, a Politburo member publicly recalled Lenin's warning: "In the course of the bourgeois democratic revolution, many joined our party not purely because they supported the proletarian program of our party, but mainly because they saw that our party had waged a brilliant and resolute struggle for democracy." In short, they lacked a "genuine Communist consciousness."

TABLE 4-1 Numerical Growth of the CCP, 1921-1961<sup>a</sup>

	Number of members	Years covered	Average annual increase
<i>First Revolutionary Civil War</i>			
1921 (1st Congress)	57	—	—
1922 (2nd Congress)	123	1	66
1923 (3rd Congress)	432	1	309
1925 (4th Congress)	950	2	259
1927 (5th Congress)	57,967	2	28,508
1927 (After "April 12th")	10,000	—	—
<i>Second Revolutionary Civil War</i>			
1928 (6th Congress)	40,000	1	30,000
1930	122,318	2	41,159
1933	300,000	3	59,227
1937	40,000	4	-65,000
<i>Anti-Japanese War</i>			
1940	800,000	3	253,333
1941	763,447	1	-36,553
1942	736,151	1	-27,296
1944	853,420	2	58,635
1945 (7th Congress)	1,211,128	1	357,708
<i>Third Revolutionary Civil War</i>			
1946	1,348,320	1	137,192
1947	2,759,456	1	1,411,136
1948	3,065,533	1	306,077
1949	4,488,080	1	1,422,547
<i>Under People's Republic of China</i>			
1950	5,821,604	1	1,333,524
1951	5,762,293	1	-59,311
1952	6,001,698	1	239,405
1953	6,612,254	1	610,556
1954	7,859,473	1	1,247,219
1955	9,393,394	1	1,533,921
1956 (8th Congress)	10,734,384	1	1,340,990
1957	12,720,000	1	1,985,616
1959	13,960,000	2	620,000
1961	17,000,000	2	1,520,000

<sup>a</sup> Table compiled by Professor John Lewis. Sources: The major sources for this table are *Shih-shih shou't's'e*, No. 18, 1956, and *People's China*, No. 18, September 16, 1956, pp. 17-26. The 1959 figures are from *Ten Glorious Years* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 283; and the 1961 figures are from *Jen-min jih-pao*, July 1, 1961. Although listed in official Communist sources, these figures must be considered tentative. For example, *Jen-min jih-pao*, August 17, 1961, states that there were more than a million party members in 1942.

Besides their youth and inexperience, the peasant background of most CCP members can arouse conflicting loyalties when extreme economic or political measures are to be implemented in the countryside. Even though the percentage of this group declined from ninety to seventy between 1945 and 1956, it still generated "conservative" and "rightist" opposition to higher policy. In 1959, Liu Lan-

t'ao, a member of the Control Committee of the CCP Central Committee, noted that in the first decade of power, "We expelled from our ranks tens of thousands of counter-revolutionaries, class dissenters, bourgeois rightists, etc." He warned, "It is not surprising that this life-and-death struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will inevitably be reflected within the party. The anti-socialist ideas of the bourgeoisie always affect and erode our party from different ways. Imperialists and reactionaries at home and abroad leave no stone unturned in their efforts to seek agents in our party in order to undermine the party

from within and from the leading nucleus."

Inevitably, such words arouse thoughts of impending purge, and in this case dismissals hit at various levels of the CCP, including provincial party secretaries as well as new recruits. But purge is not the only remedy for dissent. In 1942, "Cheng Feng" or "rectification" sought to make revolutionaries out of the thousands who had flocked to Yen-an to support the anti-Japanese struggle. Similarly today, periodic indoctrination campaigns attempt to close the gap between leaders and followers by infusing into the latter a "true Communist consciousness, a pure proletarian outlook." This cautions against our interpreting all such campaigns as evidence of serious deterioration in party loyalty, much less impending crisis. Without these indoctrination drives, in fact, the CCP might be a far less effective political instrument and much more riven with cleavages between the elite and the masses.

In addition to purge and periodic "study and self-criticism," the CCP protects its doctrinal purity by limiting mass enrollment to particular periods, usually decided upon at high levels. While membership is open to all persons eighteen years of age or older "who work and do not exploit the labor of others," a prospective member must pursue a carefully designed program of recommendation and probation to determine his intentions and capabilities. According to the CCP rules, applicants must be recommended by two full members, be approved for probationary status by a party branch as well as by the next higher party committee, and finally be admitted to full membership by these same groups after satisfactory completion of one year of "elementary party education," during which his "political qualities" are carefully observed. While these procedures may be poorly administered or violated in practice, their prominent position (Articles 4 to 9) in the party rules indicates the importance the party attaches to proper recruitment.

With more than one million "basic level organizations" forming the bottom of the party pyramid, local direction is necessary. This responsibility is vested in the party secretary,

who wields power over members in his cell or branch and, through them, over the factory or office within which they work. Liu Lan-t'ao answered the criticism of "right opportunists" who claimed that this has fostered "dictatorship" by saying, "The right opportunists do not at all understand the unification of collective leadership and individual function (the unification of party committee and its first secretary), they opposed letting the first secretary assume command, calling it 'dictatorship' and 'undemocratic'. . . . We say that the nucleus of collective leadership is the centralized demonstration of collective wisdom, and that to let the first secretary assume command in important work means to require him to be a good squad leader and do a good job of it."

Having declared himself in favor of strong party secretaries, however, Liu noted dangerous tendencies inherent in the situation: "Leaders of some units are so zealous in developing the 'independent activities' of their own units that they exaggerate to an improper degree the establishment of necessary systematic leadership relations and relations of business guidance between higher and lower organs, even preaching the absurd assertion that 'an outsider cannot lead insiders,' demanding various powers from the party, and treating the units they lead as 'independent kingdoms.' Some others accepted only the leadership of departments at a higher level but were unwilling to submit to the unified leadership of the party committees at the same level." In short, party secretaries may become petty tyrants, responding only to pressures from above or building their own local empires.

## The Organization of the CCP

### *The Central Committee*

It is quite a jump from the lowliest CCP cell to the Central Committee (CC). Through

the same method of indirect election used by the Soviet party, local CCP branches choose delegates to county or municipal party congresses which, in turn, elect provincial party congresses. These send delegates to a National Party Congress which then chooses a ninety-six man Central Committee as "the highest leading body of party organization . . . when the National Party Congress is not in session" (Article 21). Just as party committees for the county, municipal, and provincial congresses provide ongoing direction for their respective spheres of activity, so the CC of the CCP "directs the entire work of the party when the National Party Congress is not in session" (Article 34). While this somewhat overstates the actual CC role, it serves to indicate the potential power of this body.

Naturally, it would be desirable to analyze the intermediate party organizations, especially at the provincial level where the sharpest conflict appears between pressures from below and orders from above. However, until greater access to the provincial press of China permits scholars to focus on this level, we will be even more limited in our knowledge of this sector than we are of the national level. Some justification for beginning at the top is provided by the political dominance of higher over lower levels, so we may not be missing the most important area of decision-making. Nonetheless, we must mark this gap in our information as obscuring a major part of the party hierarchy.

In theory, lower-level control over higher organs is assured through periodic elections. In practice, the elections prove to be less than "periodic" so that higher-level positions are held years beyond their constitutional tenure. Thus every five years, provincial party congresses are supposed to elect the National Party Congress. Actually, only two such Congresses have been elected in the last eighteen years, the seventh in 1945 and the eighth in

1956. Even allowing for the disruption of civil war, this speaks poorly for the observance of party rules.

Moreover, the National Party Congress, consisting of more than one thousand members, is supposed to meet annually unless the Central Committee decides that "extraordinary conditions" preclude such a meeting. The Eighth Congress has met only once since its original convening in 1956, suggesting that the Central Committee exercises this option with a heavy hand. Since the Congress elects the CC and therefore is legally superior to it, failure to convene the parent body removes the problem of CC responsibility to the membership at large. In this manner, reality mirrors theory, reversing the image in the process.

Another question is whether the Congress actually picks the CC or whether the CC is hand picked by the outgoing Politburo, or perhaps by its seven-man Standing Committee, which has included such key leaders as Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Chou En-lai. Perhaps Mao personally has selected the core of CC memberships over the past twenty years. Certainly it is a striking fact that of the forty-four CC members elected in 1945, excepting those who died, only two failed to be re-elected in 1956 and both of these had been publicly purged in the interim. And twenty of the twenty-four alternate members of 1945 won alternate or regular status twelve years later. Given the tenfold increase of the CCP base membership in the interim, it is inconceivable that 1,000 national delegates, of their own free will, exercised through secret ballots, would have returned so high a percentage of the Seventh Central Committee in 1956.

What functions does the CC fulfill? Its size is somewhat large to make it a deliberating body, at least on complex and urgent matters. The infrequency and short duration of its meetings, occurring once or twice yearly for only two to three weeks, suggest that it does not formulate major domestic and foreign policies. At times of particular or prolonged crisis, the CC does not seem to meet at all. Thus although it may convene secretly, so far

as we know no CC plenum was held throughout 1960, despite the marked deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations that year and the decline of agricultural productivity that had begun in 1958. When the tenth plenum of the Eighth Central Committee met in September, 1962, only four days were granted for discussion of party and national affairs—including such problems as the growing isolation of China from the Soviet bloc, the continuing paralysis of the entire economy, and the ideological crisis which had threatened party unity at the highest levels.

Apparently, the CC is convened at the will of the Politburo, despite party rules to the contrary which stipulate two CC sessions a year. The very secrecy of its meetings suggests that it does something of importance. When Mao Tse-tung or Liu Shao-ch'i are reported to address the CC, often only the titles of their speeches are published at the time, with the full contents appearing months later, if at all. CC meetings can last as long as three weeks, with only a laconic communique at the end announcing the adoption of communes or the decentralization of economic administration—key matters affecting the entire society—yet never is there a report of the daily debates which presumably accompany such decisions. All that we can say is that a review of these communiques over the past five years shows that virtually every important domestic and foreign issue has at one time or another been brought before the Central Committee.

One clue to the Central Committee's function may lie in the responsibilities of its members. For one thing, almost all provinces and autonomous regions are represented, generally by the first party secretary of that region. This permits the leadership, more or less tied to Peking, to gain an additional perspective on problems by soliciting questions and criticisms relating to past and pending policies. No less important are the government positions represented in the CC membership, including the chairman and vice-chairman of the PRC, the chairman of the Supreme State Conference, the premier, twelve vice-premiers, and the secretary-general of the State Council;

twenty ministers and chairmen of commissions, the chairman, eleven vice-chairmen, and twenty members of the National Defense Council, the chief of staff, three deputy chiefs of staff, the chiefs of staff for air and navy, the director and deputy director of the political department of the People's Liberation Army; the chairman, four vice-chairmen, secretary-general, and twenty-six members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress; the president of the Supreme People's Court and the procurator general of the Supreme People's Procurate. If we were to identify all the provincial officials and representatives of mass organizations as well, it would be clear that the Central Committee includes the leading personnel of virtually every important governmental and public organization in China.

Thus the CC could provide Mao and his colleagues with a useful sounding-board without, however, submitting them to a private power challenge, much less public attack. Since this is a highly disciplined body, responsible not to the people but to the Politburo so far as party directives are concerned, it is unlikely to get out of hand. At the same time, its broadly representative nature, in terms of political functions and geographical areas embraced by the membership, gives the leadership an opportunity to check on various aspects of administration and to solicit ideas for improvement should such an approach to problems be desired.

The Politburo, which we shall examine shortly, has a regular membership of twenty which comprises more than one-fifth of the voting members of the CC. This core of the important decision-makers probably acts as a controlling nucleus for the larger body. The CC is important to the Politburo, however, for it transmits and implements Politburo decisions. Central Committee endorsement of Politburo actions gives the policies a legitimacy far beyond that possible through passive press

announcements. When the CC members explain and interpret Politburo decisions back home, they ease the way for programs that otherwise would have to rely on impersonal directives from Peking. This communication or transmission function of the CC is extremely important, given the size and heterogeneity of the PRC.

Still another CC function appears to be the rewarding of party workers for past service and the screening of them for future responsibility. The selection of less than two hundred regular and alternate CC members from party rosters of more than fifteen million accords special status to a few people in a country where political, not economic, criteria prevail. Recognition is heightened by the listing of Central Committee names in order of their supposed electoral position, based on "votes received." According to an official explanation, delegates to the National Party Congress submit unlimited lists of nominees from which the outgoing Politburo, after discussion with delegation heads, chooses "a list of candidates [to be] submitted to all delegates for a first preliminary election by secret ballot." After some complicated reballoting, the final list is published. We have already noted how the unusually high continuity of CC members over a span of fifteen years, despite a tenfold growth in party membership, suggests considerable rigging of the election from above. However, the final ranking may reflect legitimate differences in the size of the vote accorded each CC candidate. A comparison of the memberships of the Seventh and Eighth Central Committees shows that certain members advanced and others slipped considerably in rank. By publishing the list according to votes received, the regime provides a rough measurement of the rising or falling esteem that is accorded the more and the less worthy.

The screening function is emphasized by the expansion of alternates from twenty-four

to ninety-six between 1945 and 1958, which permitted promising individuals to be moved closer to the center of power without, however, jeopardizing Politburo control over the CC by the full participation of untried members. Since the alternates can participate in discussion but do not vote, they have a chance to display their capability without exercising power. The Central Committee has important organs, bureaus, and subcommittees, all with regular and alternate members. Rising party members act under direct surveillance by the elite in these various bodies, thereby giving the leadership a chance to recruit new blood without relying wholly on a long-distance view of individuals working in their local provinces.

In sum, the Central Committee is too large and meets too infrequently and too briefly to be the real decision-making center of the CCP. Yet it is much more than a rubber-stamp for the Politburo. It gives legitimacy to Politburo decisions in accordance with the party constitution. It transmits decisions to lower levels, linking the peak of the political pyramid with its mass base. It provides status to worthy party members and, finally, offers a proving ground for potential leaders.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS.** The hand-picked nature of the Central Committee membership makes this group of key importance for determining the characteristics of Communist China's present and prospective leadership. The remarkable continuity of this group indicates that it will probably provide the replacements for Mao and his immediate colleagues as they die or retire. While it is true that statistics alone can tell us little about individual attitudes, we can at least sketch a biographical profile of the CC members in terms of their age, origin, education, and travel, all of which provide a basis for inferring what experiences they may have had and the effect of these experiences on their attitudes.

One of the foremost analysts in this area, Donald W. Klein, has broken down the Central Committee into five groups, according to the time each member joined the CC and

his rank as regular or alternate. This sets apart (1) those elected as full members in 1945 at the Seventh Party Congress, (2) those chosen as alternate members at this time, most of whom won full membership in 1956 at the Eighth Party Congress, (3) those additional persons made full members in 1956 and not in either of the first two categories, (4) those elected as alternates in 1956, and (5) those who made alternate membership at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in 1958. Thus (1) represents Mao's original hard core, including most of the Politburo, (2) includes the group Mao acquired after the Long March in 1935 when the CCP took refuge in the Shensi Soviet, (3) might be called the "near-misses" of 1945, (4) represents those who rose to prominence toward the end of World War II, and (5) represents essentially late-comers who emerged just before or after the seizure of power in 1949. Excluding a handful of persons who exercise little authority and are unlikely to become future leaders because of extreme age or other considerations, this undoubtedly comprises Communist China's elite for the next decade.

As far as age is concerned, several striking facts emerge. Those in Mao's immediate group elected as full members in 1945 average 68 years in age; those in the next two groups, 1945 alternates and 1956 full members, average ten years less. This suggests that while natural death took only two members of the Seventh Central Committee during its tenure, many of those presently in the top CC ranks will probably pass from the scene in the very near future. Curiously enough, while they are often described in the West as "fanatic revolutionaries" who will "mature and sober their thinking in time," this top group is virtually the oldest ruling group in the world.

The ten-year gap which separates Mao's hard core from the next two groups, its most likely source of replacement, may be important in judging the continuity of policy, inasmuch as this gap sets apart those whose proximity to one another was forged in their leadership roles during the Long March of 1934-35. To be sure, a majority of all but the last group in our analysis participated in the Long March;

all CC members experienced the hardships and setbacks of the subsequent struggle for power. Yet this old guard, centering around Mao's personal leadership, may be set apart in its age and experience from those who will succeed it. This raises the question: How different will be the tone of the post-Mao leadership?

It should be noted that the bottom two groups, comprised of all those elected as alternates to the Eighth CC in 1956 and 1958, are by no means young, averaging 56 and 54 years of age, respectively. These men matured in World War II and provide an ample reserve of battle-tested revolutionaries to replace the older ranks in the next decade. We should not expect, therefore, to see a sudden softening of attitude or an abandonment of Communist goals, even should all the names which are now familiar pass from the scene. The dedication and discipline which has held these groups together under Mao's aegis will most probably prevent them from pursuing internecine warfare or any prolonged power struggles after his death, much less any radical shifts in policy and doctrine.

This hypothesis is strengthened by a look at the careers of CC members, half of whom began as guerrilla fighters, thirty-seven having served as senior political commanders in the People's Liberation Army and twenty-seven as military commanders. Combined with those who were jailed by the Kuomintang, these men comprise a core of militants whose reactions are likely to be determined more by the years of armed struggle than by the years of bureaucratic rule. Having fought almost continuously from 1925 to 1949, first against the war-lord armies, then against the Chinese Nationalists, then the Japanese, and again the Nationalists, they may be expected to shun the easy way of compromise, especially with those they have seen so long as their enemies—the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan and the United States "imperialists."

Nor are these attitudes likely to have been tempered by favorable contact with the non-Communist world, either through education or travel abroad. While three-fourths of the Central Committee members have had some sort of higher education, except for the group which made full membership in 1945, all other groups in our analysis have predominantly had an exclusively Chinese education. In fact, of the alternates chosen in 1956 and 1958, only twelve per cent had training abroad. Moreover, only three of the entire membership under review studied in the United States; a handful more went to Germany and Japan. With the bulk of the minority that received foreign education having done so in the Soviet Union, we should not be surprised to find the present and prospective Chinese Communist leadership highly parochial in outlook.

This insularity is reinforced by the physical isolation of this elite from much of the world. Not only is it untutored in non-Communist ways of thinking, but it is without much experience outside the Soviet bloc. If we discount the relevance of contacts with Western industrial countries that occurred when some of China's present leaders were students in France and Germany immediately after World War I, it appears that the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee members have no first-hand knowledge of today's advanced societies.

Thus age, experience, education, and travel combine to reinforce the stereotypes about the outside world absorbed in early Communist indoctrination and revolutionary experience. This is relevant in more than foreign policy, for it suggests that the Chinese Communist leadership is likely to remain limited to those solutions for domestic problems which are offered by the Maoist ideology or by the Soviet bloc. Thus the China of 1965 may be curiously similar to that of 1865 in its isolation and parochial outlook. It also may

be no less hostile to the outside world, with the possible exception of Soviet bloc countries.

COHESION AND FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. As we have noted, the Chinese Communists have hidden most of their disagreements from outside observation. Instead of public purges, as in the Soviet Union, quiet downgrading of individuals seems to be the preferred punishment for dissenters. For instance, two past opponents of Mao, Li Li-san and Ch'en Shou-yü (Wang Ming), continued on the Eighth Central Committee long after their opposition was defeated and they had fallen from favor. This procedure quells the reverberations of the type that repeatedly follow the power struggles in the Soviet party. But the secrecy surrounding the CCP protestations of complete unity and harmony makes it impossible for us to assess the full strains and stresses which may prevail at any given time.

The only top-level challenge to Mao's authority that has been publicly admitted since 1949 was that of Jao Shu-shih and Kao Kang. Ousted in 1954-55, these individuals were accused of setting up "independent kingdoms" and of plotting against "the center" from their respective bases of power in Shanghai and Manchuria. Jao disappeared from sight, and is presumably in jail. Kao allegedly committed suicide. A subsequent shifting of positions implied at least the temporary downgrading of lesser officials who may have been implicated in the plot against Mao, if indeed this was the nature of their wrongdoing. However, no wholesale purging of the Central Committee occurred nor did any subsequent challenge to Mao's rule cause a repetition of this development during the next eight years.

This is not to say that political maneuvering and factionalism may not occur within the CC. Indeed, Donald Klein has suggested that the sudden enlarging of its membership in 1956, only two years after the ouster of Jao and Kao, resulted from Mao Tse-tung's desire to pack the CC with his faithful comrades. In addition to such personal ties, provincial associations—traditionally strong in China—may set up a Hunan faction against



a Hupei group, at least in terms of friendship and confidence. Still another point of friction may be the gap in age and authority between the old guard and the younger recruits, who might resent remaining on the periphery of power while men approaching senility maintain a monopoly in central positions of control.

When all such speculation is laid against the evidence, however, we must admit that the factors of cohesion so far outweigh those of factionalism as to make this an incredibly united and durable elite. Against the isolated purge of Jao and Kao in the Chinese Communist Party, we might contrast the history of the Soviet Party. Seventy per cent of the Soviet Central Committee elected in 1934 was shot. In the post-Stalin period, almost half of those elected to the Nineteenth Central Committee were replaced in the Twentieth. By packing and purging this group, rival contenders for power consolidated their positions and eliminated their opponents. Khrushchev, for instance, was able to defeat a majority in the Soviet Party Presidium who wanted his ouster in 1957 by turning to the Central Committee, much of which he had personally picked, for decisive support.

This makes the Chinese Communist record even more impressive. If a struggle for power does follow Mao's demise, we are unlikely to see its outlines with the clarity that has set apart the contenders for Lenin's and for Stalin's mantle. Nor is it likely to take place within the arena of the Central Committee. This may provide a sense of stability and continuity sufficient to permit Mao's successor to consolidate the party behind his leadership without recourse to the dread purges employed by Stalin or the sweeping reorganizations and reassignments used by Khrushchev to cement his personal power.

### *The Politburo*

The Politburo or, more precisely, its seven-man Standing Committee, is right at the center of the decision-making process in China. If the constellation of political power is viewed as a series of concentric circles, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the CCP, stands in dead center.

Around him are his Standing Committee associates, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yun, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Lin Piao. A short distance separates these men from the remaining thirteen Politburo members and their six alternates. Finally, a considerable gap lies between the Politburo and its supposed parent, the Central Committee.

As far as publicity is concerned, only Mao receives personal acknowledgment for his part in the policy process. Typical of the accolades contributing to a "cult of personality" such as surrounded Stalin is this statement by Liu Lan-t'ao, claiming that the entire work of the CCP was "inseparable from the honorable name of Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of our party, and his ever victorious and outstanding Marxist-Leninist leadership. The high prestige of Mao Tse-tung as the great leader of our party and our country" is justified by the fact that "Comrade Mao is the most prominent representative of the heroic proletariat of our country, the most prominent representative of the excellent tradition of our great party, the most prominent Marxist-Leninist revolutionist, politician, and theorist among all contemporaries. He has enriched creatively the treasures of Marxism-Leninism on a series of important problems. By recalling the past and looking forward to the future, the CCP and the masses of the Chinese people . . . remember his decisive effect on winning the revolution and on reconstruction. The over six hundred million people trust to him their happiness, hope and future, considering him the embodiment of Communism and truth and the banner of invincibility. Mao Tse-tung's influence, wisdom and experience as well as his ideology of combining Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution are the most precious wealth of our party and people."

This would appear to leave little room for others in the making of policy. Indeed, the constant association of Mao's name with such

important measures as rectification, collectivization, the "Great Leap Forward," and communes is prima-facie evidence of his dominant position. At the same time, the sheer inability of one man to decide all vital issues in a wholly planned society, especially under such backward conditions as prevail in China, argues that we should expand our focus to include at least those in the Standing Committee. The 1963 membership of this committee indicates that decision-making is probably more than a one-man show in Peking, for each member, with one exception, is responsible for an important area of specialization.

Thus Liu Shao-ch'i is known for his theoretical writings on party affairs and Sino-Soviet relations. Chou En-lai, as Premier, is charged with general administrative problems. In addition, he has more personal experience in diplomacy and in the management of foreign policy than any other individual in the PRC. Ch'en Yün, somewhat in eclipse during the economic debacle of 1959-62, is best known for his work in economic planning. Marshal Lin Piao, concurrently Minister of National Defense and member of the Standing Committee, is widely regarded as one of China's most outstanding modern military strategists. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Secretary-General of the CCP and a vice-premier in the government, supervises the party apparatus and controls the files which determine the promotion or demotion of CCP personnel. Only Chu Teh, now in his late seventies, appears to lack a special portfolio or immediate responsibility. But Chu may be retained in this select group solely in recognition of his symbolic role as a "grand old man" of the guerrilla campaigns which brought the CCP to power.

We know absolutely nothing of the interaction among these individuals. Indirect and inconclusive evidence has suggested that a rivalry may exist between Liu and Chou. Some observers see this personal conflict reflected in policy positions emanating from

the two men, respectively described as "theoretical" versus "pragmatic" in orientation. Given Liu's philosophical bent and Chou's responsibility for more practical problems, this dichotomy is logical, but certainly is not proven. Liu is persistently listed second on party rosters, and in 1959 he succeeded Mao as Chairman of the PRC, which should have shattered any illusions Chou may have had of becoming number two, and ultimately number one in command. The identical age of the two men, now in their sixties, means that they perhaps work as genuine equals, at least as far as surface relations are concerned.

Communist China's succession problem has yet to be discussed publicly in Peking, but one possible pattern is suggested by past events. Until 1958, Mao was Chairman of both party and government. After finishing one term as Chairman of the government under the new state constitution, he stepped down and Liu moved into his position. However, Mao retained his chairmanship of the party, leaving unfilled the recently created post of "honorary chairman." The circumstances surrounding his resignation from the state office are unclear. Some observers believe it resulted from unfavorable criticism of Mao's initiation of communes and the unsuccessful bombardment of the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu—all occurring simultaneously in the fall of 1958. Yet Mao continued to overshadow Liu, and his "cult of personality" grew noticeably in 1959-60. A different explanation may lie in the coincidence of Mao's sixty-fifth birthday and the end of his first term as PRC Chairman, suggesting that his resignation was part of a planned program of transition.

If this analysis has any merit, it offers a precedent for the next shift in command. Since Mao's seventieth birthday and the end of Liu's first term as PRC Chairman both come in 1963-64, Mao may then move up to "honorary chairman" of the CCP and Liu may become party chairman, with Chou becoming PRC Chairman. Such an arrangement would fix the precedent of one term for the latter post, as a counter to the overconcentration

and perpetuation of power in one person. It would also ease the transition from Mao to his successor, making the arrangement so explicit as hopefully to preclude any contest after his death. In view of the Soviet party struggles following the death of Lenin in 1924 and of Stalin in 1953, the CCP leadership may be acutely aware of the hazards inherent in any informal or secret understanding on this matter, and yet be unwilling to formalize succession through written, public regulations. As for the timing, in addition to the question of formal terms of office, the significance of the fact that Mao's sixty-fifth and seventieth birthdays coincide with the beginning and end of Liu's term as chairman should not be overlooked, since throughout the Communist world an almost obsessive attention is given to such anniversaries. In addition to celebrating the arrival of these dates, many Chinese undoubtedly speculate—although they may not say anything in public—about their import for the leadership's future.

Of course, even if power should be transferred peacefully to Liu and Chou, there is no guarantee that they would cooperate with one another. And it is quite possible that Teng Hsiao-p'ing would build a personal power base in the party Secretariat against either Liu or Chou, or both. The ambitions of men in China work no less intensively than elsewhere. But two additional factors may mitigate the succession crisis. First, this elite has worked in harness for three decades. Only Teng, appointed to the Politburo in 1956, rose from the ranks after the Long March. Long and intimate association under almost constant pressure may have blunted the personal conflicts among the elite. Secondly, the gains from cooperation may so obviously outweigh the cost of conflict that Liu and Chou may decide that their personal as well as the public interest are best served by the sharing of power and prestige.

The influence of tradition should not be overlooked in this regard. The thirteen-man Politburo of 1945 was enlarged to seventeen men in 1956 and to twenty in 1958. Only two members fell from grace through open purge during this time, although others suf-

fered an eclipse of power while retaining Politburo membership. As with the Central Committee, this emphasis on promotion of favorites rather than on purge of opponents is in marked contrast with the procedure followed in the Soviet Politburo. The Chinese system of rewards encourages good performance from below, since the promise of upward mobility is not matched by the hazard of party disgrace, much less physical liquidation. At the same time, it tends to limit the means whereby future disagreements or power struggles may be resolved, since certain actions, such as denunciation and purge, appear to be taboo.

One danger which does not seem to threaten the CCP, now or in the prospective future, is Bonapartism. The militancy of Communist ideology and the years of warfare which preceded Mao's victory provided ample opportunity for a government of generals to succeed the regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Here, however, Soviet practice set a positive, not a negative example. Just as the Russian party has permitted the rise but not the dominance of military men, systematically limiting their power after the Russian Revolution and again after World War II, so the CCP gradually reduced the Army's administrative role once the regime was secure and the Korean War had ended. To be sure, all the elite came to power through military means. Mao himself is justly regarded as a leading strategist and tactician, at least for pre-nuclear warfare. Yet military affairs have not remained the professional occupation of any active Politburo member, other than P'eng Teh-huai and Lin Piao.

This does not exclude conflict between military and civilian leaders. In fact, the case of P'eng Teh-huai illustrates this very possibility, while also showing how effectively it is handled by the regime. To begin with, Lin Piao seemed to drop out of sight during most of the 1950's, perhaps because of ill

health, leaving P'eng as the regime's top military spokesman. When, in 1958, Lin came back into prominence as a new Standing Committee member, there were growing indications that a prolonged and high-level conflict had broken out in the CCP and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) between those who favored different military strategies, different uses of military manpower, and different relations with Soviet military power. While the public literature referred vaguely to one group as advocating "professional and overly military viewpoints" against those who stressed "party supremacy over purely military considerations," it seemed that the issues cut across the entire complex of policies confronting the regime at this time.

Apparently P'eng, as Minister of Defense, opposed measures which subordinated the Army to the demands of China's industrialization. Troops helped on civilian construction jobs and opened up virgin lands in Sinkiang. Military research and development lagged behind capital investment projects. China's reliance for protection on Russia's advanced weapons systems promised to keep Peking as a junior partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Against this general trend, professional officers in the PLA argued that the Army should be divorced from purely economic activities, should place increased emphasis on training and tactics, and should accelerate an indigenous nuclear weapons program.

Precisely where P'eng stood on particulars in the dispute has never been publicly disclosed. However, he reportedly took an increasingly strong stand against Mao's personal leadership and may even have attempted to appeal over the party's head to gain support from top sectors of the armed forces. But Lin Piao's emergence from the shadows provided Mao with a valuable trump. In 1959, Lin replaced P'eng as Minister of Defense. So far as we know, P'eng never publicly recanted nor was he openly humiliated or attacked

personally, as was the fate of Soviet generals who opposed party leaders, as recently as Marshal Zhukov in 1957. While ostensibly remaining in the Politburo, P'eng quietly dropped from sight and Lin became Peking's chief spokesman on military-political problems.

This incident illustrates how carefully we must approach the problem of unity and disunity in the CCP. There is no doubt that a sharp conflict raged at the highest levels for a considerable time, although the only public indication of this was the emergence of one individual at the expense of another and a shift of emphasis in policy pronouncements. Similarly, the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1955 came after a long struggle, but only the absence of these men from important state functions hinted at what was to be officially confirmed well after the event.

While it is hazardous, then, to conclude from a single photograph or list of personages which CCP leaders have fallen from grace, it is equally erroneous, in the absence of an announced purge, to accept Politburo harmony as complete. Indeed, serious tensions at this level will probably increase with time, as the aging leaders contend with the rising generation of party stalwarts who are more closely attuned to modern technological and economic developments. With an average age of 63, the Politburo faces a possible cleavage along age lines should it continue to expand rather than replace its members, or if replacement brings in more men in their lower fifties. That this group has held together through the crises of responsible power, however, as well as through the long struggle for power, suggests that it can resolve whatever differences arise with only an incidental loss of cohesion and only an occasional crisis of disunity. The full test of its cohesion, of course, will come after Mao leaves the scene of active politics.

#### *Other Central Committee Organs*

In the event of tensions within the Politburo, other organs of the Central Committee may take on increasing importance. One of the most critical areas for political direction and

control may be the Secretariat, presently under Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Soviet experience has demonstrated that aside from the secret police, no position offers more leverage for political manipulation than that of First Secretary of the party. Teng's job is not exactly comparable, but its potential in this area may explain why he, and not a Long March veteran, received the job. Although nearly the age of Liu and Chou, he could not hope to rival them since he lacked party seniority as well as the aura of the "old guard." However, Teng might exploit this very point of difference should he decide to challenge the long-established leadership on behalf of new aspirants to power. One limitation on his ability to act in this fashion could be the fact that his Secretariat numbers eight regular and three alternate members, including possibly rising party figures who may well be the proteges of other Politburo members.

Other Central Committee organs function more or less as their titles indicate: Departments of Rural Work, Industrial Work, Propaganda, Organization, etc. One of the more important of these is undoubtedly the Military Affairs Committee. Given the continuing problem of party-army relations, which is given periodic attention in the public press and was highlighted by the ouster of P'eng Teh-huai, this organ is critical for assuring party, i.e., civilian, control over the vast military establishment. It probably oversees the important programs of political indoctrination as well as the economic employment of troops in non-military construction and agricultural projects. Some indication of the prestige accorded Marshal Lin Piao, consequent with his role in this area, is the infrequent but exceptional reference to "the thought of Marshal Lin." Only Mao received such a reference down to 1960. Use of this phrase in connection with Lin Piao suggests the confidence placed in his ability to inspire the People's Liberation Army as well as to keep it subordinate to the CCP.

No less important for insuring control are the Social Affairs Department and, appropriately enough, the Control Commission. The first appears to be euphemistically named in

order to conceal its counterintelligence and counterespionage functions. Little is known about its powers and activities except that, unlike early Soviet experience, they have not resulted in sweeping purges or omnipresent intimidation. As for the Control Commission, its semi-autonomous status is indicated in the organizational chart of the CCP, which accords it a status comparable to that of the Secretariat. According to party rules (Article 53), it is empowered "to examine and deal with cases of violation of the party constitution, party discipline, Communist ethics, and the state laws and decrees on the part of party members; to decide on or cancel disciplinary measures against party members; and to deal with appeals and complaints from party members."

The Control Commission deserves far more attention than it has received from outside observers. In September, 1962, the tenth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee decided to enlarge the Control Commission beyond its already sizable membership of seventeen regulars and four alternates and "to strengthen the work of the party control commissions at all levels." This reflected its growing responsibility for keeping the party free of "improper" attitudes, such as bureaucratic or "sectarian" tendencies that result in boss-rule or privileged positions for CCP members. It must combat improper activities as well, whether it be petty corruption or mistakes in the administration of higher policy. As we noted earlier, Liu Lan-t'ao, a member of the Control Commission, summed up the first ten years of CCP rule by noting that "tens of thousands" had been expelled from the party for a range of offenses, both in attitude and in activity. In a prolonged struggle for power, the Control Commission files may prove to be a valuable weapon for unseating enemies and rewarding friends. The contents of these files are suggested by an organizational handbook of the party which states:




FIGURE 4-1 CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION. (Study submitted to the Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Washington, D. C., 1959.)

"Every party member has the duty to report to the party control committees whatever he knows about infractions against party rules, party discipline, Communist morality, national laws and decrees on the part of other party members. Moreover, it is his duty to help the party control committee struggle against such phenomena."

Since control commissions exist at every party level except in primary branches and cells, complete dossiers cover the continuing activity of all party members. The knowledge of their existence may, in itself, provide a

check against undesirable behavior. The more "voluntary" is the discipline of each member, the less is the burden placed on the detection and punitive agencies. But since this self-policing of ideology and policy is always incomplete, the surveillance function will continue to be an important one.

It is customary for non-Communist observers to note the inhibiting influence of such activities, stressing the role of informers, secret police, and punishment for "wrong thoughts" as well as wrong deeds. This is no doubt an inherent defect in the Communist system. The growing stagnation of party ideology and practice in Stalinist Russia testified to the damaging effects of purge and terror. Among defectors from Communist China, many complain of the constant anxiety and

insecurity which resulted from knowing that one's comrades were constantly on the watch and admonished to report one's words and deeds.

At the same time, we must also recognize compensating aspects which may account for the vitality and growth of the party in China, at least up to the present time. Without here going more fully into the operation of Chinese Communist politics, which we will reserve for a later chapter, we might note at this point the functional role of tension as elaborated by Professor Franz Schurman. Professor Schurman points out that the manipulation of tension can help channel energy in a defined direction, whether through constructive work or destructive fighting. Since every party member is subject to the all-seeing eye of surveillance by his peers as well as by his superiors, he has one of two options. First, he may retreat into conformity or apathy. In this case, he will soon be detected as a laggard and be accused of "formalism" and "bureaucratism," and eventually dropped from the rolls. This is more than a personal disgrace. It removes his *raison d'être*, since the most noble goal of a party member is the realization of universal laws through successful participation in the party. Secondly, he may strive to improve himself in the eyes of those examining his behavior. If successful, he should escape purge and may even be commended and promoted. The psychic gratification at being accepted as a faithful follower is well known in religious groups. It may be no less a stimulus toward "good works" in the Chinese Communist Party.

Thus surveillance may be viewed as paternalistic help toward salvation, as well as omnipresent threat of perdition. Liu Lan-t'ao emphasized this aspect of party control at the Eighth National CCP Congress: "Party discipline is by no means designed to punish a person only but also to protect a person. To educate and correct the errors of a person who is subjected to disciplinary action is virtually a kind of protection and not retaliation. . . . Party discipline is designed to aid the development of party members' creative power instead of restraining it and is aimed

at enabling party members to develop their creative power as a condition for their improvement. . . . We are under obligation to help the erring comrades earnestly and to the best of our ability so that they can free themselves from their errors."

Obviously, it is impossible to assess the precise impact of such surveillance on party members without extensive interviews, statistics on resignations and suicides, and other information presently unavailable. But we should note the possibility that the control commissions do serve a constructive purpose. In addition to ferreting out dissidents and undesirable elements, they may spur others to greater effort and be accepted as a necessary source of correction in the development of "Communist man." For the leadership, a more reliable and a more productive organization is assured. To determine whether surveillance is a point of strength or a weakness requires a more sophisticated assessment of the CCP than is possible on the basis of present materials. Unless we attempt such an assessment from time to time, however, we run the risk of exaggerating the latent hostility against the regime and overestimating the possibility that an internal explosion will erupt in China.

A more likely source of tension may arise between the central elite, in Peking, and local power centers at the regional or provincial levels. This conflict has threatened party unity once before; we have seen how Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were accused of "building independent kingdoms" and purged from the party. Kao acquired his power in the northeast where he directed the rebuilding of Manchuria's industry while the CCP was busy "pacifying" the rest of China. With the purge of Kao and Jao (the latter operated out of Shanghai), the regional administrative apparatus was scrapped in favor of direct control by the center over provincial sectors of party and government. In 1961, however, six

regional Central Committee bureaus were established, presumably in keeping with the modest decentralization of economic administration which had been initiated earlier. It is still too soon to say whether these bureaus will work as a leverage against the power concentrated in other party organs, particularly the Politburo and its Standing Committee. The memory of Kao Kang is kept alive by continued reference to his "anti-party crimes," presumably to deter others from repeating his error. But in local operations far removed from the direct scrutiny of Peking, promotion and demotion are likely to be used to improve the position of these regional power centers against the inner circle of the Politburo Standing Committee.

## The Future of the Chinese Communist Party

We are approaching a watershed in the history of the Chinese Communist Party which will be signaled by the inevitable departure of Mao Tse-tung from its leadership. Whenever or however this should come, the turbulence within the party that has marked the last several years is certain to complicate the problem of a smooth succession. The communique issued by the tenth plenum of the Eighth Central Committee in September, 1962, referred ominously to "the imperialists and their running dogs in China and abroad" who had schemed to carry out "intrusion, provocation, aggression, and subversion within our state and party." Inveighing against the continuing "class struggle" which "will last scores of years or even longer," the communique warned, "this class struggle is complicated, tortuous, with ups and downs and sometimes it is very sharp. This class struggle inevitably finds expression within the party. Pressure from foreign imperialism and the existence of bourgeois influences at home con-

stitute the social source of revisionist ideas in the party." Put in plain language, a profound ideological crisis confronted the Chinese Communist Party.

That this was a deep-seated and long-lasting crisis was revealed by the 1962 communique linking its present warnings with the dispute between P'eng Teh-huai and Mao. This linkage was established in two ways. First, P'eng's partisans on the Secretariat, Huang K'o-cheng and T'an Cheng, were "dismissed," and replaced by Lo Jui-ching, Kang Sheng, and Lu Ting-yi. This removed two prominent persons responsible for military affairs and political indoctrination of the military and introduced three in their place, of whom one had become, after ten years as Minister of Public Security, head of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and two were prominent in past political propaganda and organization activity.

The second indicator came in a direct warning which established a line of continuity between the 1959 crisis and the problems of 1962-63:

While urging a struggle against the foreign and domestic class enemies, we must remain vigilant and resolutely oppose in good time various opportunist ideological tendencies in the party. The great historic significance of the eighth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee, held in Lushan in August 1959, lies in the fact that it victoriously smashed attacks by right opportunism and revisionism and safeguarded the party line and the unity of the party. At present and in the future, our party must sharpen its vigilance and correctly wage a struggle on two fronts—against revisionism and against dogmatism. Only thus can the purity of Marxism-Leninism be always preserved, the unity of the party constantly strengthened, and the fighting power of the party continuously increased.

This excerpt is worth quoting at length because it spotlights the erosion of drive and discipline, marked by such words as "opportunism" and "revisionism." Apparently growing doubts about the efficacy of Mao's leadership, if not about the reliability of Marxism-Leninism as a guide to modernization, led to serious questioning by various prominent party figures. This may have per-



colated downward, especially in view of the swelling of party rosters with young, inexperienced members who had little indoctrination and no memory of the Long March and its aftermath. The failure of the vaunted "mass line" to reinvigorate the Chinese people must have demoralized party cadres who had been told that by "studying Chairman Mao's works" they could find the answers to problems of leadership and control, without resorting to violence and terror.

Whether this crisis could be resolved without violence and terror within the party itself remained to be seen. At least down to 1963, Peking had specifically admonished party leaders against "leftist" errors. On July 31, 1962, it announced that Liu Shao-ch'i's essay, "On How To Be a Good Communist," would be reissued with changes by the author. This came amidst warnings that "several problems concern cadre policy," one of which was the danger of repressing criticism and losing touch with the people. One article in the theoretical journal *Red Flag* recalled how China's emperors had often resorted to hiring close relatives and building tight cliques, while others sought out the services of their enemies provided they were talented. In a direct allusion to previous party crises, the author noted that Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang, and Jao Shu-shih "did not hesitate to form a closed clique, reject those differing from them, organize factions, and conspire to replace the party." Still another article in this journal declared that criticism within the party should not be treated as insubordination and that the right of a party member to bring accusations against leading organs, right up to the Central Committee, could not be abridged.

Thus the "leftist error" of repression and intimidation is balanced off against the "liberalist" or "rightist error" of permitting dangerous views. The party leadership must steer between this Scylla and Charybdis, pursuing a zigzag course in its attempt to preserve discipline without impairing genuine unity. As Mao puts it, the party must "treat the illness in order to save the man." Over time, the tendency to backslide increases as problems defy solution and the fervor of revolu-

tion and reconstruction dims into memory. Against this tendency, the temptation to resort to purge for reviving flagging party spirits may increase to a corresponding degree. At the least, this ambivalence can create a sort of political schizophrenia; at worst, it can paralyze the party and, as in Stalinist Russia, tear it asunder.

So far, the CCP has avoided the worst. Professor John Lewis, a close student of Maoist doctrine and indoctrination, believes that such dangers can be avoided. In fact, he interprets warnings such as those given in the September, 1962, Central Committee communique as evidence of a strengthening of the party by identifying those sources of deviation and then failing to react in an inhumane way against erroneous thought. This combination of omniscience and humanity, he holds, shows the resilience of CCP doctrine. Since this doctrine explicitly stipulates that "contradictions" or dissent arise even within the highest circles of the party, P'eng's views should come as no surprise. His crime, however, may have been that he attempted to form a faction, which is proscribed by doctrine. Finally, since doctrine posits failure as the fault of erring analysis, and not as a function of the general Marxist-Leninist ideology, it permits blame to be placed on those who strayed from the "correct path."


According to this analysis, the revelation of past opposition deters present and prospective opponents of the party line from forming factions and, even worse, from plotting more serious action against the leadership. Since those who "erred" remain in their Central Committee posts even after losing positions of major responsibility, they serve as constant reminders of the disgrace that comes to those who challenge party unity. Some past opponents of Mao, such as Li Li-san, return periodically to public view; on one occasion, Li delivered a *mea culpa* in abject apology for deviating from the correct line, and on

another he appeared as testimony of Mao's magnanimity in allowing him to retain public office. Of course, these men are politically powerless; they are unlikely to attract any supporters of fresh moves against Mao.

This practice may account for the rather low attrition rate within the CCP, since through accusations, confessions, and the retention of "remolded" party members the party may be better able to insure general party unity than by actually ousting fallen comrades. At least we should be cautioned against assuming that the disappearance of a leading CCP figure from public view, or the

reappearance of attacks against one or another deviant view, necessarily presages a massive purge or wholesale terror in China. Indeed, should such convulsions shake the Chinese Communist Party, we might well anticipate a more widespread crisis throughout the society and one whose outcome would probably remain in doubt for some time thereafter. Until then, it would seem that the CCP can surmount its ideological difficulties and preserve its basic unity, and perhaps actually revive the revolutionary zeal and ardor which marked its long, tortuous climb to power.

# The Party and the Organs of Government



Although we examined the Chinese Communist Party structure in Chapter 4, we shall continue to be involved with its organization as we discuss the organs of the Chinese state. In China, where the center of decision-making lies wholly outside the constitutional framework and where so much important political activity takes place outside the formal structure of the government, we must take special pains if we are to distinguish appearance from reality. So far we have concentrated on the party; now we must examine the structure of the government and the relationship between the government and the party. Our investigation will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of this relationship, recognizing that much is beyond our present knowledge and much is subject to change in this political system that is still in its first generation of leadership.

This procedure is the reverse of standard political analysis, which usually begins with a study of the various groups in a society and of how their many different interests conflict, and then shows how these conflicts are

resolved in political action. In Communist China, the system functions essentially from the top down, not from the bottom up. Thus we must delay our examination of groups and their conflicts until our sketch of the elite is complete, for the clash of interests can only be understood in the light of the interaction between party and government.

## The Supremacy of the Party

We have already seen how Politburo and Central Committee members hold key posts throughout the government of the PRC. The General Program of the CCP bears repeating at this point: "The party is a united militant organization, welded together by a discipline which is obligatory on all its members. . . . As the highest form of class organization, the party must strive to play a correct role as the leader and core in every aspect of the country's life and must combat any tendency to departmentalism, which reduces the party's role and weakens its unity."

The key words are "obligatory discipline" and "leader and core in every aspect of the country's life." The party exists outside the government as a "teacher and leader," but

also functions as the prime force inside the government. Party members are not to limit their loyalties just to government and thereby succumb to "departmentalism," but must heed the higher dictates of the party. Because of this conflicting authority between party and state, the relevant rules of the CCP constitution are worth quoting in full:

Article 19, (6): Party decisions must be carried out unconditionally. Individual party members shall obey the party organization, the minority shall obey the majority, the lower party organs shall obey the higher party organs, and all constituent party organs throughout the country shall obey the National Party Congress and the Central Committee.

This subordination of individual to group and of lower to higher levels constitutes the more important half of the formulation, "democratic centralism," a keynote of Communist doctrine. The democratic aspects, manifested in free discussions before decisions are made and in elections of higher bodies by lower groups, always seem to receive secondary attention compared with the centralistic or disciplinary aspects cited in the foregoing rule. Obedience is not left to the conscience of each individual, but is enforced by the primary party organizations, located in "factories, mines, and other enterprises, in *hsiang* and nationality *hsiang*, in agricultural producers' cooperatives, in offices, schools, in companies of the People's Liberation Army and in other primary units where there are three or more full party members." (Article 47.)

This list of the locations of "primary party branches" reveals the thoroughness with which Peking strives to control virtually every group activity in China. The purpose of this vast network is suggested by some of the key obligations given in Article 50. The primary branch is not only to propagandize and organize "the masses," implementing "decisions of higher party organizations," but it is responsible for "the character, work, and dis-

cipline" of party members within its jurisdiction. In conjunction with this supervisory role, the primary branch "promotes criticism and self-criticism," investigates and publicizes breaches of conduct not only of party but of non-party personnel, and maintains "revolutionary vigilance, being constantly on the alert to combat the disruptive activities of the class enemy."

These wide-ranging duties are bound to cause conflicts between primary party branches and the government agencies responsible for administering particular programs. The clashes are ameliorated somewhat by Article 51, which distinguishes between lower and higher levels of organization on the basis of relative levels of policy-making. Thus among "enterprises, villages, schools, and army units," primary branches of the CCP "guide and supervise the administrative bodies." However, "in public institutions and organizations the primary party organizations are in no position to guide and supervise their work."

Yet the problem remains, for despite this caveat against the usurpation of administrative authority by the primary party branches, Article 51 insists that these branches "give ideological and political supervision to all party members, including those who hold leading administrative posts." Although this presumably leaves non-party officials outside the purview of the primary branch, the relatively small minority who fall within this category makes the exemption highly academic. In practice, the continuous conflict between party branches and administrative centers, and within the individual between his duties as a public official and as a disciplined party member, poses a major obstacle to personal initiative and organizational efficiency. There is evidence that this conflict has cost China dearly.

For instance, in the "Great Leap Forward," the highest levels of the CCP laid down an incredibly ambitious and unrealistic set of goals to be fulfilled by all aspects of the economy. To achieve these goals, manpower was exploited beyond the limits of human endurance and machines were driven beyond their capacity. Undernourishment and

undermaintenance eventually wrecked the productive powers of both man and machine, although from 1958 to late 1959 an incredible burst of effort seemed to bring the unrealistic goals within reach. By 1961, the full effects of this party-dictated program were evident: harvests were the most disastrous in ten years, and most industrial activity came to a slow, grinding halt.

From scattered evidence, it appears that many of the more knowledgeable officials in the PRC anticipated the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," and some even cautioned against its excesses during the first eighteen months of seeming success. Yet if the program emanated from Chairman Mao, what lesser party member could oppose it? And if the party member's function was to provide the revolutionary zeal necessary to the "Great Leap Forward," how could he simultaneously exercise his authority as a manager or bureaucrat to keep his area of responsibility from overuse or neglect? Finally, how could the expert who was outside the party challenge its wisdom or omniscience without seeming to challenge the very basis of its authority?

Even the highest PRC officials are not entirely immune from supervision by those immediately below them and by their party peers. Articles 59 and 60 spell out the duties of a so-called "leading party members' group," to be formed where "three or more party members hold responsible posts in the leading body of a state organ or people's organization." This group is close to the highest officials in such an organization and provides the link between them and the relevant party committee which "in all matters" provides "leadership" for the group and continuous party surveillance of their activities.

According to the rules, then, whether a party member is in a local people's congress, the National People's Congress, or the People's Liberation Army, he is explicitly subject to (1) general CCP policy as enunciated by party organs right up to the Central Committee, (2) the party central committee at his level of organization, and (3) the party primary branch in his place of work, if he is not an official in a high public organization,

or (4) a "leading members' group," if he is such an official.

In theory, this ideal model should function smoothly, since the party is supposedly a monolithic organization with complete unity from top to bottom. Actually, a number of points where friction can arise appear inherent in the system, enumeration of which may highlight Mao Tse-tung's emphasis on "the inevitability of non-antagonistic contradictions."

Before doing so, we should recall that certain problems arise in any hierarchical system, whether Communist or non-Communist. The problem of communication, for instance, plagues every bureaucracy. Either too many directives are sent from above to below, burying the lesser official in paper and paralyzing his ability to exercise discretion and judgment. Or lower officials usurp authority and act on what they think will advance their positions, perhaps unwittingly going far astray from a general guideline issued at higher levels. In a massive, backward, and largely illiterate society, the hazards of a highly centralized form of government seem to compound the inevitable points of friction that can be found in other societies. Small wonder that when things go awry in Communist China, as they did in the "Great Leap Forward," they not only create widespread dislocations but their effects may not be remedied for some time since the many parts of the system must be completely reoriented by the central authority.

One point of friction which seems to have caused particular difficulty throughout the period of excessive economic demands lies in the relationship between the party branch within an organization and higher party levels on the outside. The problems which seem important at a distance may take on entirely different dimensions at the local level, in the shop or in the field. Conversely, issues considered crucial locally may be given a lower

priority by groups at a higher level of responsibility. The individual who attempts to mesh the demands made on him by his fellow workers in the party and those imposed by directives from the Central Committee may well find compromise the only solution, and thereby leave both groups dissatisfied.

There is also the conflict between party and non-party persons in all organizations. The CCP is the ultimate authority for all political decisions in China, although others may be officially vested with public responsibility. When blame is allocated, however, there is no guarantee that it will not be laid at the feet of those "elected" or "appointed" to head a factory, ministry, or division, rather than of those party members whose private pressures were responsible for shortcomings and failure. In sum, when authority and responsibility are not held in the same hands, some difficulty is inevitable.

The scope of this problem was highlighted by Liu Lan-t'ao in a statement on CCP leadership prepared for the tenth anniversary of the PRC. Speaking of the more than one million party branches and their function, Liu warned: "To assure the unified leadership of the party, it is necessary to place all revolutionary organizations . . . no matter whether they are government organs, army units, or civil groups, whether they are political and legal departments in financial, economic, cultural, educational, scientific and public health fields . . . under the unified leadership of the party Central Committee and local committees at various levels, including those at the basic level."

These injunctions conflict explicitly with the sense of the PRC constitution, which states, in Articles 21 and 22: "The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority in the People's Republic of China [and] the only legislative authority in the country." Obviously, the NPC has no

such status or power if its members are under the direction of CCP groups, which are in turn subservient to the Central Committee and its Politburo or Standing Committee. This does not deny other functions to the NPC, any more than the Politburo's decision-making power denies other roles to the Central Committee. It does, however, provide a continuing source of friction between the "ought to be" and "is" of Chinese Communist politics, as is shown in the contradiction between constitutional theory and experienced fact.

## The Organization of the People's Republic of China

It is no accident that we have given prior attention to the CCP constitution before turning to the PRC charter. There is good reason to believe that the latter was drafted in higher party echelons, despite the appointment of public commissions and the holding of nationwide discussions on its draft provisions. During the first five years of the PRC, a so-called "Common Program" and an "Organic Law" provided the only basis for governmental structure and procedures. Not until 1952 did preparations begin for drawing up a constitution, and much of the subsequent proceedings remained secret. In September, 1954, coincident with the convening of the First National People's Congress, the present constitution was adopted.

Given its probable genesis, the parallel between party and state organization is understandable. "Democratic centralism" results through selection from below and strict obedience to directives from above. People's congresses are popularly elected at the lowest level; these congresses choose the delegates to the next higher congress, and so it goes on up through the counties and the provinces (Fig. 5-1). So far as is known, only one slate of candidates is offered. It is chosen by a secret council in the local CCP, and there is no guarantee of a secret ballot. Some choice may be offered, however, where more candidates are listed than can be elected to the




FIGURE 5-1 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (Tone areas indicate national minority units. These may exist at any level from county up to region, but, depending on the nature of the larger administrative unit within which they are located, they are subordinate to regular or national minority administration. Therefore, no clear hierarchical lines divide national minority from regular administrative authority.)


number of positions vacant. In addition, some scale of performance by incumbents may be reflected in the voters' preferences as indicated by negative voting. Basically, though, this is not an expression of popular will, but rather an opportunity to ratify choices already made from above.

In denying the similarity to Western electoral procedures, we do not remove all importance from this procedure. Besides some of the lesser screening functions mentioned above, public discussion prior to the actual selection of candidates can air views on the existing officials and their possible successors. This gives the citizen a sense of participation in government while providing the elite with additional opinions on present and prospective leaders. Second, the actual balloting links the individual with the regime in a symbolic demonstration of allegiance. Where concepts of unity and harmony prevail, as in traditional China, the political vocabulary may literally be inadequate for communicating concepts of loyal opposition and the two-party system as

we know them. On the contrary, opposition may be equated with revolution and two-party politics with national schism. Thus the electoral procedure in the PRC may not appear to the peasant as a mockery but rather a manifestation of "people's democracy."

### *The National People's Congress*

At the very top of the government hierarchy is the National People's Congress, composed of more than one thousand delegates who gather in Peking for a few weeks each year (Fig. 5-2). Too large to serve as a legislative body, the NPC brings representatives from the provinces and autonomous regions into a display of public unity. They endorse the past policies of the elite and pledge support to proposed actions. This colorful assemblage of Kazakh, Tibetan, Mongol, and Han, of



\* Headed by non-party persons

FIGURE 5-2 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION.



diverse races and from distant points, engages in tea-cup contact with Mao, Chou, and other renowned figures and thus provides a valuable link between Peking and the far-flung corners of the vast nation.

The NPC "elects" a Standing Committee as its "permanently acting body." As occurs elsewhere, actual selection is made from above and then ratified by the NPC. With almost eighty members, this group seems unwieldy for making policy, at least in plenary session. Presumably, it has subcommittees that hear proposals by key leaders, but we do not know whether these groups merely approve drafts already prepared or if they can actually modify proposals within agreed limits. While the Standing Committee meets fairly regularly, no evidence of debate or opposition to policy has emerged. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect these two bodies to perform initiating or controlling functions, even though they are given such power in the PRC constitution. The party's charter requires that the "leading members' group" decide in advance of NPC or Standing Committee meetings what the policy shall be, or the group directs them to follow the dictates of the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Once such a position is known, it must be imposed on non-party as well as party colleagues.

However, other purposes are perhaps achieved by the National People's Congress. It ratifies decisions made elsewhere, thereby endowing them with a legitimacy that makes their public acceptance more likely. It may perform a communications and implementation role, similar to that performed by the CCP Central Committee. We will attempt to analyze these and other functions of the NPC by examining its relationship to another leading government organ, the State Council.

### *The State Council*

The State Council, chosen by the Premier and approved by the NPC, has been authoritatively described as "the most important center for executive decision-making in the government." The key words which qualify this judgment are "executive" and "in the government." It unquestionably contains top

political leaders but is rather large for "decision-making." Members include the Premier and sixteen vice-premiers, and also some thirty or more Ministers and heads of state commissions. While this group meets in a monthly plenary session, like other such bodies, it has a smaller standing committee, composed of the Premier, vice-premiers, and secretary-general, that meets more frequently.

The functions and powers of the State Council as enumerated in Article 49 of the constitution make an impressive list, of which the following sample is representative. The Council is directed: to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders, and verify their execution; to submit bills to the NPC or its Standing Committee; to coordinate and lead the work of Ministries and Commissions; to put into effect the national economic plans and provisions of the state budget; to direct the conduct of external affairs; and to guide the building up of the defense forces. These are powerful prerogatives. With its notable membership and these responsibilities, it can be argued that the State Council is a center of direction for the PRC, even if it is not a center of decision-making. This hypothesis is strengthened by the striking overlap in membership that exists between the State Council standing committee and the Politburo. In 1962, Premier Chou En-lai and twelve of the sixteen vice-premiers were all regular or alternate Politburo members, while the remaining four vice-premiers were in the CCP. By changing rooms or titles, this group could sit as the top political group of either the government or the party.

Yet despite the impressive array of political personalities in the State Council and its standing committee, they appear to exercise power primarily as party, not as state functionaries. An unusually vivid illustration of this came in Chou En-lai's speech of August 28, 1959, to the Standing Committee of the Second National People's Congress. Speaking

as Premier, Chou revealed that the grain estimates for the 1958 harvest had been exaggerated, and he called for a major reduction of farm production targets for 1959. In his address, Chou mentioned that changes in the 1959 plan were discussed at the eighth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee, held from August 2 to August 16, 1959, which recommended "adjusting the economic targets for this year." Thus an important affair of state was discussed initially by the highest party, not state, organ. Following this, "a plenary meeting called by the State Council on August 25 unanimously agreed to the appraisal" of the Central Committee. Not until the August 28 meeting did Chou announce: "on behalf of the State Council, I shall deliver a report to the Standing Committee of the Second National People's Congress." Needless to say, his proposals won unanimous approval.

Chou's speech contained another revealing description of decision-making, again on a problem of major state significance. In 1958, the commune movement had been launched by a Central Committee directive in August, and reviewed by another CC report in December. Even then, however, the primary responsibility for its administration did not pass to state organs. Chou reported:

The question of checking up on the people's communes was already discussed at the meeting called by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at Chengchow in November last year [1958], which was attended by part of the leading comrades of the Central Committee and the local committees. Later, at the sixth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held at Wuchang, and at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held at Chengchow in February and March of this year, a series of important decisions on checking up on the people's communes were made. In accordance with these decisions, local leading party and government organs of various levels from last winter have conducted large-scale checkups in the people's communes.

This chronology is highly revealing. First, Mao conferred initially with some but not all of his Politburo colleagues. Did he do this deliberately to avoid those who opposed him, or because some were more readily available than others? We do not know, for we have no information about how Mao marshals support for his programs, but the wording is suggestive. Second, no state organs made "decisions," although they were subsequently involved in the "large-scale checkups." Were matters so uncertain as to require consideration by only the most trusted inner-party leadership? Again, we do not know, but Chou's account suggests this was the case. The gradually expanding circle of participation, from Mao and "part of the leading comrades," to the Politburo, the CC, and finally through the State Council to the NPC Standing Committee, suggests that careful control was maintained to assure the proper response to "policy proposals." The leading personnel in each group had already been apprised of the plan at a prior meeting of the next higher body. The hierarchy of authority produced by "democratic centralism" guaranteed that by the time the matter reached the NPC Standing Committee it would be discussed and approved in accordance with the wishes of the men around Mao Tse-tung.

Do the real decision-makers accept the responsibility for error? Tensions may be compounded if the blame for failure is shifted to state ministries, when the policy was actually made in party bodies. Chou was elliptical on this point. He conceded that "certain shortcomings and errors were made in the course of drawing up and implementing the 1959 national economic plan," but explained the mistakes only in general terms: "This indicates that our organs in charge of planning and economic affairs are not yet adept at the work of coordination and equilibrium under the conditions of a big leap forward in the national economy. . . . These are shortcomings in practical work made while applying the general line for socialist construction, and not shortcomings in the general line." While discreetly avoiding a precise allocation of responsibility, Chou's sequential description of

the meetings was a tacit admission that top CCP leaders had failed to anticipate the problems of the commune and the "Great Leap Forward." Chou's speech may have fallen short of the "self-criticism" so ardently advocated by party leaders, but at least it did not exacerbate relations with non-party groups by unfairly accusing them of failures for which the Politburo was actually responsible.

Compared with other published reports that come out of China, Chou's address was exceptional in the amount of detail it presented of decisions and conferences. More common is the simple announcement of a State Council "proposal" for NPC approval. Acceptance always appears to be unanimous; the published record rarely refers to any questions or debate. Even on so important and far-reaching a question as judicial reform, this procedure holds. Thus on May 24, 1959, Chou En-lai made the following report to the first session of the Second National People's Congress:

(1) For the past several years, the Ministry of Justice has done much in connection with judicial reforms, establishment of people's courts, and training of cadres for the people's courts. Now that the judicial reforms have been basically completed, the people's courts have been soundly established at all levels, and cadres for the people's courts have been trained and reinforced, there is no longer any necessity for an independent Justice Ministry. It is proposed that the Ministry of Justice be abolished, and that its duties be taken over by the Supreme People's Court.

(2) Since its establishment, the Ministry of Supervision has done much to uphold state discipline and supervise the personnel of state administrative organs. Experience in the past several years has shown that such work can be well done only when it is done by the state organs under the leadership of the party committees at various levels and by relying on the masses. Therefore, there is also no longer any necessity for the independent establishment of the Ministry of Supervision. It is proposed that the Ministry of Supervision be abolished and that in the future the supervision of personnel of state administrative organs be undertaken by the state organs concerned. You are requested to take a decision on the two proposals stated above.

In view of the cardinal role played by these Ministries of Justice and Supervision in the dispensing of justice and punishment, their abolition might be expected to concern a broad spectrum of the Chinese people and certainly the NPC deputies themselves. At the least, some investigation might have been made of the accomplishments of the two Ministries. Yet the public account shows no questioning or discussion, but only the unanimous approval of the more than one thousand NPC delegates.

These illustrations suggest that the need for legitimacy is marginal as far as the Chinese Communist leadership is concerned. It may not be wholly dispensed with, but neither is it of sufficient importance to make it more than a formal procedure. We must question how much the NPC can grasp of the complicated matters that are presented to it in this summary fashion, although its Standing Committee may have a better chance to study proposals. In the last analysis, both the NPC and its Standing Committee seem to be window-dressing on a constitutional facade, with only the State Council serving important governmental functions at the top level.

### *The Chairman of the PRC*

Other groups of equal constitutional status, although of lesser import, deserve brief mention. The titular head of state, the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, together with his two vice-chairmen, are elected by the NPC for four-year terms with no specified injunction against self-succession. As we have seen, Mao may have established a precedent for one term by his refusal to stand for re-election. The honorific nature of this post is suggested by the fact that in 1959 one of the two vice-chairmen, who is legally empowered to succeed the chief of state in case of his death, was Madame Soong Ching-ling. Although the venerated widow of Sun Yat-

sen, she was in no sense a politically accomplished or powerful figure.

The PRC Chairman, however, enjoys exceptional status, second only to that of the CCP Chairman. By succeeding Mao as Chairman of the PRC, Liu Shao-ch'i enhanced his public image immeasurably. Although Liu had previously held second place in CCP rankings, he had been eclipsed by third-ranking Chou En-lai as Premier. As PRC Chairman, however, Liu outranked Chou legally as well as symbolically, since, according to the constitution, the Premier is appointed by the NPC upon the recommendation of the PRC Chairman. Actually, both men undoubtedly received and retained their positions at the will of Mao Tse-tung. Given the dominance of the party, it is unlikely that the PRC Chairman will ever have enough power to appoint the Premier against the CCP Chairman's wishes.

In addition to his titular duties as chief of state, the PRC Chairman is empowered to convene two bodies of high constitutional rank, though of only nominal importance. The first, the Supreme State Conference, consists of more than three hundred people from various government organizations. Embracing prominent non-party people in ministerial posts, this gathering serves to enhance their sense of participation in the policy process without, however, granting them any effective power. This may be why Mao delivered his speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" before this group, thereby emphasizing his desire for criticisms of the CCP at the highest non-party levels.

The second body is the National Defense Council. It, too, has a large percentage of non-party figures among its hundred or more members, as well as less active CCP generals, many of whom were leaders in the revolution and who maintain titular responsibility in the twilight of their careers. Convened at the

pleasure of the PRC Chairman, the National Defense Council rarely meets for more than a few days a year and appears to have no authority over the allocation of military appropriations, much less over basic strategy or the development of weapons. Neither the Supreme State Conference nor the National Defense Council, therefore, add significantly to the power of the PRC Chairman, especially when compared to that of the Premier, who heads the important State Council. In a future showdown of political strength, however, they might be of marginal importance as forums in which the chief of state could announce policies in opposition to those of the Premier. Or the Supreme State Conference might bolster prominent bureaucrats who would otherwise be muffled by directives from the State Council.

#### *Lower Administrative Levels*

If we take a cross-section of the PRC administration as it existed in 1962, we can see the general outlines of the interrelationship between party and government. Much of the supervisory function of the State Council was fulfilled through six staff offices, supplemented by a secretariat and the Premier's office. Three of the six posts—foreign affairs, finance and trade, and industry and communications—were filled by Politburo members. The remainder—internal security and justice, education and culture, and agriculture and conservation—had Central Committee members in command. In addition to this overlap of authority, some staff offices had full counterparts under the CC, occasionally with the same individual heading both groups. At this important working level, then, it is virtually impossible to disentangle party from state personnel. This tendency to fill high governmental posts with party members has been increasing.

Beneath these staff offices are approximately forty ministries and commissions, the exact number varying according to periodic reorganizations, ostensibly for administrative efficiency. The Ministry of National Defense appears to operate under the direct supervision of the State Council rather than under a staff office. The same seems to be true for

the State Planning Commission. In addition, the Ministry of National Defense and probably the State Planning Commission had counterpart sections in the Central Committee, paralleling the relationship between party and State Council staff offices. Another feature which distinguished the Defense Ministry and the State Planning Commission from the other ministries and commissions was the nature of their leadership. Nineteen of the then thirty-nine administrative agencies divided the chief and deputy chief positions between Central Committee and non-party personnel. However, the State Planning Commission appointed CC members to both posts, while the Ministry of National Defense recruited its Minister and eight of the nine vice-ministers from the CC.

Does this placement of high party figures in the Ministry of National Defense indicate the "politicization" of the military or the "militarization" of politics? The question was sharpened by the naming of Lin Piao as Minister of Defense when he was placed in the highest elite group, the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The significance of this move was accentuated by the fact that Ministry of National Defense positions are staffed with much younger officers than those that dominate the National Defense Council, which suggests that the former is the operational center for military affairs while the latter offers honorary retirement for aging generals, both PLA and ex-Kuomintang officers. Party members are, of course, numerous in both bodies.

One clue to the answer came in a major article by Lin Piao. Writing on the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory, Lin recalled Mao Tse-tung's instructions of thirty years' standing: "The members of the Communist Party will not fight for their own personal power over the troops. . . . However, they should fight for the power of the party over troops and the power of the people over troops. . . . Our principle is to have the party directing the guns, and never allow the guns to direct the party." If the basic guarantee against Bonapartism is to be the political restructuring of military thinking, then this

overlap of Central Committee membership with the Ministry of National Defense serves a vital function.

Why is the overlap not complete, giving the CC all ministerial power? We do not know the rationale of inner-party decisions, but several explanations are plausible. For one thing, certain essential skills may have been lacking within the Central Committee when the government was established. Originally, the ministries of geology and petroleum were held by non-party persons, suggesting that competence in these areas was recognized as beyond that of CCP leaders. In this regard, it is interesting that both of these organs had their non-party heads enrolled in the CCP after several years in office. For transitional purposes, this enabled subordinate party members to gain training under experts; later, the experts could be replaced by qualified party officials or become disciplined party members themselves.

Moreover, these appointments may provide additional support for the regime among groups in the society who remain somewhat suspicious of the party as an administrative authority. Intellectuals in particular have been pleased to receive at least token representation through ministerial appointments, although several of the most important of these disappeared during the "anti-rightist" campaign of 1957. These non-party figures play a role in foreign affairs, too, carrying on cultural relations with groups in Japan or Latin America who might not respond to the appeal of militant CCP leaders. In addition, when Peking chooses to emphasize "peaceful" means for splitting Taiwan from the United States, it lets non-Communist ministers and commission chairmen hint that similar positions are available to defecting Chinese Nationalists.

Finally, of course, we must remember that this practice does not jeopardize the party's control over the important organs. The State

Council staff offices supervise all ministerial activities, and we have already noted how prominent the Politburo figures are in this role. In addition, the "leading members' group" which we examined earlier unites the CCP members of ministries and commissions with the party center and thus provides surveillance and supervision over state administration. Still another source of control is the Ministry of Public Security. Together with the Social Affairs Department and the Control Commission of the CCP, it monitors the words and deeds of all governmental personnel so that any deviation, whether political or financial, is likely to be reported and eventually punished. Within this web of interlocking and overlapping CCP threads, the non-party officials have little opportunity of acting contrary to the wishes of the party elite, centered around Mao Tse-tung.

### CCP Relations with "Democratic Parties"

In theory, the CCP and the so-called "democratic parties" make up what is officially called a "coalition government," previously known as a "United Front government." Whatever the term, it always includes the phrase, "under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." These other "parties" offer no real challenge to the organizational monopoly of the CCP since they lack a mass membership, independent organs of communication, and a hierarchical structure impervious to outside penetration and control. Indeed, they are little more than titular groups of esteemed individuals from various professional and public bodies whose participation in government has little effect on the successful functioning of the CCP. As we have indicated above, they contribute a certain amount of valuable expertise in technical fields and enable non-party persons to feel represented

in the government. For a brief period in 1957, they articulated the grievances of key political sectors in the country and thus provided us with a penetrating insight into some of the tensions or "non-antagonistic contradictions" which beset the People's Republic of China.

The leading "democratic party" is the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, comprising, as its title indicates, defectors from the Chinese Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek. Important before 1949, but now of lesser rank, is the Democratic League, made up chiefly of intellectuals and liberal bureaucrats of the former regime who attempted an abortive "third force" movement in 1946-48. Business interests, the so-called "national bourgeoisie," are grouped into the National Construction Association, while the misleadingly titled Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party seems dominated by doctors and health specialists. The Association for Promoting Democracy directs its attention primarily to school teachers. Finally, the Chiu San Society serves as a general organization for intellectuals who do not fall into any of the foregoing categories.

These groups do not function like pressure groups or interest associations in non-Communist states. Perhaps in some minor way they perform a related service in so far as they provide the CCP with a regular channel for tapping opinion and reaction among different sectors of society. Their main function by far, however, is to communicate policies downward from the apex of CCP power to selected audiences, transmitting special messages not intended or not suitable for the public as a whole. During the campaigns against bureaucratism and corruption, for instance, the National Construction Association mobilized the "national bourgeoisie" into mass meetings and "self-criticism" movements. Similarly, the Association for Promoting Democracy and the Chiu San Society pay special attention to CCP directives concerning the schools and the "work while studying" campaign.

We shall examine these organizations in somewhat greater detail in the next chapter, in connection with groups and group tensions.

At this point, we are interested solely in their role in government prior to the "blooming and contending" period of 1957. Up to that time, the "democratic party" representatives, together with other non-Communists, held approximately one-third of the posts of governmental ministers and chairmen of commissions under the State Council; in the National People's Congress, this sector comprised roughly forty-five per cent of the 1,226 deputies. While the "bourgeois rightist attacks" may have been biased, they were not entirely baseless, given this sizable participation of non-Communists in the governmental hierarchy.

One non-CCP member of the Standing Committee of the NPC complained that his CCP colleagues in the committee knew so little about state administration that "their discussion of major policies as well as their approval was only a gesture." Another charged that non-Communists "were not informed in advance of the matters to be discussed, and they had no time to study them at the moment of discussion." Complaints were common about the rapid promotion of CCP personnel over their colleagues, while related criticism focused on the severity of punishment given regular civil servants for minor infractions as compared with the apparently light disciplinary action suffered by party members.

While the last two criticisms could be disputed by the CCP, a more serious challenge lay in the allegation that "the party has replaced the government." One of the most penetrating presentations of this widespread complaint came from a prominent spokesman for all the "democratic parties," Chu An-p'ing, editor of the newspaper, *Kuang Ming Daily*, who addressed himself to the top men of China in an article audaciously entitled, "Allow Me To Offer Some Opinions to Chairman Mao and Premier Chou."

In my opinion, the key lies in the idea that "the world belongs to the party." I think a party leading a nation is not the same thing as a party owning a nation; the public supports the party but members of the public have not forgotten that they are masters of the nation. . . . Is it

not too much that within the scope of the nation, there must be a party man as leader in every unit, big or small, whether section or subsection: or that nothing, big or small, can be done without a nod from a party man? . . . For many years, the talents or capabilities of many party men have not matched their duties. They have bungled their jobs. . . . But the fault has not lain with the party members, but rather with the party which has placed square pegs in round holes. I wonder if the party acts this way because it entertains the idea that "every place is royal territory" and therefore has created the present monochromatic, one-family-empire appearance. . . . Before the liberation, we heard tell that Chairman Mao wanted to organize a coalition government with non-party members. In 1949, when the nation began, three of the six deputy chairmen of the central government were non-party persons, and two out of the four deputy premiers were non-party persons. It looked like a coalition government. Later when the government was reorganized, there was only one deputy chairman of the People's Republic of China, and the seats of the non-party deputy chairmen were moved to the Standing Committee of the People's Congress.

That is not all. Now there are twelve deputy premiers in the State Council, not one of whom is a non-party man. Could it be that there is not a single person among the non-party people who can sit in a deputy premier's chair, or that none of them can be groomed to hold this chair?

Other non-Communists came forward with evidence of their purely nominal roles. The Minister of Light Industry, a non-Communist, was refused a list of the directors of departments of industry in various provinces "for security reasons." Another person attacked the "double-track system" whereby one set of organizations existed in the government while a parallel set in the party actually gave the orders. More than one official complained of directives issued in the name of the Central Committee, instead of solely by the state. Repeated demands were made for a rigid separation of functions, with the party being responsible for ideology and broad policy and the state for laws and decrees.

This sampling of the charges vented by non-Communists in the administration substantiates our analysis of the relationship between party and state. The violent reaction of the subsequent "anti-rightist campaign" undoubtedly decreased the power and prerogatives of these officials. Indeed, this campaign may have contributed to the gross errors of planning and management that took place in the commune and the "Great Leap Forward" movements of 1958-59. By dispensing with what little technical expertise existed in China and by placing "square pegs in round holes," the CCP leadership placed exclusive reliance on inexperienced members to design and implement an overly ambitious and highly complicated economic program. Where "politics must command everything," failure was almost inevitable.

Perhaps China's surplus population permits millions of persons to be expendable, while the party's ubiquitous controls make dissidence a minimal danger. But the cost in human and material resources is appalling, although it will probably lessen with time. As a younger generation comes to power, its technical training, under Soviet bloc guidance, will produce officials who are both "red" and "expert." This leaves unresolved the conflicting demands of party and bureaucracy on the individual who belongs to both, but it may remove all non-Communist civil servants from government and thus transform the party-state problem into an "inner-party struggle." By making it impossible to blame "bourgeois rightists" for failure, this change may severely challenge the stability of the CCP, which will not have a scapegoat for the accumulated grievances from below. If this transformation occurs, it will remove one of the few surface differences between "multi-party" China and the one-party Soviet Union so far as the constitutional trappings of political power are concerned.

## Regional and Local Government

Our discussion of the authority of the state in China would be incomplete without some mention of territorial organs of administration below the central government. Information is extremely scanty on these levels. For the most part, provincial and local newspapers are not permitted to leave the country, whereas the major metropolitan dailies provide us with some information, censored as it is, about the higher governmental activities.

The major territorial unit is the province, of which there are twenty-one. On an equal level, although usually larger in size, are the autonomous regions (AR), of which there were four in 1963, with a fifth in preparation. These included the Inner Mongolian AR, the Ningsia Hui AR, the Sinkiang Uighur AR, and the Kwangsi Chuang AR, with the Tibetan AR still in the process of formation. These lie largely along the borderlands and are predominantly non-Chinese in population. Still a third division immediately under the central government includes the densely populated metropolitan areas of Peking and Shanghai.

Certain features distinguish this structure from the Soviet system, although basically both China and Russia are highly centralized through their all-embracing, pyramidal Communist parties. Unlike the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China is a unitary, not a federated state. Its constitution makes no provision for secession, as does that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, nor do any of its territorial units have the right to conduct their own foreign relations, as is nominally accorded the Union Republics. Finally, Chinese nationality groups do not receive special attention in a two-house chamber, as nationality blocs do in Moscow, but are granted "autonomy" in their immediate locality and only token representation in the National People's Congress.

Below this level of administration comes the *hsien*, or county, and *shih*, or municipal-



ity. The *hsiang*, or districts, appear to have been superseded by the communes as local centers of administration, but constant reshuffling of this bottom level has left the situation unclear. Beginning in 1958, the communes first encompassed virtually all aspects of local administration, then contracted to certain narrowly defined areas of production and distribution, only to expand once more to include various public service functions. Another complication lay in the wide variation in commune powers from one province to another. Not until a regularized system remains in operation for several years will it be possible to analyze more precisely the local foundations of administration.

While elections proceed upwards through local congresses to the National People's Congress, administration appears to flow downward from the State Council through successive levels of "people's councils." As with the party, the election upward represents the "democratic" part of "democratic centralism," with the latter part of the term manifested by the power of higher organs over lower levels. The chairmen of these councils correspond to governors and mayors, although their power is considerably less because of the rival authority of party officials at each level. Among the 1957 charges of "blooming and contending" was the specific allegation that in Shantung, CCP district committees vetoed directives of the provincial people's council. Conflicting authority also arises from the vertical competition between state and party hierarchies. One official claimed that the "entire Ministry of Education existed only in name without any actual authority." Its directives "did not mean anything to lower-level organizations, while sometimes even a directive issued by the State Council encountered the same indifference among the lower-level organizations [which] only observed directives jointly issued by the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council." An imaginative Chinese critic described the administrative routes between the State Council and primary levels as "channels even longer than descending an eighteen-story pagoda."

Without more information on the functioning of "people's councils" at provincial and local levels, it is impossible to give a proper assessment of their role. We know that local authority is severely proscribed by the principle of "democratic centralism," which binds each organ to its superior level of command and each party member to an even more rigid obedience to higher authority. Whether it is the inauguration of communes or conscription of "volunteers" for construction projects, a decision in Peking is mandatory upon all sectors of the country.

On the other hand, local officials do have a considerable latitude in the administering of details in programs which are intentionally drafted in only general terms by Peking. Our analysis of the communes, for instance, was impeded at the time by the extreme differences that existed between those of one area and those of another. These lower levels of administration may be of great value to the central government because they permit local areas to adjust to their particular conditions within an over-all frame of policy, and to avoid forcing China's heterogeneous economic and demographic regions into a single, artificial pattern. No less important in evaluating the stability of the Chinese system is the degree to which these local institutions fill the need for democracy as it is understood by the mass populace. However rigged may be the elections to the various congresses and councils, if the delegates subsequently demonstrate some responsiveness to local demands, they may provide a sufficient atmosphere of self-government to make the Communist claims of "people's rule" and "people's democracy" credible to the peasant masses, no matter how specious they appear to Western analysts. Only extensive interviews and on-the-spot studies of local organs can verify these hypotheses, but they cannot be rejected out of hand if we are to remain detached and objective in judging the system.

# Governmental Performance

## VI

Evaluating the performance of the CCP and the PRC presents obvious difficulties. We have no public-opinion polls to guide us on the society's sense of satisfaction or accomplishment. We have no opposition press to inform us about shortcomings and failure. We have almost no statistics of an official sort since 1959, and we have very few ways to verify unofficially many of the earlier figures on such important matters as population, agricultural productivity, and disturbances of the peace. Even when we receive eyewitness reports from tourists and refugees, there is only a glimpse of the state of the nation, isolated in time and often impressionistic in content.

But we are not wholly without means to estimate roughly the regime's over-all performance, both in terms of its own goals and those which we may infer as being held by a majority of its populace. Needless to say,

the goals of the government and those of the people may differ. Mao called explicit attention to this "non-antagonistic contradiction." The degree of incompatibility is significant in appraising the genuine support the regime enjoys from its citizens, and here our evaluation must remain extremely tentative. For example, the aim of driving the United States out of Asia may demand so much sacrifice from the people in terms of military outlay, forced industrialization, and exclusion from profitable trading areas that most Chinese would not think it worth the cost. The government may score points for its performance in Korea, Laos, or elsewhere and yet not get support from the populace because of the burden associated with accomplishing goals so far removed from the immediate wants of the peasant. Conversely, failure in one of these areas may not disturb the populace greatly and thereby not impair the regime's stability.

Assuming that there is underlying national agreement on such matters as security from attack, expanding China's international prestige, and increasing economic development, we may hazard some guesses about the compatibility between the goals of the elite and those of the people. Our guesses will be little more than that, however. Given the gaps in evidence, the relatively short time Communism has ruled in China, and the extreme swings in Peking's policies during the 1955-60 period, we must avoid facile generaliza-

tions, much less firm conclusions. This is particularly true for such peculiarly Communist aims as the advancement of revolution in Asia, the collectivization of socio-economic relationships, and the creation of the Marxist-cum-Maoist man. If experts on the Soviet Union remain uncertain and in sharp disagreement on these points after forty-five years of Bolshevik rule, we cannot expect to glean more certainties at this stage in the history of the People's Republic of China.

## National Goals

### *Foreign Policy*

The foreign policy of Peking is properly beyond the scope of this essay. However, we cannot ignore it in connection with an evaluation of governmental performance if only because the goals of foreign policy may predetermine or limit domestic goals, especially in economic development. If the elite places higher priority on political objectives in its relations with Japan or the Soviet Union, certain avenues of trade and technical assistance may be foreclosed thereby. More narrowly, the traditional "Mandate of Heaven" concept designates that the area of foreign relations most immediately of domestic concern will be the securing of the borders against "foreign barbarians." Guaranteeing the country against invasion, against either a genuine threat or one perceived by the regime, can divert the allocation of resources from more productive projects of economic development and therefore must be considered in the over-all assessment of governmental performance.

By its very nature, national security calls for negative rather than positive accomplishments; it emphasizes defensive, not offensive, ends. In this area, Peking can claim success, having deterred or thwarted all efforts aimed at its overthrow by the rival regime of Chiang Kai-shek. That Chiang's regime enjoyed the public support of the United States in his ultimate objective, although not in his immediate military means of accomplishing it, makes the achievement more noteworthy,

since Chiang's efforts to exploit dissatisfaction in Communist China to his own ends were politically enhanced by his alliance with U.S. power. Not even a revolt in Tibet succeeded in shaking the regime's control over the rest of China, even though it revealed significant areas of weakness along the vulnerable border areas.

Peking has systematically attempted to resolve long-standing border disputes so as to buttress those areas, diplomatically as well as militarily. Agreements with Burma and Nepal met these objectives. India, however, refused to tolerate occupation by the People's Liberation Army of thousands of square miles of disputed territory along the western portions of the Sino-Indian frontier. Between 1959 and 1963, repeated incidents between Chinese and Indian patrols and border guards led to sudden devastating attacks by Chinese forces plunging deep into traditional Indian territory. Peking's immediate objective, the securing of a line of communications between Sinkiang and Tibet and the closing off of points of entry into Tibet, was accomplished, although its international prestige was badly dimmed both by the image of aggression and by its unwillingness to negotiate differences without the use of force. Given the traditional self-image held by the Chinese people, the regime's efforts in the border areas, on balance, probably sustain nationally held goals of internal security and external power.

Against these successes, some complete and some partial, the record of failure must be reviewed. Thirteen years after officially laying claim to all of China, Mao Tse-tung still had not been able to occupy the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu within sight of his coast, much less take Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist base one hundred miles away. Before his own people and the eyes of the world, Mao's failure to eliminate his rival claimant to power was mitigated only partly by the fact that this rival enjoyed the

### *Governmental Performance*

protection of the United States. Mao's inability to win over his opponent through blackmail, bluff, and bribery signalled the basic weakness of Peking's power, in both indigenous strength and that derived from the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Moreover, thirteen years after proclaiming the People's Republic of China, Mao was unable to win recognition by a majority of the world's nations, much less become a member of the United Nations. He could not even force a defeated neighbor, Japan, to break relations with the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. Nor was the exclusion from international organs wholly offset by inclusion in the Soviet bloc, since the Sino-Soviet dispute which mounted in intensity between 1957 and 1963 found China increasingly isolated from the "socialist camp." Symbolic of this isolation was Moscow's move in 1962 to expand the Council on Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and admit Outer Mongolia as a full-fledged member; heretofore, membership in this body had been limited to Russia and its East European satellites, with Asian Communist states being allowed in only as observers. Peking's failure to attend CEMA meetings as an observer, much less as a member, marked the growing division between Moscow-oriented Communist regimes and those clustered around Peking, including, at this time, the North Korean and, to a lesser extent, the North Vietnamese governments.

Indeed, so overriding were the implications of the Sino-Soviet rift for China's economic development as well as its international stature that we may ultimately judge Mao's unwillingness or inability to mend his relations with Khrushchev as his most significant failure of performance in foreign affairs and one which outweighs his other successes. At least we can divide the period of relative success from that of seeming failure. Given China's degradation and defeat at the hands of foreign powers from 1841 to 1949, the

emergence of Mao's regime as a credible claimant to Asian leadership between 1949 and 1957 was a signal accomplishment. However, its failure to make any improvements in its position vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and India makes Mao's rule since 1957 of questionable value so far as the proclaimed goals of the elite are concerned.

Both in terms of the regime's self-defined goals, then, and of our own objective evaluation of its foreign policy record, Peking's performance is found wanting. But how is this poor showing viewed domestically? At the level of the elite, we sense bitter hatred of the United States, deep resentment against the Soviet Union, and a compulsive insistence on the correctness of Chinese Communist policy. Frustration seems to mark most of Peking's public pronouncements on policy over the past six years. However, one wonders how far down the hierarchical line this goes. If the public is apathetic about the goal of promoting Communism throughout Asia, failure to accomplish this goal will have few domestic consequences unless accompanied by real deprivation at home. The inability to unite Korea or Vietnam under the red flag may hurt the general cause of Communism, or even the prestige of the People's Republic of China, but the peasant in Szechuan is unlikely to hold it against Peking unless he has contributed his son, or perhaps a large amount of his produce, to the futile venture. Paradoxically, the regime's inability to excite the public to identify with the regime's goals mitigates the impact of failure when the government does not succeed in achieving those goals. Two failures do not make a victory, certainly, but in this combination they make the absence of victory less bitter at the mass level.

### *Economic Development*

What about the second major aim of elite and mass alike: economic development? How should we measure performance here? Do we take the regime's statements at face value when it promises to "overtake Great Britain in twelve years" or do we dismiss this as hortatory appeal? Do we take a comparable

period of Soviet economic development as a yardstick or do we use a non-Communist model, such as nineteenth-century Japan or present-day India? Depending on our base measurement, we will have different evaluations of Peking's performance in the economic area.

Certainly a legitimate and conservative approach would be to take the regime's accomplishments and failures as reflected in trends measured from the time of takeover. This will at least provide an indicator of growth. Progress in living standards and modernization, symbolized by swift methods of communication and transportation, by rising smokestacks and belching blast furnaces, ranks high in all so-called underdeveloped societies. We have seen how this complex of goals marked pre-Communist regimes in China. Therefore, we can assess Peking's performance in terms of its ability to maintain visible growth, if not to meet its more grandiose ambitions of economic well-being.

By comparison with the state of things on the eve of the Communist takeover, industrial figures cannot but redound to the credit of Mao's administration. Between 1950 and 1958—the last year for which statistics are available—steel output soared from less than one million tons to more than sixteen million tons. Coal production increased tenfold, electric power more than nine times. With Soviet assistance, a machine-tool industry burgeoned, the foundations for automotive and aircraft production were laid, the nucleus of an electronics industry was established, and a nuclear research reactor was constructed. Hundreds of miles of new railroad track pushed through the Gobi Desert to link Russia with China via Outer Mongolia, while a longer, more arduous line snaked its way across Sinkiang. These railroads promised to shift China's industrial base from the overconcentrated and exposed coastal areas to the protected interior.

These advances were achieved because the government applied most of the country's capital and labor to the task of building heavy industry and of laying the foundations for future growth. With singleminded deter-

mination, the regime invested more than twenty billion dollars in "capital construction" during the First Five Year Plan, 1953 to 1957, despite the impoverished state of the economy. Although preliminary studies in the West have yet to confirm many Chinese Communist statistics, it seems safe to say that the gross national product rose by at least seven or eight per cent annually during this period. The bulk of this increase, of course, came in the industrial sector, while agriculture barely kept pace with the population increase of between two and three per cent.

Considering the impediments to this growth—the burdensome military establishment, the scarcity of capital and of skilled human resources, the lack of trade with most non-Communist countries, the refusal to seek foreign capital and credits from sources outside the Soviet bloc, the continuous disruption of society by ruthless programs of "counter-revolutionary suppression," the wholesale reorganization of land tenure, and the confiscation of private industry, not to mention the inexperience of Communist cadres at fiscal management and national administration—the performance is impressive. How one would rate it relative to other economies depends largely on the specific points of comparison. Japan's growth rate matched and, in some years, exceeded that of Communist China, but Japan started from a much higher base of industrialization. Japan began its phenomenal postwar boom with the benefit of several generations of advanced industrial and technological experience, with a highly literate society, and without any serious political or social disruption following the postwar occupation. India, on the other hand, did not begin to match China in its first decade of independence, either in capital formation or in industrial output. In the Asian context, therefore, China's economic growth is a credit to the regime, at least down to 1959–60, in quantitative terms. But this is only a one-dimensional

approach; quantitative calculations tell us nothing about quality.

In 1958-59, Peking unleashed a massive "backyard furnace" campaign, urging its citizens to utilize all available scrap metal and all spare hours of manpower—no matter how inefficiently or exhaustingly—to fashion crude iron and steel in rough hearths set up in courtyards and fields the length and breadth of the land. Almost all of the output was later admitted to be of marginal utility at best, while the physical exhaustion that resulted (men, women, and children worked late at night and under hazardous conditions) may well have been partly responsible for the epidemics that accompanied food shortages in 1960-61.

Nor is this an isolated example of wasted resources and misdirected efforts. At one point, Peking ordered millions of wheeled plows to be manufactured, only to find they were completely unsuited to peasant needs; these plows went into the scrap furnaces along with the cooking utensils of the backyard steel workers. Experienced Japanese industrial visitors returned from the northeastern provinces to tell of ball-bearing output that would be rejected in Japan as of inferior and unreliable quality. At the cruder level, millions of man-hours invested in dam construction and dike building proved to be a total loss when the hastily built and inadequately engineered structures collapsed under torrential rains in 1959-60.

Moreover, figures of total production can be misleading; the statistics on a per capita basis are much more meaningful. For several years, Peking proudly promised its people they would "overtake Britain" in the output of iron, steel, and coal. No public attention, however, was given the fact that China has twelve times the number of people that Great Britain has. Yet to the 700 million Chinese, individual standards of living and their personal sense of well-being or depriva-

tion mean more than bar charts and graphs of gross industrial output.

The average Chinese peasant's evaluation of the regime undoubtedly has fluctuated widely from year to year. Initially, his gratification at receiving relief from usurious loans, exploitation by landlords, and governmental abuse probably overcame his innate suspicion of outsiders who came with glowing promises of improvement in his traditionally oppressed condition. Then came the sudden shift in policy from giving the "land to the tillers" to one of agricultural cooperatives. Curiously enough, we have little evidence of overt opposition to this move, although it is difficult to believe that the peasants relinquished their ownership of land, so cherished a goal, without regret. In 1958-59, however, the radical commune movement triggered widespread resistance throughout the countryside. The resulting dislocation of production and distribution was compounded by amateurishly designed programs of deep plowing and close planting. Agricultural production fell catastrophically, accelerated in its decline by unprecedented droughts, floods, and typhoons in 1959-61. As malnutrition spread through China, many observers—in the elite, among the peasants, and in the outside world—wondered if the system could survive these multiple blows.

How deep was the crisis and how devastating to morale were these blows? We may never really know. In the Soviet Union, the catastrophe of collectivization was not appreciated in its entirety until years later when population figures and production data in key sectors revealed the extent of the disaster that beset Russia in the early 1930's. It is significant that up to 1958, visitors were permitted to travel widely in China, and Peking permitted its periodicals to go abroad in large numbers. Since then, travelers have become circumscribed in their movements while all but a handful of newspapers and magazines have been withdrawn from outside circulation.

From all reports, however, there is no question about the sudden grinding halt that brought economic development to a standstill

by 1962. The outpouring of refugees by the tens of thousands testified to the lack of work and food. The sudden drop in Peking's exports made credible travelers' reports of idle factories and empty harbors, reflecting the precipitous decline in industrial activity. Even top leaders such as Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi spoke grimly to foreign visitors of "our three years of difficulty" and "our need for years of recovery." A crude graph, based on such scattered data, would show a perceptible rise in the standard of living from 1950 to 1955, a leveling off from 1956 to 1958, and then a steep drop in 1959-62. Since most of China began at a near subsistence level of consumption, these changes would register most heavily in such basic necessities as food and clothing. To be sure, conditions vary considerably from region to region, and between city and countryside. Generally, however, this grim picture prevailed throughout the country as the People's Republic of China entered its fourteenth year of power. Just as its foreign policy performance, while mixed, proved to reflect creditably on the regime's ability down to 1957 but showed a preponderance of failure after that year, so economic development moved steadily upward in the first eight years of rule, only to spiral steadily downward between 1959 and 1962.

## The Past and Prospects for the Future

In the absence of statistics, official or otherwise, we can only guess at the course of China's economy in the near future. Although outside experts differed sharply in their evaluation of specific points in the downward spiral that resulted from Mao's misnamed "Great Leap Forward," by the end of 1962 most agreed that the spiral had slowed if not halted altogether. The production indicators seemed to be "bottoming out," and they might even have been turning up out of the trough of decline. Peking noted this development hesitantly in a communique following the tenth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee, issued on September 28, 1962:

"The condition of the national economy last year was slightly better than the year before, and this year it is again slightly better than last year. In agriculture, the actual harvest of summer crops this year has shown a slight gain over that of last year, and the yield of autumn crops is also expected to register an increase. In industry . . . the output of the means of production in support of agriculture, light industrial products using industrial products as raw material, many handicrafts, and some badly needed heavy industrial products has registered a considerable increase during the January-August period as compared with the corresponding period of last year."

Was this only temporary relief before further declines in productivity? Or did it signal the slow return to economic growth? Peking spoke with grim confidence, claiming victory over its problems but promising nothing specific in the way of output targets or a coming time of plenty. After outlining its general program "to attach first importance to the development of agriculture, to handle correctly the relationship between industry and agriculture, and to readjust the work of industrial departments according to the policy of making agriculture the foundation of the national economy," the communique concluded, "We will certainly be able, after making efforts for a period of time, to usher in a new period of great upsurge in our country's socialist construction."

Whether in fact this can be achieved depends as much on the intangible political factors of leadership and morale as on the economic factors of population growth, agricultural yields, and climatic conditions. To a degree unparalleled by almost any other society except perhaps that of Russia in the earlier decades and India at present, successful development of China depends on a sense of movement that can overcome the paralyzing apathy and anxiety over sheer survival which

turns each family into itself and away from response to government commands. To extract the food from the farms and the labor from the masses without material incentives and without recourse to terror requires an elan that links the entire society, from top to bottom, in a coordinated network of production. It was this elan which impressed all who visited China down to 1957, whether they described it as one of voluntary enthusiasm or psychologically induced response. In its absence, the basic question that plagues Peking's rulers is how to get the entire system moving forward again. How can the 17 million party workers be refashioned into the smoothly functioning organization of pre-"Great Leap Forward" days, and how can they mobilize the 700 million citizens into continuing self-sacrifice for the goals of modernization and industrialization?

Regardless of variations in living standards, the regime has never relaxed its role as the motor force in Chinese society. For the individual worker or peasant, intellectual or bureaucrat, soldier or civilian, this has meant a constant barrage of directives from above. Calisthenics at dawn and political discussion at dusk bracket the most intensive working days in China's history. But against this forward thrust from above come contrary pressures from below. When failure occurs, the overworked populace turns on the ubiquitous Communist cadres. To be sure, they can plead innocent when natural disasters wreak visible damage to crops. But the flow of refugees into Macao and Hong Kong provides daily evidence that the government cannot always shift the blame from itself successfully. In the last analysis, it is the subjective beliefs of individuals that count more in determining political action than the objective causes of success or failure.

So far, the regime's actions have appeared both to strengthen and to weaken its position. By totally mobilizing China's populace for

every conceivable kind of activity, from exterminating sparrows to the harnessing of water for irrigation, Peking has demonstrated its interest in the people's welfare and its determination to channel vast amounts of manpower into constructive efforts. At the same time, the frenzied pace of manpower mobilization has built cumulative problems of fatigue, resentment, and tension which, at times of failure, may react against the regime precisely when maximum effort is needed to rectify a crisis.

Is China faced with paralyzing apathy at the mass level, increasing tension between mass and elite, tighter repression from above, and an ultimate explosion from below? The possibility of such a sequence of developments cannot be dismissed. But to weigh its likelihood we must probe beneath the surface to determine the flexibility of the regime in responding to its failure to achieve set goals. As a particularly illuminating case, let us examine the approach to scientific and technical development. A crucial ingredient in modernization, it deserves attention in its own right as well as for its relevance to other fields of endeavor.

From 1950 to 1955, the Chinese Communist Party treated China's intellectuals with considerable suspicion. In part, this stemmed from Marxist dogma about class warfare, the intelligentsia being suspect because of its "bourgeois origin." Also important, however, was the fact that the bulk of China's scientists had received Western training, either at home or abroad, and they were more favorably disposed toward European and American accomplishments than those of Soviet Russia. Despite repeated "ideological remolding" campaigns, the regime failed to enlist the enthusiastic support of this small but important sector of the society.

In 1956, Chou En-lai and other leaders attempted to win greater response from scientific and technical personnel by soliciting their criticisms and extending their prerogatives. This move grew from an awareness of China's dependence on Soviet technical assistance which limited Peking's political independence and which seemed to limit the



speed and scope of PRC economic growth. In party vernacular, it was a matter of granting more status to being "expert" than to being "red." In reality, more powers of decision were given to scientific personnel and less to party cadres in technical institutes and government agencies.

The effort to woo scientists halted in 1957 when their criticisms challenged the foundations of party control and broadened well beyond the physical and natural sciences. An "anti-rightist" reaction led to renewed "ideological remolding" in 1957-59, and the party launched a complex of economic programs on its own, countering the more cautious advice of the "experts" who were not "red." But the fiasco of the "Great Leap Forward" and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960 jeopardized the entire industrialization program into which so much had been invested and from which so much had been hoped. Small wonder that in 1960-61, the regime renewed its appeals to the "expert," eschewed emphasis upon being "red," and pruned back its economic program across the board.

This synopsis suggests several observations which seem relevant in assessing China's prospects. First, Mao and his colleagues do not act as fanatics; they are not wholly compulsive or irrational in their behavior. Their miscalculations may be severe and their tendencies may be counter to what we would consider good sense. Both faults may be explained by their background, their isolation from the outer world, and of course, their ideology. But they appear sufficiently rational to analyze their needs and to respond to failure by remedial measures. Flexibility is manifest in the variations of approach to problems and the types of responses they make to various challenges. Thus the party has not "brainwashed" the intelligentsia, as is commonly supposed in the West, nor has it shipped all dissenters to slave labor camps, much less executed them en masse. Even were a campaign of terror to be unleashed, Soviet precedent suggests that certain intellectual sectors of society might be safeguarded against elimination and might possibly flourish. Certainly the post-Stalin accomplishments in highly

complex and sophisticated weapons systems and space exploration is testimony to the work of those who survived the purges of the previous two decades. But the fact remains that up to 1963 Peking had not turned to the bloodletting that Moscow had once indulged in.

Having said this, however, we must still conclude that the party's vacillating policy concerning the reliability of the "bourgeois mentality" and of "the expert who is not red" has wasted millions of dollars and may have set back the realization of some goals by ten or more years. The constant changing of plans, the endless hours of political indoctrination, the recurring identification of criticism as "anti-party," the low level of statistical accuracy on whole sectors of the economy all combine to dim China's prospect of achieving the technological advances necessary for improving its living standards, and thus for attaining its more ambitious goal of becoming a modern world power.

The experimentation of Peking's first decade of Communist rule may smooth the path for a more even growth in the years to come, assuming that the recent crisis has ended. Or perhaps this development must await the passing of Mao, or the resolution of conflict between radical and conservative sectors of the leadership. In this regard, the September 1962 communique following the tenth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee revealed that a profound ideological schism had threatened party unity during the previous three years. Harkening back to the 1959 struggle between P'eng Teh-huai and Mao, the communique warned against "subversion within our state or party." It recalled "the great historic significance of the eighth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee, held in Lushan in August 1959" which "victoriously smashed attacks by right opportunism and revisionism and safeguarded the party line and the unity of the party."

This was no mere historical reference, according to the communique, since "class struggle inevitably finds expression within the party. Pressure from foreign imperialism and the existence of bourgeois influences at home constitute the social source of revisionist ideas in the party." Beneath the jargon lay clear signs of deep, and perhaps continuing, differences within the elite over the tempo of modernization, the means of its accomplishment, the degree of reliance on outside aid—Russian, and perhaps even non-Communist—and the political price to pay for that aid. Had the debate been wholly over and done with, Peking might have felt it prudent to leave such references unexpressed. That they were made at all suggested both a sense of victory over the opposition and a continuing concern lest "rightist" ideas spread.

This dispute over policy is inevitably linked with ideological purity, given the Marxist-Leninist predilection for equating opposition with wrong-headedness if not treason. Up to 1963, the dispute had not resulted in rigidity. Mao's apparent response to his "rightist" critics was to purge them and then adopt their

policies, at least in the domestic fields of economics and politics. As long as the government remains rational and flexible, its performance should improve even if there are schisms and purges at top levels. If frustration and tension accompany failure, however, the possibility of increasing rigidity in policy might hasten the government's demise. The pressures that can be sustained by a social system are usually greater than anticipated by outside observers. This was true of Stalinist Russia; it may be true of Maoist or post-Maoist China. But the signs of disintegration must be watched carefully, since no set of controls is so perfect as to withstand abuse from above and universal opposition from below. In this area, Peking's performance must be judged on a year-to-year basis. All that can be said at this point is that having weathered the crises of 1959–62, its survival power is impressive and frightening, as is the sheer grit and stamina of the Chinese populace. This brings us to our final point of inquiry: the interaction between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese society.

# Problems and Prospects

## VII

Having examined the relationship between party and state and evaluated the government's performance, we must now analyze the interaction between party and society. How does the Chinese Communist Party, with a membership of seventeen million, rule a nation of almost 700 million inhabitants? What problems arise? What tensions exist? How genuine and wide is consensus between party and people? Is popular dissent possible and, if so, is it repressed, resolved, or released in revolt?

One approach to such questions, useful for non-Communist societies, focuses on socio-economic groups and measures the effectiveness with which political systems mediate the conflicting demands of these groups while enabling them to accomplish their various goals. In the final analysis, then, the prospects for growth or decay depend on how successfully the political system channels group endeavor while moderating group conflict. Yet our discussion thus far has emphasized the drive toward monolithic unity within the Chinese Communist Party, accompanied by

its persistent penetration of every political, economic, and social organization in the country. If we assign a one-to-one relationship between party membership and loyalty to the Politburo, it would seem impossible to discuss group tensions meaningfully, since all groups would respond uniformly to Politburo dictates. Their interaction would be regulated by the CCP, which theoretically responds as one organism to directives from the party center and Mao Tse-tung.

Two considerations, however, warrant our adoption of the group approach for political analysis of the People's Republic of China. First, it seems highly unlikely that CCP unity is as complete or as effective in eliminating competing loyalties as Peking's propaganda claims. Common sense tells us that long-standing group loyalties would hardly be obliterated in only a dozen years or so of Communist rule. Formal lines of identification might disappear with the liquidation of guilds, trade associations, and secret societies, but the sense of unity among professors, students, shopkeepers, and similar socio-economic groups is undoubtedly more durable. This assumption is borne out by Mao's admission that "non-antagonistic contradictions" exist among groups that antedate the CCP, groups

whose demands coincide with those of similar sectors of other, non-Communist societies.

A second factor which makes this approach relevant is the degree to which Communist ideology stresses group affiliations. In fact, if group loyalties did not exist, it would appear that the ideology would have invented them. Marx's assumption of omnipresent class conflict culminates in Mao's emphasis on "contradictions among the people." By persistently categorizing all peasants as rich, middle, and poor, and by directing its political approach to them on this basis, the regime strengthens "rich," "middle," and "poor" attitudes among the peasants, if it does not, in fact, create them. Paradoxically, by emphasizing the "bourgeois mentality of intellectuals," Peking may have convinced a number of individuals that they were indeed endangered by the state, thereby making more serious a "contradiction" that the CCP has purported to eliminate. Thus a group-oriented analysis is justified by the objective evidence and by the party's subjective insistence that political tensions stem from omnipresent group conflict.

## Groups and Tensions

Two problems handicap this approach as a method of understanding contemporary China, however. One is our uncertainty about the basic loyalties of individual Chinese and the other is our inability to determine to what extent the regime's control of communications masks the degree of discontent within China. Even in an open society, it is difficult to determine the intensity of loyalties of persons who have overlapping membership in family, club, factory, political organization, and other groups. With psychological testing and intensive interviewing, the priority of loyalties of such a person can be discovered, but these techniques are not available to us in China.

How then can the analyst determine which loyalty is the strongest in a Chinese citizen in any given situation?

One simple basis for the division of allegiances might be Mao's differentiation between leaders and led, or more properly between the administrators and the administered. This juxtaposes the bureaucrats and the ubiquitous "cadres" against the peasantry, the proletariat, and the intelligentsia. But an examination of the Chinese Communist press provides abundant evidence that other types of groupings exist, many of which persist from traditional associations that Peking derides as "remnants from the bourgeois culture." For instance, repeated injunctions against "localism" arraign not just the peasantry but all who defend village interests against provincial authority; at a higher level, this includes provincial administrators who resist central government directives. Strictures against "local nationalism" are directed even against the bureaucrats among the Uighurs, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans, who are accused of anti-Chinese or "anti-Han" attitudes. Attacks on "the exclusively military viewpoint" suggest that the traditional animosity between civilian and soldier continues, only now it is emerging as a party versus PLA conflict. The CPR has by no means succeeded in solving its problems of national unity.

Even this refinement of our crude dichotomy between leaders and led can be developed further to embrace cleavages or "contradictions" within groups whose members display a conflict of loyalty to other groups, through their membership in both. Marshal Lin Piao spoke directly to this point when he admitted: "Because the overwhelming majority of our officers and combatants are farmers, it is quite natural for some comrades from time to time to consider their problems based on interests of a transient and local nature. . . . It is also unavoidable that a handful of comrades, under the influence of bourgeois ideology and petit bourgeois ideology . . . particularly the ideology of rich middle peasants . . . have revealed a weak stand in the course of socialist revolution." In other words, the PLA sometimes not only resists party in-

junctions to police the communes or take grain from the peasants but also actively sympathizes with rural, agrarian interests against the edicts from Peking.

An additional complication lies in the party's constantly shifting definitions of group loyalties. The political standing of a group is subject to sudden re-evaluation by the elite. The approved "middle peasant" of today may be the attacked "rich peasant" tomorrow, while the scorned "bourgeois rightist" of yesterday may be hailed as today's "red expert." This makes it very difficult for us to assess the depth with which loyalties are held by individuals in China today.

But this fluidity is not entirely caused by the CCP. China is a society in transition. The intensive drive to literacy on the part of this generation sets it apart from its illiterate parents, and opens up new opportunities for peasant sons who can gain access to knowledge, traditionally the exclusive province of the gentry. The wandering nomads of Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet are now settled; tribes and extended families are fragmented into production brigades on communes. Millions have been forced to migrate to the barren borderlands, while additional millions flock to the cities to join the swelling proletariat. This list does not exhaust the ways in which China is being transformed, but it serves to illustrate the extent to which social and economic associations are impermanent and unstable. Circumstances of this sort are bound to persist for some time in China.

This turmoil causes obvious problems for the regime but it also enables the party to appear as the only source of solidity and confidence in the country. It alone can give the people as a whole a sense of belonging and of security, so long a hallmark of traditional Chinese society but so rare a phenomenon in the recent decades of civil war and invasion, industrialization, and collectivization. Interviews with refugees who were once in the Chinese Communist Party and its affiliated youth organization reveal how many of them joined these organizations for precisely this need for protective group membership and the sense of orientation provided the

individual caught up in the turmoil of transition.

Another opportunity offered the regime by this unstable environment is the way it facilitates the classical strategy of divide and rule. By reshaping group allegiances or creating them where none existed, Peking can pit one sector of society against another. This maneuver, of course, is common to Communists throughout the world. Matyas Rakosi, the former "little Stalin" of Hungary, termed this splitting of society the "salami technique." Mao Tse-tung, refining the analogy, once remarked, "Strategically we take the eating of a meal lightly; we know we can finish it. But when actually eating, we do it a mouthful at a time. It would be impossible to swallow the entire feast in a single mouthful. This is called a piecemeal solution. In military literature, it is called smashing the enemy bit by bit."

This pattern marked the Communist conquest of rural China. The initial target of attack was the very wealthy landlord, who was readily isolated from his less affluent colleagues and the landless peasants. After eliminating the landed gentry, Communist agitators mobilized the countryside against "rich peasants" and rewarded their militant supporters with grants of land. Then the regime systematically split the remaining populace with successive campaigns, aligning those who had less against those who had more. Finally, the "poor peasants," for whom the struggle had ostensibly been waged, were dispossessed of their newly acquired holdings through amalgamation into agricultural co-operatives. From here it was only a step to the paramilitary communes, with their highly disciplined production brigades.

By breaking old bonds, the party reduced the capacity of its opposition to organize effectively. It did not assault Tibetans *per se*, but instead created a "class struggle" where none existed in order to prevent the Tibetans

from forming a solid front against Chinese rule. While destroying existing groups, however, the party also creates new ones. This dual process seeks to transform passive opposition into active support by sweeping all persons into new organizations which submerge their identity as individuals under forms of activity directed from Peking. The process is obviously somewhat forced and artificial; with good reason, the party questions its success in remolding all Chinese into carbon copies of what it presents as the ideal Communist man. In fact, a sense of constant threat to complete party control refocuses the attention of the elite on its newly created groups, lest "bourgeois remnant influences" or "imperialist agents" contaminate them and transform "non-antagonistic contradictions among the people into antagonistic contradictions between the people and the enemy."

Mao Tse-tung's emphasis on the precarious nature of loyalty indicates what a dominant role attitude plays in defining group relations in China. As we noted earlier, Marxism traditionally stresses that economic influences are the prime factor in determining classes and engendering class conflict. For the Chinese Communists, however, thought, belief, and attitude are important criteria for distinguishing friend from enemy and may be determined quite independently of one's socio-economic origins or affiliations. While this seems more in line with Western sociology than with classical Marxism, it at least justifies our use of Western methods for analyzing group dynamics in studying the various "interest" groups in China and their interaction with the regime.

One fundamental objection to this standard sociological approach to group behavior in China might stem from the regime's control of mass communications. Can groups as we understand them exist in a totalitarian society where all public media are controlled from the center and private communication is vul-

nerable to secret detection? Groups can only thrive when their members can share values and common interpretations of their experiences. Yet this would seem so inimical to Communist interests as to compel the regime to monitor all communication in order to make any cohesion that challenged its control virtually impossible.

One answer is suggested by the 1957 "blooming and contending" period, which showed that non-Communist groups did, in fact, communicate with one another, with either the explicit or implicit sanction of the regime. Statements made in open forums or in publications carried esoteric messages, usually between the lines. The perceptive reader could see through the ritualistic language of speeches and editorials in the *Kuang Ming Daily*, the newspaper of the "democratic parties," and detect criticisms of the regime as well as recommendations for limited political action. In private, non-party leaders frankly discussed how to strengthen their position by exploiting Mao's invitation to "rectify" the CCP through "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision with the democratic parties." During this period, therefore, communication among non-party groups was possible.

Later, the CCP charged, and backed up its accusations with documentation, that such communication constituted a "plot" on the part of prominent non-Communists, which proved that this means of strengthening group affiliation was possible in the PRC. But it left open the question: Was this relative freedom of communication permitted only to trap critics? If not, was it a genuinely encouraged movement which got out of hand and about which the government subsequently framed exaggerated charges? If, as is generally agreed, the latter hypothesis is correct, this implies a certain ambivalence in CCP attitudes toward groups, especially during the "transition to socialism." Too rigorous a suppression of differences will only provide an artificial and precarious unity. As Mao has remarked, "You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will still be there." A limited discourse among non-Communists not only provides a harmless release for tension, but also

gives an eavesdropping elite information that will help it achieve its long-range goal of transforming "bourgeois values" into "socialist consciousness." On the other hand, the party paranoia compels it to monitor and censor all communications in order to nip in the bud any incipient "counter-revolutionary elements."

Certainly the CCP monopoly on mass media limits the territorial span of "free" communication in China. It is impossible to conceive of peasants in Kwangtung, for instance, linking grievances with those in Szechuan and presenting a common front against Peking. It is possible, however, that within a single village or province the "bamboo telegraph" can transmit news of tension and trouble, despite official efforts to suppress such information. Where the regime's controls are new or loosely applied, as in Tibet, word of mouth may convey over large areas views of events contrary to the official interpretation of Radio Lhasa. Within these variable limits, then, we can assume that sufficient communication occurs to permit non-Communist groups to strengthen particularized loyalties and outlooks, attitudes often contrary to those exhorted by Peking's propaganda.

This may help to explain why throughout our essay we have found causes for and evidence of serious tensions in China but have discovered no widespread revolt against the regime. Aside from the efficacy of control measures which we will examine shortly, the explanation seems to lie in the fact that dissidence thus far has remained particularized, arising among intellectuals at one time, among peasants at another, and among national minorities at still another. For instance, despite the urban political furor surrounding the "blooming and contending" period, followed by the stormy "anti-rightist struggle," it is unlikely that the Chinese countryside felt any repercussions of these events which attracted so much world attention in 1957. The peasants simply were not interested in arguing the merits of Marxism or the prerogatives of non-party professors, issues of vital concern to the intellectuals but not to a peasantry absorbed in their own problems.

Similarly, in 1958-59, the severe rural dislocation caused by the communes probably aroused little response among the students in Peking and Tientsin. They were too busy trying to squeeze study, work programs, and political indoctrination into the same day and hoping that they would receive one of the increasingly scarce opportunities to join government or industry. Peasant problems were not their problems, at least not unless they were assigned to work on the communes or they suffered from malnutrition because agricultural produce did not reach their dining-halls. Again, by the time of Tibet's revolt in 1959, the Mongols had long since been gerrymandered into a minority in their own "autonomous region," while Sinkiang had already suffered its series of abortive uprisings in the mid-fifties. These non-Chinese peoples might sympathize with the beleaguered Tibetans when news reached them of the event, generally long after its occurrence, but they would be unlikely to risk their own lives to join cause with the distant turmoil on the roof of the world.

In sum, at one time or another some sector of the Chinese population has been driven to the point of near revolt. That such revolt did not occur is in large part due to the fact that the tensions have remained localized and have occurred in widely separated areas over a thirteen-year span of events. At any given moment, the amount of tension in China not only depends on the degree to which various groups are simultaneously disaffected, but also on the degree to which these groups possess a stable membership and are able to communicate their discontent with one another and thus transform passive opposition into active resistance. This compels us to examine the sources of tension more particularly, and the various means by which the regime reacts to them—or, to use Mao's words, the way it acts to "turn bad things into good things."

## Major Areas of Tension

Mao's 1957 speech on "contradictions" catalogued some of the major areas of tension in Chinese Communist society and provided an authoritative list of the groups that display "non-antagonistic contradictions"—i.e., the peasants, industrialists, businessmen, intellectuals, and national minorities. More specifically, he acknowledged that "some people have stirred up a miniature typhoon . . . complaining that cooperative farming will not do." Against this accusation, apparently supported by "a very small minority who are really dissatisfied," Mao juxtaposed as "staunch supporters of cooperatives the overwhelming majority of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants [who] together constitute more than seventy per cent of the rural population."

Mao was less confident in his description of intellectuals. Although "many of them are diligently studying Marxism, and some have become Communists, this number is small." He complained that "some people apparently think that there is no longer any need to concern themselves about politics. . . . It seems as if the Marxism that was once all the rage is not so much in fashion now." As for the national minorities, Mao frankly conceded that "because conditions in Tibet are not ripe, democratic reforms have not yet been carried out there." This was to prove the understatement of his regime. Only the industrialists and businessmen apparently showed no overt opposition, although Mao warned that "even when they rid themselves of the label 'bourgeoisie,' they will still need ideological remolding for quite some time."

This was no mere abstract analysis, for, as Mao admitted: "In 1956, small numbers of workers and students in certain places went on strike," because of "failure to satisfy certain

of their demands for material benefits." Moreover, "certain people in our country were delighted when the Hungarian events [the revolt of 1956] took place. They hoped that something similar would happen in China, that thousands upon thousands of people would demonstrate in the streets against the people's government. . . . There were other people in our country who took a wavering attitude toward the Hungarian events because they were ignorant about the actual world situation. They felt that there was too little freedom under our people's democracy and that there was more freedom under Western parliamentary democracy." In short, peasant resistance to collectivization, worker opposition to low wages and long hours, student complaints against political oppression, and non-Chinese revolts against Peking's authority provide the political and economic bases for group tension.

The years following Mao's speech saw new tensions in old places. Politburo member Li Fu-ch'un revealed some of the difficulties in 1959 when he stated that "a small number of discontented, rightist-inclined opportunists within the party reflected the resistance which some bourgeois elements and a small number of well-to-do middle farmers offered to the victory of socialism. They exaggerated shortcomings which were difficult to avoid, yet were subsequently overcome, in order to launch wanton attacks against the party, to conduct sectarian activities, and to oppose the correct leadership of the CCP Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Mao's economic schemes were reportedly attacked as being motivated by "fanatical petty-bourgeois enthusiasm" and "leftist adventurism." People's communes, critics charged, were "established too early" and "very poorly managed." Subsequent evidence was to point to these charges as centering around the controversy between P'eng Teh-huai and Mao, but their ramifications spread throughout the groups affected by the "Great Leap Forward."

Nor did things improve subsequently, to judge from the tone of the 1962 communique following the tenth plenary session of the Central Committee, which noted that "those



landlords, rich peasants, and bourgeois rightists who have not reformed themselves and the remnant counter-revolutionaries gloated over our difficulties and tried to take advantage of the situation." While less specific in categorizing the sources of tension than were some earlier documents, perhaps because to do so would have been too damaging to the regime's prestige, the communique hewed to its 1959 line, arguing that "throughout the historical period of transition from capitalism to communism—which will last scores of years or even longer—there is class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road. The reactionary ruling classes which have been overthrown are not reconciled to their doom. They always attempt to stage a comeback. Meanwhile there still exist in society bourgeois influences, the force of habit of the old society, and a spontaneous tendency toward capitalism among some of the small producers. Therefore among the people a small number of persons making up only a fraction of the total population who have not yet undergone socialist remolding always attempt to depart from the socialist road and turn to the capitalist road whenever there is an opportunity." In short, the Chinese peasant still wants to work his own land.

The details of specific crises concern us less than the fact that problem areas persist in the body politic. These are not passing phenomena, nor are they necessarily the result of Communist methods. To a large degree, they stem from the gap between "what ought to be" and "what is" in present-day China. Much of the frustration is caused by the unrealized hopes that are engendered by the exaggerated claims of Communist propaganda. More basically, however, serious frictions are bound to occur when a backward country with a large population, low capital investment, and a small surplus of agricultural output, is forcefully modernized. The fruits of progress are far more welcome to the population than are the long years of arduous effort needed to increase production without increasing consumption in order to finance the nation's industrialization program. In China, the

resulting tensions are compounded by the rigorous centralization demanded by the regime. The traditional tug of war between province and capital must be resolved in favor of Peking, just as the historic friction between borderland peoples and the Han race must be won by the latter, if the People's Republic of China is to become a modern and major international power.

Tensions are obviously inevitable, too, when an inexperienced elite attempts to chart a course for rapid growth in the absence of adequate statistical information, and in the face of both domestic and foreign opposition. For instance, how are production targets to be established? If they are set high, they may stimulate greater output, but if production falls short of proclaimed goals, disappointment or embarrassment over "failure" results. If they are set low, triumphant claims of "overfulfillment" may arouse false hopes that similar achievements can be readily secured in the future. And how are costs to be estimated? Is labor wholly expendable when millions live on near-starvation rations? Do the psychological benefits of mass participation in large-scale projects compensate for the waste of manpower and materials that results from inefficient, "volunteer" effort?

Even if the plan is well designed, getting it implemented and checking its progress take a great deal of time and work. Should the emphasis be on quality or quantity? If targets are not met, political careers may be ruined. If quality proves defective, serious economic consequences will result. Should conservative, tested methods be employed or radical innovations? Given the political pressure to produce and to "overfulfill the quota," the temptation is strong to try the radical experiment. But if failure occurs, the persons involved are strongly motivated to conceal it through rigged reports of output or exaggerated claims of difficulty.

Specifically, in 1958 harvest reports were

inflated by more than one-third, as the regime later admitted. Since there are many administrative layers between the lowly farmer and the State Council, when fraudulent figures are entered at each stage of accounting, a cumulative distortion of a considerable amount results. A Chinese refugee statistician later described in convincing detail how production targets for industry and mining were inflated throughout his *hsien* or county, and, reciprocally, the producers exaggerated their production claims by anywhere from forty to seventy per cent. Eventually something has to give, either by the verification of production claims or by the reduction of the pressures to inflate such claims, or the gap between reality and pretense grows so wide as to make the system wholly unmanageable as a so-called "planned economy."

## The Regime's Response to Tension

We have already examined the relationship between party and state and seen how the doctrines of democratic centralism, interlocking membership, and iron discipline affect this relationship. Two additional organization techniques demand our attention. The first consists of the vertical ordering of such mass groups as women, youth, and businessmen into hierarchical systems of command and communication that reach from village hovel to central headquarters in Peking. The second technique, misnamed "brainwashing" in the West, centers around small study groups that are established in all bodies at all levels. Their purpose is to indoctrinate everyone, whether in the party or out, to the point where response is automatic.

The vertical organizations can be divided into two categories, sub-elite groups and mass groups. Sub-elite groups are those small sec-

tors of society that normally, under non-Communist rule, play the leading role in economic and social affairs. Mass groups are those major divisions of the populace, based on sex, occupation, or age that embrace millions of persons and whose membership plays only an implementing or "following" role in economic and social affairs. The sub-elites in this sense comprise the secondary levels of leadership while the mass groups are the led. Typical of the sub-elite organizations are the so-called "democratic parties" which we examined earlier. In addition, there are special organizations for natural scientists, social scientists, educators, publishers and writers, and religious leaders of the Buddhist and Moslem faiths. Prominent mass organizations include the Young Communist League, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.

The regime explicitly separates the roles of these two types of organization. While data are unavailable on the "democratic parties," the 1957 "blooming and contending" period revealed that one bone of contention between their leadership and that of the CCP was the CCP's refusal to permit these groups to recruit a large membership. These bodies were to be strictly limited to an advisory capacity within the government and to appeal to particular audiences inside or outside of China, depending on their composition. By contrast, the mass organizations boast staggering rosters, ranging from more than fifteen million members in the case of the trade unions federation to almost one hundred million for the women's group.

These mass organizations are involved in both large and trivial policy matters; they do not decide but only implement decisions. To facilitate the dissemination of the marriage law and the implementation of its provisions, the national, provincial, and local women's conferences helped explain the government's program and solicited questions and criticisms about its operation. Unpopular taxation and confiscation measures which transformed private industry into public corporations won

at least passive acceptance after conferences were held between state leaders and various business groups. When matters of national import arise, whether on pest extermination or a "Resist-America-Liberate-Taiwan" campaign, these organizations meet ritualistically, pass unanimous resolutions in support of the government, and mobilize their members in mass demonstrations. Within forty-eight hours of a Peking directive, three hundred million persons will have been gathered in public meetings throughout China, to repeat such slogans as "Hands Off Cuba!" or "Drive the American Imperialists out of Taiwan!" At the top level, leaders of the various mass organizations gather irregularly as the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which brings together almost eight hundred persons into a purely rubber-stamp endorsement of policy.

A valuable adjunct to these mass organizations in soliciting universal support for national policy are the so-called "street committees." Especially in the crowded cities, these groups, based on residence rather than on social strata or occupation, check the daily performance of neighbors in attending demonstrations, killing rats and flies, contributing "volunteer" labor, or whatever else may be decreed by the authorities. The members of these committees are typical "cadres" or "activists." Whether in the party or not, they act as informal administrators of policy. They may receive no remuneration other than minor privileges or exemption from more onerous duties, small compensation for the strain of serving as buffeted and perhaps detested middlemen between their peers and government officials.

Nor does this exhaust the organizational controls on individual behavior. The so-called "people's militia," which operates primarily in the countryside and is of minimal military importance, regiment the political activity of their charges in accordance with directives from commune headquarters. Ultimately, perhaps, the communes themselves may approach the ideal model of regimentation that they sought to establish for a brief time in 1958 but which was quickly altered in the face of

disastrous mismanagement and widespread opposition. In the communes, all persons would eat together in mess halls, sleep together in barracks, work together in brigades, play together in teams, and study together in evening meetings. From the first bugle note at dawn until the final "lights out," the individual would be constantly immersed in group activity, directed by centrally appointed officials.

The massive, complex, and pervasive organizational apparatus that we have surveyed is possible only because it is run by dedicated full-time party workers with the help of part-time personnel, the vaunted "cadres." Local organizations based on residence are linked with vertical organizations based on sex, age, and occupation in an interlocking relationship with the CCP that leads through party committees and secretaries right up to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. In this way, a decision by Mao Tse-tung and the elite can be implemented throughout most of the country in a matter of days, if not hours, and with a response on the part of the people that amazes observers in its uniformity.

The advantages of such a complex system in terms of command and control are multiple. In the crudest fashion, it pre-empts the time and energy of several hundred million persons, denying them an opportunity for acting on their own volition and perhaps contrary to the regime's wishes. As a constructive measure, the Young Pioneers provide a deterrent to juvenile delinquency by implanting habits of good citizenship, which are especially important for a society in transition where normal institutional influences are weakened. As a destructive measure, the constant round of meetings, discussions, demonstrations, and projects makes impossible, or at least difficult, the maintenance of private groups, whether around home and family or among friends and fellow workers. This re-

duces the need for police surveillance; the individual's words and deeds are constantly subjected to public scrutiny.

At a more subtle level, the constant immersion of the individual in group and mass activity minimizes his chance of communicating his dissent or dissatisfaction except in a manner sanctioned by the regime. He remains isolated in his doubts, while being surrounded by the affirmative reaction to authority of his neighbors and colleagues. In the extreme case, the hundreds of thousands who march enthusiastically in National Day parades on October 1 or the millions whose patriotic petitions are reported in the daily press may well convince many individuals that they alone are lagging behind in support for the regime, whereas disillusionment and discontent may actually be quite universal.

### *The Study Group*

This brings us to the most precisely focused form of persuasion and participation in attitude formation: the study group. "Hsueh-hsi," or study, and "t'ao-lun," or discussion, provide the two-step procedure by which the new socialist man is to be fashioned in China. Without an exact precedent in the Soviet Union, this institution is so characteristic of Mao's methods as to demand far more attention than we can give it. In fact, next to the CCP, the study group may be the most important single institution for transmitting policy and insuring its acceptance by the 700 million Chinese people.

From seven to fifteen persons meet regularly under the supervision of an instructor or cadre; they are assigned topics ranging from implementation of the latest five-year plan to the growing struggle against imperialism in Latin America. Common reading matter is provided for the group in advance. Where members of the group cannot read, the cadre will read the topic of the day or it may be transmitted through the local radio.

Then each person elaborates on his understanding of the theme, articulating whatever doubts or criticisms seem safe as well as relevant. His colleagues compare their reactions with his, pointing out the "shortcomings" in his approach. The individual re-examines his position, and then, or at the next meeting, subjects his own views publicly to "self-criticism." Throughout the process, the cadre guides the discussion, notes the pitfalls of policy as well as of individual views, and reports to his superiors on the group's reactions.

Chinese Communist literature stresses the importance of the "mass line" and the need to keep party policy in touch with popular sentiment. This does not mean abandoning objectives in the face of public opposition. Instead, the regime tries to discover the causes of dissension and then either modifies its policy or explains it in terms designed to meet local criticism. The study groups make this system work, since they are the one assured means of reaching every person in the generally illiterate populace of China. Moreover, they are the only forum within which individual views are actively and systematically solicited.

The study groups form the outer circle of a system that concentrates political power at the center and tries to maximize the participation of the masses at the periphery. Through the study groups the regime hopes to gauge the public response to its policies. Their location at places of work or residence provides a ready index for measuring this acceptance by the degree to which the group members implement policy by activity in the neighborhood, farm, and factory. For the regime, this is a basic guide to popular attitudes. For the individual, the deep psychological involvement with his peers in group discussions may make him very sensitive to their feelings toward him. Thus the reward of group approval or the stigma of group reprobation may substitute, in some degree, for material incentives or physical punishment. The pioneering studies on this subject by Professors Robert Lifton and Franz Schurman indicate that this pressure on the individual may explain

how the regime has extracted so much effort from so many persons with so little tangible reward and such relatively little force. At the same time, we must note that the study groups appear to have met less and less frequently as the debacle of 1959-62 deepened its impact. Not only did they not counter the trend but perhaps their very convening was too risky for the regime since they provided another opportunity for face-to-face contact among those whose grievances might become sources of danger if shared under these circumstances.

We have suggested earlier that the tensions and insecurity experienced by the people in a Communist state, where the masses are under ubiquitous surveillance and the elite is subject to periodic purges, serve as stimuli to greater discipline and better performance. So, too, the pressures generated in the study groups, which probe the individual's personal attitudes as well as his political understanding, may increase the individual's commitment to the goals of the state and drive him to ever greater effort. Indeed, these action-producing tensions may be analogous to the parental discipline which mixes love with punishment, or to the rules of a religious order which mix salvation with retribution. Like the parent or the church, the party makes these tensions serve its purposes by directing the energy they create into desired channels of behavior.

If these analogies are valid, they suggest that the regime gets the population not only to conform to its dictates but to work actively to achieve the goals set by the regime. Thus the controlled behavior of the individual, at least ideally, would satisfy his own needs as well as those of the state. It would be hazardous to take this proposition as proven, however. Assumptions of inner acceptance of Communism in Eastern Europe were exploded by the Hungarian revolt. The Chinese people have simulated obeisance to authority in order to avoid punishment for too many generations for us to take at face value the public display of support for Communism there. Yet the intimacy and long duration of the study group sessions make

it very difficult for the citizen to practice hypocrisy or deceit successfully. Instead, it may well be that, over time, the process will weld tighter bonds between the individual and the group and, through the group, between the individual and the entire nation.

## The Repressive Instruments of the State

We have reserved the state's use of repression to enforce its decrees until last in our analysis. This is not because it is of negligible importance, but because it receives such attention in non-Communist writings that it requires some de-emphasis if we are to place it in proper perspective. Moreover, its role has diminished with time, since, as in the Soviet Union, the regime has found ways to satisfy the needs of the populace and, through indoctrination, has succeeded in winning more voluntary support among the people.

There is no denying the role of terror during the first five years of the PRC. The continuation of the civil war in remote areas and the acceleration of the revolution resulted in the death of thousands, perhaps millions, of persons through execution, imprisonment, and forced labor. The memory of this ruthless repression is sufficiently vivid in most people's minds to deter them from resisting the regime, long after the actual use of terror has diminished. In addition, while our analysis shows China to be far from a "police state" as the term is commonly understood in the West, imprisonment and deportation to forced labor camps remain omnipresent threats to "counter-revolutionary elements." Foreign visitors have reported that large groups of political prisoners are experiencing "reform through labor" by constructing a railroad through Sinkiang's mountains and deserts. Road building in Tibet's frozen wastes has provided a

similar "re-education for reactionaries and feudal elements," thousands of whom have died in the effort.

At a lesser level, the regime has castigated "bourgeois rightists" and has sent many bureaucrats, teachers, and students to toil arduously in frontier areas. Significantly, many critics of the regime who were in the forefront of the "blooming and contending" movement later were reported by the Peking press to have "achieved new socialist consciousness" while standing knee-deep in the freezing waters of Inner Mongolia or collecting and distributing manure in Kwangtung. To be sure, several thousand of these "rightists" of 1958 were publicly freed of stigma in 1960. However, the intervening period provided a painful and humiliating lesson to those who accepted at face value Mao's invitation to "assist in rectification of the Chinese Communist Party."

Another instrument of repression is the People's Liberation Army, which is engaged in "construction effort" in troubled areas. Indeed, so extensive is this activity that in some respects China might be termed a "garrison state," rather than a police state. The presence of almost one hundred thousand troops in Sinkiang—who are there ostensibly to open up virgin lands, to fell timber, and to build a variety of structures—is a daily reminder to potential anti-Chinese dissidents that while Peking is far away, its mailed fist is nearby, ready to smash any Uighur, Kazakh, or Kirghiz uprising. The army's role in "tidying up the communes" received such publicity abroad that Marshal Lin Piao felt compelled to reply to "mouthpieces of imperialism" who "have described the positive participation of our armed forces in the people's revolutionary movements as 'armed suppression.'" At the same time, Lin tacitly admitted the enforcement role of the troops when he complained that "because the overwhelming majority of our officers and combatants are farmers . . .

some comrades . . . have failed to gain a clear understanding of certain questions concerning socialist transformation." In short, the troops balked at forcing their fellow peasants into communes.

Still another repressive force is the public security system. We know little of this organization, but Peking's infrequent references to its role suggest considerable reliance upon this additional source of control over the populace. Probably the most pointed allusion to the combined army and security forces as an enforcement system came in the September, 1962, Central Committee communique. After summing up the difficulties that confronted China's domestic development, the communique declared, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army and the public security forces are strong and reliable armed forces of the people. Our country has also a heroic military force of vast numbers. . . . At all times they are vigilantly guarding the frontiers of our great motherland and protecting public order, and stand ready to smash the aggressive and sabotage activities of any enemy." We know that the PLA numbers well over 2.4 million men. While no figures are given for the public security forces, we may assume that they make up an equally impressive number.

The importance of the security that is enforced by the PLA heightens the importance of security *within* the PLA. For this reason, it was significant that following the abortive effort of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai to challenge Mao's policies in 1959, the former Minister of Public Security, Lo Jui-ching, was named to head the General Staff of the PLA. The then director of the General Political Department in the Ministry of National Defense, T'an Cheng, subsequently fell from power, presumably because he was implicated in the case of P'eng Teh-huai. As long as the army can be relied on to enforce Peking's edict, any revolt is likely to be localized and short-lived. Should the armed forces vacillate in their allegiance, however, the regime might be seriously threatened. In this regard, it is important to note that, except for those captured in the Korean War who refused repatriation, of the millions who have fled China in the

past thirteen years, few have been from the armed forces and none have been high in their position. This is an impressive testimony of the indoctrination and control apparatus within the People's Liberation Army.

It is proper to include the court system in the organs of repression, given Communist assumptions about the role of law. Aside from its handling of purely civil and criminal cases, the court fulfills an educative and punitive role in Communist society. Law, as are all other social institutions, is frankly described as the handmaiden of politics. In a review of the Supreme People's Court from 1955 to 1959, one of its vice-presidents, Kao Ko-lin, gave ample evidence of this function of the courts. After praising the 1955 actions of Local People's Courts at various levels for their "struggle for the elimination of counter-revolutionaries in conjunction with Procuratorial and Public Security organs," he noted that trouble had emerged when "a number of bourgeois rightists and persons, insisting on their bourgeois legal viewpoints, infiltrated the judicial circles." These individuals "expended great efforts to oppose the advancement of the interests of the people's democratic dictatorship on the part of the People's Courts, the leadership of the party over the work of the People's Courts, the mass line of judicial work, and the directives of the party and the state formulated according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism." However, "the rectification campaign and the anti-rightist struggle in 1957 . . . served as a razor-sharp political and ideological lesson to the judicial cadres." The dismissal of a division president of the Supreme People's Court, of five procurators of the Supreme People's Procurate, and of fifty-two procurators at the provincial and municipal levels on charges of "leniency" and "bourgeois views" brought the "ideological lesson" home, not only to those who were dismissed but undoubtedly also to those who remained on the bench.

It is important to note the gradation of terminology used in Communist accusations, which range from "antisocialist elements" to "counter-revolutionary agents." Taking the most serious, "counter-revolutionaries" are

"enemies of the people" and receive summary treatment. The decreasing frequency with which this term has appeared in the Peking press over the years connotes increasing confidence on the part of the regime. The occasional appearances of the term now and then, especially in the southern and coastal areas, need not indicate that mass executions or sizable deportations are in order. Instead, they may refer to saboteurs and agents who were acting on behalf of the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. Espionage and sabotage antedate the "cold war" and in China they may be entirely separate from it since Peking and Taipei are mutually pledged to one another's demise. When conditions worsened markedly in 1962, Chinese Communist propaganda accused Chiang Kai-shek of plotting actively against the mainland regime. Chiang's propaganda responded in kind, boasting of agents who set off explosions in Canton and nearby areas.

Far less ominous are accusations against "bourgeois rightists" and "antisocialist elements"; these charges connote "contradictions within the ranks of the people." We might read such terms as referring to people who dissent against policy but who basically support the regime or, in a more serious context, groups whose resistance threatens to thwart policy altogether. At present, the regime has chosen to handle these deviants through a mixture of moderate coercion (demotion in rank, short terms of forced labor, imprisonment, etc.) and persuasion (i.e., "brainwashing")—but it can, at any time, increase the punishment by simply redefining the crime in more drastic terms. Unquestionably, then, the PRC uses repressive methods to achieve its ends, but its use of such methods now is considerably less than in the earlier years of the regime.

This point is worth stressing because we face the critical question of how much popular support exists for the Communist regime

in China. It is almost impossible to answer this with any precision, given the censorship of Peking combined with its elliptical references to opposition. In 1959, Lo Jui-ch'ing summarized his ten years as Minister for Public Security by noting: "China is a big country with 650,000,000 people and even if the counter-revolutionaries account for only one per cent of the total population or less than one per thousand, their number would still be considerable." After this suggestive reference to those suspected of plotting the overthrow of the regime, he recalled, "At the time of the collapse of the Kuomintang revolutionary rule, there remained on the mainland two million political bandits, in addition to 600,000 backbone elements of the reactionary party and Youth League and 600,000 special agents of all types." This would put those dedicated to the downfall of Communism on the Chinese mainland at somewhere between three and six million, although presumably the better part of those described by Lo as actively working toward this end in 1949 have long since been killed. Put in gross figures, this is a staggering total. Put in percentage terms, it is an unimpressive minority of the total population. Regardless of the actual number of those killed and those presently active in anti-Communist groups, the regime's hypersensitivity to the threat of "counter-revolutionaries," real or supposed, makes terror and repression certain to be employed to some extent by Peking in the foreseeable future.

## The Problem of the National Minorities

Space prevents us from examining in detail many of the areas of tension in China and the regime's measures to counteract them. We select the conflict between the various nationalities for brief review because the clash (1) illustrates how Peking exerts

its authority over its vast nation and (2) helps to place the dramatic Tibet revolt in perspective. With approximately six per cent of China's population, the non-Han nationalities demand a disproportionate amount of attention on the part of the regime because of their concentration in the borderlands, traditionally distant from and hostile to control by any central government—Manchu, Nationalist, or Communist. Today, these borderlands take on added importance as areas of potential settlement and economic development.

Peking proclaims that it wants to create "a great family of nations," but its real goal is ultimately a "fusion of nationalities." In short, it does not seek a fraternal relationship that will preserve the identity of all peoples but a paternal one which will permit the dominant Chinese to absorb and eventually to eliminate other races in China. The problem is complicated somewhat by Peking's attack on minority groups for so-called "local nationalism." The term "nation" is used loosely in Communist parlance, especially in China. In the West, this term generally connotes a sense of unity based on an historical consciousness and a territorial concentration of people enjoying similar ethnic, linguistic, and perhaps religious traits. Minority groups in China, however, rarely meet these criteria. The Uighurs of Sinkiang, for instance, have no "national heritage" to bind their scattered oases into a symbolic entity. Peking's attacks on the "local nationalism" of the Chinese Moslems—the Hui—in the northwest make little sense, since these people are ethnically and linguistically identical with the "great Han race." Their separatism is marked primarily by their occasional participation in non-Chinese Moslem revolts, not by any separatist movement such as has characterized Mongol or Tibetan political activity over the past centuries.

To simplify matters, we will concentrate on the three "autonomous regions" that are clearly set off from the main body of China, namely the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, founded in 1947, the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, founded in 1955, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for which



a Preparatory Committee was formed in 1956 but which has yet to be formally inaugurated. These areas are in three different stages on the road to the creation of "the big family," a family that will live, of course, under a Chinese roof and be established only after the conflicts between the different nationalities are eliminated. The means toward this end have run the full gamut, from total terror and armed repression to the absorption of minorities into the dominant populace of China. Peking has candidly admitted that some of its policies have been directed against the minorities, including such self-identified steps as "increasing the number of settlers of Han nationality . . . deliberately absorbing members of national minorities into factories and schools in Han areas . . . and absorbing large numbers of national minorities into the People's Liberation Army." These techniques are not peculiar to Communism. They reflect the inevitable tendency for modernization and industrialization to dissolve cohesive minority groups, whether among the plains Indians of the United States, the aborigines of Australia, or the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. Their articulation in this context by Peking shows that the elite is aware of how industrialization can be used to mask its political machinations as well as serve its economic ends.

The degree to which the regime has been able to weaken the minority nationalities varies considerably among the three areas under review. Inner Mongolia lies close to China's economic and political centers. Both rail lines and highways have facilitated the flow of capital investment and population into the region. Sinkiang, by contrast, is separated from China proper by mountain and desert. Only in 1960 did the first railroad enter its territory. Tibet, of course, is linked with the PRC chiefly by air and by extremely hazardous mountain roads which twist tortuously through narrow gorges and over high plateaus amidst a sparse but hostile populace.

Another variable worth noting is the ethnic composition of these areas. The Inner Mongolian Region, for example, has been gerrymandered to include more than seven million Chinese as against only one million

Mongols. Its chief figure, Ulanfu, has loyally supported Peking against the "local nationalist" demands that the area be redrawn to separate the Chinese urban and rural sections from the Mongol-dominated pastoral regions. In Sinkiang, however, less than ten per cent of the six million inhabitants are Chinese, the majority being Uighur. Almost all the non-Chinese groups share the Moslem faith and Turki languages. Small wonder that the key political and military posts remain in the hands of Chinese leaders, while the local figurehead, Saifudin, serves as nominal chairman of the region. Finally, of course, we have Tibet, which was occupied by Chinese troops and civilian magistrates following the massive revolt of the Tibetans in 1959. All top positions are held by Chinese; the nominal head, the Dalai Lama, is in exile, and the "acting" chairman, the Panchen Lama, is a powerless puppet who is noticeably absent from most of the governmental activity.

Thus the Peking regime faces widely differing problems in controlling the minority nationalities. Armed force has been necessary in Tibet. In Sinkiang, as we suggested earlier, the PLA has played a passive rather than an active role—at least so far as we know, although we must note that in the years 1949–54 considerable violence occurred there, too. Only Inner Mongolia proved relatively quiescent during the first decade of Communist rule. Mongol resistance did flare up much earlier, however, against the Japanese invaders during World War II. But the Mongols were suppressed by the Japanese, who used the old strategy of divide and rule. Since 1949, Communist promises of autonomy and self-rule appear to have been more or less successful in meeting local aspirations in this area.

An indicator of tension is the fact that Peking still finds it necessary to conduct political purges in the nationality areas. In 1957–58, those who fell before charges of

"anti-party, local nationalist" crimes in Sinkiang included: the mayor of the capital city of Urumchi; the director of cultural affairs and chairman of the regional Writer's League; the director of regional civil affairs; and, in the center of traditional anti-Chinese activity, Ili, the head and deputy head of the *chou*, the president of the people's court, and the vice-director of propaganda for the CCP Ili Party Committee. In 1959, the chief of police in Kashgar and eight of his ten subordinates were found guilty of "local nationalism," while a more sweeping charge claimed that "almost every head of the local nationality groups was an individual with political ambitions." The expressed link between "individualism" and "local nationalism" underscored the seriousness of this accusation.

Indirect methods of control are more likely to be employed by Peking as it attempts to move from quelling opposition to marshalling support. Although Chinese comprise less than one-fifth of the populace in Sinkiang, they made up a majority of the Chinese Communist Party members there in 1959, and comprised a near majority of the Sinkiang Young Communist League. While Peking constantly discourages indiscriminate, mass recruiting of "local cadres," it assures the region that placing the administration wholly in local hands remains a cardinal goal of policy. Admittedly, recruitment of illiterate herders for the management of communes and of light industry takes considerable time and training. Basically, however, the transition is dictated by political considerations of tension between non-Chinese and Chinese which aggravates the modernization problem at every turn.

The Chinese have learned to combine traditional colonial practices with Communist innovations to increase their control over the minorities. One of their favorite policies, borrowed from the old colonial powers, is to disperse the local inhabitants and, at the same time, introduce increasing numbers of the

dominant race. Recruitment in the Army takes thousands of local youths to distant points of China. Meanwhile, thousands of families from coastal provinces are moved to the borderlands for permanent settlement and eventual intermarriage with non-Chinese minorities. The new Communist innovation is the introduction of collective farms and communes, which change living patterns drastically by placing all persons under centralized direction.

With Communist indoctrination being spread in the wake of the dramatic increase of literacy, with a new generation being set wholly apart from the old one by the educational opportunities open to the young, and with socio-economic institutions being transformed into twentieth-century totalitarian forms in the space of a lifetime, it would appear that the tensions between Peking and the autonomous regions will decline in the foreseeable future. This does not mean that the process will occur without regret, or even resistance, among the non-Chinese peoples. It does mean, however, that the Communists in Peking will probably find increasingly effective means of subduing the minorities with each passing year.

## The Future of the People's Republic of China

We have attempted to overcome the obstacles imposed by the Communist authorities in Peking which prevent first-hand, reliable, and systematic examination of their political system. We have also tried to set aside our national sentiments as well as our own values, in order to assess the problems and prospects of the People's Republic of China. Obviously, both efforts can be only partially successful, but to the degree that they can be pursued, we will increase our understanding of this incredible Communist effort to transform the largest and oldest society on earth.

If our analysis of the past is impeded by the various obstacles enumerated earlier, our look into the future is even more hazardous,

given the unforeseen events which make prognosis uncertain. How will the succession problem be resolved when Mao Tse-tung leaves the scene? Will the natural calamities which have struck China so heavily in the past few years repeat themselves in the near future? Can the regime check the population explosion and thus relieve its almost intolerable obstacle to economic growth? How will the regime restore the elan and drive which, in the absence of material incentives, seem so necessary to forward movement?

These questions highlight some of the major areas of uncertainty, the outcome of which will have a basic effect on the future of the PRC. Within these limitations, however, we will attempt to glimpse this future on the basis of our findings thus far. First, it would seem safe to conclude that the People's Republic of China will remain essentially as it is presently constituted. The elite will be authoritarian and totalitarian. The population will remain regimented and mobilized. Industrial production will increase steadily, while agricultural growth will barely stay ahead of population increases. The net economic effect will be one of gradually increasing Chinese Communist power on the international scene, both in trade and military capability, and of imperceptible increases in the standard of living at home. China will not rival Russia or the United States in technology or industry in the foreseeable future, but it will give India the toughest sort of

competition in the race for Asian leadership.

Will China's 700 million inhabitants tolerate the grim austerity and incessant propaganda campaigns that confront them in the years ahead? The answer to this depends, in the final analysis, on the effectiveness of political controls. Economic incentives seem a remote and marginal hope for winning positive support in China. Instead, the regime must rely on the party and its ideology and organizational apparatus to fashion this vast country, with its abysmally low living standards and its overwhelming population, into a modern military and industrial power. Thirteen years of Mao's rule suggest that the foundations for achieving these goals have been laid. However, the superstructure will be at least a decade in the building. Whether at that time it will collapse under its own weight or through faulty construction remains to be seen. But at this point, the political system has shown a remarkable ability to survive almost incredible miscalculations on the part of its leadership and heavy pressures from diverse outside sources. Compared with the previous century of China's history, the record of 1949-63 is indeed impressive. In short, the People's Republic of China promises to be an ambitious, dynamic, ruthless, and growing power. As such, it will require constant attention and increased understanding by all persons who are concerned not only with the future of the United States, but with the future of Asia and, indeed, of the world.

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Two problems confront the person interested in an authoritative and up-to-date book on Communist China. The majority of the titles published since 1949 represent travelers' accounts, limited both in the accuracy of their reporting and the timeliness of their observations. Those that have represented a scholarly effort to describe economic matters or to analyze political problems sometimes were premature efforts which were attempted before developments permitted a better perspective on programs launched in the middle or late 1950's. Within the next few years, however, a number of books are scheduled for publication that represent

the results of long and careful study by outstanding scholars in various fields, such as Professor Howard Boorman's monumental compilation of political biographies, Professor Franz Schurman's illuminating theoretical analysis of political organization in the People's Republic of China, and Professor John

Lewis's painstaking examination of lower levels in the Chinese Communist Party.

The student can fill in some of the void by examining some of the periodicals primarily devoted to articles on Asian political developments. Foremost for this purpose is *The China Quarterly*, published in London. *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, California) and *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, British Columbia) are also valuable. *The Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor, Mich.) not only contains articles pertaining to modern China but publishes an annual bibliography that is the most comprehensive guide to the literature available in English. Finally, anyone interested in the People's Republic of China should read its authoritative journal, *Peking Review*, for important documents, editorials, and government statements.

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
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RICHARD L. PARK

India



# Introduction



Half a century ago, the subcontinent of India was the center of British imperial power in Asia. In 1912, the modern capital of New Delhi existed only in its architect's imagination, and the financial and business cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were the hubs of politics and civil administration. Throughout the countryside British magistrates toured the districts on horseback, giving benevolent advice to the peasantry, hearing minor civil and criminal cases on appeal, and supervising the collection of land revenues which supported British power in India. Mahatma Gandhi had not yet made his political appearance on the Indian scene. He was then in South Africa perfecting techniques of non-violent resistance to racial discrimination that later were to become characteristic forms of action in the Indian nationalist movement.

Good railroads, trunk roads, and modern communications systems, plus a centralized administration, and its English-language medium, provided the means for a political and cultural unification of India that never had existed previously. In the rural backwaters,

the peasants went about their lives much as had their ancestors a hundred or even a thousand years before, continuing a local community tradition that had permitted Indian civilization to endure, despite the predatory inclinations of many an invader. In the cities, education in high schools, colleges, and universities had expanded rapidly since the founding of the Universities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta in 1857. With education and travel, with higher incomes and more demanding expectations, an urban middle class and a landed aristocracy arose to spearhead the growing movement of nationalism. By the First World War, India was divided socially between a relatively docile, illiterate rural community, and a vibrant and ambitious urban intelligentsia, both dominated by the presence and discipline of British rule. Fifty years ago a casual observer would have had good reason to conclude that the British Indian Empire was here to stay, at least for a very long time to come. Few took nationalistic "radicals" seriously. The romantic image of white men carrying the dark man's burden was comforting to the many misguided people in Britain and elsewhere who felt that the far parts of the world could stand still while progress churned on at home.

Even the most casual newspaper reader today carries a far different vision of India than did his forebears five decades ago. Most contemporary discussions relating to economic development, social change, political stability, or ideological conflict in Asia ultimately turn to the case of India for extended exploration. India shares with many other countries a similar set of problems. But in India these problems tend to be more massive in scope, the conditions among the poor more deplorable, the aspirations and plans for the future more ambitious, and the articulation of the past, present, and future more dramatic. In foreign affairs, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru has been the spokesman for a policy of "nonalignment" in the era of the cold war that has gained for his country a respected role in the conduct of international politics, even though his country lacks the essential strengths of a great power. Conflict between Communist China and India over the Sino-Indian border regions have upset India's unique role of leadership in the nonaligned world. If India can manage it, the upset will be temporary. "Economic aid" and "India" are words that seem to go together, almost as if by habit in usage. Indeed, with Japan and China, India represents Asian civilization to much of the world.

Although India no longer rests on the outer fringes of the active world community, too many outside observers still have a view of India that was more true in 1900 than in 1960. The inadequate education about Asia that most of today's leaders have received has given them a distorted knowledge of the continent that is not easily erased. If one examines the high school geography or world history books of the 1930's, for example, it will be noted that India, like so much of Asia and Africa, was treated minimally in space and depth, and generally was appraised strictly within the framework of British imperial interests. The country tended to be anonymous and its peo-


ple faceless, except perhaps for Gandhi whose genius was difficult to ignore.

Book illustrations showed white-clad masses of dark-skinned people, farm lands and jungles, and an occasional close-up of a farmer, complete with turban, thatched-roof hut in the background, and with ancient farm implements in hand. Indian novels of the day complemented sentimental and irrelevant journalistic reporting that stressed the unique and the bizarre, and ignored the essentials of the commonplace. Motion pictures, when they were produced on Indian themes, often were concerned with the Englishman desperately attempting to come to grips with the mysterious East, and inevitably failing as a veil of mysticism enveloped the hero during the final reel. The fact is that few knew much about India in pre-World War II years, except some of the British who ruled, and, of course, the Indians who aspired to rule themselves. The residue of ignorance continues, unfortunately, despite a much greater effort all around to dispel error with competent analysis.

India today is center-front on the world's stage. Internally, experiments with democratic forms of government, plans and aspirations for economic development, and legislation encouraging social change race against time, since time seems to favor totalitarian alternatives if government by consultation, discussion, and persuasion fails. Hopes for a better life now tend to outrun capacities for reaching ambitious targets, thus adding a note of desperation to the apparently calm voices of leadership in the nation. Now that the traditional slow pace has been hurried and the rural community has been encompassed in national economic planning, unemployment grows as rural migrants swell the cities. Industrial expansion further hastens the collapse of the village artisans' role, and a competitive market replaces an earlier village economy that was largely self-sufficient and partially isolated from the ups and downs of speculative urban enterprise. Population growth, while lower in rate than some other countries (like Ceylon and the Philippines), starts from such a large base that over nine million new persons are accumulated each year, adding pressure to existing



# PRESENT-DAY INDIA



## Pre-Independence India



### Key

- India Proper
- State Boundaries
- Kashmir: "International Status" to be Determined by United Nations
- Cease-Fire Line
- Main Railways

plans for increasing per capita annual income and consumption of foodstuffs.

India's obvious need for rapid social change and economic growth has triggered ideological debates across the country's political spectrum—from Communism on the left, through Nehru's democratic socialist center, to an array of conservative, traditional, and reactionary philosophies on the right. Although the Congress Party under Nehru dominates the political order, the Communist Party of India (CPI), manned by disciplined workers and headed by a group of able and seasoned leaders, has managed to capture the imagination of a sizable sector of India's youth. In Parliament, in the state assemblies, and in municipal councils, the CPI (using constitutional means during the current "parliamentary front" phase of strategy) has been more successful than would appear on the surface, since the popular vote favoring the Communists has risen steadily, even while seats have been lost to other parties. Armed conflict between Communist China and India in late 1962 rapidly reduced the popularity of the CPI, but the change in public opinion seems to have been national and emotional, rather than political and ideological. On the other extreme, organized conservative and traditional groups, some of them highly reactionary, prepare for the day when India can be restored to something akin to the "Golden Age" of the Hindu past. Ideological issues, which are rooted in the many conflicting institutions of the country, are alive and competing daily in India. The democratic forms and values enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic (1950) are by no means secured for the long-run future. Pragmatic tests of success in economic growth are attached to the democratic Constitution as the price tags of popular acceptance.

Ideological issues, difficult enough when viewed domestically, become even more critical because of the competition with the Peo-

ple's Republic of China—a competition that has been thrust upon India as an unwanted burden. Despite denials of competition between democratic India and Communist China, the world insists that such a battle proceeds, and in truth most of India's leaders recognize the Chinese challenge and are trying to rise to meet it. One would be foolhardy to ignore the fact that Communist China appears to have gained a substantial lead in this competition in the industrial sector of economic development, although in agriculture both countries are troubled by food deficits. But the end is not yet.

Perhaps the most spectacular among the many achievements of India since 1947 have been the framing of the 1950 Constitution, the fair and honest conduct of general elections at five-year intervals since 1951–52, the relatively sophisticated operation of the political party system, the reorganization of the states along linguistic lines, the effective operation of a complicated federal system of government, and the continuation and improvement of excellent administrative and judicial institutions. These institutional aspects of political modernization in India, while not yet perfected, have been the subjects of remarkably skillful experimentation, compared with their development in the rest of Southern Asia. It remains for India's leaders to bridge the gaps in politics between the old nationalists and the young, between the rural peasantry and the urban workers and intelligentsia, between the peoples of one region and those of another, and between those of wealth and those of poverty. Whether time-tried parliamentary forms will prove adequate to unite the country and to provide an effective and acceptable government remains to be seen. Political modernization in India—as many like Jayaprakash Narayan, a former socialist leader and present-day critic of parliamentary government, have pointed out—may require compromises that will blend traditional with modern modes of rule in order to capture the imagination and support of the rural, tradition-bound peasantry.

The continued leadership in India since 1947 of one political party, the Congress Party, and the inspiration of Jawaharlal Nehru

through all these years may have provided a record of unity and political stability that is more to be credited to the unique skills and power of Mr. Nehru than to the established political institutions outlined in the Constitution, or to the Congress Party. The great test of India's political stability will arise only when Mr. Nehru no longer is present to call the country's political tunes.

India today is subject to the serious attention and studied concern of statesmen, journalists, scholars, and businessmen all over the

world. An old civilization is adjusting to new circumstances. What happens in India over the next two decades will help to determine the fate of the weaker and smaller states in Asia that look to India for guidance on the political arts of the possible. India is, after all, the world's largest political experiment testing the feasibility of following the democratic path to political and economic development. An exploration of the record to date may be of assistance in taking the measure of future trends.

# History

## II

### Ancient India

India is a newly independent state, but its history stretches back at least to the Indus Valley civilization established before the third millennium B.C. The advanced state of material culture exemplified by the archaeological findings at Indus Valley sites, such as Harappa in southwestern Punjab or at Mohenjo-daro in Sind, suggest much earlier beginnings. Indeed, the brick houses of two and three stories, the baths, drainage, rational town planning, utilitarian household implements, and artistic forms found at Harappa compare favorably with their counterparts in modern Indian towns, and far exceed some.

As some historical and linguistic evidence reveals, Harappa civilization was at least partly

Dravidian in character, and probably is related to the present-day cultures of southern India where Dravidian languages are commonly used. This ancient civilization collapsed or was destroyed at an exact time and for reasons that have never been fully explained. It is probable that Aryan invaders from Central Asia, descending upon Punjab by way of Afghanistan and the northwestern mountain passes proved to be too powerful and efficient in their exploitation of the northern plains and deserts for the artistic and rational but apparently unwarlike peoples of the Indus Valley. Although Harappa culture disappeared physically, it left behind reverence for the *pipal* tree and the swastika (emblems of well-being), artistic interpretations of animals common in Indian folklore, and attitudes of contemplation and the worship of natural forces that have become a part of the Hindu and Buddhist ways of life. One of the complications in understanding Indian civilization is the fact that almost nothing has been wholly discarded from the past. As Hinduism systematized its philosophies and established its unique perspectives on the unity of matter, thought, and spirit, every experience and all objects could find a place in the cultural panorama. Harappa civilization disintegrated, but part of it continues; it has been adapted and absorbed into newer forms in today's Indian civilization.

The Aryan invaders brought important contributions in language, literature, philosophy,

and ideas about social structure that, when combined with earlier indigenous Dravidian elements, made up the foundations of Hinduism. Not much is known directly about the Aryans, except that they were Central Asian in origin and nomadic by habit. Sometime between 1500 and 1200 B.C., migrations took place that sent one branch of the Aryans on a trek to Europe and another to India through the passes of the northwest. They spoke an Indo-Iranian language (pre-Sanskrit) and spread its influence both in Europe and in India. Linguists now identify as "Indo-European" the many languages that trace back to Aryan pre-Sanskrit roots. In India, these languages are prevalent today in the vast region of northern India, while the Dravidian language group of south India, affected only sparingly by the Sanskrit tradition, forms a quite separate linguistic region.

In addition to Sanskrit, the Aryans brought ideas about the ultimate questions of being that have come down to us in sacred texts known as the Vedas. At first memorized and recited ritualistically in appropriate cadence and tone, and then passed on from generation to generation orally, in later years the texts were committed to writing and finally were printed. It is characteristic of the traditions of India that learned *pandits* (scholars) even today continue to memorize and recite the ancient Vedic teachings and pass on their secrets to chosen apprentices, despite multiple copies of manuscripts and libraries full of printed texts.

The literature of the Aryan period contained the rudiments of what over many centuries became Indian philosophy, one of the most profound systems of speculative thought in all human experience. The term *darshana* ("being in the presence of truth") best describes the thought of ancient India, for intuitive or mystic realization of ultimate truth was at least as honored an entry to spiritual knowledge as was intellectual ratiocination or emotional attachment. Political thought, as such, actually received very little attention in Vedic times, perhaps because so little importance was given in the philosophic systems to such mundane and essentially

transitory matters as politics and government.

The clash between the Aryan rulers and the indigenous people they defeated seems to have resulted in the establishment of rules of social behavior that would assure permanent high status to the Aryans. This is one of the explanations of the origins of the unique caste system in India. Since the lighter-skinned Aryans were dominant and the dark-skinned people were 'the conquered, social status could be classified roughly along color lines—thus explaining one reason that *varna*, the term for caste grouping, literally means "color." In Vedic times, the Aryans assumed their rights to the three highest social groupings: Brahman (priest), Kshatriya (warrior or ruler), and Vaishya (merchant). The more lowly rank of Shudra (worker) remained for the indigenous men and women. The fact that the people defeated by the Aryans were an agricultural people and had to teach the nomadic Aryans how to farm may also help to explain why it was thought right and proper that the defeated should assume the obligations of manual labor. This primitive social system of caste, after many centuries of spreading and mixing throughout India, became far more complex and was highly structured along regional and kinship lines. But the modern caste system traces back ultimately to the theory of *varna* of the Vedic age.

From the sixteenth century B.C. to the fourth century B.C., our knowledge of Indian history is unfortunately scanty. But we do know that Indian civilization deepened in this era and that the significant new faiths of Buddhism and Jainism arose to challenge a caste-ridden Brahmanical orthodoxy. Through Buddhist texts, written in languages (especially Pali) that were closer to the common man than Sanskrit, something of the social life of the times can be determined. The general self-sufficiency of the village communities protected the peasantry from the worst consequences of the intersectional warfare that

characterized the times. Numerous contending "kingdoms," usually organized along tribal lines and ruled in an authoritarian manner, constituted all the government known at the time. One can re-examine the general social and political conditions of the period from 1500–1000 B.C. in India's two great epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. Book VI of the *Mahabharata* contains the *Bhagavad Gita*, perhaps the single most discussed text in the literature of Hinduism.

Alexander the Great in 326 B.C. invaded northern India through the passes from Afghanistan, but remained only a short time and died in 323 B.C. before he could return for his planned occupation. Observations on Indian life at about the time of Alexander's visit, recorded by the Greek, Megasthenes, are of continuing value to students of ancient India. Greek influences in Persia, Afghanistan (Bactria), and Central Asia in the second century B.C. spread through cultural contacts with Hellenistic groups such as Alexander's and especially affected the Kushanas in India, who helped to establish an art tradition known by the name of an area in the northwest of India, Gandhara. The unique sculpture of this period incorporates Greek facial features and dress in images of Gautama Buddha.

Chandragupta Maurya in 321 B.C. formed an empire that for the first time in history gave some sense of unity to India. The center of this loosely linked state was Pataliputra (now known as Patna) in Bihar. Before the empire collapsed, almost all of the subcontinent was subject to Mauryan authority. The most famous of the Mauryan emperors was Ashoka, grandson of Chandragupta, who ruled for over 35 years, beginning in 274 B.C. Ashoka was a powerful and often hard-handed ruler in his early years. As a patron of Buddhism and a critic of caste, however, he later brought peace to his domain and encouraged the spread of the tolerant message of Lord Buddha. Ashoka had his message inscribed on pillars that he

placed in prominent locations within his empire. The designs of these pillars, and the famous wheel of Ashoka, are used to this day as symbols of the Indian tradition. The wheel, for example, will be noted on much of the paper currency in India, and in the center of the national flag. The pillar often is engraved on official letterhead stationery to represent the authority of the Government of India.

One of the classical political texts of ancient India, the *Arthashastra* (roughly "Treatise on Government"), is addressed to the Mauryan rulers, and includes some of the most blunt lessons in the art of rule by connivance, treachery, and bloodshed extant in the literature of politics. Machiavelli's *The Prince* pales as an elementary work in the face of the *Arthashastra's* instructions in ruthlessness. One should remember that the uncontrolled chaos of the pre-Mauryan era called for great skill and shrewdness in the exercise of power to make unity and peace possible. It seems likely that the *Arthashastra*, a most unacademic work, indeed reflected some of the techniques of harsh rule utilized by kings of that time.

Shortly after the death of Ashoka, the Mauryan Empire disintegrated, and the patchwork-quilt political nature of pre-imperial times was restored. Only in the fourth century A.D., almost 600 years later, was the Gupta Empire organized by Chandragupta II to give a unified character once more to northern India. (Southern India has always had its own intricate history, although Indian civilization, and more especially the Hindu way of life, continued to link north and south together culturally.) Gupta times, lasting until about 500 A.D., were of great importance in the development of the caste system, philosophic discourse, legal theory, architecture, sculpture, painting, dance, and music. This was the classical age for all forms of Indian art and philosophic speculation. The Buddhist university at Nalanda, only recently reopened in honor of Buddha, was founded in this era, and Buddhist doctrines spread from India to Southeast Asia and to China, continuing the earlier encouragements of Ashoka.

After the decline of the Guptas in the

sixth century, India returned to a state of disarray and conflict. What some historians call the medieval age, and others call the middle age, had begun. The period from 600 to 1500 saw the subcontinent badly split between numerous warring kingdoms. Theological conflict, first between Buddhism and orthodox and doctrinaire Brahmanism, and later between Islam and Hinduism, added enormously to the confusion of the times. However, in the ninth century a great Hindu religious leader, Shankara, preached a profound message on the unity of the cosmos, *advaita vedanta*, that has become the most popular intellectual interpretation of Hinduism in modern India. Shankara's non-dualist philosophy which denied that object and subject were separable concepts underscored the tolerant urge for oneness in religious belief that has had such a powerful impact on the world-view of modern India.

Students of politics will look in vain for extensive theoretical or descriptive literature on the politics of ancient India. In theory, the role of the ruler was to maintain law and order, thus making possible the peaceful pursuit of one's given destiny—a destiny determined by birth, bounded by caste rules, and supported by kinship ties. The natural form of government was the kingdom; the natural ruler, the king (*raja*); the natural sanction, punishment (*danda*); the appropriate check on the authoritarian powers of the ruler, the laws of spiritual obligation (*dharma*); the interpreter of *dharma*, ultimately the king, although he often took into account the recommendations of his Brahman priests. The tradition, and in all probability the general practice as well, was authoritarian. Evidence has been found of some "republican" forms of government in Mauryan times, established under the patronage of Ashoka. Here the basic form of kingship prevailed, but the king technically was elected by the elders, and consultative assemblies were established to advise the ruler. These republics were definitely not democracies. As in the ancient Greek city-states, at least half of the subjects were the equivalent of slaves and were without any voice in the conduct of public affairs. Consul-

tation in the Indian "republics" involved only a few wealthy, land-owning aristocrats who gingerly shared oligarchical powers with the king. Kingship, bolstered by the authority of power, was the dominant political framework of the ancient Hindu period. However, since public affairs at the level of the village and small town were largely untouched by the king's power, authoritarian rule did not result in totalitarian rule.

## Islam and the Moghul Empire

Up to the time of the Muslim invasions, beginning in the eighth century A.D., Hinduism and its heterodox off-shoots, Buddhism and Jainism, had been able to meet new theological challenges with toleration. Even as issues were being debated, the sponge-like Hindu view of life encompassed its would-be opposition and absorbed it into the spectrum of neo-orthodoxy. Buddhism itself, born in India in the seventh century B.C., returned in time to the Hindu fold, even as its potent message of love spread throughout the rest of Asia. Today a Buddhist is hard to find in India.

But Islam and Hinduism were ways of life and systems of belief that had little in common. The hard narrow path of revealed truth in the Koran contrasted sharply with the broad-ranging philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishads that offered many roads and numerous by-ways to the goal of ultimate truth. On theological lines alone, Hinduism and Islam have been at odds from the first. The origins of the separate state of Pakistan thus trace back to the initial contact between the true believers of the two religious groups. Hinduism and Islam might well learn to live side by side, as indeed they did. But matters of faith and ceremony prevented intimate social melding.

Islam first came to India less than a hundred years after the death of the Prophet,

Mohammed (569–632 A.D.). In 711 a few Arab traders, led by Mohammed-bin-Kasim, landed in Sind at a place not far from present-day Karachi. They came to revenge a Hindu raid on one of their ships, and stayed for the benefits of commerce. The bleak wastes of the desert to the east inhibited them from exploring inland. Although these early traders made little impact on the whole of India, Islam did gain an early foothold on the west coast. Today some of the aristocratic Muslim families of India and Pakistan trace their ancestry back to the original Arabian families of eighth-century Sind.

The more substantial Muslim invasions date from the tenth century. In a series of seventeen raids through the northwest mountain passages from the Middle East, Mahmud of Ghazni from 998 to 1030 scourged the northern plains of India. Conversions to Islam were forced in large numbers; those who resisted were killed. Hindu temples and shrines were desecrated. Ghazni had little love for the land or the people of India, but he appreciated the silks, the fine cottons, the gold and silver, and the foodstuffs that he found and transported back to Afghanistan following each expedition. After Ghazni, many other Muslim adventurers and crusaders on behalf of Islam came to India to convert, to exploit, and to despoil. One of the most famous of these was the Turkish founder in the twelfth century of the Kingdom of Ghor in northern India. Monumental relics of the kingdom, as well as the remains of the Delhi Sultanates that were founded by one of Ghor's generals in 1206, can be seen in and near the modern city of New Delhi. The great thirteenth-century tower, the Qutb Minar, is one of their memorials. The Sultanates, headed by a Muslim ruling class, were remarkable for their skillful control of a large sector of northern India inhabited mostly by Hindus. Without interfering unduly in the lives of their Hindu subjects, the Sultans gathered rev-

enues and organized a splendid way of life for themselves that finally led to moral decadence and the collapse of the Sultanates' power. To cap the sloth that was all that remained of the once-powerful rulers of Delhi, Timur, known to most readers as Tamerlane, invaded Delhi in 1398, and after the battle of Panipat reduced most of the city to rubble. It is estimated that 50,000 were killed, and 100,000 were taken as slaves after the battle. The Delhi Sultanates never recovered their former greatness, although they revived sufficiently to hold nominal power until the sixteenth century.

Babur, born Zahir-ud-din Mohammed, a Turk who was related to Genghis Khan on his mother's side and to Timur on his father's, had established himself in Afghanistan in the early sixteenth century. He led several looting raids on the plains of India starting in 1519, but returned to Kabul to enjoy the fruits of his spoils. However, in 1525–1526 Babur fought and defeated the armies of the Delhi Sultans, again at Panipat, and remained in India to establish what became the Moghul Empire. Babur never reconciled himself to India, but he occupied the northern territory down to Agra, and defeated the powerful Rajputs as well. He detested India's climate, food, people, and most of all its Hinduism. On his death in 1530, he was buried in Kabul where his tomb is one of the most famous tourist attractions of Afghanistan.

There can be little doubt that the Moghul Empire was one of the greatest of all times. The names of the emperors recall a remarkable period in Indian history: Babur, Humayun, Akbar, Jehangir, Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb, to name the best known.

It was Akbar, grandson of Babur, ruling for almost 50 years (1556–1605), who gave shape and discipline to the empire, and who spread its power over all of India except a small segment in the south. Since he was only 13 when he became emperor, he ruled through a regent, Bairam Khan. Upon coming of age at 18, Akbar had his regent killed, and either imprisoned or killed all other rivals. This was a tried and true method of assuring life tenure. Akbar inherited the brilliant administrative



and financial ideas developed by Sher Shah, an Afghan interloper in Moghul times who managed to hold power from 1540 until he was blown up by mistake in 1545. Sher Shah had divided the Empire into provinces and districts and had established land-survey and land-revenue systems that were highly advanced for their time. Akbar improved upon Sher Shah's administration, following the advice of his shrewd Hindu minister of state, Todar Mal. The land-revenue system that evolved assessed taxes based on the extent of the area, the kind of crop, and the fertility of the soil. Assessments normally were the equivalent of one-third of the value of the average yield. With modifications, the same land-revenue system continues in India today.

Akbar's empire was divided and subdivided in accordance with a rational plan:

A. Provinces (*suba*)—each headed by a noble, called a *subadar*, who held military and civil powers.

B. Districts (*sarkar*)—each headed by a lesser official called a *mansubadar*, who also held military and civil powers.

C. Subdistricts (*pargana* or *mahal*)—each headed by subordinate officials.

The district was the basic administrative unit where (1) law and order were to be maintained, (2) revenues were to be collected, and (3) criminal cases were to be tried. The Moghul administrative system is worthy of careful study, for the British later adopted and adapted it to their needs, and the independent Governments of India and Pakistan follow the basic Moghul pattern today.

The central imperial government under Akbar and his successors was also well organized. Although the emperor was an absolute monarch in all matters civil and military, he was aided by a council of ministers who advised him. Military control was maintained by a strong contingent of cavalry standing at the ready in Delhi, supplemented by regional forces under the command of the *mansubadars* of the districts.

A second major contribution of Akbar was his conception of a dual Indian society. He did not attempt to convert all Hindus to Islam. Rather, he recognized a ruling class of Mus-

lims and a ruled class of Hindus and others not of the Book (i.e., those who were not Muslims, Christians, or Jews), and sought means for the two classes to work together peacefully. Early in his reign, in 1562, he married a Rajput (Hindu) princess of the Jaipur family to show his personal sense of toleration. He also abolished the pilgrim tax on Hindus, and the *jizya*, the traditional tax on non-Muslims. Late in his life Akbar turned more closely to religion. He had been born a Sunni, but leaned later to the unorthodox Shiah sect, and finally to the mysticism of the Sufis who were very close in doctrine to mystic Hinduism. In 1579, Akbar issued an edict of infallibility, declaring his right to decide all matters of religious conflict; in 1582, he founded a universal religion, the "Divine Monotheism" (*Din Ilahi*), which he hoped would unite the Muslims and Hindus of India. Few joined, and Akbar died a few years later without succeeding in his mission of unification. Following the death of Akbar, the Moghul Empire continued for over a century. But the golden age of the Moghuls had passed.

Remains of the Empire are to be found today in contemporary administrative and financial procedures, as well as in hundreds of magnificent tombs, forts, mosques, and gardens located in various parts of northern India and Pakistan. The Shalimar gardens in Lahore and Kashmir, the mosques at Lahore and Delhi, the great red forts of Delhi and Agra, Humayun's tomb in Delhi, the Taj Mahal (built in Agra by Shah Jahan in memory of his wife, Mumtaz), and the abandoned city of Fatehpur Sikri near Agra, constructed by Akbar, are only a few of the monuments to a fabulous Moghul past.

The Moghul Empire declined in power and efficiency in the seventeenth century, just as traders from Portugal, Holland, and France were gaining commercial footholds on the subcontinent. The English, arriving a bit later, were even more favored, for the Moghuls

were at low ebb when the East India Company made its bid for the silks and spices of India.

## The British Indian Empire

Trade in ancient times between Europe, India, and the Far East had been carried on for centuries through the ports of Alexandria and Constantinople. But when Islam overran the Middle East, and more especially when Constantinople was occupied in 1453, European access to the spices and luxury goods of Asia was cut off. The explorations overseas that followed were spurred on by the need to find new routes to Asia. As is well known, Christopher Columbus discovered America while looking for India.

### *Early European Settlements*

Among the early adventurers were the Portuguese. Vasco da Gama's travels in 1498 brought him to Calicut on the west coast of India, and by 1500 a trading center had been established in that city. The capital of the Portuguese East Indies was located in Goa after it was taken from the Sultan of Bijapur in 1510. Trading centers later were founded in Bombay, Diu, and Daman on the west coast of India, and in Chittagong and on the Hooghly river in Bengal. Although the Portuguese were pioneers in the occupation of India, their influence waned in the sixteenth century because of their religious intolerance, exemplified by the operation of the Inquisition in Goa in 1560. When the Government of India took over Goa in December, 1961, the last vestige of Portuguese power was cut off.

The English first approached the trade of India after Queen Elizabeth in 1600 granted a charter to the East India Company. Of all the European commercial agencies operating in Asia, the East India Company probably was the most famous. It existed as an entity for

258 years, and through this time built the foundation that ultimately became the British Indian Empire.

The East India Company set up its major trading centers in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Originally Surat was to have been the west-coast headquarters. But because of continuous attacks by Maratha warriors, Bombay was selected as an alternate site. The island of Bombay was given to the English King, Charles II, by the King of Portugal as part of his daughter's dowry. Bombay thus became a possession of the English Crown, but was utilized by the East India Company for purposes of commerce on a lease of £10 per annum. Although Bombay at that time was only a fishing village of no particular importance, it grew rapidly and soon became one of the major commercial and financial cities of India. In Bengal, the East India Company established its factory<sup>1</sup> first at Hooghly. Hooghly did not prove to be a proper location, and Job Charnock in 1690 located a new site on the Hooghly river which was called Fort William after King William III. Fort William in due course became known as Calcutta, following the name of a small village that had flourished there. By 1700, the President and Council of the East India Company were stationed in Fort William, and the region of Bengal then became known as the Presidency of Bengal. The East India Company founded its factory in Madras as early as 1625, later expanding it within the walls of Fort St. George, which was completed in 1640. In addition to these three major centers, the English maintained many smaller trading posts.

The East India Company was a "regulation" enterprise at first, not a joint-stock company. This meant that each member in the Company traded with his own capital only. The result was fierce competition between members of the Company, and a lack of flexibility—and profit—in trading. On the request of the company in 1693, the terms of the original charter granted by the Crown were changed to make the Company a joint-

<sup>1</sup>The Company's headquarters were known as "factories" because they were places where clerks, known as "factors," carried on business.

stock venture. This great advantage spurred a number of rival trading groups who also wished an opportunity to trade in the East Indies to challenge the Company's monopoly. After a good deal of conflict between the Company and its rivals, the House of Commons in 1694 ended the Company's monopoly and stated in a resolution that all subjects of England should have equal rights to trade unless prohibited by an Act of Parliament. The resolution was important since it indicated a shift in power from the Crown to Parliament. But conflicts between competing companies continued until 1709, when the two most important competitors united under the East India Company's name.

The English had yet to contend with the Dutch and the French, who were their new competitors following the decline of the Portuguese. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Dutch possessed only minor trading warehouses in India. But the battle with the French in the eighteenth century was more difficult. A French marquis, Joseph François Dupleix, was well established in Pondicherry by 1741 and maintained himself there and elsewhere in south India with the aid of friendly local rulers, until the English forces under Robert Clive ousted them in the decade between 1750 and 1760. By the end of the eighteenth century, French power in India was reduced to a few enclaves on the Bay of Bengal and near Calcutta.

### *The Rise of British Political Power*

The East India Company made its first advances toward substantial political power in Bengal. A problem facing all European traders in India was that they had to construct large-scale forts to protect themselves, their stores, and their records against the marauding activities of local rulers, despite assurances of protection from the emperor in Delhi. The Moghul Empire by the eighteenth century was only a shell of its former greatness, and was able to exercise little control over its subordinates. European forts required armed forces for protection. And all of this cost a great deal of money. The East India

Company had only limited rights in India, of course. If the local rulers were irresponsible, the British certainly pressed their rights far beyond legal limits. But the Company was in no mood for legalistic hairsplitting when it came to the details of their legitimacy.

In 1756, the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daulah, attacked the Company's property in Calcutta. The garrison force of the English was inadequate, and the Company at Fort William was forced to surrender. Robert Clive and his military associates were called from Madras to rescue the situation. Clive was able to take Fort William in January, 1757, and at the same time to force a treaty with the Nawab of Bengal for appropriate compensation, the restitution of the Fort to the Company, and the continuation of the rights of the Company previously awarded by the emperor. Intrigue, however, continued on both sides, until a major war between the forces of the Company under Clive and the Nawab's army took place at Plassey later in 1757. Clive was successful, and the Nawab was forced to flee in disguise, later to be murdered by one of his former associates, Mir Jaffar, who had plotted with Clive at Plassey.

As of 1760, the East India Company had no serious rivals in India except the Marathas, who managed to hold on to their power until 1805. The Nawab's government in Bengal no longer was effective, and an earlier competition with the French had been ended in the Company's favor. It is clear that Clive, while recognizing the nominal sovereignty of the emperor in Delhi, nevertheless had decided upon a policy of political expansion. He allied himself with some of the powerful local rulers in areas surrounding Bengal, and thus placed the Company in a position of military supremacy.

Considering the extensive costs of operating the English properties, Clive sought a means by which substantial income over and beyond trade and commerce could come to the Com-

pany's coffers. Clive went to Delhi in August, 1765, and requested the emperor to cede to the Company the Diwani (roughly, finance ministership) of Bengal. The office of Diwan was granted to Clive. It carried with it the right to collect revenues, which in Bengal at that time amounted to four million pounds per annum, of which £1,650,000 was a net profit to the Company. Needless to say, the value of the stock in the East India Company went up rapidly under such circumstances, and great personal fortunes were made. This was the age of the "Nabobs"—men made exceedingly wealthy in India who purchased landed estates in England and purchased control over seats in Parliament as well. The severe censure of persons such as Robert Clive and Warren Hastings by members of Parliament reflected the widespread criticism in England of the East India Company's swashbuckling operations abroad.

### *The Consolidation of British Power*

Warren Hastings was Governor of Bengal from 1772 to 1774, and was appointed first Governor-General for the period from 1774 to 1785. From Hastings' time through the middle of the nineteenth century, the Company's powers grew rapidly and the extent of its direct political control over the lands of India grew steadily. When the British first assumed the Diwani rights in Bengal in 1765, they shared power with the Nawab of Bengal, who administered the Nazimat, the agency responsible for military power and criminal justice in the region. Hastings abolished this system of "double government" and took over full governing powers for the Company. Even the tribute paid to the emperor was greatly reduced, thus clearly indicating the disdain with which the Company viewed the impotent Moghul Empire.

Parliament passed the Regulating Act of 1773 to define more clearly the commercial

and political functions of the Company. Similar Acts of Control were issued regularly from this date. The 1773 Act was intended to reflect Parliament's concern over the vast territories controlled by the Company. The Act placed authority for the Company's operations in the hands of a Governor-General at Fort William, assisted by four Councillors, who together also had partial control over the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. A Supreme Court, composed of a Chief Justice and three other judges, was founded at Fort William to care for cases involving British subjects. Further, the directors of the East India Company were required by this Act to submit to Parliament copies of all correspondence concerning their affairs, as well as semiannual financial accounts.

The administrative system established by the Act of 1773 did not work efficiently. The Councillors working with the Governor-General were not subordinate to him, since the principle of majority rule prevailed. The powers of the Supreme Court were not well defined, leading to disputes between the Court and the Governor-General-in-Council. Although an amending act was passed by Parliament in 1781 to strengthen the hand of the Governor-General, it was the India Act of 1784 that settled matters more clearly. In London, a Board of Control was established, under which a Secret Committee of directors supervised the Company's affairs in India. The President of the Board of Control became a man of great power; this office can be seen as the forerunner of the later Cabinet post of Secretary of State for India.

Lord Cornwallis, fresh from his battles in the American colonies, became Governor-General in 1786. He instituted a number of reforms in administration and in law, but he is best remembered for his work on land-revenue reforms. The most famous of these was the Permanent Settlement in Bengal of 1793. By this settlement, large landowners (known as *zamindars*) were recognized, and commissions were given to them or to their agents for collecting the land revenues of Bengal. The settlement was "permanent" because a certain set amount of revenue was

demand, and no increase in this demand was to be made, even though the value of the lands might increase. Over the years land values did rise, and vast fortunes were made by the *zamindars*. Thus a landed aristocracy was created that later became the source of much of the capital enterprise in industry, finance, and commerce that was instituted by indigenous entrepreneurship.

The years following Cornwallis' Governor-Generalship saw annexation after annexation of territory take place under what the Marquess of Wellesley (Governor-General, 1798–1805) called the "forward policy." In the period of Lord William Bentinck's Governor-Generalship (1828–35), reforms were introduced to revise the schedule of land assessments in non-*zamindari* areas as a means for bringing in more needed taxes. Economies in government were scrupulously required by Bentinck, as were tours of inspection by the Governor-General and his subordinates to gain better knowledge of the activities of their "subjects." Bentinck saw to the prohibition of *sati* (the immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands), as well as the suppression of India's hereditary assassins, known as *thugs* (thugs). In the courts, Bentinck encouraged Indians to enter judicial service and authorized the use of Indian vernaculars before the bench instead of the classical Persian that had been common up to his time. Thomas Babbington Macaulay was brought to India as an additional (law) member in the Governor-General's Council to examine the Indian legal system. Macaulay drafted a penal code in 1837 that ultimately was adopted in 1860 and became a model of such codes throughout the world.

Education for Indians had been given some support by the Company up to the 1830's, but standards were low and decisions had not been reached concerning either the subject matter or the medium of instruction. The Company's Committee on Public Instruction debated these issues over a long period of time. The famous English Sanskritist, Horace Wilson, aided by a number of Hindu and Muslim leaders, urged that vernacular languages and the classical languages of India be used for

teaching and that the curriculum bear a close relationship to the Indian heritage. On the other side, the teaching missionaries, supported by the learned Indian leader, Raja Rammohan Roy, demanded that English be introduced for instruction at least at high school and college levels and that the most advanced knowledge of Europe be the subject matter studied. Macaulay's Minute of 1835 stated the case boldly—and undoubtedly unfairly—in favor of English and European learning. Under Bentinck, Macaulay's proposal was accepted and became public policy.

The Charter Renewal Act of 1833 made explicit the fact that the Company, in every practical sense, had ceased to be a strictly commercial operation. A new province was authorized, the North-Western Provinces (roughly the present Uttar Pradesh), in 1835, and a separate Governorship for Bengal was authorized in 1853. Moreover, the British Government of India was permitted after 1833 to pass Acts as if it were a government, which indeed it was. The charter renewal went on record in favor of a greater measure of Indian participation in the governing of the country. The terms of the Act in this regard were that ". . . no native of India, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty, should be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent or colour." In fact, few Indians participated in government except at lower levels.

Between 1835 and 1856, the Governors-General were engaged in a series of wars, first with Afghanistan, later in Sind, and finally with the Sikhs in Punjab. In the end, Afghanistan was isolated as a buffer region against Russia—much feared by the British at this time—and the territories of Sind and Punjab were annexed. In addition to fighting wars, the Company also encouraged such activities as the building of railroads (beginning in 1853), the establishment of a public-works

department and an engineering college at Roorkee, improvement of the Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta to Punjab, the building of the Ganges canal and its irrigation works, the opening of postal and telegraph systems, and an increase in opportunities for secondary and higher education.

### *The Mutiny-Rebellion of 1857*

Despite a number of constructive activities sponsored by the British up to the middle of the nineteenth century, interference in the affairs of the Indian princes, social reforms passed and executed too rapidly, and an enormous ignorance concerning the well-being of the Indian people led to an undercurrent of discontent that broke out in the rebellion of 1857. Conflict first occurred at Barrackpore near Calcutta and in Meerut near Delhi, with mutinies amongst the Indian soldiers of the East India Company. These localized mutinies, which were part of a loose master plan, then spread through much of northern India and involved the troops of a number of the princes as well. The ostensible purpose of the rebellion to many participants was the restoration to power of the Moghul emperor in Delhi. But historians recognize that underneath this apparent objective rested years of basic misunderstanding and distrust between the British rulers and the Indian people. After a good deal of bloodshed and damage on all sides, the British were able to restore order to the country and to punish those who had been defeated.

Although many Indian nationalists claim that the mutiny was, in fact, the first war of Indian independence, there seems to be little evidence to support this assertion. It is clear, however, that the mutiny constituted a political watershed between the rough-and-ready Company rule before the rebellion and the British Indian government that followed the rebellion. After 1857, fear colored the social policies of the British in India, leading to

rather sharp social barriers between the British and all others in India. In isolating themselves protectively, the British tended to create an exclusive British Indian pattern of social behavior, supported often by kinship ties, that operated much like any other caste. The difference was that the British shunned social relations with any other "caste," which was interpreted by Indians as racial discrimination or worse.

### *Constitutional Development:*

1858-1939

In 1858, the British Crown abolished the East India Company and assumed control of India directly. The new pattern of administration, detailed in the Indian Councils Act of 1861, involved expanding the size of the legislature to enable it to carry on its legislative functions more efficiently. A Secretary of State for India was made a British Cabinet post, and the Governor-General in India carried the additional title of Viceroy in his capacity as representative of the Crown in India.

From 1861 until the passage of the British India Act of 1935, the philosophy of government in India evolved from the principle of representative government toward the principle of responsible Cabinet government along British lines. Among the most important of the constitutional advances made after the mid-nineteenth century was the Act of 1909, usually known as the Morley-Minto reforms, which expanded all of the legislatures, both central and provincial, and in the provinces permitted majorities of non-officials in the legislatures. Previously, officials in the government had been in the majority. By 1909, representation was complicated by the consequences of "communalism,"<sup>2</sup> which required that "reserved seats" be set aside for certain minority communities, especially the Muslims, and that "separate electorates" be established to assure that only members of one community would vote for the seats reserved for them. In administration, the principle of "weightage"

<sup>2</sup> "Communalism" in India refers to thoughts and actions favoring the exclusive interests of particular religious communities, thus "Hindu communalism," or "Muslim communalism."

was introduced to give a greater voice in administration to minorities than their population alone would warrant.

The Act of 1919, known as the Montagu-Chelmsford or "Mont-ford" reforms, introduced the constitutional principle of "dyarchy." "Dyarchy" was a method for separating certain "reserved" subjects (controlled by British officials) from "transferred" subjects (administered by Indian ministers). This system of dual government applied only in the provinces and was intended both to protect essential British power in the most critical functions of government and to give Indians control over functions that were of lesser significance. Central government, of course, remained strictly in the hands of British officials.

In the meantime, the latent force of Indian nationalism had begun to be felt in the major cities of the country. Graduates of the universities formed associations, such as the Indian Association of Calcutta, for the discussion of public affairs, and by the late nineteenth century they were prepared to go further with their activities. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 by a small group of highly educated Indian urban leaders, joined by several sympathetic Britons, and was supported at first by the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin. Although the Indian National Congress explicitly stated its loyalty to the British Crown in the early years of its existence, British Indian officialdom soon recognized that this body was bound to become a thorn in the side of British autonomy. Reform measures, such as those of 1909 and 1919, were made partially because the Indian National Congress demanded a greater Indian voice in the governing of the country, especially for more places in the higher civil service. The fact was, however, that by the time reforms were acceptable to the British Parliament, they were obsolete as far as Indian nationalists were concerned.

British actions at the time of the First World War disillusioned moderate Indian leaders in the good faith of the British government. In 1917, Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, stated that the government's policy would be to encourage ever-increasing participation by Indians in the governing of India,

leading toward the goal of self-government within the British Empire. But at the end of the war, only the half measures reflected in the 1919 Act were granted to meet the nationalists' demands. Discontent was rife, especially in Punjab where in 1919 the Rowlatt Acts, dealing severely with sedition, were passed by British Indian officials who remembered the terrorist movements that had arisen in Bengal, in Punjab, and in Maharashtra against the partition of Bengal in 1905. Terrorist and revolutionary parties continued to operate underground in several parts of the country after World War I. Added to these threats was the infiltration into India of revolutionary Marxian doctrines that spread rapidly following the Russian revolution of 1917.

Disturbances in Punjab in 1918 and 1919, and particularly the dreadful massacre in Amritsar at Jallianwalabagh, brought to the forefront a man whose early reputation had been made in South Africa, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. In South Africa, Gandhi had developed techniques of non-violent resistance to racial discriminations that he called *satyagraha* (literally, "holding fast to truth"). Back in India after 1915, and disturbed by conditions in Punjab, Gandhi suggested to the Indian National Congress that they adopt a nationwide non-violent resistance campaign against British Indian tyranny. The Congress accepted Gandhi's recommendation, and a non-violent civil disobedience campaign, under Gandhi's personal direction, was undertaken in 1920. This was the first of the major *satyagrahas* led by Gandhi that gave the unique non-violent character to the Indian nationalist movement, and which successfully moved India, step by step, towards independence.

The Government of India Act of 1935 was based on a series of investigations that included: the Sir John Simon Mission's Report; the All-Parties Conference Report, drafted by its chairman, Motilal Nehru (father of

Jawaharlal); the reports emanating from the Round Table Conferences convened in London between 1930 and 1932, and the report by a Joint Committee of Parliament. The 1935 Act, in addition to separating Burma from India constitutionally ('Burma always had been administered separately by the British'), attempted to reconcile the demand made by the Indian National Congress at its Lahore session in 1929 for complete independence (*purna swaraj*), the increasingly articulate view of the Muslim League that they should have a greater say in any future form of government in India, and, of course, the long-range interests of British power.

The 1935 Act did not establish dominion status for India, and in this respect it was repudiated by nationalist leaders. The emergency powers of the Governor-General and the governors in the provinces were left intact. However, the Act authorized the establishment of a federation that would link together the provinces of British India and the princely states. Central government was to be shared functionally between the Governor-General and Indian ministers, thus resulting in "dyarchy" at the center. Provincial government, on the other hand, was completely turned over to Indian ministers, although it should be remembered that the governors retained emergency powers.

The full dimensions of the Government of India Act of 1935 never were tested, since the federal principle that would have incorporated the princely states never became effective. But the provincial governments operating under the Act from 1937 to 1939 were of importance. Provincial elections were held in February, 1937, and provincial governments were established later in the same year. The Indian National Congress was able to capture majorities in the provinces of Madras, Bihar, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, and Orissa, and was the largest single party in Bombay, Assam, the North West Frontier

Province, and Bengal. The Muslim League formed the government in Sind, participated in the Unionist Party coalition in Punjab, and held a crucial and large minority vote in Bengal.

The provincial ministries controlled by the Congress worked with relative efficiency in the twenty-eight months they held power between 1937 and 1939. A good deal of constructive legislation, especially on economic and social welfare matters, was introduced. The governors in the provinces vetoed very few measures. But the Congress, in forming its cabinets in the provinces, had been unwilling to accept any ministers who would not submit to the control of the Congress. A Parliamentary Control Board, under the supervision of Vallabhbhai Patel in New Delhi, wielded a rigorous hand over the operations of Congress governments; it is clear that the leaders of the Congress did not wish to share power in their provinces with other political parties. The Muslim League demanded representation in a number of the Congress cabinets, especially in the United Provinces, on the grounds that the Muslim League best represented Muslim interests where this minority community was in substantial numbers. The fact that the Congress would not concede seats to the Muslim League at this time appears in retrospect to have been a serious error. The Muslim League thereby was convinced that in any unified and independent government of India, Muslim League spokesmen would remain in a permanent minority. The demand for a separate state of Pakistan was voiced formally at Lahore in March, 1940, and no compromise regarding this objective was made by the League from that time until they gained their objective in 1947.

#### *Wartime Politics*

Politics in India during World War II was characterized by two major issues: (1) The struggle between Indian nationalism and British imperialism (in this case, the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and other Indian political groups were aligned together against the British Indian government) and (2) the demand for Pakistan (posing the



Indian National Congress, which stood for unity, against the Muslim League, which demanded partition and the founding of Pakistan). At the outbreak of the war in Europe in September, 1939, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, proclaimed India at war with the Axis powers at the same time that Great Britain declared war. Because this action was taken without consultation with the leading political groups in India, the Indian National Congress protested, and on October 1, 1939, all the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned. Emergency governments were established in these provinces by the Government of India for the duration of the war.

The political situation in India became more serious as each month passed, and Lord Linlithgow, on August 8, 1940, offered the national leaders of India the promise of dominion status "as soon after the war as possible," plus support for the founding of a constitution-making body to be convened at the end of the war. In the meantime, the Viceroy offered to add Indian representatives to his executive council and to establish a war advisory council to assist in the defense of India. Both the Congress and the Muslim League rejected the offer. In October, 1940, Gandhi ordered the inauguration of a *satyagraha* campaign, on an individual basis, under his own personal supervision, in protest against the British failure to grant independence. The government acted rapidly in jailing the *satyagrahis* and other Congress leaders; by May, 1941, over 14,000 had been arrested. The Viceroy did expand his executive council by adding five leading Indian citizens who were not under the control of either the Congress or the Muslim League.

Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Japanese quickly overran much of Southeast Asia, and by February, 1942, it appeared that Burma would fall and that India would follow. Congress leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, were anxious to organize for the defense of India, and world leaders like Chiang Kai-shek and Franklin D. Roosevelt appealed to Prime Minister Winston Churchill for a compromise solution that would enable Indian nationalists to participate in the Allied defense.

In March, 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and a member of the British Cabinet, came to India to seek a solution to the constitutional crisis. He consulted with Indian national leaders from various political parties. When a solution did not arise out of these discussions, Cripps presented the proposals that had been approved in advance by the British Cabinet. These provided for the formation of an Indian Union of dominion status, to be constructed by an elected constitution-making body immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, with the power to secede if it chose from the British Empire. Certain safeguards were included for the princely states (where plebiscites were to determine their roles within the Union) and for certain other areas (particularly those where Muslim majorities prevailed). For the war period, the British would have control of defense, but other aspects of government would be turned over to Indians.

The proposals were rejected by both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress opposed the possibility of partition contained in the safeguards for Muslim-majority areas, and they held out for a government with full power, under which the British military commander would have control only of military operations. The Muslim League, among other objections, did not find their demand for Pakistan clearly met.

Apparently upon orders from the Prime Minister, Cripps returned to England rather suddenly following the rejection of his proposals. Gandhi called for an active nationalist policy to gain independence by non-violent means which was implemented by the "Quit India" resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay on August 8, 1942. Congress leaders were jailed on August 9, and mass unrest ensued. Generally non-violent opposition continued, directed by an underground movement that was led by the few nationalist leaders, including Jayaprakash Narayan and Rammanohar Lohia, who were

not jailed in the mass arrests of August 9. Violent opposition to British rule also arose during the war years, gaining attention for the nationalist cause, and lowering the prestige of effective British power in India.

From 1942 until the end of the war, politics in India were in a rather confused state. Gandhi was jailed in 1942 and was not released until May 6, 1944. Nehru remained in jail for much of the war period. In effect, the Congress was rendered politically impotent by the 1942 arrests, enabling both the Muslim League and the Communist Party of India to increase their strength. The Muslim League rapidly became a mass party among Muslims, and the Communist Party, following the attack by Germany upon the Soviet Union, became a favored group of the British Indian Government, thereby gaining prestige for its leaders, money for its coffers, and free access within the country for its propaganda.

The Muslim League pressed at every opportunity for Pakistan, and with some success. One of the leaders of the Congress from Madras, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, suggested in 1944 that it would be best for the people of the subcontinent to recognize the rationale of Pakistan, to grant the partitioning of the country, and attempt to avoid the bloodshed and disorder that might arise later on if the Pakistan issue had to be settled by force. Although hindsight reveals the shrewdness of Rajagopalachari's analysis, at the time he was roundly condemned by the Congress and was forced to resign. Later he became the first Indian Governor-General, and his logic of 1944 was more widely recognized, although not by Gandhi.

Lord Wavell, who had replaced Linlithgow in October, 1943, as Viceroy, called a conference in Simla on June 14, 1945, to present his proposal for a political solution. His plan was similar to the Cripps proposal of 1942, but seemed to be more acceptable since the war was nearly over and the British were ready

to move rapidly toward self-government in India. But the conference and the offer broke down over the technical issue of the make-up of the Viceroy's executive council. Mohammed Ali Jinnah insisted that all Muslim members on the executive council should be named by the Muslim League, thus giving the Muslim League half of the power on the executive council, since the various parties had agreed to Hindu-Muslim parity. The Congress would not agree.

### *The Cabinet Mission and Independence*

The British General Election of 1945 resulted in a change of government in Britain. The Labour Party, under Prime Minister Clement Attlee, formed a government that among other things was determined to end the deadlock in India. An election also was held in India in the winter of 1945-46 to name members to the central and provincial legislatures. In these elections, the Congress won almost all the seats in Hindu-dominated constituencies. More dramatically, the Muslim League won 446 of the 495 seats in Muslim-dominated constituencies. In all major Muslim areas, except the North West Frontier Province, the Muslim League clearly showed that it had substantial support for its demand for Pakistan.

To resolve the constitutional issue, Prime Minister Attlee sent to India a Cabinet Mission headed by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, joined by Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander. They arrived in India on March 23, 1946, and immediately undertook a series of conferences to discuss the Indian problem. When solutions did not arise out of these discussions, the Mission issued its proposals on May 16, 1946. In sum, the proposal called for a federal Union, including the princely states, that would be fully free to secede from the British Commonwealth and Empire if it wished. A constituent assembly was to be elected by the provincial legislative assemblies, and a constitution was to be formed, with limited functions held by the Union (foreign affairs, defense, and communications), and with residual

powers to rest with the provinces. With an interim government carrying on until the constitution was devised, provinces with a heavy Muslim population would be authorized to meet together to see if they wished to form an intermediary government between that of the Union and the provinces to safeguard the interests of the Muslims.

Although there was some opposition to some of the terms of the Cabinet Mission plan, it was clear that the British government intended to enforce it, and so it was accepted. Elections were held for the constituent assembly in July, 1946, in the provincial legislatures, and the Congress was able to capture 205 of the British Indian seats to the Muslim League's 73. The constituent assembly held its first meeting on December 9, 1946, but the Muslim League members did not participate then or at any later time. There was difficulty over forming the interim government, but, ultimately, on August 6, 1946, the Viceroy invited the Congress to form the interim ministry under the leadership (Vice-Presidency) of Jawaharlal Nehru. Seats in this government were reserved for the Muslim League which took them up only in October, 1946.

On February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to transfer power to Indian hands before June, 1948. Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed Viceroy to succeed Lord Wavell. In many parts of India, however, uncertainty over the country's political future and antagonism between Hindus and Muslims over the Pakistan question released violent hatreds long suppressed. Because of widespread and brutal rioting in the country, partition was agreed to. On August 14, 1947, at midnight, Pakistan was founded, followed by India's independence on August 15, 1947. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 included the terms of the transfer of power. Mohammed Ali Jinnah in Pakistan and Lord Louis Mountbatten in India became the first Governors-General of the newly independent states.

Both before and after independence, the problem of the princely states had to be dealt with. By August 15, 1947, all the princes had

acceded either to India or Pakistan except Junagadh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Hyderabad. Military police action by India later led to the absorption of Junagadh and Hyderabad into India. The province of Jammu and Kashmir, of course, is still a subject of controversy, and the issue remains before the United Nations. Otherwise, princely India is only a memory.

## Partition and Pakistan

The circumstances and consequences of partition are so crucial to a proper understanding of Indian politics that some further historical exploration of it is warranted. Muslim leaders were long wary of what would happen if India ever gained a democratic government. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, founder of a major center of Muslim higher education in India, Aligarh, argued in the late nineteenth century that the application of the principles of representative and parliamentary government in Indian society would mean the permanent subordination of the Muslim minority to the Hindu majority. Sir Syed assumed that it would not be reasonable to expect many Hindus to vote for Muslim candidates solely on merit, nor could one assume that the vast Hindu majority would be much concerned with the wishes and interests of Muslims or other minorities. Sir Syed was voicing, in his own way, the view that India actually held within its boundaries several major communities; that these communities were not united as one people; that in order to safeguard the interests of the minorities it would be best for the British to remain in India as arbiters of inter-communal disputes. To this end, Sir Syed advised his followers not to cooperate with the Indian National Congress in its program for nationalist development.

At a later stage, particularly under the

guidance of the poet, Sir Mohammed Iqbal, and the political leader par excellence, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, it was argued that the Muslims in India constituted a separate nation. India, said Jinnah, contained two nations living side-by-side, cooperating in many ways, certainly friendly in most of their joint enterprises, but nevertheless separate and distinct as communities. As has been noted earlier, at Lahore in 1940 the Muslim League, representing a large number of the Muslims of India, issued a resolution demanding that special consideration be given to the future of the Muslim-majority areas in Bengal and in the northwestern sectors of the subcontinent, and that the achievement of a separate state, Pakistan, be conceded to the Muslims.

It is well to ponder the circumstances that led to the splitting of the subcontinent into two parts, for a good many of the problems of consolidation that faced India in 1947 were seriously affected by the partition. First, recognition should be given to the substance in the argument presented by Sir Syed Ahmed. India has been a seat of the Hindu way of life for centuries, certainly for a long time before Islam came to the subcontinent in the eighth century. To orthodox Muslims, following the dictates of the revealed truth of the Koran, the tolerant quality of the Hindu way that enabled Gandhi, for example, to join his Muslim brothers in prayers at their mosques did not allow them to reciprocate at the temples and shrines of Hindus, whom they viewed as infidels and unbelievers. Tolerance, to the Hindu, often meant an accommodation of opposite views within a spiritual system that did not reject the unorthodox. Tolerance, for the Muslim, where tolerance was considered essential at all, meant a mutual regard for the rights of all to worship as they saw fit, but protected by organs of law and order. One must conclude that the theological and historical differences between the Islamic and Hindu ways of life were so great that, at least

for the Muslims, there was no compromise possible that could unite the communities.

Although the two communities might not see eye-to-eye on the essentials of religious belief, the Indian National Congress argued that it still should be possible for all groups within India to agree on a secular program that would separate the functions of church and state, leaving religious observance to individual conscience. It was here that Jinnah disagreed with Hindu opinion. The Muslim political view was that the vast Hindu majority, perhaps without realizing it fully, was primarily concerned with its own community's welfare. It would be natural, argued Jinnah, for the majority to take care of its own first. The Muslim League felt that the final proof of their contention was to be found in the record of Congress governments that held power in several of the Indian states for the twenty-eight months during 1937-39. In these governments, very few Muslims were given high positions of public office, and legislation tended to favor the majority at the expense of the minority, or so it seemed to the Muslim League. As a direct consequence of this experience with representative government, the Lahore Resolution of 1940 demanding Pakistan as a separate Muslim-majority state was enunciated.

The consequences of partition were so disastrous to plans for building an independent India that further developments had to wait until the breach began to heal. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Hindus were killed in riots and massacres that occurred from the summer of 1946 through 1948 and beyond. At least 12,000,000 persons, Hindu and Muslim, left their ancestral homes and migrated in droves to one or the other of the newly independent countries. Homes were left behind with generations of prized possessions abandoned where they lay. Factories and other business establishments were vacated in the flight for life. Destruction of property was so great that probably no accurate estimate ever will be made. The balance that had existed between Muslim and Hindu workers in industries such as the railways, the textile works, the jute industry, shoe factories, and in village

communities, was disrupted in a burst of hatred and pent-up fury the likes of which has seldom—if ever—been seen in history. If considerable portions of the Indian nationalist movement had remained non-violent because of the moral purpose and responsible leadership of Gandhi, the last phase was a blood bath whose consequences still haunt the leaders of both Pakistan and India.

Since 1947, India has been binding up the wounds of partition. Refugees in the millions needed to be sheltered, fed, and given permanent employment. Those who had evacuated Pakistan leaving their property and other resources behind needed support. The refugee rehabilitation problem was continually made more severe by the trickle—sometimes turning into a healthy stream—of additional refugees that continued to come to India from Pakistan. Although Muslims also leave India for Pakistan, the number does not seem to be so great as those coming in the opposite direction.

Partition also brought immense problems to government itself. The administrative services, the armed forces, the properties of the government, and all the other governmental

paraphernalia of a large country needed to be divided between the two countries. To cite only one minor problem, consider the difficulty in dividing the properties of the Survey of India, world famed for its excellent cartography. The stocks on hand, the personnel, the work in progress, and the plates and equipment needed to be equitably distributed.

On the whole, the Indian and Pakistani civil service personnel who handled the urgent problems arising from partition did a magnificent job. Being friends and colleagues for many years, and being devoted to tasks of public service in a system known for its efficiency and dignity, the Pakistani and Indian administrators did a fine job. It was left to the politicians to deal with the emotional aftermath that pitted old acquaintances against each other across a border that only yesterday was not there. Needless to say, the heartaches and fears that grew in those days of horror have not left the subcontinent as yet. It may be generations before the Indian and Pakistani people will be able to work together with their mutual interests in mind. Partition and the scars it left on mind as well as property will not easily be forgotten.

# Ecology



## Geography

The Republic of India, occupying the largest sector of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent, has an area of approximately 1,127,000 square miles. The subcontinent is shaped much like a double triangle, with its apex in the north abutting the Himalaya Mountains, and its southern triangle—separated from the northern by the Vindhya Range—running to a tip between the Bay of Bengal on the east and the Indian Ocean on the west. The Himalayas and adjoining mountains are among the highest in the world, and include peaks such as Mount Everest in Nepal that go above 28,000 feet. The country is 1,700 miles across from east to west and 2,000 miles from north to south. Its land frontier is 8,200 miles long

and its sea frontier about 3,500 miles long.

Flowing from the northeast to the west, from the Himalayas to Sind in Pakistan, is the Indus River, carrying water from numerous tributaries that flow through both India and Pakistan. The Indus Valley, now extensively irrigated by a famous canal system, is historically one of the oldest centers of civilization in the world. The Ganges River runs to the east through an enormous basin in north India toward the Bay of Bengal and near Calcutta joins the Brahmaputra River flowing down from Assam; below the confluence, the river deposits tremendous quantities of sedimentary detritus on the Bengal delta. In the south there are numerous rivers, including the Mahanadi, the Godavari, and the Krishna, but none of the southern rivers competes in waterflow with the rivers of the north which are fed by the melting snows of the high Himalayas.

Although many people conceive of India as being a lush, green, jungle-like country, the fact is that most of India is dry, brown, and bereft of extensive vegetation. Fuel is in short supply, so trees and bushes are cut for firewood unless carefully protected. Cattle and other animals keep much of the grass cut down nearly to the roots, while sheep and goats take the roots as well when given the opportunity. The central and state governments maintain forest and wildlife preserves, but even in them guards are needed to prevent cutting and hunting.

Although India has been protected from outside influences by high mountains in the north and great expanses of ocean in the south, access by outsiders has been gained through its extensive seacoast and through the passes in the northwestern mountains; the Khyber Pass located between Peshawar (Pakistan) and Kabul (Afghanistan) has been the route of numerous incursions by invaders from Central Asia and the Middle East. Other passes in the northeast between Bengal and Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan have allowed trade as well as enemies to enter India. Access to eastern Bengal and Assam from Burma and China is not particularly difficult, thus explaining the culturally mixed population in the northeastern areas of India and Pakistan.

Rainfall varies in the country from over 400 inches annually in parts of Assam and Bengal to less than 10 inches in some of the dry deserts of the north, northwest, and south. The major part of India receives most of its rainfall at the time of the summer monsoon that opens in June and closes in September. Although heavy rains fall during this short period, the monsoon drenches soils that are inadequately covered with vegetation, and thus a large amount of the rainfall runs off without benefiting agriculture. The control of water, for irrigation, transportation, and the production of electrical power, is one of the highest priorities in India's Five Year Plans for economic development. (See Table 3-4 on page 244.)

The staple of diet in India is divided between wheat and rice. Wheat is particularly required in the west and north, while rice is the staple in the Ganges Valley, in the northeast, and in most of the south. India suffers a deficit in foodgrains of nearly 10 million tons a year, despite a rising agricultural productivity for most of the years from 1947 to the present.

Domesticated animals include almost 150,000,000 cattle. These cattle are used primarily for their power and for the dung that they provide for fuel, rather than for milk (which is not a major staple article of food) or for dung to use as fertilizer. On the whole, India's

cattle are underfed and are in severe need of upgrading by controlled breeding and disease prevention. Cows and bulls are sacred animals to many Hindus, and their slaughter and use for food is severely restricted; legislation for improvement by controlled breeding tends to be obstructed.

In addition to cattle, there are over 40 million buffaloes that are used for ploughing and other needed rural and urban power. The female buffalo is widely used for its milk. India's sheep, numbering about 40 million, are mostly of a poor breed that give neither good wool nor meat. The 50 million goats are popular animals to keep at home, both in the towns and in the villages, because they do not take much care and keep alive by foraging on low-grade grass and shrubs. Goats' milk is favored by Indian mothers for their young children. Horses, ponies, and donkeys are widely used for public and private transportation, and camels still are to be found in large numbers in desert country.

For minerals, India is well supplied with iron ore, manganese ore, titanium, mica, bauxite, magnesite, refractory materials, natural abrasives, steatite, building stones, limestone, and small supplies of others. India must import for its internal needs copper ore, silver, nickel, cobalt, lead, zinc, tin, mercury, tungsten, molybdenum, petroleum and petroleum products, sulphur, fluorite, graphite, potash, and asphalt. Coal in large supply, but of relatively low quality, is located in Bihar close to major supplies of iron ore. This juxtaposition of minerals has made possible the development of a major iron and steel industry in the Bihar-Bengal sector of India. Although oil has been discovered in small amounts in Assam and elsewhere, production is low, and most of India's petroleum and petroleum products are imported. Since 1947, petroleum processing has been carried on in India in plants operated for the most part under contract by American and British firms.

## The Economy

India is basically an agricultural country, since over 80 per cent of the people are dependent on the land for their livelihood (Table 3-1). Since 1947, however, the Government of India has been attempting to increase the extent of its industry and commerce, and at the same time to make its agriculture more efficient by the introduction of scientific methods, higher grades of seeds, and fertilizers.

dustries that had developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were processing industries for consumer products, such as cotton textiles, tea, and jute, with only very modest segments in the iron and steel, chemicals, and engineering industries. Producers goods were rarely manufactured, although after World War I a good many machines were assembled in India. In 1951, to get a sense of the backwardness of the Indian economy, a small internal combustion engine manufactured completely in India was exhibited in New Delhi as a sign of a major industrial advance.

TABLE 3-1 *The Distribution of Population in India by Livelihood*  
(Based on 1951 Census—in millions)<sup>a</sup>

Livelihood	Self-supporting persons	Non-earning dependents	Earning dependents	Total
Cultivators of land wholly or mainly owned	45.7	100.1	21.5	167.3
Cultivators of land wholly or mainly unowned	8.8	18.9	3.9	31.6
Agricultural laborers	14.9	24.7	5.2	44.8
Non-cultivating owners of land and agricultural rent receivers	1.6	3.3	0.4	5.3
<b>TOTAL OF AGRICULTURAL CLASSES</b>	<b>71.0</b>	<b>147.0</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>249.0</b>
Production other than cultivation	12.2	22.3	3.2	37.7
Commerce	5.9	14.5	0.9	21.3
Transport	1.7	3.7	0.2	5.6
Other services and miscellaneous	13.6	26.8	2.6	43.0
<b>TOTAL OF NON-AGRICULTURAL CLASSES</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>67.3</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>107.6</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>104.4</b>	<b>214.3</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>356.6</b>

<sup>a</sup> Source: *India: A Reference Annual, 1958* (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1959), p. 25.

As of 1947, it was possible to list India as the seventh most industrialized country in the world, although it lagged so far behind the major industrialized countries that this ranking was more or less meaningless. The in-

Planning for economic development in India is made excessively difficult because of the low level of investment capital available. In 1955-56, investment capital equaled only about seven per cent of national income, although by the early 1960's this figure had been raised to somewhat over 12 per cent, and the percentage is on the rise as each year passes. But the standard of living in India clearly is very low, and savings inevitably are



limited and inadequate. Per capita income in 1961 was not much over \$60–70 per person per year, as estimated by the Planning Commission (see Tables 3-2 and 3-3).

TABLE 3-2 *National Income of India, 1931–1959 (In billions of dollars)*

Year <sup>a</sup>	National Income
1931–32	\$ 3.5 <sup>b</sup>
1945–46	10.4 <sup>b</sup>
1946–47	11.6 <sup>b</sup>
1948–49	18.2 <sup>c</sup>
1949–50	18.9 <sup>c</sup>
1950–51	20.0 <sup>d</sup>
1951–52	20.9
1952–53	20.6
1953–54	22.0
1954–55	20.2
1955–56	21.0
1956–57	23.8
1957–58	24.0
1958–59	26.2

<sup>a</sup> Fiscal year, beginning April 1.

<sup>b</sup> *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1950* (United Nations: Department of Economic Affairs, 1951), p. 110.

<sup>c</sup> *Monthly Abstract of Statistics*, Vol. 12, No. 10 (New Delhi: Government of India, October, 1959), p. 115.

<sup>d</sup> *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (United Nations, March, 1961), p. 160, for all data from 1950–51 to 1958–59.

TABLE 3-3 *Per Capita National Income of India, 1948–1959 <sup>a</sup>*

Year	Total	Index number (1948–49 = 100)
1948–49	Rs. 246.9 <sup>b</sup> (\$51.87)	100.0
1951–52	Rs. 250.1 (\$52.54)	101.3
1955–56	Rs. 273.6 (\$57.48)	110.8
1956–57	Rs. 283.5 (\$59.56)	114.8
1957–58	Rs. 277.1 (\$58.21)	112.2
1958–59	Rs. 293.6 (\$61.68)	118.9

<sup>a</sup> Source: *The Economic Weekly* (Bombay), Twelfth Annual Number, February, 1961, p. 117.

<sup>b</sup> \$1.00 = 4.76 rupees (Rs. 4.76).

After India's independence, the Government of India established a Planning Commission to coordinate schemes for economic development. Under the First Five Year Plan (1951–56), \$3.89 billion of public and \$3.5 billion of private funds were made available for investment over the five-year period. Priority was given to increasing agricultural pro-

ductivity, rehabilitating the railway system, and starting river valley developments for purposes of increasing irrigation and the supply of electrical power. Some attention was given to the revitalization of rural Indian life through the community development program, and a general increase was planned for the production of consumers goods. The First Five Year Plan reached—and even surpassed—most of its targets, aided in part by external assistance of over a half a billion dollars, mostly granted or loaned by the United States. National income was increased by 18 per cent, and food output jumped to 65.8 million tons, an increase of over 20 per cent. Quotas were exceeded in the production of cloth, jute, cement, paper, chemicals, and in the light engineering industry, and at the same time prices were kept at a generally stable level; the cost of living actually declined slightly. The Community Development Program, instituted on a national scale in 1952, brought scientific knowledge of agriculture directly to the villagers, and the advice of trained village workers gave the peasantry some hope for the gradual improvement of village life.

The Government of India announced in 1956 that its objective was to construct a “socialist pattern of society” that called for the building of a “mixed economy” in which government enterprise would carry on certain industrial activities considered essential for the state or of no interest to private investors, and the private sector would carry on the rest. Industrial policy statements issued first in 1948 and amended since have stressed the same “mixed economy” goal, but since 1956 a much greater emphasis has been placed on the role of the public sector. The Second (1956–61) and the Third (1961–66) Five Year Plans both reflect the government's conviction that it should—for social and political, as well as for economic reasons—plan the growth of the total economy, public and private.

The Second Five Year Plan was much more ambitious than the First, calling for an investment about double that of the First, or the equivalent of over 10 billion dollars. Difficulties in finance ultimately led to a small decrease in the total amount of actual investment, but most of the goals set for the Second Plan were reached. Much greater emphasis was given in the Second Plan to the improvement of transportation and communications, industry and mining, and irrigation and power. The goal of increasing the production of iron and steel was aided by the establishment of new mills with financial and technical assistance from West Germany, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, and by the expansion of the Tata plants in Jamshedpur by the Kaiser Company of the United States.

Under the Third Five Year Plan, instituted in 1961, India hopes to have almost 24.5 bil-

## II. PLEDGED FOR THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN (1961-1966)<sup>b</sup>

U.S. (Public Law 480— agricultural commodities)	\$1,276.01
U.S.	1,045.00
U.S.S.R.	504.00
World Bank (I.B.R.D.)	400.00
West Germany	364.00
U.K.	250.00
Japan	80.00
Canada	56.00
Czechoslovakia	48.51
Yugoslavia	40.01
Poland	30.01
France	30.00
	<hr/>
	\$4,123.54

Grand total up to June, 1961  
(amounts authorized and  
pledged) \$7,670.36

<sup>a</sup> Sources: Adapted from data published in the *Annual Number (1961) of The Eastern Economist* (New Delhi), January 6, 1961, pp. 178-179, and in *The New York Times*, June 3, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>b</sup> Pledges for 1961-66 include \$2,225,000 from the so-called "Aid to India Club" for the two-year period, 1961-63, based on the general principle by which the U.S. matches the total loans pledged by the other members. Pledges for the period 1963-66 are expected to be made at a later date.

TABLE 3-4 *External Assistance to India:*  
*Authorized or Pledged, 1950-1966*  
(In millions of U.S. dollars)<sup>a</sup>

I. AUTHORIZED (1950-1960)			
A. Loans Repayable in Foreign Currencies			
World Bank (I.B.R.D.)	\$592.08		
U.S.	352.05		
U.S.S.R.	302.46		
U.K.	243.58		
West Germany	226.32		
Japan	58.00		
Canada	33.01		
Switzerland	22.89	\$1,830.39	
<hr/>			
B. Loans Repayable in Indian Rupees			
U.S.		933.10	
C. Grants			
U.S.	\$515.30		
Colombo Plan Countries	199.67		
Norway	3.51	718.48	
<hr/>			
D. Loan Agreed to in Principle			
U.S.		64.85	
<hr/>			
Total up to the end of 1960		\$3,546.82	

## "AID TO INDIA CLUB" PLEDGES, 1961-1963 ONLY (In millions of U.S. dollars)

	Year 1961-62	Year 1962-63	Two-year totals
U.S.	\$545	\$500	\$1,045
World Bank (I.B.R.D.)	250	150	400
West Germany	225	139	364
U.K.	182	68	250
Japan	50	30	80
Canada	28	28	56
France	15	15	30
Total			<u><u>\$2,225</u></u>

lion dollars of investment pumped into the country and is counting on close to 5.5 billion dollars in foreign exchange being made available from countries abroad (see Table 3-4). This investment will total more than the combined investments of the First and Second Plans.

It is anticipated that over the five-year period 1961-66 per capita income will be increased from its present estimated \$69.30 a year to \$80.85 a year. Self-sufficiency in food grains, a goal set in India ever since 1947, is hoped to be achieved in the period. The production of iron and steel, chemicals, and fuel

TABLE 3-5 *India's Agricultural and Industrial Production: Progress and Targets for Selected Items, 1946-1966*<sup>a</sup>

Item	Unit	1945-46	1950-51	1955-56	Targets 1960-61	Targets 1965-66	Percentage Increase 1960-61 over 1950-51	Percentage Increase 1965-66 over 1960-61
Food grains	million tons		52.2	65.8	75.0	100-105	44%	33-40%
Cotton	million bales		2.91	4.0	5.4	7.2	86	33
Sugar cane, <i>gur</i>	million tons		5.6	6.0	7.2	9.0-9.2	29	25-28
Oil seeds	million tons		5.1	5.6	7.2	9.2-9.5	41	28-32
Jute	million bales		3.3	4.2	5.5	6.5	67	18
Tea	million lbs.		613	678	725	850	18	17
Tobacco	thousand tons		257	298	300	325	17	8
Milk	million maunds (of 82 lbs.)		466	528	600	690	29	15
Wool	million lbs.		60	65	72	90	20	25
Electricity (generated)	million kwts.							
Iron ore	million tons	2.36	6,575	11,000	20,700	42,250	215	104
Coal	million tons	28.97	3.0	4.7	12.00	32.0	300	167
Finished steel	million tons	0.964	32.0	38.0	53.0	97.0	66	83
Pig iron (for sale)	million tons		1.0	1.3	2.6	6.9	160	165
Aluminum	thousand tons		0.35	0.38	0.90	1.50	157	67
Machine tools (graded)	Rs. 100,000 value		3.7	7.3	17	75.0	359	341
Diesel engines	thousands		29	72	550	3,000	1,797	445
Electric motors	thousand h.p.		5.5	10.0	33.0	66.0	500	100
Bicycles (organized sector)	thousands		100	270	800	25,001	700	213
Automobiles	thousands		101	513	1,050	2,000	940	90
Cement	million tons	1.54	16.5	25.3	53.5	100	224	87
Paper and paper board	thousand tons		2.7	4.6	8.8	13.0	226	48
Telephones	thousands		114	187	320	700	181	119
			168	280	475	675	183	42

<sup>a</sup> Sources: *Third Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline* (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 1960); *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1950* (United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1951), for 1945-46 figures only.

and power will be greatly expanded, along with India's capacity for building machinery and other producers goods (see Tables 3-5 and 3-6).

The invasion of India by China on October 20, 1962, has resulted in the need for adjusting the original targets of the Third Five Year Plan, increasing the expenditures for

TABLE 3-6 *Government of India: General Revenues and Expenditures, 1951-1957<sup>a</sup>*  
(In billions of rupees)<sup>b</sup>

Year	Current revenues	Current expenditure				Total	Savings
		Consumption expenditures		Subsidies	Current transfers to households and private non-profit institutions		
		Civil	Defense				
1951	9.17	3.88	1.97	0.45	0.59	6.89	2.28
1952	8.44	4.06	1.98	0.36	0.71	7.11	1.33
1953	8.51	4.35	2.09	0.15	0.76	7.35	1.16
1954	9.09	4.62	2.10	0.13	0.91	7.76	1.33
1955	10.21	5.12	2.03	0.17	1.26	8.58	1.63
1956	11.69	5.61	2.24	0.29	1.44	9.58	2.11
1957	13.21	6.27	2.93	0.50	1.50	11.20	2.01

<sup>a</sup> Source: *United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1960* (United Nations, Statistical Office, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1961), p. 113.

<sup>b</sup> For fiscal years beginning April 1. Capital development budget not included. \$1.00 = Rs 4.76.

Unemployment and underemployment, serious social problems in India for many years, are expected to increase over the Third Five Year Plan by 3 million persons, with the result that over 12 million people will be unemployed by 1966. This is likely to be true even though during the Third Five Year Plan new jobs are expected to be found for over 14 million persons.

Education from primary to higher education will be expanded steadily, along with social developments and health programs both in rural and urban India. Because of the rapid growth of India's cities over the past several decades, the Third Five Year Plan will make an effort to rehabilitate the worst urban areas, such as those in Calcutta. The goal of reaching a "socialist pattern of society" remains accepted policy. Planners will attempt to improve the equality of social and economic opportunities, to reduce disparities in income, and to more evenly distribute economic power.

defense, and reducing less essential activities. The major goals of economic growth, however, are not expected to be abandoned.

## Population

The Census of India of 1961 reports that the total population of the country is approximately 438 million persons, an increase over 1951's figure of 359.2 million of about 80 million persons (Table 3-7). This represents an increase in the ten-year period of 21.5 per cent, or an annual rate of increase of approximately 2.15 per cent, a rate that is a good deal higher than India's planners had anticipated. Most of the estimates for the Third Five Year Plan were based on an annual increase of population of only 1.8 per cent. Adjustments for the corrected rate of population increase have required both a reduction of some development targets and an increase of the total level of investment, including an increase of the amount of foreign assistance required.

One of the factors in recent population counts in India has been the change in the

TABLE 3-7 *Population Growth of India, 1901-1961*<sup>a</sup>

Year	Population <sup>b</sup> (in millions)	Increase (+) or decrease (-) during preceding decade (in millions)	Rate of increase (percentage per year)
1901	235.5	-0.4	-0.02
1911	249.0	+13.5	0.56
1921	248.1	-0.9	-0.04
1931	275.5	+27.4	1.04
1941	312.8	+37.3	1.27
1951	356.9	+44.1	1.32
1961	438.0	+81.1	2.15

<sup>a</sup> Sources: The 1901-51 figures are based on a review published in the *Census of India, 1951*, Part IA-Report, adjusted both for the area of India applying since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and for inflations in reporting in 1941 from West Bengal and Punjab. The 1961 figures are taken from *1961 Census: Provisional Population Totals* (New Delhi, Office of the Registrar General, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1961), including estimates for a few small areas not yet recorded. (The final official population of India as of March, 1961, according to the Registrar General of India, was 439,235,082 persons.)

<sup>b</sup> Excludes 1901-51 figures for Jammu and Kashmir, whose population in 1951 was 3.3 million and in 1961, 3.6 million.

sex ratio. For example, in 1951 for every thousand males there were 946 females, whereas a decade later the ratio was 1,000 males to 940 females. This decline in females had been noted in earlier censuses as well.

Urban population has increased in the 1951-61 decade from 61.9 million in 1951 to 77.8 million in 1961, an increase of 0.43 per cent in the proportion of urban population to total population. Urban growth was expected to be far more spectacular, but, as

experts have pointed out, the definitions of "urban" used by the Census of India for 1961 may have obscured some portion of the urban increase. Experts on the Planning Commission assume that from 1961-81, India's cities will grow by about 100 million persons at a rate of increase of 3.8 per cent per year, whereas the rural sector will grow by about 90 million persons at a rate of 1.2 per cent per year. Cities such as New Delhi, Bombay, and Calcutta, plus other industrially favored areas, will experience population explosions over this period. (See Table 4-3.)

In general terms, the increase in recent years of India's population can be attributed mostly to the lowered death rates. Birth rates have declined somewhat, but death rates have declined even further, thanks to more adequate public health measures taken throughout the country. Life expectancy at birth was estimated at about 32.5 years in 1950, contrasted with the life expectancy at birth in 1901 of only 22.6 years. Estimates for 1961 show an increase to a life expectancy at birth of over 40 years. Family planning has been supported in the Five Year Plans to an extent surpassed in Asia only by Japan. But these expensive efforts have been ineffective statistically because of the nearly impossible administrative task of bringing meaningful educative information and materials for birth control to the millions of villagers.

# Social Structure

## IV

### Religion

Religious belief is the most characteristic social organizing principle in India. Before the foundation of Pakistan, the subcontinent's politics in the twentieth century tended to be dominated by the struggles between the Hindus in the majority and the Muslims in the minority. Other minorities, such as the Sikhs, Jains, and Christians, also exerted political pressure in the interests of their religious communities. Among Hindus, political conflicts have existed for decades between the Brahman and non-Brahman communities, between non-caste ("untouchable") and caste Hindus, and between dominant caste groups in one section of the country and opposing castes in other parts of the

country. Some minority communities, e.g., the Muslims and Sikhs, sought protection from the massive Hindu majority by demanding minority rights in political and economic life from the British, and then from the leaders of independent India. The politics of India makes no sense without carefully taking into account the pervasive influence of religion on the everyday rhythms of life.

The founding of Pakistan did lessen the pressure of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in politics. But it should be remembered that even after partition India contained almost 40 million Muslims; Pakistan, in turn, inherited over 8 million Hindus. Minority politics is by no means a dead issue either in contemporary India or Pakistan.

Hinduism is by far the dominant religion of India (Table 4-1). However, the term "Hinduism" encompasses a wide theological range: from abstract intellectual speculation, through mysticism and idolatry, to atheism. In a practical sense, anyone born to Hindu parents who recognizes (but does not necessarily accept) the hierarchy of castes, as well as the sacred standing of the Vedic literature, may be considered a Hindu. The recognition of caste implies belief in the transmigration of the soul, and in the principle that the status acquired upon rebirth is rewarded on the basis of the good and evil acts of the previous existence, weighed on the scales of moral merit at the transmigrating moment. Although it certainly is true that many Hindus

TABLE 4-1 *India. Population  
by Religions<sup>a</sup>*  
(Based on 1951 Census)

Religion	Number <sup>b</sup> (in millions)	Percentage of the total population
Hindu	303.2	84.99%
Muslim	35.4	9.93
Christian	8.2	2.30
Sikh	6.2	1.74
Jain	1.6	0.45
Buddhist	0.2	0.06
Zoroastrian	0.1	0.03
Other religions (tribal)	1.7	0.47
Other religions (non-tribal)	0.1	0.03
All religions	356.7	100.00%

<sup>a</sup> Source, *India: A Reference Annual, 1959* (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1960), p. 44.

<sup>b</sup> Excluding the population of Jammu and Kashmir and certain tribal areas of Assam where the 1951 Census was not taken.

in modern times are apathetic towards caste, if not actively opposed, and may even be uninstructed concerning the principles embodied in the Vedas, the traditional modes of belief of Hinduism are widely accepted by the vast majority of the Indian community.

Caste, of course, is founded upon kinship ties. Although many explain the caste system as a fourfold order, namely, Brahman (priest), Kshatriya (warrior), Vaishya (merchant), and Shudra (worker)—and with outcastes (*panchama*) remaining beyond the caste structure—caste actually is highly localized and is divided into several thousand relatively small kinship groups (called *jati*), each of which maintains complex and exclusive rules for the caste's social and ceremonial behavior.

For example, in an Indian village cultural anthropologists can identify the "caste structure" of that particular village, placing caste groups into a rough hierarchy of social acceptance from the highest to the lowest. In most instances, one caste (or a configuration of several castes) will be dominant in that community. A "dominant caste" usually holds high caste status relative to others in the community, and almost always is "wealthy" as far as lands and money are concerned. If minority communities, such as Muslims or Christians,

are present in such a village, they too are placed somewhere within the "caste" hierarchy and are expected to behave in accordance with the structured traditions of the village. Any shrewd politician in India, regardless of his own religious beliefs, obviously must be able to recognize, at least crudely, the caste structure within his constituency in order to be able to capture the support either of the dominant castes or a majority of those who oppose the dominant castes.

The Muslims in India hold a very ambiguous position in society. Although Indian leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, have insisted that all minorities be given their full rights in public and private life, it is not easy for the massive Hindu majority to act other than in its own self-interest. To date, Muslims have tended to support the Congress Party, because they have felt that the leadership, headed by Nehru, would protect them. The same can be said for many of the other minority religions, except perhaps for the Sikhs in Punjab who are powerful enough there to be politically self-sufficient and thus self-assertive.

## Language and Sectionalism

A second major social factor in the organization of India is language. The problem of language is further complicated by the fact that the regionalism of India is linguistically bounded. If one flies from the city of Bombay to Delhi and on to Calcutta and Madras, one will hear at the airports at least four different languages: Marathi in Bombay, Hindi (or Urdu) in Delhi, Bengali in Calcutta, and Tamil in Madras. If the traveler had a linguist's ear, he probably would overhear a dozen or more other languages or major dialects spoken by persons who were resident near each of these airports.

The Census of 1951 enumerated a total of 845 languages or dialects, including 720 In-

dian languages or dialects spoken by less than 100,000 persons each, plus 63 non-Indian languages. Looked at this way, India is hopelessly divided by language. The situation is serious enough, but it is not hopeless. The vast majority of the people of India speak one of the modern languages that are recognized in the Constitution (Table 4-2). The Gov-

TABLE 4-2 *Languages Specified in the Constitution of India and Their Speakers*<sup>a</sup> (Based on 1951 Census)

Languages	Number of persons (in millions)	Percentage of total
Hindi <sup>b</sup>	149.9	46.3%
Urdu <sup>b</sup>		
Hindustani <sup>b</sup>		
Punjabi <sup>b</sup>		
Telugu	33.0	10.2
Marathi	27.0	8.3
Tamil	26.5	8.2
Bengali	25.1	7.8
Gujarati	16.3	5.0
Kannada	14.5	4.5
Malayalam	13.4	4.1
Oriya	13.2	4.1
Assamese	5.0	1.5
Kashmiri	0.005	—
Sanskrit	0.001	—

<sup>a</sup> Source: *India: A Reference Annual, 1959* (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1960), p. 45.

<sup>b</sup> Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani, and Punjabi, as spoken languages, are very closely related.

ernment of India intends to make Hindi, the single most widely spoken Indian language, the official language of India in due course. But English continues to be the communicating medium between the various sections of India and to the outside world. English still is the medium of instruction in most of the four-year colleges and universities and is widely used before the courts and in commerce and industry. The Parliament has ruled that English should continue to be utilized

for an indefinite period, although Hindi will be encouraged to replace English eventually.

One of the most serious political problems of India has been, and continues to be, the provincialism encouraged by the separate languages, literatures, and artistic styles that one finds in the several parts of India. The reorganization of the states along linguistic lines in 1956 aided cultural growth in the new linguistic states. But the administrative change also increased the level of harsh conflict between the regions, among other reasons because of the historic antagonisms that once prevailed when these linguistic states were independent in ancient times. The unity of India depends on the skill by which the Government in New Delhi is able to substitute the national interest for provincial interests in the process of developing India into a modernized society. Self-seeking regionalists are doing their best to make unity difficult to achieve.

## Ethnic Variations

India is one of the world's largest natural laboratories for cultural and social anthropologists. A wide range of racial influences can be found within the country, and ethnic variation is widespread. The tribal communities in the North East Frontier Agency, Assam, Orissa, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, and scattered elsewhere in the country are numerous. Although the tribal peoples are for the most part isolated from modern Indian life, they are now seeking education, and countrywide plans for economic development are making it less possible for traditional tribal isolation to continue.

Certain of the tribal groups, such as the Nagas in the northeast and the Mundas of Bihar, have organized politically. The Nagas have demanded and are receiving a specially administered region for their own government; the Jharkand Party in Bihar, under Jaipal Singh, is a force to be reckoned with in that state. Other tribes are also expected to follow the road to greater political power.



## Class Structure

Class in India is divided between a tiny upper class or aristocracy, a small and growing urban middle class, and the vast majority of the people in the lower or poverty-stricken class. Although the Constitution, as well as the political outlook of Parliament, provide encouragement for social mobility within the existing class structure, opportunities, in fact, are unevenly distributed, and mobility is a rarity among the poor. Entrance into the middle class, largely an urban phenomenon, has been spurred by an increase in educational institutions that have been built since 1947. The rapid growth of central and state bureaucracies have provided other avenues to those aspiring for higher social and economic standing. But rural India changes slowly, and mobility is impeded there by the inbred resistance of the caste system and traditional ways of behavior.

TABLE 4-3 *The Ratio of Rural to Urban Population in India, 1872-1961*<sup>a</sup>

Census year	Percentage rural	Percentage urban
1872	91.28%	8.72%
1881	90.59	9.41
1891	90.54	9.46
1901	90.21	9.79
1911	90.65	9.35
1921	89.70	10.30
1931	89.00	11.00
1941	87.20	12.80
1951	82.70	17.30
1961	82.20	17.80

<sup>a</sup> Sources: P. C. Bansil, *India's Food Resources and Population: A Historical and Analytical Study* (Bombay: Vora and Co., 1958), and for the 1961 figures, *The Economic Weekly* (Bombay), Vol. XIII, No. 14 (April 8, 1961), p. 571.

Since the turn of the century, there has been a noticeable increase in urban population. Since 1947, the increase has been sharp. As of 1961, approximately 17.8 per cent of the people of India lived in urban areas (Table 4-3). Compared with highly industrialized countries, such as Great Britain or the United States, the Indian urban percentage

still is low. But as scientific agriculture has reduced the need for farmers, as population has risen, and as the cities turn to rapid industrialization, migrations from the villages to the cities have increased spectacularly. It is likely that the Census of 1981 will show an increase of over 100 million persons in the urban population over that of 1961. Politically, urban growth will bring with it an increase in articulated discontent; as past history has shown, this urban discontent probably will result in strengthening the hands of extremist politicians of the Left- and Right-wings.

Despite the growth of cities, India at this stage remains primarily an agricultural country. As of 1951, about two-thirds of the population could be classified as agricultural. Even more people were dependent on the land for their livelihood, since many of those who were listed as non-cultivating producers or as engaged in commerce or transportation lived in or were dependent on village communities (see Table 3-1).

## Literacy

As of 1961, approximately 23.7 per cent of the Indian population was literate (Table 4-4). Many more men than women were numbered among the literate, and of course the distribution of literacy within the country varied between city and country and between the various sections of India.

Table 4-4 gives a clear indication of the rapid growth of literacy since 1947. But no country seeking the best welfare of its citizenry or hoping to industrialize rapidly can be satisfied with a literacy rate that includes less than a quarter of the population. Further, one must be wary in reading literacy figures. The literacy test in India is a simple one that requires only the ability to read an uncomplicated text in any language, to sign one's name, and in some instances to write a few basic sentences.

TABLE 4-4 *The Growth of Literacy in India, 1901-1961*<sup>a</sup>

Year	Literacy <sup>b</sup> percentage	Literacy among men	Literacy among women
1901	5.3%	9.8%	0.7%
1911	5.9	10.6	1.0
1921	7.2	12.2	1.8
1931	8.0	13.3	2.5
1941	—	—	—
1951	16.6	24.9	7.9
1961	23.7	33.9	12.8

<sup>a</sup> Sources: For the compilations from the *Census of India* covering 1901-51, B. N. Datar, "Literate Labour," in *Seminar*, February, 1961, pp. 30-33; figures for 1961 are taken from *The Economic Weekly* (Bombay), Vol. XIII, No. 14 (April 8, 1961), p. 573.

<sup>b</sup> Figures for 1901-31 are given for undivided India; literacy figures for 1941 are unavailable.

trators and politicians, in order to come in contact with the vast majority of the people of India, must speak directly to them. Unquestionably illiteracy impedes social change and economic development and makes the operation of a responsive and responsible democratic system of government a great deal more difficult.

## Mass Media

To the superficial observer, India is a country swamped with newspapers, pamphlets, journals, books, and periodicals. Bookstalls in

TABLE 4-5 *Newspapers in India, 1959*<sup>a</sup> (Number and circulation by language)

Language	Number of Newspapers	Circulation (in thousands)		
		Copies Sold	Copies Distributed Free	Total
English	999	2,934	1,063	3,997
Hindi	875	2,902	651	3,553
Assamese	10	51	2	53
Bengali	326	736	187	923
Gujarati	326	1,013	146	1,159
Kannada	126	428	42	470
Malayalam	131	741	60	801
Marathi	272	895	159	1,054
Oriya	38	86	13	99
Punjabi	76	149	34	183
Sanskrit	10	6	1	7
Tamil	231	1,953	172	2,125
Telugu	170	582	81	663
Urdu	398	892	155	1,047
Bi-lingual	435	566	200	766
Multi-lingual	235	68	170	238
Others	80	105	27	132
Totals	4,738	14,107	3,163	17,270

<sup>a</sup> Source: *Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India, 1960*, Part I (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961).

"Statistical literacy" does not necessarily mean that all literates can intelligently read and write, and thus communicate in a meaningful fashion. It remains true that Indian adminis-

trators and politicians, in order to come in contact with the vast majority of the people of India, must speak directly to them. Unquestionably illiteracy impedes social change and economic development and makes the operation of a responsive and responsible democratic system of government a great deal more difficult.

the cities, towns, and even in some of the villages will be found stocked with all kinds of publications. But the fact remains that widespread illiteracy severely retards the growth of mass media, regardless of the language used. For every thousand persons in the population in 1959, there were approximately 48 copies of newspapers available (Table 4-5). The ratio here between the number of newspaper copies

available and the total population is most unfavorable for the effective circulation of news. And yet in gross figures it will be noted that in 1959 the newspaper circulation in India totaled 17,270,000.

English-language newspapers can be found in every major city in India. They continue to circulate in larger numbers than the newspapers of any other language, partially because a curious prestige is acquired by their readers in the eyes of their fellows. The quality of the English press runs from outstanding to poor, but the best of the English papers, such as the *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), *The Statesman* (Calcutta and Delhi), the *Times of India* (Bombay and Delhi), and *The Hindu* (Madras) are of very high quality. Among other things, these papers are used by editors of the smaller papers of the Indian-language press as models and sources of data. The Hindi press, as well as papers published in Tamil, Gujarati, Marathi, Urdu, and Bengali, get wide distribution regionally and tend to reach down into the smaller cities, towns, and villages with their information. Whereas the English press is predominantly urban in its readership, the Indian-language press has both an urban and a rural clientele (Table 4-6).

Unfortunately, the circulation of weekly, fortnightly, and monthly journals, as well as the distribution of books and pamphlets, is most inadequately organized. Bookshops and newspaper stalls (with few exceptions) are independent enterprises and are not linked to-

gether by central distributing agencies that would see that materials from one region of the country get to all others. Visitors to India who travel from city to city are more likely to keep abreast of the latest publications (if they have time to browse and search out the shops) than are alert residents even of the major cities. Fortunately, books and articles of excellence become known to the leading intellectuals of the country by word of mouth and through correspondence, thus making possible the alert and vigorous intellectual communication that flows between the small number of India's leading thinkers. Radio and motion pictures, and perhaps television in the future, may be expected to become potent forces politically and socially as these media of communications are more widely experienced by the mass of India's population. Radio and films today are carriers of modernization, and both are popular in the cities.

TABLE 4-6 *Estimates of Readership of Indian Newspapers, 1958 and 1959*<sup>a</sup>

Year	Number of Newspapers	Circulation	Number of copies per 1,000 population (1951 Census)
1958	4,550	15,428,000	42.7
1959	4,738	17,270,000	47.8

<sup>a</sup> Source *Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India, 1960*, Part I (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961).

# Ideology



## The Community and Its Symbols

### *Legitimacy*

The traditions of government in both ancient Hindu and middle-period Muslim times considered high social status and the effective capture of power and its skillful manipulation the keystones of legitimacy. For the Hindus, rule was considered to be the right, and indeed the duty, of persons born to the task. Here the caste system best explains the principle. Those who theoretically were born to rule because of the merit of their previous existences were the Kshatriyas, although often the Brahmins, because of their spiritual supremacy in the social hierarchy, also claimed rights of rulership through control by high spiritual advice. In ancient Indian political

thought, the two schools, Kshatriya and Brahman, each had its advocates. The theoretical literature, usually written by Brahmins on behalf of the Brahmanical argument, understandably is dominated by Brahman views. But it appears that the Kshatriyas more often than not were the actual wielders of power.

Nothing approximating popular rule can be found in the ancient Hindu heritage, except, perhaps, the "republics" of the Buddhist period; even in these exceptional cases only a few of the well-placed in the community effectively shared power. The authoritarian—and usually arbitrary—exercise of power by the ruler was considered appropriate to the office of the head of state. The real test of a ruler's legitimacy was whether or not he was able to maintain peace and order within his domain, while at the same time pressing the interests of the state abroad by any means necessary, including war. The concept of functional efficiency being the source of legitimacy has sometimes been characterized as the principle of *sarkar*, literally, power or government. The people were willing to support whoever ruled against his would-be opposition, providing the ruler fulfilled his duties in the maintenance of order. It has been said of modern India that the Congress Party has been able to hold its predominant strength in the country, among other reasons, because it was considered to be the *sarkar*, which is to say the effective government. The evidence reveals that many voters continue to

favor the Congress Party—which is the government—because they feel that the party has been effective in fulfilling its functions of governing. The fine shadings in the ideological principles of India's various political parties have not yet become significant for most of the people of the country. Balloting really is to say "yes" or "no" to the government in power—the *sarkar*.

Muslim government in India also gained allegiance from the mass of the people by exhibiting, through symbols of power, that it was effectively governing. With Muslim rulers, political office is held theoretically in a fiduciary relationship to God, which is to say that rulers rule on behalf of the higher interests of God. But since no effective means was present for checking the ruler in his own interpretation of God's will, Muslim rulers, as Hindu rulers before them, were for the most part unchecked in their authority.

Running through Hindu and Muslim philosophy, as indeed through the philosophical outlooks of most other religious groups in India, has for centuries been the view that the powerful man also should be the morally good man. Although it is obvious from a reading of Indian history that many rulers did not live up to this high standard, the great names of both the past and the present in the political leadership of India usually have been those who combined the saintly (or at least decent) personal life with justice, including, if necessary, an exacting justice. Thus among Hindus and Buddhists an emperor like Ashoka is remembered as a hero; among the Moghuls it was Akbar; and in modern times Gandhi, of course, was in this tradition, as is Nehru today.

An examination of the members of India's Parliament, or of members of legislative assemblies in the states, will reveal many men of simple habits and desires, indefatigable in their efforts on behalf of good government, and speaking always of the greater good for the poor and the oppressed. To act as if one were an exalted member of Parliament—for example, to dress the part, to ride about in shiny new automobiles, to patronize Westernized restaurants, to drink alcoholic beverages

—would be like announcing to the country at large that one no longer wished to be elected. Indian politicians are not saints; at least it is not likely that there are many among them. But in public, a political leader must lead an exemplary life if he wishes to succeed. Only the very top few among Indian politicians have a national following large and powerful enough to permit them to ignore these rules of behavior.

The Indian philosophic outlook is most congenial when dealing with monist conceptions. The unity of the cosmos is central to Indian philosophy, and any political theory which ignores this underlying principle in India will be at a disadvantage. But the curious thing is that the central monist core of Indian philosophy encompasses a plurality of outlooks, any one of which is acceptable for a given individual to follow. Thus unity here converges with plural interpretations. In more recent years, with the rise of constitutionalism in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India, pluralism in politics has gained ascendancy. The necessity for finding legitimate places in the Indian political order for members of many religious minority groups in addition to the large Hindu majority has required the development of a pluralist outlook. The objective of the secular state that has been advanced by the Indian National Congress since its origin in 1885 is an attempt to separate religious values from political objectives. From the late nineteenth century on, political problems have come to involve economic and social interests other than those strictly communal in nature and are increasingly dealt with by secular means, although religious or communal considerations have never been eliminated completely.

#### *Consensus*

A strong tradition calling for general agreement in the community can be found in ancient as well as modern Indian experience.

The origins of this approach to social problems can be found in the propensity in India to find unified solutions, rather than to encourage political decisions based on the principle of majority rule. For example, the institution of the *panchayat* (literally, council of five), a common form of village government, operates in such a fashion as to attempt to reach consensus. In the intimate social life of the Indian village, disputes that are not resolved by general agreement in all probability will break out again and again later on. Where the *panchayat* in ancient or modern times has worked most effectively, elders on the council, representing the several communities and castes in the village, have talked together until one of the most senior among them determined that an appropriate solution had been reached.

Another indication of the strength of the consensus principle in India will be found in the language used in Parliament. Very often spokesmen, either for government or for the opposition, will speak of a solution as being the "correct" solution. "Correct solutions" here do not mean policies that the controlling majority in Parliament choose to make law. Rather the solution is considered to be the *only* appropriate and legitimate solution to be found among all other possibilities. Since the Congress Party has held a dominant majority in Parliament since 1947, it is understandable that their spokesmen have been most regular in expressing views on what was "correct" or not.

#### *Liberalism, Socialism, Communism*

Although Indian philosophy, and some measure of the Islamic outlook as well, find a place in contemporary Indian political thought, India, like most of the rest of the world, has been extensively influenced by the social and political thought of the West, especially that since the nineteenth century. Liberalism, par-

ticularly in its British garb, remains an important ingredient in the political thought of most senior politicians in India today. It is assumed by them, following the liberal heritage, that all men are entitled to certain civil and political liberties, as well as a right to be represented in government, to select those whom they wish to represent them, and to control government's actions by secret, fair, and regular elections. Parliamentary institutions and their procedures, as well as the legitimacy of civilian control over the military and the responsibility of the bureaucracy to the legislature, are concepts that few except extremists of the Left and Right deny.

All but a few Indian political leaders also have been influenced by socialism either of the Fabian evolutionary model early associated with the Labour Party in Great Britain, or with various shadings of the Marxian creed. From the mid-1920's, when the Communist Party of India was founded by M. N. Roy from his headquarters in Europe, Communism has been a relatively potent force in Indian politics, despite the fact that it has never become a mass movement. A great many people in India, including a fair segment of the intelligentsia, continue to accept Communism as a theory and the Communist Party of India as a legitimate political party offering an alternate form of rule.

What has been called "democratic socialism" is perhaps the most popular symbol of legitimate government in modern India. This doctrine has many expounders. Prime Minister Nehru expresses democratic socialist ideals, but usually in terms of the objectives of the "welfare state." Nehru and a large segment of the Congress Party, however, prefer, at least at this stage, a political and economic order divided into a public sector and a private sector. The pragmatic evaluation of a policy's usefulness under given circumstances normally is Nehru's test for public or private control. Socialism, in this sense, would normally move toward greater public control only to the extent that the private sector defaulted in its responsibility.

Others, such as the leaders of the Praja Socialist Party, advocate democratic socialism in

much the same way as does Mr. Nehru, but they propose to bring about an equalitarian, socialized community more rapidly. Socialism, to the avowed socialists, is an objective worthy of reaching on its own merits, regardless of strictly pragmatic tests of usefulness. The fact seems to be, however, that since the Congress voices democratic socialist objectives and at the same time gives substantial support to private objectives, organized socialist parties in India have been unable to gain public support.

### *Political Participation*

It is usually assumed that India is a highly political country. Certainly one would get this impression if one sat in the coffee houses of the cities and towns, read the newspapers, or listened to the speeches and debates in public forums. But all of these experiences are urban phenomena, and they relate in almost every instance to communications between the educated minority. Throughout the countryside, where over 80 per cent of the people live, few people read, and discussions normally relate to personal, family, or highly localized problems. Since independence, the peasantry, as well as those in the cities, have had an opportunity to vote on the basis of adult suffrage. And a surprisingly high percentage of the eligible voters do vote. But electoral events come as rather special activities every five years or so—perhaps more often in the case of local elections—and are not accepted widely as significant parts of the routine of life. Much of India simply is not concerned with politics.

### *Egalitarianism and Elitism*

Every formal effort has been made in the Constitution of India, and in the political objectives put before the country by the leaders of the Congress Party, to bring a spirit of egalitarianism to the whole country. Tax legislation, the encouragement given to increasing wages and decreasing the level of profits, the opportunities given to the poor and backward to raise their educational and economic status, all move toward the goal of greater equality. And yet it is clear that India is ruled today in social, political, and economic spheres by a

small, urban, educated elite of less than five million persons. No matter how hard members of this elite try to give the appearance that they live on an equal status with the majority of the citizenry, the specialized functions performed by the leaders give them an elite status, whether they want it or not.

It should be noted that Indian leaders are by no means ignorant of the dichotomy in values between the state's objective of equality and their own personal desire for their sons and daughters to be prepared for elite roles. If one examines the rosters of the best schools in India—whether the exclusive high-tuition public schools run closely along British lines or the best colleges within the universities at home and abroad—one will find present the sons and daughters of present-day Ministers of State, senior civil servants, judges, leading lawyers, journalists, and businessmen. Many of the same persons who in Parliament or in the legislative assemblies proclaim loudest for the acceptance of Hindi as the exclusive official language of India send their own children to schools where English is the medium of instruction. The point is clear: probably for several generations the leaders of India are going to be fluent English speakers, thoroughly trained in the humanities and in modern technical subjects, which have been eliminated or highly simplified in the schools of basic education fostered on the floors of India's legislatures.

### *Nationalism*

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, nationalism became a pervasive influence on all Indians who had any interest in politics at all. The nationalist movement can be traced to the early nineteenth century when, in its cultural phase, the debate began between the ideas and institutions of the West, including the philosophy and ethics of Christianity, and India's Hindu heritage. Most of the early social reform movements in India

were fostered by men such as Raja Rammohan Roy, who believed that the first step toward social and political reform should be the reconstruction of the religious thought and institutions of Hinduism itself. In 1828, Roy founded the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal, a religious institution which was influenced by Christianity and Unitarianism. He preserved the higher philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishads, but eliminated certain of the social customs that had arisen among Hindus, such as the prohibition of widow remarriage, thus giving a greater degree of mobility to the community in his church.

Others followed in the same tradition. Dayananda Saraswati founded the Arya Samaj, which opposed caste distinctions, and preached a return to the pure and more austere values of Vedic times. Saraswati, more than Rammohan Roy, was of the orthodox Hindu tradition; he used Indian languages by preference and strove to improve the old heritage rather than construct a new set of values. Later, Swami Vivekananda, in Bengal, following the religious ideas of Ramakrishna, developed the Ramakrishna Mission which bolstered a spirit of confidence in the ancient heritage and, under Vivekananda's leadership, extended into nationalism the demand for more vigor in public life. An Irish woman, Mrs. Annie Besant of Madras, also made a contribution through the Theosophical Society which she headed. Mrs. Besant, a most remarkable woman, became a leader of the Indian National Congress and a "radical" among the nationalists demanding self-rule for the Indian people. As the cultural phase of nationalism moved into the twentieth century, Vivekananda and Mrs. Besant advocated new forms of economic and political action, which grew out of their cultural messages.

The economic phase of nationalism, based on the idea that the poverty-stricken people of India were being exploited by British im-

perialism, had its roots in the late nineteenth century. When it became clear that the economic growth in western Europe had progressed rapidly while the economic life of India had moved at a snail's pace, the economic nationalists argued that only by ending imperial control could the economic well-being of the Indian people be obtained. The "exploitation theory," expounded by the economic nationalists, bears a close relationship to Lenin's theories on imperialism, and it is understandable that the economic nationalists as of the 1920's tended to be those to whom the fresh ideas of Marxism most appealed.

Political nationalism moved gingerly in India, from modest requests for a greater role in administration before the First World War to a demand for full-scale representative and responsible government within the British Empire and, finally, in 1929, to the demand for independence itself. Nationalism and its counterpart, anti-colonialism, are symbols of great importance in Indian political life. India's foreign policy sees anti-colonialism as an important objective, and events in world affairs increasingly tend to be judged on the basis of whether or not they encourage or discourage national urges for self-determination and self-government.

India's contemporary nationalism is strengthened by the nation's fear of external influence upon Indian affairs by British power, or by the power of other "imperialists." India's attitude toward the West's professed desire to divest itself of colonial territories thus tends to be tinged with a healthy skepticism. Although the United States does not have an empire, its extensive economic power brings it under suspicion. Most of the intellectuals of India are aware of Lenin's and Stalin's works on nationalism, and they know about the national autonomy theoretically guaranteed to national groups within the Soviet Union. Since these intellectuals have followed the literature on Communist theory emanating from the Communist press more closely than they have the critical literature on Soviet nationalist policy, they are not as aware of the apparatus of centralizing power within the Soviet Union as they are of the history of



Western imperialism. As far as nationalism is concerned, the Soviet Union therefore gains in favor in contrast to the West.

## Tradition versus Change

The persistence of tradition in India is one of the remarkable characteristics of its civilization. One can without much difficulty find religious practices, social behaviors, agricultural methods, and private and public ceremonies today that have changed little for hundreds of years. Bits and pieces of the past have been meticulously worked into the habits of the present so that one can move, in a cultural sense, from one century to another by walking down one lane in an Indian town. This mixture of the many contributions of the past does not form a neat or tidy pattern. Rather the appearance is more like a mosaic, in which colors and sizes vary, and only from a distance does the unity appear at all. But the unity is there, held together by the bonds of a distinguished history.

Change, however, is the dominant characteristic of the mid-twentieth century. Physical change is obvious—the rapid growth of cities, the expansion of industry in the towns and even the villages, jet aircraft and modern locomotives, improved roads, hydroelectric power, and all the many other advances that have come with the Five Year Plans. A careful observer in Indian villages will see change there, too, although one must know what to look for. Muddy lanes are in all probability straighter than they used to be and less muddy than before drainage was added. A simple hut made of mud brick is repaired with fired brick, and in time and with sufficient repairs it will be constructed entirely of fire brick. The well may be covered securely now, whereas two decades ago the cover never quite fit. These are the kinds of changes taking place in the countryside, along with the use of improved seeds, farm implements, and fertilizers, all of which give better crops, and produce greater incomes, and thus make it possible to improve the environment of the rural family.

All the great modern leaders of India have been advocates of change—even Gandhi, who was often mistakenly accused of wanting to keep India rural and backward. By associating himself closely with the poor of India and by living their lives and sharing many of their values, he was able to suggest alterations in their treatment of “untouchables” and of women and children, to show them their need for education, to get them to see the importance of participation in the social and political life of the country—all radical innovations. Nehru, of course, is a strong believer in change and has a far less orthodox tie to the older heritage than Gandhi. Nehru long ago set high goals for the Indian people, and for over 35 years he has toured the country exhorting his fellow nationals to achieve these goals. Although Nehru has not hesitated to suggest changes in the social and economic order that attack the ancient heritage head-on, he has gained broad support.

More recently, Jayaprakash Narayan, a founder of the Socialist Party of India, and now independent of any political tie, has advocated a return to a more intimate political community at the village level, where he feels most of the major decisions in the country should rest. Very much along Gandhian lines, Jayaprakash believes that it is not too late to create social and economic institutions, as well as political ways, that men can control as direct participants. Jayaprakash Narayan’s ideas, which cannot be fairly presented in this short sketch, are among the most penetrating in India or elsewhere in Asia today. The fact that they are not attracting (and are not likely to attract) much of a following does not detract from their wisdom.

In the light of developments in India today, one must conclude that although bits of the past hang on and persist, industrialization, urbanization, and specialization—in business, in education, and even in politics—is the trend of the times.

# Political Dynamics



## Elections

Elections to public office are not new to India. In the later phases of British rule, Indian representatives to legislative councils were selected by ballot, although the franchise then was limited to those who owned extensive property and could pass tests for literacy. Through the decades to 1947, hundreds of thousands of persons in India had opportunities to vote, not only for upper-level legislative bodies, but also for the assemblies of city corporations, municipal councils, district boards, and rural political institutions. But only since independence have elections taken on the full responsibility for naming those citizens who would control the political life in the country. By the early 1960's, central and

state elections had become a distinct part of the Indian political order, and were accepted as the only legitimate way to decide who would rule.

Political parties in pre-independence days did not so much concern themselves with specific public issues as they did with the growth of the nationalist movement or with the interests of the communities they tended to reflect. But now a mature political party system is in the process of formation, and elections constitute the dynamic force that gives contemporary political parties their unique role and significance. Elections in India since 1947 have been regular, have been fair, and have been accepted.

### *The Electoral System*

The Indian Constitution outlines a federal system of government and defines the way that elections both for central and state governments will be conducted. Part XV of the Constitution specifies the general procedures of elections, and legislation such as the Representation of the People Act, the Delimitation Commission Act, and others spell out the details of the electoral process. All the relevant laws and procedures relating to elections will be found compiled in the official *Election Manual*, which is amended from time to time.

The keystone of the Indian electoral system is a national Election Commission which is all-India in its scope, is independent of executive control, and has constitutional status. The

Chief Election Commissioner holds rights of independence similar to those of a judge, and he administers the Commission without legislative, executive, or political party interference. The Chief Election Commissioner nominates persons in the various sections of India who are to be appointed Regional Commissioners; they, in turn, supervise the work of Chief Electoral Officers in the states and their subordinates. The Election Commission appoints Election Tribunals to consider disputes arising in a given election. Although all or most of the staff of the Election Commission are government servants, when these civil servants are acting in their capacity as officers of the Election Commission, they are not subject to direction in their duties other than under the authority of the Election Commission. The electoral experience in India since 1947 has proved the excellence of the work of the Election Commission, a system of supervision and control that has helped to assure fair and orderly elections.

The electoral process starts with the careful delimitation of constituencies, a job that is performed by Parliament. At first it was intended that a member of Parliament would represent approximately 500,000 to 750,000 constituents. But the rise in population has made it necessary to abolish this principle rather than to force an increase in the size of the House of the People which now is set at 520. Most Indian constituencies are single-member, but in some cases, especially where there are reserved seats for scheduled castes or tribes, double-member constituencies may prevail.

The preparation of electoral rolls is another of the preliminary functions in Indian elections. Since under the Constitution adult suffrage has been granted to all citizens 21 years of age or over, and with a population numbering 438 million in 1961, it is obvious that the preparation of electoral rolls is no simple task. Well over 200 million people are listed on current electoral rolls, and the number rises steadily. Once the preliminary rolls were prepared for the First General Election of 1951-1952, they were published and distributed widely for correction. Revisions are

made regularly, with approximately one-fifth of each state being reviewed meticulously each year. Within the five-year hiatus between normal general elections, the whole electoral roll in every state is reviewed and corrected.

The next major process supervised by the Election Commission is nomination for office. Although political parties determine the names of persons they wish to support, the Election Commission scrutinizes these nominations to be sure that the minimum age of 25, citizenship, and other technical requirements have been met. Nomination papers must be filed formally and a deposit paid (originally Rs. 500 for a parliamentary seat and Rs. 250 for an assembly seat, and subject to alteration), which is returned only if the person paying the deposit receives a minimum of one-sixth of the total valid vote for the seat sought.

Indian elections, in order to be conducted honestly and fairly, are subject to many regulations against corrupt practices, such as bribery, threats to life and limb, and so forth. Candidates must maintain accounts of all expenditures made during the campaign, and a limitation on expenditure is required by law. The Election Commission examines expense accounts carefully; there have been a number of cases since 1947 of invalidation based on improper accounts or a falsification of reporting on financial matters. But some Indian politicians, like those in other countries, have found ways to get around financial restrictions in order to obscure the amount of money expended in their campaigns.

Since a majority of the eligible voters are illiterate, methods have been devised to permit relatively easy selection of one's choices without the necessity either of reading or writing. The method, used until 1962, involved the setting up in each polling booth of a number of boxes, each bearing a unique symbol which represented a particular candidate in that constituency and at the same time the particular political party backing the candidate.

Candidates in their campaigns identified themselves with their party symbol or the symbol that represented their independent status. When a voter entered the polling booth, he dropped his ballot in the box bearing the symbol of his choice, and by that action a vote had taken place. For those who could read, the names of candidates were placed on the polling boxes in local languages.

Starting with the General Election of 1962, a change was made in voting procedures. Ballot papers are now printed bearing the several symbols representing the candidates contesting in the constituency, and the voter is asked to place an "X" beside the symbol of his choice. Polling places are strictly controlled, under orders of the Election Commission, to prevent canvassing from taking place on election day, to take note of illegal transportation provided by candidates or their backers to voters, and to prevent, to the extent possible, improper voting by impersonation. Representatives of the candidates may be present at the polls, one for each, and no more. On the whole, this electoral process has worked so well that the former Election Commissioner, Mr. Sukumar Sen, has spent several years of his retirement as a consultant to other governments in Asia and Africa helping to devise similar election systems.

### *Electoral Participation*

In the General Elections held in India since independence, a sizable portion of the electorate has voted—a far greater proportion than many critics had thought would vote. In the First General Election, held over several weeks in 1951–52, of the 173 million persons eligible to vote, 105 million did vote. In the Second General Elections, in 1957, over 193 million persons were eligible, and 47.7 per cent exercised the franchise. A similar high percentage (51.9) voted in 1962. Although no official figures are available to indicate the extent of participation by women in these elections,

observers have estimated that about 40 per cent of the women eligible to vote did vote. This is remarkable, considering the generally backward status of women in public affairs in India.

### *The Electoral Records*

Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 summarize the parliamentary results of the General Elections of 1951–52, 1957, and 1962. Although these tables for the most part tell their own story in revealing the results of the three most important of the elections held in India, certain characteristics of the results may be worthy of special comment. First, it should be noted that by 1957 the boundaries of the states in India had been changed by the reorganization of 1956, and thus there was a consolidation of states in the 1957 election.

Perhaps the most startling fact about these elections was that the Congress Party captured such a substantial majority each time that all other parties and the independents combined did not come close to matching the Congress Party's strength. Even parties such as the Communist Party of India and the socialist parties, both known to have had broad followings in the country, actually won very few seats. Since in single-member constituencies, especially where there are a number of competing candidates, the candidate gaining the largest bloc of votes will win the seat, it is quite possible for a candidate to win in a constituency with a minority of the total vote, but with a plurality compared with the votes of each other candidate. In the parliamentary election of 1951–52, for example, the Congress gained approximately 45 per cent of the votes, but won 364 seats, which constituted 74 per cent of the total. This may be contrasted with the 10.5 per cent of the vote captured by the socialists, which gave them only 12 parliamentary seats, or 2.5 per cent. The same phenomenon of "bunching" was true of the 1957 and 1962 elections; the Congress Party took less than 50 per cent of the votes polled in 1957 but won an expansive majority in Parliament; with 43 per cent of the popular vote in 1962, the Congress Party took 72.4 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats.

TABLE 6-1 General Election Results, 1951-1952<sup>a</sup>

State	Number of eligible voters	Number of seats	Congress Party	Socialist Party	Kisan Mazdoor		Communist Party of India	Jan Sangh	Hindu Mahasabha	Ram Raya Parishad	Scheduled Castes Federation	Revolutionary Socialist Party	Other Parties	Independents
					Praga Party	Party								
Assam	4,141,720	12	11	1										
Bihar	18,080,181	55	45	3									6	1
Bombay	16,790,399	45	40								1		1	3
Madhya Pradesh	1,075,140	29	27											2
Madras	26,980,956	75	35	2	6	8							9	15
Orissa	7,708,161	20	11	1		1							5	2
Punjab	6,718,345	18	16										2	
Uttar Pradesh	31,770,309	86	81	2					1					2
West Bengal	12,497,714	34	24			5	2	1				2		
Hyderabad	9,035,497	25	14	1		7					1		1	1
Madhya Bharat	4,090,857	11	9						2					
Mysore	3,969,735	11	10		1									
P.E.P.S.U.	1,763,591	5	2										2	1
Rajasthan	7,676,419	20	9				1			3			1	6
Saurashtra	1,838,880	6	6											
Travancore-Cochin	4,210,244	12	6									1	1	4
Ajmer	329,484	2	2											
Bhopal	419,970	2	2											
Bilaspur	68,130	1												1
Coorg	94,593	1	1											
Delhi	744,668	4	3		1									
Himachal Pradesh	531,018	3	3											
Kutch	288,400	2	2											
Manipur	298,552	2	1	1										
Tripura	329,806	2				2								
Vindhya Pradesh	1,760,926	6	4	1	1									
Totals	173,213,635	489	364	12	9	23	3	4		3	2	3	28	38

<sup>a</sup> Source. Report on the First General Elections in India, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Election Commission, 1955), Vol. II, Statistical; and Margaret W Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, *The Indian Experience with Democratic Elections*, Indian Press Digests Monograph No. 3 (Berkeley, California: University of California, Indian Press Digests, 1956).

TABLE 6-2 *General Election Results, 1957*<sup>a</sup>

State	Number of eligible voters	Number of seats	Congress Party	Pragya Socialist Party	Communist Party of India	Jan Sangh	Thakhand	Scheduled Castes Federation	Ganatantra Parishad	Other parties	Independents
Andhra Pradesh	17,668,716	43	37		2					2	2
Assam	4,495,359	12	9	2							1
Bihar	19,514,567	53	41	2			6			3	1
Bombay	24,458,672	66	38	5	4	2		5		4	8
Kerala	7,514,626	18	6	1	9						2
Madhya Pradesh	14,010,137	36	35							1	
Madras	17,514,993	41	31		2						8
Mysore	10,006,926	26	23	1				1			1
Orissa	7,983,915	20	7	2	1				7		3
Punjab	9,208,926	22	21		1						
Rajasthan	8,745,726	22	19								3
Uttar Pradesh	34,901,603	86	70	4	1	2					9
West Bengal	15,216,532	36	23	2	6					2	3
Delhi	976,352	5	5								
Himachal Pradesh	671,906	4	4								
Manipur	330,211	2	1								1
Tripura	432,902	2	1		1						
Totals	193,652,069	494	371	19	27	4	6	6	7	12	42

<sup>a</sup> Source: *Report on the Second General Elections in India*, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Election Commission, 1959), Vol. II, Statistical.

Close students of Indian elections must examine electoral prospects on a state-by-state and constituency-by-constituency basis, for it would be quite possible in many parts of the country for a coalition of like-minded parties and independents to join forces in opposition to the Congress and, by a shrewd combination of electoral affiliations, to reduce substantially

the present hold of the Congress Party on Indian politics.

The results of the elections of 1951-52, 1957, and 1962 do not reveal adequately the strength of the Communist Party of India. The number of seats that the CPI has been able to take in Parliament and in the assemblies of the states has in most instances not been great. (In Kerala, of course, the CPI in 1957 gained sufficient seats to form the government. They held power in Kerala for twenty-eight months until the President of India put an end to the government by procla-

TABLE 6-3 General Election Results, 1962<sup>a</sup>

State	Number of seats	Elections completed	Congress Party	Praja Socialist Party	Communist Party of India	Jan Sangh	Socialist Party of India	Swatantra	Other parties	Independents
Andhra Pradesh	43	43	34	—	7	—	—	1	—	1
Assam	12	12	9	2	—	—	—	—	1	—
Bihar	53	53	39	2	1	—	1	7	3	—
Gujarat	22	22	16	1	—	—	—	4	—	1
Kerala	18	18	6	—	6	—	—	—	3	3
Madhya Pradesh	36	36	23	3	—	4	1	—	1	4
Madras	41	41	31	—	2	—	—	—	8	—
Maharashtra	44	40	37	1	—	—	—	—	—	2
Mysore	26	26	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Orissa	20	20	14	1	—	—	1	—	4	—
Punjab	22	21	13	—	—	3	1	—	3	1
Rajasthan	22	22	14	—	—	1	—	3	1	3
Uttar Pradesh	86	83	60	2	2	7	1	2	4	5
West Bengal	36	36	22	—	9	—	—	—	3	2
Jammu & Kashmir	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS	487	473 <sup>b</sup>	343	12	27	15	5	17	31	23

## Union Territories

Delhi	5	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Himachal Pradesh	4	— <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Manipur	2	— <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tripura	2	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—

<sup>a</sup> Source: *India News*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Washington, D. C.: Embassy of India, April 27, 1962), p. 4.<sup>b</sup> Final election results not available at the time of this report.

mation on July 31, 1959.) Elections held since 1946, however, show a steady increase in the popular vote gained by the CPI. If the popular vote continues to increase steadily, it is likely that succeeding elections will result in many more CPI candidates being elected. Leaving aside niceties of analysis, the Congress Party has succeeded in dominating the central and state General Elections held to date, and the Congress Party is likely to hold this lead for the next decade, or at least as long as the leadership of Mr. Nehru and the group that supports him remain in power.

### *Local Elections*

At other than General Election time, elections are held for the legislative bodies of city corporations, municipal councils, district boards, and for village *panchayats* (councils). The franchise varies for these bodies, however. The Bombay Corporation is formed on the basis of a wide suffrage, whereas the Calcutta Corporation is elected by a narrow electorate of the wealthy and highly placed. Village elections, open to all, sometimes are conducted by a show of hands, thus practically assuring the return to village-level public office of the dominant, creditor castes.

Many of India's political leaders have hoped that local government would remain apart from partisan politics. But the city corporations were coveted by the parties during British times when they were among the few places where nationalist parties were permitted to capture legislative power. All the way down the line to *panchayats* in the villages, local affairs today have become arenas for partisan politics.

## The Party System

India since 1947 has been in the process of developing a mature political party system. Nominally, the system now in effect

is of the multi-party variety. But as we noted in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3, the Congress Party has secured such massive majorities in Parliament that contending groups provide meaningful opposition only as critics who sharpen and publicize major issues. The situation in almost all the states is nearly the same. In only a few, such as in Kerala, have other parties been able to capture a sufficient number of the seats in state legislative assemblies to provide a bargaining position with the Congress. A greater measure of stabilization in the party system is likely to occur only when political parties with similar ideological objectives merge to form groups sizable enough to be realistic candidates for the control of political power.

A list of all the political parties in India would be a very long list indeed. But dozens of these parties are strictly local; many of them are of no significance at all, except that they represent the political outlook of a given personality and his small coterie of followers; many of the others have some significance in one or a few states, but they are not strong enough to affect either state or national elections.

The national parties, such as the Congress, the Praja Socialists, and even the Communist Party of India, are structured along lines that roughly correspond to the organization of the country into administrative-linguistic states. Both at the time of general elections and when some national issue seems to be of great importance to the central leadership of these parties, the national objectives of the parties appear. But at other times, the power of the national parties is localized, and local leaders are able to dominate without particular reference to national party objectives. (The Communist Party, of course, is much more disciplined and centralized.) In this sense, the major Indian political parties are closer in structure to the parties of the United States than they are to the more unified and disciplined parties of Great Britain. At the same time, Indian parties maintain party discipline in Parliament and in the Assemblies, differing in this respect from United States parties.



It is difficult to anticipate when the political party system of India will be able to be classified as "mature and stable." In all probability, that time will arrive only when the Congress Party is opposed by one other political party (or a coalition of parties) that is able to maintain a disciplined unity of purpose over a period of at least five years. Variations along multi-party lines also would be possible. But Congress dominance can play one force against another in systems of multi-party balance.

### *Political Parties*

The major political parties of India are aligned ideologically from the Communist Party on the left, through the Praja Socialist Party and the Congress Party in the "democratic socialist" center, to the economically conservative Swatantra Party on the center right, and finally to more tradition-oriented and generally conservative Hindu parties (such as the Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha) on the right. The rest of India's parties can be placed along this political spectrum.

As we have seen, the Congress is the leading political party of India. Founded in 1885 by a group of able and vigorous urban leaders, the Indian National Congress (as it was then called) was responsible for constructing the nationalist movement under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and his predecessors, leading India to independence. Through all of the years since 1885, the Congress has had no serious rival for national leadership. As of the early 1960's, the Congress is led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and is supported by a large proportion of the country's ruling elite, both in rural and urban areas. This party has not experienced any serious opposition; in Parliament no contending party has taken a sufficient number of seats to be recognized as the official opposition. Parliamentary "opposition" has consisted of a coalition of parties that tends to be unstable in its challenge of the ruling party's policies.

The Congress Party is run from its central offices in New Delhi and is organized systematically down through the states, cities,

towns, districts, and even to many of the villages of India. It is headed by a president who normally is elected at the Annual Session held just before the new year opens. The president administers party affairs with the help of one or more general-secretaries, aided by the All-India Congress Committee headquartered in New Delhi—the central control organ of the Congress Party. The Working Committee, however, is the center of the party's real political power. The Working Committee is partially appointed by the president (one-third is elected by the All-India Congress Committee) and is intended to reflect the party leaders' estimate of the most significant interests within the Congress that should be represented on the body that recommends major political policies for the Congress Party to follow. Usually, the most important of the chief ministers in the states are appointed to the Working Committee, along with a few members of the central government's cabinet, and selected other political leaders who may or may not at that time head or lead governments. An effort is made to appoint some person to represent women's interests, and a reasonable balance is maintained between advocates of modernization along western lines and spokesmen of more traditional views. The Working Committee technically does not make policy; it only recommends, either to the All-India Congress Committee, or to the Annual Session of the Congress—the final authority within the party. But very seldom has the advice of the Working Committee not been accepted.

In each of the states, a headquarters administers party affairs within that state. The state party hierarchy is complex and moves down from the capital of the state to (in some cases) regions within the state, to city headquarters, district headquarters, and below. Close liaison is maintained between party leaders and party representatives in Parliament and in the state assemblies through the Congress Party offices located in Parliament

House and in the assembly buildings, the natural haunts of government whips.

Because the Congress Party was the nationalist party in pre-independence days, it feels it has the right to carry out in practice the objectives it sought for so many decades. Many Congressmen do not consider their party to be a "political party" in the usual sense. They often speak of it as the "national party," meaning by this that the process of nation-building should be kept non-partisan, which is to say be conducted by the Congress.

Since the Congress dominates Indian politics to the extent it does, some critics have felt that India might best be characterized as a one-party state. There is much merit in this analysis, although, of course, technically and formally it is not true. In practice, there is more active and meaningful politics carried on within the structure of the Congress Party, between its regional and ideological factions and interests groups, than between the several recognized political parties of the country. The voices of opposing political groups are heard in the legislative halls, and opposition views are given a reasonable press. But the superior finances of the Congress Party, its large and relatively effective party apparatus, and its control over the enormous bureaucracy of government give it an overwhelming lead in Indian politics.

Factionalism within the Congress arises both along ideological and regional lines. In terms of sheer numbers, Congress Party leaders at local and state levels are far more inclined to conservatism in economic theory and to traditionalism culturally than is the top leadership under Mr. Nehru in New Delhi. But the powerful presence of Mr. Nehru and his associates at the party's helm have to date been able to check the more conservative and traditional threat that rests deep in the local organizations of the party. The struggle for succession to Mr. Nehru's leadership, although kept as quiet as possible and

as distant from public discussion as is reasonable, nevertheless is underway. It is likely that when Mr. Nehru leaves Congress leadership, an open struggle between the "modernists" and "traditionalists" (a dichotomy more economic than cultural) will break out, the result of which is difficult to determine in advance. Because the liberal and democratic socialist program of the party has been greatly strengthened since 1947, the more liberal segment of the party will probably be able to hold power even after Mr. Nehru's departure. Many of the more tradition-minded party members will then probably leave the Congress, either to join other more conservatively oriented parties or to form a new group to oppose the "socialist" Congress.

The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) is a group that stemmed originally from the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), formed as a part of the Indian National Congress in 1934. The Congress Socialist Party, headed by Jayaprakash Narayan, was intended to be a faction within the Congress that would attempt over time to persuade the Congress to adopt socialist objectives. The CSP existed until 1948 when its members resigned from the Congress because they would not agree to be disciplined by the Congress Party leadership. A Socialist Party was formed under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan, Narendra Dev, and Asoka Mehta in time to fight the battle of the First General Election. The socialist leaders thought they had a broad following in the country and would be able to win enough seats in Parliament to be recognized as the official opposition. But the party captured only 12 seats, in contrast with the Congress Party's 364. Following the First General Election, the Socialist Party merged with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (Farmer, Worker, People's Party—KMPP), then headed by Acharya J. B. Kripalani, to form the Praja (People's) Socialist Party. This group, under the presidency of Kripalani, was able to win only 19 parliamentary seats in the General Election of 1957. The PSP's electoral record in the states was equally dismal. The failure of the PSP in 1962 to gain parliamentary and assembly seats shows that the party has not

been able to build its popular strength to a substantially higher level. This has caused considerable puzzlement and dismay among the party's leadership.

Indeed, the leader of the Praja Socialists, Asoka Mehta, has proposed that opposition parties work amicably with the dominant Congress on all public issues where the parties are in general agreement, and actively oppose the government and party in power only when a critical matter of principle is involved. Asoka Mehta's reading of the power situation in the country probably has been correct; he has been concerned that the economic plight of India is such that opposition for opposition's sake makes no sense under the circumstances. But the consequence to Mehta's Party of his outlook has been a decrease in the popularity of the socialists as a party, giving even greater strength to the Congress as the party of effective rule.

The Communist Party of India (CPI), founded originally by M. N. Roy in the mid-1920's, has had a relatively slow growth. But this growth has been steady, particularly among urban workers and the intelligentsia. More recently, the CPI has turned its attention to rural regions in states such as West Bengal and others along the northern border in a campaign to build an effective mass movement.

Politically, the Communist Party of India has been able to capture only a very modest number of seats in Parliament, as Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 show. In the states, however, the CPI has been a power to be reckoned with: in Andhra, in West Bengal, and especially in Kerala where the CPI actually headed the government from 1957 until President's Rule was declared in 1959.

The CPI characteristically has maintained tight control and discipline over its membership. The party seldom has ranged in membership much over 50,000, but voters favoring the CPI in elections number in the many millions. In addition to party members and party supporters at elections, there are millions more in the country who, in their frustration arising from the slow pace of economic growth, support the alternative offered by the Com-

munists as a party that might have some chance of moving the country more rapidly toward a higher standard of living.

During most of the 1950's and into the 1960's, the CPI has followed the tactic of the "parliamentary front," encouraging the view that the CPI is simply one of several legitimate political parties offering a variety of alternatives at the polls to the people of India. In Parliament, and in the state assemblies where the CPI has elected members, Communist spokesmen have been active participants in legislative affairs, and in fact have been constructive critics and well-informed speakers on behalf of measures proposed by the Congress. Electoral success in Kerala, and a gradually increasing popular vote in a number of the states, have convinced the CPI that at least at the present time the tactic of parliamentary cooperation is the most fruitful one for them to follow. Kerala was the first constitutional government to be captured anywhere in the world by a Communist Party without the assistance of an armed force. It is quite possible—even probable—that the CPI, despite election losses since 1957, will successfully capture some other state governments in the future, and do it on the basis of the legitimate authority given to them by the electorate at the polls.

Since 1959, when Prime Minister Nehru announced in Parliament that Communist China was claiming over 42,000 square miles of Indian territory along the Tibetan borders, many of the Communist sympathizers and fellow-travelers in India have been disillusioned with Communism and the CPI. Here the national interest was strong enough to overcome a predilection toward the radical alternative provided by the Communist Left. But the CPI is by no means a dead party. Its leaders include some of the most competent analysts and strategists in Indian politics, and its disciplined membership is hard working and is spurred on by the objective of the socialist society it feels must come to India if a

better life is to be brought to the peasants and workers.

In the summer of 1959, a new political party, called the Swatantra (or "Freedom") Party, was founded under the leadership of a former Congress leader from Madras, Mr. Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. The party's officers include such persons as the peasant leader from Andhra, Professor N. G. Ranga, a former Congress cabinet member and governor, K. M. Munshi, and India's leading anti-Communist spokesman, Minoo R. Masani.

The Swatantra Party was organized to make available to the country a more conservative approach to economics, one that would restrict the level of public enterprise, would expand to the full the private sector and thereby hopefully assist the more rapid expansion of the economy. The party opposes forms of cooperative farming that would detach the individual peasant from his own lands. On foreign policy, the party has been vocally anti-Communist, as well as strongly nationalistic, but critical of Mr. Nehru. And on many issues, as a matter of principle, the national party has chosen not to take a stand, but has encouraged party members to voice their own individual opinions.

It is too early to say what measure of success the Swatantra Party will have in future state and national elections. Swatantra strength in a few states, such as Bihar, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Orissa, was sizable after the 1962 elections. And because of the rather large number of leaders in this party possessing national reputations, the Swatantra Party will have a group representing them in Parliament. But the party appeals primarily to the business community, to some of the landed peasantry (such as that led by N. G. Ranga), to some of the small businessmen and a few intellectuals and to a fairly large number of people in states such as Gujarat and Bihar where former princes are able to hold the allegiance of their

former "subjects." This kind of backing is not the kind that is apt to gain a mass following.

India's other political parties are not of equal importance to those discussed above. The Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha, as well as the Ram Rajya Parishad and the Ganatantra Parishad, represent a traditional Hindu outlook; the only electoral success that they have been able to gain has been in state, municipal, and local elections where traditional modes of behavior are more susceptible to Hindu communal appeals. The strength of these parties may increase at a later stage if there is a split in the Congress between those of democratic socialist persuasion and those of Hindu tradition. Some local parties, such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham in Madras (which is fostering a movement for an independent state in South India), and the Akali Dal in Punjab (which is demanding a separate state for the Sikhs), have unique principles and objectives.

#### *The Political Roles of Parties*

The Congress Party has been an important integrating force in India. The complex party apparatus, and the many public personalities of note among Congressmen, have helped to give a sense of drama and purpose to government, and have tied together the national objectives with those of the states. Certainly this task has been made easier because one political party has had the responsibility for the whole national task. But one should also bear in mind that other political parties, particularly the PSP, and CPI, and the Jan Sangh, have presented to the public alternative policies that, while having virtually no chance of winning at the polls, have nevertheless focused the attention of the public on the political issues of the day. Jawaharlal Nehru often has spoken of India's General Elections as being massive efforts in public education. And, indeed, these elections have performed the task of identifying issues, of illuminating the conflicts involved in the making of public policy, and of bringing a sense of political sophistication to the electorate.

But the weak nature of the opposition has

not encouraged the public to make sharp political distinctions. When all is said and done, very few voters have been willing to vote their ideological convictions and cast their ballot for some splinter party or local group, since they have felt they would be "wasting their vote"; the Congress, they believe, in its monolithic way, inevitably would move on and capture power. Why not vote for the winners? Political sophistication has not yet reached the point where many backers of political parties are willing to "waste their vote" as part of the process of developing stronger opposition parties.

Governmental stability has been provided by the Congress Party from 1947, and only in a few of the states have there been any questions raised about who, legitimately, should rule. In this sense, the Congress Party has given India a much more stable political order than those to be found in most other parts of Asia. But stable government is not necessarily good government. In India's case, responsible government has been bolstered by Mr. Nehru's insistence that the opposition have a voice in the making of public policy, even if they did not have sufficient strength to force the majority to listen to their views.

## Political Interest Groups

Interest groups representing the realms of business, labor, the peasantry, students, women, various religious communities, and the castes do play political roles in India of some importance. But the government of India does not approve of the direct involvement of interest lobbies in the making of public policy, and the stringency of the law does not encourage interest groups to press their views, except indirectly. It is left primarily to the political parties to adopt or reject the major special interest pleadings, and to make those they accept the interests of party policy. At the level of state politics, interest groups tend to be more powerful.

The trade-union movement in India is split along party lines. The Indian National Trade Union Congress (I.N.T.U.C.), formed under

the auspices of the Congress Party in 1947, is the labor front for the majority party. The Praja Socialist Party controls the central core of the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (Indian Labor Association—HMS), whereas the Communists dominate the All-India Trade Union Congress (A.I.T.U.C.). Congress, PSP, and CPI political leaders often get their apprenticeships in public life working as organizers in the trade-union field. Occasionally, a well-known political leader is brought in to strengthen the administration of the union organization. A good many of the top-ranking political leaders in India today, including Jawaharlal Nehru, have at one time held high office in the labor field, even though they could scarcely be said to have come up from the ranks of labor. Few Indian union leaders were or are from the working classes.

Peasant and student interest groups are also divided along party lines. Today, the Farmers' Forum and the Bharat Sevak Samaj (Indian Service Association) reflect Congress Party views on rural problems, whereas the Kisan Sabha (Farmers' Association) is Communist controlled and the Kisan Panchayat (Farmers' Council) is a Praja Socialist Party organ in the countryside. Among students, the most powerful interest group is the All-India Student Federation that was captured by the Communists during World War II, and which remains Communist in orientation. The semi-abortive Youth Congress, founded by the Congress Party in 1955 to replace a fully abortive predecessor organization, claims a large membership, but has low prestige among Indian college students. The Socialist Student Organization has never succeeded in capturing student attention, but its units represent PSP views.

Before independence, there were a number of women's associations among interest groups. But many of these organizations were deliberately allowed to dissolve. Women leaders, such as Hansa Mehta and Kamaladevi Chat-

topadhyaya, argue that with independence women must fight for their rights within appropriate functional organizations, such as political parties, and not as segregated lobbies.

The business community is one of the exceptions to the general rule of political domination over interest groups. Most business leaders in India are cautiously sympathetic to the Congress Party, among other reasons because the Congress holds such a powerful majority that to oppose concrete strength in favor of vague hopes for something better does not seem to be prudent or "businesslike." But the employers have formed numerous associations, such as the Indian Jute Mills Association and the Indian Tea Association, to represent their interests and to make their views known to the public. More important to business in general have been the chambers of commerce, such as the Bharat Chamber of Commerce representing the Marwari community, the Indian Chamber of Commerce, and others in every major industrial, commercial, and financial center in India. These chambers of commerce, with or without the financial assistance of individual business leaders, publish reports and pamphlets, and underwrite the publishing of business journals such as *Capital* (Calcutta), *Indian Finance* (New Delhi), or the *Eastern Economist* (New Delhi) that spread the voice of Indian business to those who will read it.

A unique kind of interest group to be found in India is the "caste lobby." These lobbies foster the regional interests of particular castes and demand support from members of the same caste in the legislatures. More careful study probably would reveal a greater potency in these caste group ties than is usually thought to be present. Another strong Hindu bond is the relationship that exists between some Indian legislators and the leaders of their religious sects. Followers of Ramakrishna, Sri Aurobindo, or Anandamayi, for example, are likely to be influenced

by the teachings of their masters; religious teachings in India normally have political overtones.

But one must return to the generalization that interest-group behavior in India does not follow the pattern that students of politics have found so common in the West. The Congress Party's predominance has perhaps tended to obscure interest-group influence; Congress' leadership is safe enough to enable the party to make policy along doctrinaire and unresponsive lines if it wishes, since no other political group or combination of interest organizations can possibly threaten the power of the Congress Party. As a substantial opposition arises in India, interest groups will also probably achieve more influence. It is not at all certain that this change will be an asset.

## Political Leadership

Leadership in Indian politics, at all levels except those from the village up to the district, is held mostly by educated, urban, Hindu, male civilians of relatively high caste. There are Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and members of other religions among the leaders, of course, but Hindus, naturally, are in the vast majority. Women in politics are statistical rarities, although there are a number of women of exceptional ability in the legislatures, in high party office, and in ministerial positions. An occasional rural leader of little education rises to the top, but to date there have been very few. On the other hand, rural leaders of education now are beginning to rise, especially in state governments.

The military services contain many highly educated officers who are thoroughly trained for public service, civilian or military, and some of these officers do transfer into high governmental posts. But civilian control over the military, and military avoidance of political entanglements, are two principles seldom questioned in India. It is conceivable that a crisis in the maintenance of national security or a threat to national unity might occur at a time when civilian political leadership was in-

adequate to handle the situation. Leaders from the military certainly would be competent to administer martial law effectively, or even to establish a military government. Such a prospect does not appear likely, however, considering the several echelons of able political leaders that are available to carry on the responsibilities of government.

A great many of India's top-level political leaders are intellectually inclined, and a surprising number of books, pamphlets, and articles of significance have come from the pens of contemporary leaders. Long years in jail under the British permitted them to read widely and write extensively. Intellect and a contemplative nature appear to be assets for senior status in Indian political life. Former President Rajendra Prasad was a leading scholar in his university and has written a considerable amount on politics and religion. President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is India's best-known philosopher and an author of many learned books. Prime Minister Nehru is perhaps as well known as the author of his autobiography and the *Discovery of India* as he is for his years of public service. Gandhi, of course, was a prolific writer whose collected works will fill over 100 volumes. Humayun Kabir, Minister of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, is a poet and author and was a professor; Dr. B. C. Roy, the late Chief Minister of West Bengal, was a noted surgeon and financial expert, in addition to holding high rank in India's public affairs. C. Rajagopalachari has written interpretations of the Indian epics, and K. M. Munshi is a leading literary critic and author. The list could be expanded.

Strangely enough for India, men strictly of religious outlook are not especially prevalent in politics. Men of piety—Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim—do find places in politics, providing they are competent in the hurly-burly of partisan conflict as well. The new leadership coming up, the so-called "traditional elite," is more sympathetic to communal Hindu interests than are today's top leaders. Adult suffrage, combined with a higher quality local education and better communications, is drawing men from the rural areas who are chal-

lenging the septuagenarian leadership that now holds power.

Some of the important characteristics of political leadership in India may become more clear if we examine some of the qualities exhibited by a group of twentieth-century leaders. Mahatma Gandhi was one of the truly creative personalities of the first half of this century. Perhaps it is improper to put him in the same category as those who will be discussed later. Gandhi was a symbolic link between the past, present, and future generations of Indian civilization. He is considered to be the model in politics for the rural—but not necessarily traditional—elites who now are rising to great influence. Throughout his long political life, Gandhi spent as much time as he could spare in contemplation of the eternal verities. He constantly sought to improve his own moral being, and made clear to his followers that self-searching was to him at least as important as nation-building. But Gandhi also was a man of politics. He was alert to the complexities of personal relationships and somehow was able to deal with the highly intellectual and businesslike men and women of the cities, at the same time that he lived and worked with villagers of little or no education who possessed few of the sophisticated niceties of behavior.

Gandhi's strength in political leadership stemmed from his personal identification with the ways of life of the majority of the Indian people. By making apparent in his dress, his diet, and his traditional approach to matters such as farming and medicine that he understood the plight of Indian villagers, Gandhi not only gained the affection of the villagers but also educated upper-income nationalists to the bedrock rural truth of Indian social life. Gandhi was at the same time a highly intelligent and shrewd political negotiator for whom no detail was too small to receive serious attention. Gandhi was displeased when his followers were to the least degree slovenly

about the meticulous work that constituted successful Gandhian politics. Identification with the masses, an inner sense of righteousness, and hard, painstaking attention to detail were among Gandhi's qualities as a leader.

One of Gandhi's lieutenants, who was closer to him in political outlook than in spiritual matters, was Vallabhbhai Patel, the late Deputy Prime Minister of India. Patel's strength as a leader was his administrative capacity and his unique ability to pull together the many strands of the Congress Party into an effective organization. Patel was a difficult man to convince, but once convinced he bulldoggedly pressed his policy into operation. To many in the Congress of more Left-wing persuasion, Patel was considered a reactionary who opposed planned and rapid economic growth and who sought to restore to India some measure of the greatness of the Hindu past. But these were the very characteristics that endeared Patel to a large section of the Congress in the states, which were far more traditionally oriented than was the leadership in independent India under Nehru. In strictly political terms, Patel was a party boss of the highest ability. Since his death, the Congress Party has not brought forward any one of such great organizing capacity.

Jawaharlal Nehru, like Gandhi, is a unique figure among India's top leadership. Nehru is (at least) agnostic in his religious beliefs. His aristocratic and fastidious upbringing have made him contemptuous of many of the characteristic ways of the peasants and workers in India. Although in the abstract Nehru has been the friend of the working classes, his friendship toward them tends to be aloof and intellectual, rather than warm and empathetic. It is perhaps the "princely" quality in Nehru that has brought him closest to the Indian people. Nehru does not pretend to be anything other than a leader. He looks like a leader; he acts with a flare and with a sense of drama; his language reflects a self-knowledge

of the history he is making; his dress is as immaculate and distinguished (but certainly not as foppish) as that of any prince from the past. Indeed, Nehru is India's romantic modern prince. To Nehru's dismay, many villagers call him "prince." But what could be more natural? What could be more advantageous politically?

Subhas Chandra Bose in the late 1930's was a leader of the Congress from Bengal; later he founded a new political party, the Forward Bloc. During World War II, he was the leader of the Indian National Army—first in Berlin with the Germans and later in Southeast Asia under Japanese auspices—which was an army that hoped to liberate India from British imperial hands by force of arms. Subhas Bose was a man of action, a type that has a long tradition in the history of India. Though dead since 1945, he is by no means forgotten. On the colored posters adorning the walls of shops throughout India, pictures of Gandhi and Nehru normally appear; in many cases, a portrait of Subhas Bose completes the collection. The most common portrait of Bose shows him in the uniform of the Indian National Army; the background usually includes symbols of strength and warfare. It is a mistake to think of India as being strictly non-violent in temperament. Gandhi stressed the non-violent strain, and there are a good many followers of this tradition today; Subhas Bose represents an equally old tradition of strength and power and action and, if necessary, violence. Particularly in states such as West Bengal, Punjab, and Maharashtra, persons of power and action, such as Subhas Bose, are more honored today than is Gandhi.

M. N. Roy, founder of the Communist Party of India and, in the post-World War II years, the founder of a humanist movement, was an uncommon Indian leader who frankly was a materialist and an atheist, even after he left the Communist Party; he decried the spiritualism of the Indian heritage because he felt it had led to the sad condition of modern India's social and economic life. Roy was a severe critic both of Gandhi and of Nehru, and he lectured and wrote *against* the force



of nationalism. Roy formed a political party, the Radical Democratic Party, to gain adherents for his radical humanist views, but he was unable to gain more than a limited personal following because his criticism of faith, religion, and nationalism alienated him from the mainstream of Indian thought. As a powerful and yet austere personality, Roy was honored. As a political leader, he was all but ignored. Roy did not appeal to the Indian emotions; he appealed to their brains. In India

successful politics is not constructed by brains alone.

Each of these five persons possesses characteristics that appeal to particular groups in India. The one characteristic that all have in common is a dramatic individuality that sets them apart from all the hundreds of other contenders for political power. It is this personal magnetism—charisma if you will—that every person who aspires to high place in Indian political life must possess.

# Decision-Making: The Organs of Government

## VII

### The Constitution

One of the major tasks facing India's nation-builders was the writing of a constitution that would reflect the most relevant political wisdom of India's past, and yet would fulfill the requirements of a government bent upon broad social and economic reforms. After long discussion and debate by the Constituent Assembly that met almost continuously between December, 1946, and November, 1949, a Constitution was framed for the Republic of India that became effective on January 26, 1950. This Constitution embodies the results of years of experience with various experiments in constitutional government conducted during the period of British rule. The Government of India Act of 1935, the last con-

stitutional arrangement made in British times, was incorporated into several sections of the new document. In addition, governmental structures and principles borrowed from countries such as Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States were adapted for Indian use, and were made parts of the Constitution.

The government established under the Constitution of 1950 follows a federal pattern, with enumerated powers divided between the several states and the central government, and with a list of concurrent functions that either the states or the central government can exercise, but with preference granted to the central government to utilize a given "concurrent" function. The greater element of power at the moment rests with New Delhi, even though much of the authority for executing social and economic change is given to the states. The Indian Constitution is more federal in appearance than in reality because of the financial control held by the Government of India in New Delhi. The power wielded by the central government has been very great in almost every sector of public life, including those sectors, like education and economic development, that, on the surface, seem to be assigned to the states. As the state governments gain in experience and in familiarity with the exercise of political power, the ascendancy of New Delhi over the states may be challenged; the states will be able to cite constitutional principles to support their states' rights contentions.

Rather than the presidential system as practiced in the United States, India's constitution-makers chose to follow a form of cabinet government similar to that found in Great Britain. The President acts as the head of state in matters of ceremony and of parliamentary procedures, and on these duties he is advised by his Council of Ministers.

The Constitution is a long and complex document of 395 articles, to which have been added a number of detailed schedules. It should be remembered, however, that the Constitution of the Republic of India encompasses the whole of the federal structure; one section in this document covers the principles of state government, a section that, in effect, is the constitution for each of the states. Nevertheless, the detailed nature of the Constitution and its many ambiguities have led to numerous law suits over constitutional interpretation that have made the Constitution a lawyers' paradise ever since its enactment in 1950.

The philosophy of the Constitution is embodied in its Preamble and in the "Directive Principles of State Policy," that, while being non-justiciable, do establish the goals toward which the Government of India is expected to strive. Here are the objectives of the Constitution as set out in the Preamble:

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation;

IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY . . . DO HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.

In general terms, the Constitution establishes a central government, headed by a President who presides over a bicameral legislature or Parliament (Fig. 7-1). The Parliament, headed formally by the President, is controlled by the President's Council of Ministers, which is led by the Prime Minister who acts as the effective source of executive power. The Cab-

inet, made up of senior ministers, is responsible collectively to the Parliament. The central bureaucracy is subject to the control of the executive, which is to say of the Prime Minister. A Supreme Court is established as the highest judicial body in India, holding among other rights those of judicial review. At the state level, governments are headed formally by governors, who are advised on their executive actions by cabinets headed by chief ministers, who in turn are collectively responsible with their respective cabinets to the states' legislatures. Each state's bureaucracy is controlled by the chief minister and his ministerial cabinet associates. A High Court in each major state considers judicial issues arising within the state and forwards to the Supreme Court those cases that constitutionally must be decided at the higher level.

The Constituent Assembly, in devising the Constitution of 1950, debated at length whether or not to include the "due process" principle, thus expanding the Supreme Court's functions of judicial review. Ultimately, it was decided not to include such a clause. Instead, the phrase "in accordance with law" was introduced. This choice of language means, in effect, that Parliament, under the Indian Constitution, retains the primary right to decide what government policy should be. The Indian principle more closely follows British practices than those in the United States, where the due process clause has been an important source of authority for the Supreme Court's right to exercise judicial review. In India, the question of deciding whether or not appropriate legislative and/or administrative procedures have been followed by the non-judicial organs of government is, in most cases, the responsibility of Parliament. It was this consideration of parliamentary supremacy that enabled the Indian Parliament to include in the Constitution (Articles 21 and 22) the right of the state to detain persons preventively, in times of peace, without the neces-




FIGURE 7-1 ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. (*The Indian Institute of Public Administration, The Organization of the Government of India. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1956, facing p. 32.*)

sity of granting the “due process” of judicial safeguards to those whom the executive branch of government felt might endanger the peace and general welfare of the state.

Preventive detention, continuously attacked by advocates of civil and political rights, has remained in force since 1950 as a working symbol of the belief, held by India’s present

rulers, that threats to civil order in India demand that more authority be left in the hands of the executive than the high ideals of the Constitution would “normally” permit. The danger, of course, is that powers such as those of preventive detention, once tasted, may never be relinquished by the executive. “Normal conditions” may never prevail; one cannot be sure that such powers, exercised responsibly by one group of leaders, may not be misused by another, who in turn will be supported by the precedents set in a more “responsible” era. India is caught by the classic conflict

between urges for freedom and the search for security. In this instance, security has the upper hand.

Legislation, however, may be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court under the authority granted to the Court by Article 132 of the Constitution. In such circumstances, Parliament's recourse is to amend the Constitution. As of 1961, Parliament had amended the Constitution nine times, and other amendments have been introduced since 1961; some of the changes were broad and significant. With the following exceptions—cases involving the election of the President, limitations on the powers of the states or the central government, the legislative relations between the central government and the states and their specified powers, and the representation in Parliament of the states (in all these instances, ratification by the legislatures of not less than half the states is required)—the Parliament may amend the Constitution by a simple procedure. After an amendment bill is introduced in either House of Parliament and is passed in both houses by a majority of not less than two-thirds of those Members in each house present and voting, the bill is presented to the President for his assent. Since the Congress Party has held a substantial majority in Parliament since 1947, amendments have not been difficult to pass.

The Indian Constitution is a unique document. Complicated and detailed it may be—and imperfect, because of the compromises between idealism and realism upon which it rests. Nevertheless, it has worked with relative effectiveness in the years since 1950 as the formal structure within which one of the few stable governments in Asia has done its work.

## The Legislature

Legislative power in the central government and in the states of India is organized along lines familiar to students of British government and politics. Parliament is made up of two houses: a lower house, the Lok Sabha (House of the People) of no more than 520 members, and an upper house, the Rajya

Sabha (Council of States) of no more than 250 members, including 12 representatives of the arts and professions appointed by the President. The upper house is presided over by the Vice-President of India; an elected Speaker presides over the lower house. The upper house is by no means as important as the lower house for purposes of legislation. However, as with the House of Lords in Great Britain, the Rajya Sabha permits more leisurely and extended debate, and provides a home for a large number of India's elder statesmen. The upper house is a continuous body and is not subject to dissolution. About one-third of its members retire every second year. Since all but the twelve members nominated by the President are elected by the state legislatures, the Rajya Sabha does give Parliament an organic tie to the legislatures of the states.

The officers of the major political parties operating within the two houses are officially recognized, and the majority party's leader and his whips, as well as spokesmen for the opposition, are given the necessary facilities for operating the affairs of Parliament. India's parliamentary-cabinet form of government plus a system of political parties, headed by the Congress Party, which holds a substantial parliamentary majority, have provided India with the two essential ingredients for effective parliamentary government. Added to these factors has been superior leadership, in the person of Jawaharlal Nehru, that has persuaded the public to support the institutional procedures of party government.

The Indian Parliament has a committee structure; although relatively simple in form, this structure is important in the legislative process. The Committee on Estimates and the Public Accounts Committee are active and significant financial bodies that scrutinize matters concerning appropriations and expenditures. Other committees, such as the Committee on Rules and the Committee on

Government Assurances, as well as *ad hoc* (or select) committees that conduct particular investigations or inquiries, perform vital roles and include in their membership representatives of the major political parties.

At the beginning of each daily session of the lower house, a question period is allowed. During this time, initial queries as well as supplementary questions can be thrown up to the members of the Government. In the upper house, question periods are permitted on four days of the week. The procedures on question times closely parallel those of the British Parliament.

The two Houses of Parliament have not been particularly effective legislative bodies to date. Although debate on the floor often is conducted at a high level, many parliamentarians appear to be apathetic about most issues other than those on foreign affairs, economic development, or on matters of concern to their own constituents. A certain air of unreality is to be noted during the Parliament's formal deliberations because the Congress Party's substantial majority so dominates the ultimate decisions that are to be reached. Only a few members of Parliament study the documents closely, and even fewer do enough research to become informed supporters of the majority or sharp and knowledgeable critics of the Government. But there is an elevated and dignified quality to much of the activity of Members of Parliament on the floor of the legislative body. In particular, presentations to Parliament by members of the Cabinet often are models of eloquence and candor. When foreign affairs are discussed, because of the world-wide reputation held by Prime Minister Nehru, observers get the sense that history is being made in the great circular Parliament building in New Delhi.

At the state level, the legislatures operate in much the same way as does the central Parliament. Debate tends to be livelier, sharper, and less elevated in the states. In

most states, the legislature is unicameral, but in a few, where the practice was set in earlier years, an upper house is to be found as well.

## The Executive

The executive sector of government in India technically is headed by the President in New Delhi and by the governors in the several states. These ceremonial heads of state have the power to assent to bills passed by the legislature and brought to them for consideration; they also have the right to return to the legislature bills they feel should be reconsidered. The President and the governors summon the legislatures into session, and they address the legislatures with statements of advice on problems facing their respective governments. A reading of the Constitution will give one the impression that the President of India, and the governors in the states, are very powerful men. The fact is that executive strength, in reality, is held by the Councils of Ministers, known generally as Cabinets. Executive power is directed by the head of each Council of Ministers—the Prime Minister in New Delhi, the Chief Minister in the states. Addresses to Parliament or to the state assemblies are drafted in the Cabinet (or by the Prime Minister or Chief Minister) and are read as formal documents by the President or governor. While the ceremonial heads of state hold certain powers within their personal discretion, such as the right to return bills for further consideration, any President or governor who would act other than on the advice of his Cabinet would be considered to be acting unconstitutionally.

The Prime Minister is selected by the President. Except under extraordinary circumstances—such as a time when no political party held a majority in Parliament—the President must select as Prime Minister the accepted leader of the majority party. The Prime Minister retains his authority until such time as he recommends to the President that Parliament be dissolved and new elections be held, or for the five-year term of the lower

house, after which time new elections are held.

Because of the enormous personal power of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who since 1947 has also held the portfolio for External Affairs, much of India's central executive power actually rests with the Prime Minister, rather than with the Cabinet as a body. Of course, the Cabinet is consulted, and the Cabinet also is collectively responsible to Parliament for the Government's action. But, in practice, the Prime Minister's own secretariat tends to carry a great deal of the burden of coordinating high policy, leaving to Cabinet members and other Ministers of State the administrative responsibility for carrying on the business within the several ministries.

Committees within the Cabinet have been established to avoid the necessity of having all matters decided in full Cabinet session. Members of the Cabinet also are in close touch with important commissions, such as the Planning Commission. In this way, they bring a detailed knowledge of economic planning to the National Development Council, which is the high-level all-India body that recommends economic policies to the country. Members of the Council are drawn from the Chief Ministers of the states as well as from the Cabinet of the Government in New Delhi.

## Executive-Legislative Relations

The cabinet system of government that operates in India provides a certain coincidence of interests between the executive and legislative functions of government, which is, of course, one of the unique characteristics of cabinet governments. Since the Cabinet, as the source of executive power, is made up of Members of Parliament representing the political party in majority control of Parliament, disputes between Cabinet and majority party leaderships are unlikely to happen. The conflicts that may arise under the cabinet system when two parties of nearly equal strength vie for political power have not occurred in India, except in a few of the states. In New Delhi, the Congress Party need not fear censure motions that for other

cabinet governments might well lead to the fall of the government.

## Bureaucracy and Administration

India has inherited from British times an excellent administrative service. The old Indian Civil Service was a model to the world, because it selected intelligent men, who possessed good liberal educations and were expected to be competent, to assume responsibilities for administration over any high-level operation in government. Indian Civil Service (ICS) personnel moved in their careers from a subordinate office in a district, up through district and divisional administration in the states, and then on to administrative posts in state or central governments, with shifts occurring from function to function, and from place to place, every few years. Almost to a man, administrators possessing the letters "ICS" after their names were executives of the finest quality. Very few ICS officers remain on active duty today. But a new Indian Administrative Service (IAS) has been built since independence to take the place of the old ICS. These civil servants are also selected with minute care and are expected, over time, to perform administrative functions at several levels and in several functions of government. The Indian Administrative Service, like the old ICS, is an all-India service—that is, an IAS officer may be assigned to duties in the states as well as to service with the central government.

In addition to the IAS, there are numerous other civil service posts—in the foreign service, the Indian Medical Service, and in dozens of other technical branches. The states have parallel services that are conducted strictly within their own jurisdictions. Recruitment into the higher all-India services is supervised by the Union Public Service Commission. Those who pass the periodic examinations

and interviews are offered positions in government, once selected, they are usually given some specialized training and some apprenticeship on the job. Similar procedures of recruitment are conducted at the state level by state public service commissions.

There is a long tradition in India of a clear separation between the politicians who make policies and the administrators who execute them. And this has always been thought desirable. With the rise of welfare-state objectives in India and with the enormous intervention of the government into the social and economic life of the country, technically qualified administrators are having more of a say in the making of public policy than many legislators, including those heading central and state ministries, think appropriate. But Indian politicians, like politicians all over the world in a highly scientific and rapidly changing age, are not competent to deal with many of the complex issues that come before them. As a result, the administrators, working behind the scenes and within the bureaucracy, are increasingly coming to judge the correctness or incorrectness, the wisdom or stupidity, of given political choices.

Criticism of the bureaucracy for its expanding role in the making of public policy is especially prevalent in discussions concerning the Planning Commission. The Planning Commission technically is "irresponsible," in the sense that it does not answer directly to Parliament, has no executing functions, and holds no legislative power. It is an advisory body to the central government. Since the Planning Commission considers almost every aspect of the social and economic life of the country, however, and even scrutinizes the plans for economic development arising in the several states, there are those who feel that behind the statistical documents and wall charts of the mathematically inclined staff of the Planning Commission lies a great deal of power that cannot be effectively controlled

by legislative processes. Some go so far as to call the Planning Commission India's fourth branch of government.

In general terms, the upper levels of Indian administration are of a very high quality—probably as high as any bureaucracy in the world. At middle levels—including the administration of the districts, the cities, and the less important ministries at the center and in the states—quality tends to run from fair to poor. At the lowest levels—which contain workers in local post offices, semi-skilled clerical help, many of the local administrators on the nationalized railway system, and so forth—quality, with few exceptions, is of a low order. Opportunities for advancement into the higher administrative levels for persons of good education and above-average intelligence are plentiful; a competent man can move upwards rapidly. But at the low-paying levels, such as that of the village schoolteacher whose take-home pay may be the equivalent of only \$15–20 a month, it is understandably difficult to maintain quality, and upward mobility is largely nil. Thus the very good people opt for urban jobs, and the less able tend to remain in the towns and countryside.

If one travels from New Delhi to Lucknow, for example, and stops en route at a number of the local administrative offices, one gets a dramatic sense of the enormous gap that separates the administrative giants in the ministries of New Delhi from the officials in the rural backwaters. Unfortunately, the average Indian citizen has to deal primarily with the local authorities, and it is there that he finds out how difficult it is to get a telephone connected, or how long it takes to get his water turned on, or how much effort he must expend to get the appropriate district personnel to clean out his canal when debris obstructs the passage of water. These are serious matters to the people concerned.

The politicians and administrators in New Delhi often are oblivious to these petty problems that constitute a routine irritant within the country. It is amazing to see how rapidly these problems are cleared up in the hill resorts when Ministers of State and top-level members of the bureaucracy take vacations there



during the hot season. Many students of public administration and the philosophically inclined among the senior administrators in India seem to think these low-level administrative difficulties are so primitive as to be unworthy of their serious attention. What they forget is that people tend to judge the whole structure of government on the basis of their concrete experience with representatives of that government, at however low a level. This is a weak link in India's otherwise excellent civil service system.

## Local Government

Governments below the state level are subject to the control of state governments. For example, municipal corporations in the largest cities, municipal councils in smaller cities, district boards, and all other political and administrative bodies down to the village are formed under authority granted to them by a state government (Fig. 7-2).

In practice, political bodies within a state are granted authority by the state legislature, and then they are interfered with only when emergencies occur. This system seems to be based on the time-tested principle of delegation of power. But, in part, the system also provides an easy way for state governments to divorce themselves from the serious problems of local government. The major cities are governed by corporations which operate much as if they were state governments themselves. Cities such as Calcutta or Bombay—like New York or Boston—are at least as formidable to govern as any state. Municipal councils, operating within specified jurisdictions, have a long and generally unsuccessful history in most parts of the country.

Village governments vary so widely that it is almost impossible to make any generalization about them except to say that few have worked well and almost all have been, and continue to be, handicapped because of a severe lack of funds. In the late 1950's, a new pattern of local and village government was instituted, both to revitalize local self government and to increase agricultural productivity

and improve the programs of community development. Although the terms used for the new local systems (normally called *panchayati raj*) vary, the functional framework remains similar in most parts of the country. It is constituted as follows:

1. *Village*. At the village level, a *panchayat* (council) is elected to represent the several interests within the village. Such councils have a long heritage in some parts of the country, and none in others. But the concept of a group of village elders meeting together to decide, preferably by consensus, issues that face the village has an ancient and nearly universal heritage in India.

2. *The Development Block*. The Development Block is a major administrative unit of the Community Development Program of rural revitalization, normally ministering to the needs of approximately 100 villages. The new legislative-control body over the Development Block is called (in some areas) the *panchayat samiti* (or *panchayat council*) and is made up of the elected heads of the village *panchayats* from within the Development Block. The *panchayat samiti* elects its own officers and is charged with determining the efforts that are to be undertaken within the Development Block area. Some *panchayat samitis* have even been given the authority to collect land revenues within their blocks. All of them have been given some rights to collect taxes to finance developments that go beyond state and central financial contributions.

3. *District*. A *zila parishad* (district council) exists at the district headquarters to help coordinate development planning within the whole district. A district normally is larger than an American county and may contain two or more Development Blocks. The *zila parishad* is more a coordinating body than an administering body (such as is the *panchayat samiti*). Greater power has purposefully been granted to the *panchayat samiti* than to the




FIGURE 7-2 DIAGRAM OF CENTRAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA, 1961. (Terms used for local government vary in the states.)

*zila parishad*, because it is at the block level (*samiti* level) that action relating to economic development actually takes place.

This new local political system may have been introduced prematurely; it is too early to say. Clearly, wide responsibility for economic development has been given under this plan to illiterate and politically inexperienced peasants. It is also clear that the work of professional administrators, down through the

hierarchy of government from center to state to district, may well be hampered by the experimentation that now rests in the hands of the new local bodies.

In addition to the economic development hierarchy that administers rural development and to the local government bodies discussed above, the old administrative pattern, centering upon the districts, continues. In each district headquarters town, there is a senior administrative officer of the state, known variously as the Collector, the District Magistrate, or the Deputy Commissioner, who is the administrator and coordinator for all governmental policies, state and central, that have consequences within that district. There are

a few functions, such as irrigation, agriculture, and public works, that are not within the direct jurisdiction of the Collector, but technicians or supervisors working on these specialized services normally are expected to coordinate their district work with the Collector. The Collector is a powerful figure who can untangle administrative confusions if he wishes to do so, and who now bears the additional responsibility, as district development officer, of overseeing social and economic growth within his jurisdiction.

India's district administrative system, developed by the Moghuls and adapted and utilized by the British, is now proving to be an important part of independent India's administration. As local government becomes more assertive under the *panchayati raj* system and as local politics become more partisan and party controlled, the pressure against the district administrative system (the Collectorate) is likely to grow. Despite all the experiments in politics and administration that are going on about the district officer, however, he remains the mainstay of governmental stability in rural India.

## The Judiciary

The Supreme Court is the highest legal tribunal in India. It is headed by a Chief Justice who is joined by no more than seven associates. Judges of the Supreme Court

are appointed by the President after consultation with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the states as the President deems necessary. This court is the final interpreter of the Constitution and is a final court of civil appeal. In criminal matters, it may grant special leave of appeal. Cases involving disputes between the central government and the states, or between states, come to the Supreme Court on original jurisdiction.

In the states there are High Courts, appointed by the President, that hold full legal powers within their particular states, with the exception of those few cases where the Supreme Court holds original jurisdiction. The governor in each state, in consultation with the High Court and the Public Service Commission in that state, appoints District Judges within the state.

The judiciary is one of the most effective stabilizing elements of democratic government in India. Judges, almost without exception, along with the best of the lawyers, are among the leaders in Indian society. Their advocacy of the rule of law and the general support among the citizenry given to the Indian legal system combine to provide India with buffers against arbitrary government. Lawyers acting as legal counsels in the various ministries, however, are not especially powerful—certainly not to the extent that they are powerful forces in the executive aspects of government in the United States.

# Governmental Performance

## VIII

Since 1947, the politicians and public officials of India have been wrestling with one of the most formidable tasks of government ever presented to a newly independent state. India's economy at the time of independence was undeveloped, with resulting low standards of living for the vast bulk of the people. Eighty per cent of the people were illiterate. Traditional (and unscientific) systems of medicine were widely practiced. Many social institutions were resistant to change. Only a few trained and experienced persons were available to take on the responsibility for reconstructing the country along modern lines. The riots and destruction that accompanied partition were costly in lives and in property and brought the country to an economic standstill. The relief and rehabilitation of refugees placed a tremendous burden on the young state, and the psychological scars left by those

days of violence have yet to be erased. The fact that sections of Pakistan straddle India posed a further threat to the country's security and stability. Considering the enormity of the problems faced since independence, it must be conceded that the political and administrative leaders of India have achieved remarkable results in bringing cohesion and even progress to the Republic of India. The ground has been laid to raise standards of living and to bring the common man into the political process, which, as we have seen, involves extensive economic and social planning.

One of the characteristics of India's contemporary public life is the intervention of the government into almost every aspect of society's activities. A close perusal of a Bombay morning newspaper, for example, might uncover the following items, each of which reveals an activity of the Government of India:

A leading writer in Madras is given a prize by the Sahitya Akademi for his recent work in Tamil poetry. (The Sahitya Akademi, the "National Literary Academy," is an organization sponsored and financed by the Government of India.)

An announcement is made of the completion of a demographic survey in a major city of north India. (The demographic survey was sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission, a public advisory body to the Government of India.)

A *Bharatanatayam* dance troupe from Andhra leaves on a tour of France and Germany. (This activity is part of the cultural relations program of the Government of India, administered

through the Central Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, in cooperation with the Ministry of External Affairs.)

It is announced that a master plan for a city and its rural hinterland in western India is about to be undertaken. (Financing for the project is to be given by the Government of India, supplemented by a grant from an American foundation negotiated through the Government of India.)

It is announced that a change in rates for life insurance will take effect on July 1. (Life insurance in India is nationalized.)

The vice-chancellor of a university in the eastern sector of India announces the establishment of a new Institute for Japanese Studies. (Finances for this Institute are to be given, in part, by the state government of the state in which the university is located and, in part, by a grant from the University Grants Commission, a semi-independent body financed by the Government of India.)

The mayor in a central Indian town announces the opening of two new family planning clinics. (The clinics are supported by a grant to the state in which the town is located, received from the central Ministry of Health.)

The Government of Assam announces the opening of a new rail link connecting West Bengal to Assam. (Railways in India are nationalized.)

Although these examples are hypothetical, they could be found on almost any day in the Indian press. The point is that the direction of the country's development is not left to chance; overseeing the nation's growth and development is considered a legitimate responsibility of government. To the extent that private, voluntary organizations or individuals undertake activities that are acceptable to the Government of India, private activity may flourish without interference. In the case of private activity that runs contrary to the Government's wishes, those activities that are not considered to be crucial or central to the purposes of the state, as interpreted by its present rulers, also will not be resisted. Where private activity of significance challenges accepted policies of government, Government leaders will do what they can to stop them.

Indian leaders conceive the ends of their governmental activity to be the construction of a welfare state—a state in which the economic standard of life of all the people is a matter of direct concern to those charged with

public responsibility, but also a state in which social justice prevails. In economic sectors, the principles of the welfare state can, and do, cause a conflict between the goals of higher productivity and of social equality. Senior members of the Government of India are quite aware, for example, that greater inducements in the private sector of industry and commerce might lead, in the short run, to greater total productivity. But, since effective inducement normally would permit higher levels of profit, the profit inducements might lead to a greater spread in the distance separating the rich from the poor. A "reasonable" margin of profit is granted to the private sector within the economy, and the private sector in turn has contributed greatly to the rise in industrial output. But, to maintain the government's egalitarian principles, the private sector is kept in check through taxation, through production and marketing regulations, and by the development of parallel public industrial establishments.

## Social and Economic Planning

No problem is too large or too small to escape the Government's attention. The central government, naturally, as an examination of the Third Five Year Plan will show, is concentrating on broad-scale social and economic planning. Whereas rural problems received prominent attention in the two earlier Five Year Plans, urban growth now has been recognized as a major contemporary problem, and the cities receive greater emphasis in the Third Plan. Industrialization, the spread of scientific agriculture, education at elementary, secondary, and higher levels, curative and preventive medicine, family planning, finance, commerce, and culture are among the many subjects that receive attention in the Third Five Year Plan, which outlines the objectives to be achieved in each category and assigns

funds for the accomplishment of these goals.

Social and economic planning, therefore, are the two most important ingredients of contemporary Indian government. The scale of planning appears to be overly ambitious and beyond the scope even of intelligent people to tackle, but India's senior administrators and statesmen, while being decidedly planning-minded, are also pragmatists who use the goals that are set to remind them of what are the most important objectives; meanwhile, they feel free to experiment in the realms of second and third levels of priority. To outsiders, the complexity of the problems in India is such as to cause despair. Fortunately, the best of the leaders in Indian public life have learned to live with apparent chaos and have become quite adroit at picking out the problems that require immediate attention, while still keeping an eye on the broad sweep of change that occurs over a long period of time. Thus the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission is charged with charting the objectives and likely achievements of Indian planning for decades in the future, in order to assist those who are struggling with today's actual and tomorrow's threatening crises.

Nevertheless, the planners are often caught between short- and long-run objectives that conflict with each other. For example, when the Community Development Program was established on a nationwide basis in 1952, primary emphasis was given to the social aspects of making the countryside a more pleasant and fruitful place to live, whereas by the late 1950's critics applied economic criteria in questioning whether or not Community Development had resulted in an adequate increase in agricultural productivity. In the "social phase" of Community Development, it was assumed that once the peasantry saw a glimmer of hope for improving their lives and understood that the government was genuinely interested in their welfare, agricultural pro-

ductivity would rise steadily. In the later "economic phase," when deficiencies in the production of foodstuffs continued, Community Development took the brunt of the critics' blame, even though social growth, rather than increased productivity, had been Community Development's initial purpose.

In another example, the *panchayati raj* system of local self-government was developed to assure the peasants' participation in the control and planning of their own local affairs. It was assumed that such participation would create an atmosphere of cooperation in the countryside, which in turn would result in higher agricultural productivity. But agricultural deficiencies remain, even as greater measures of participation have become part of local government. In these two examples, the struggle between the forces stressing vital participation (egalitarianism) and those stressing economic growth (productivity) continues. Economists like to point out that India's planning does not concentrate adequately upon strictly productive elements; social strategists and politicians, however, are unwilling to abandon the goal of a cooperative society that is represented by the term "welfare state" and that has become the hallmark of contemporary Indian politics. Competition between productivity and equality is apt to continue for the indefinite future.

Proportionate to their population, the peasantry has been given less attention than urban dwellers in the government's planning. The belief of India's rulers is that, with an industrialized society, India can be transformed from a raw materials-producing nation into a modern, commercial nation that will take its place among the greatest nations in the world.

## Other Areas of Public Concern

**EDUCATION.** Although the educational system, established in India first under the British and expanded greatly since 1947, is excellent when compared with those in other Asian countries, it is not well adapted to India's needs, and all too little attention has been given to its fundamental revision since inde-

pendence. This is true despite the fact that new universities are formed almost every year, and thousands of high schools and tens of thousands of elementary schools have mushroomed over the past decade. Budgets for education have increased steadily since 1947, but, compared with the need, they have been decidedly inadequate. On the whole, both secondary and higher education concentrate on the liberal arts and general training, and all too little emphasis is given to professional and technical training, both so desperately needed at the present time. Although many thousands graduate each year from India's colleges and universities, many of these are arts and science graduates of mediocre ability, possessing few or no special skills that can help their country face its pressing problems. These semi-educated graduates constitute the bulk of the educated unemployed so often referred to by India's critics.

**GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION.** Government service is one of the major professions available to India's educated populace. And the executive skills for public administration are assets fully as important to the future of India as are industrial and scientific know-how. At the upper levels of administration—in the central government and in the states' governments—men of quality have been developed, and many young men and women are qualified to be recruited for these high-level posts. But attention as yet has not been given to upgrading the standards of administration down through the lower levels of government service. Training in public administration tends to be directed toward upper-level problems and not toward those that exist in the city, town, and village. Unfortunately, this imbalance in public-administration skills within the country is compounded by traditional educational programs. Modernization of India's public life will be severely handicapped until efficiency in administration moves downward and outward to the points where government directly touches the people.

**JUDICIAL AND POLICE SYSTEMS.** One of the great sustaining powers in Indian society

is the sense of justice and devotion to the rule of law that prevails in the nation. The judicial system is staffed with remarkably able people, and citizens expect (and usually receive) fair and just treatment in the courts. The same cannot be said of the police system. The common man in India assumes, perhaps unfairly, that when the police appear, they tend to act in an arbitrary fashion; when their presence is desperately needed, somehow they are not to be found. Police establishments in India are creatures of state governments and are not locally controlled. Although this is not necessarily a weakness in the Indian system, it does mean that the police remain aloof from local controls. They tend to exist more as symbols of the authority of the state than as servants of the people who are preserving law and order. Both the judicial and the police systems of India, however, have served the country well. During times of social discontent, political upheaval, and class conflict, they have usually been able to maintain law and order. Perhaps effectiveness, during times of social and economic revolution, are advantages not to be lightly dismissed, even if perfection, as in the case of the police, has not been reached.

**FOREIGN POLICY.** India's foreign policy, perhaps the most dramatic aspect of government developed under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, has been constructed to elevate India's role in world affairs to the level of a major participant, and at the same time to assure the security and well-being of the people. It has been Nehru's contention that economic growth and social change, so essential for the people of India, could take place only in a world free from the horrors and dislocations of war. Since India is unable and unwilling to wield much economic or military power in international affairs, Nehru has attempted to provide India with an independent role in the world, unimpeded by

military, economic, or political commitments, except those that fall to an active member of the United Nations. This policy also has the advantage of protecting the national interests of India from the demands of neighbors, by encouraging the growth of cordial relations between India and all the nations of the world, and particularly with India's immediate neighbors (Pakistan is the traditional exception, to which China more recently has been added).

To reach these ends, India's foreign policy has attempted: (1) to adhere to the principle of nonalignment, (2) to decide India's position on each issue in international affairs as it arises, (3) to spread the idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries through the signing of *pancha shila* agreements, and (4) to stress the importance of national self-determination, nondiscrimination in race relationships, and the universal right for economic development, especially for the colonial and ex-colonial areas of the world.

India's foreign policy has been successful in gaining for India a leading role in world affairs as a spokesman for the nonaligned countries. Also, India's unwillingness to join the camp of the Soviet Union, or of the United States, has led to economic advantages, for it receives substantial economic aid and technical assistance from both the U.S.S.R. and the Western countries. Whether this result is based on a calculated policy is beside the point. The fact is that India has gained substantially by its neutral position in the power struggle and ideological conflict prevailing between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds.

**MILITARY SECURITY.** But India's military security is not satisfactory, most students of the subject agree, since no outside country is committed to give India military aid in times of grave emergency. The most dangerous threat to India's security is Communist China. China has claimed at least 52,000 square miles

of Indian territory along India's northern border with Tibet. In 1957, the Chinese started to infiltrate parts of this territory, and by 1962 over 14,000 square miles of the disputed area had been occupied by the Chinese. Even before 1957, the Chinese built roads through Tibet up to the borders of India and also constructed airfields in Tibet. On October 20, 1962, the Chinese entered the North East Frontier Agency of India above Assam, and later opened a military campaign in Ladakh as well. The immediate military threat to India was answered by assistance from the United States and Great Britain to an Indian Army that proved to be badly equipped, trained, and led. The Defense Minister of India, V. K. Krishna Menon, was forced to resign over this issue, later to be replaced by Y. B. Chavan, former Chief Minister of Maharashtra. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese demands will be answered by effective Indian resistance. In the case of a major armed conflict between China and India, it is doubtful whether India could survive without additional assistance from other nations in the world. Thus India's national security remains precarious as long as the threat from China looms so ominously along the northern border.

**PUBLIC PARTICIPATION.** The degree of participation by the citizens of India in the country's practical politics, planning, and administration has been steadily increasing since 1947. Three General Elections, conducted efficiently, fairly, and on the basis of adult suffrage, have brought to the attention of most of the people the positive role that the individual may play—and should play—in political life. On the whole, the political parties have approached the process of general and special elections responsibly and thus have helped to perform the educational task of making political choices meaningful to the average citizen. Certainly in most of the cities, in many of the towns, and in a fair number of the villages, national, state, and local politics have become more intimate parts of the average citizen's life. Naturally, a great deal more needs to be done along lines already



established to make issues, as well as personalities, central to the political process. This is a task that faces every society, including those that are literate and "modernized." The job in India simply is a bigger one, one that will take longer to finish. The vast size of the country and its population, the widespread illiteracy, and the rural nature of most of the country, which makes most state, national, and international problems appear distant and irrelevant to the majority of the people, present obstacles to the political education of the citizenry that will take decades to overcome.

## An Uncertain Future

Despite the remarkably able start made by the Government of India in establishing its political goals and its administrative procedures, in the end it is results that determine the success or failure of governmental performance. Like a novel written with a brilliant style that, nevertheless, says nothing—or says too little for its length—a brilliantly conceived government that does not signifi-

cantly improve the lives of its citizens cannot be considered successful. In India, standards of living have moved upwards slowly so that, on a per capita basis, a man's income is now much higher than it was ten or fifteen years ago. But, since the original base was low, this rise in living standards, which has taken more than a decade to achieve, is in no way spectacular. While big buildings rise in the cities, while the railroads improve their road beds and equipment, while enormous hydroelectric plants are built, and while structures sprout up everywhere to house new activities, the country's population also shoots up by nine million people a year, and the way of life of the average man remains, as yet, largely untouched. Improvement there has been in almost every direction, and politicians and administrators in India can take a great deal of credit for these achievements. But since India's basic needs outweigh its immediate capacities to fulfill them, only the future can judge how well today's governmental pioneers have nurtured and directed the forces within the Republic of India toward the ends so eloquently stated in the Constitution.

# Problems and Prospects

## IX

One would be foolhardy to conclude this review of India's political heritage without a note of caution about present problems and future prospects. Despite the strides made in modernizing the political order, in boosting economic development, and in adjusting social institutions to new circumstances, the problems yet to be solved are enormous; the political pressure urging speed in this process is almost beyond human capacities to channel. As the facts outlined in the preceding chapters reveal, congratulations for past accomplishments must be tempered by a realization of the tough problems remaining for the future. As yet, the people of India and their leaders have reached only the foothills in their climb to the peak of success in development; steep cliffs, yawning crevasses, and icy paths lie ahead. It remains to be seen if they have the ability and stamina to climb higher.

Of the many problems facing India's political leaders in the 1960's and 1970's, the following appear to be the most crucial:

1. National security.
2. National unity.
3. General agreement on a set of political ideals.
4. Economic growth, with attendant social change and population control.
5. Professionalization and depersonalization in government and politics.

Since India's ambitious domestic plans for development would be destroyed if war, or threats of war, were to upset the delicate balance now existing between the nation's material resources and its programs for economic growth, the controversy with Communist China over the Himalayan border region poses not only an external danger to India but an internal one as well. The dispute with China was made public in 1959, and since then the defense budget of the Government of India has risen sharply. India's relationship with Communist China is obviously a first-priority problem. The logic of the situation calls for a reconciliation between India and Pakistan, including a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, so that the two countries can devise an effective system of defense for the subcontinent. Fear and disapproval of Pakistan, however, bar a reconciliation now, although future Chinese expansion may force India and Pakistan to cooperate in a mutual-security agreement.

The boundaries of the states were reorganized in 1956 to give each major linguistic

region its own cultural and administrative identity. This reorganization met the demands of most of the leaders in the various language areas, and it did reflect a sensible recognition of the cultural variations within India. But linguistic regionalism also strengthened the parochialism and local patriotism that now vie dangerously with national loyalty for the highest esteem of the citizenry. India, faced with many of the same kinds of sectional subloyalties that exist in the United States, but possessing fewer of the means for welding national unity, has concentrated authority and power in the hands of the central government to bolster the country's sense of national unity. The result has been a tendency to impose authoritarian decisions upon resisting state and local governments. The Congress Party, which controls almost every major governmental unit in the country, through its disciplined and centrally controlled party power bypasses interparty compromises that might otherwise strengthen the position of leaders at state levels. These centrally directed authoritarian pressures are likely to continue until national unity no longer is threatened.

The Constitution of 1950 sets forth the ideological and structural principles of India, and these conform to the high ideals of democracy. But the debate over political values and methods continues. Democratic principles, parliamentary institutions, and party government still are on trial in India, and final judgment will be reached on the basis of what

India will be able to achieve under them. The social welfare doctrines and democratic socialist ideals that Jawaharlal Nehru and his associates in and out of the Congress Party have fostered conflict with orthodox Marxist socialism and traditional Hindu notions over the proper nature and purpose of the state. Ideological consensus has by no means been settled. This political issue is one that intellectuals may clarify, but one that powerful leaders ultimately will resolve.

The prospect that the Indian people will develop a strong ideological consensus for democratic government is as likely in India as anywhere else in newly independent Asia. India has pushed its post-independence economic and social development with about as much vigor and intelligence as could be brought to the task. And a number of factors should give the country a good chance to succeed in the future: the general stability of the political order, bolstered by Nehru's outstanding leadership; the brilliant performances by other statesmen and administrators in introducing modernization to Indian society; the success of the Congress Party in winning unchallenged political authority through three General Elections.

The way to a stable, modernized, and democratic political order for India has been charted in the Nehru era. The challenges of unity, population growth, illiteracy, poverty, disease, and a traditional resistance to change remain to be met and overcome.

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LUCIAN W. PYE

# Southeast Asia



# Introduction



Southeast Asia is a region of great diversity and contrast. Each of the eight leading countries of the region—Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—represents a distinct and separate tradition. And within each country further diversities abound, for none has an homogeneous population. No other region of the world offers such a rich array of major religions. Malaya and Indonesia are Islamic countries; the Philippines is the only Christian country in Asia; and the remainder of mainland Southeast Asia consists of Buddhist societies that adhere to different beliefs. Behind these religious differences are additional disparities in customs and historical experience. The 180 million Southeast Asians employ over 150 different languages and dialects, most of which are mutually unintelligible.

All the Southeast Asian countries have substantial minority populations of diverse ethnic backgrounds. In some countries, the ethnic divisions are conspicuous and explicitly recognized, as for example in Malaya with its pop-

ulation of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. In other cases, as in Indonesia and the Philippines, the ethnic divisions are more subtle but no less a cause for political division. This mixture of peoples and cultures is a reflection of the fact that Southeast Asia has long been the communications crossroads of Asia. Situated between the two great Asian cultures of India and China, the peoples of Southeast Asia have been exposed to all the main currents of Asian history. The region also had an early and continuous exposure to traders and merchants from the Western world and has been under constant pressure from outside conquerors. The era of European colonialism, which reshaped life in all the countries except Thailand, was only the last epoch of external forces penetrating Southeast Asia.

In spite of the diversity born of the melting-pot quality of Southeast Asia, the countries of the region have many problems in common. The contemporary theme that now characterizes the entire area is the effort to translate diffuse feelings of nationalism into strong loyalties to the nation. In varying degrees, each country is engrossed in the task of nation-building. Sentiments of nationalism and anti-colonialism were adequate to sustain independence movements, but now the more

difficult job of creating a viable nation-state has become the main challenge for all the countries. In most of them, there is disagreement about what the structure of government should be or how the political system should operate. The governmental forms that do exist are still relatively weak and have not become firmly institutionalized.

The problem of nation-building is only part of the larger problem of passing rapidly from a backward condition into the world of the mid-twentieth century. In striving to become modern nation-states, the countries of Southeast Asia are also grappling with the fundamental dilemma of trying to introduce new ways of life while preserving ancient values and customs. The central concern of present-day Southeast Asian governments is to bring economic development and the principal attributes of modern societies to their countries without losing their ancient identities. Thus the conflict between the old and the new, between a modern outlook and traditional customs, is basic in most of the Southeast Asian countries. Colonialism substantially weakened the traditional political systems of the region and also implanted the concept of the modern administrative state in all of Southeast Asia except Thailand. Eventually, the people reacted against their colonial masters and formed independence movements to achieve for themselves the fundamental political values of modern life: independence, equality, and human dignity (see Table 1-1 at end of this chapter).

In the struggle between the forces of modernization and the persisting grip of traditional attitudes, tensions have emerged that threaten the stability of all the countries of Southeast Asia. These tensions have tended to crystallize into a conflict between an initial commitment to democratic institutions and the attraction of more authoritarian practices. At present, the trend is away from more liberal practices and toward increasingly authoritarian methods. Some of the countries have experimented

with military rule, and the army continues to be dominant in others. The pressures on the democratic institutions of Southeast Asia are enormously increased by the presence next door of the massive and overpopulated Communist China.

The geographic location of Southeast Asia has made it a crucial theater in the cold war. Only North Vietnam and parts of Laos so far have fallen to Communist domination, but the politics of all the countries are strongly influenced by the question of how best to deal with the realities of Communism in Asia. Three of the countries—Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia—have steadily followed neutralist or non-alignment policies, while most of the others have, in varying degrees, associated themselves more closely with the West. Northern Vietnam has been closely allied with China. The entire area of Southeast Asia is acutely vulnerable to Chinese expansion and Communist penetration. Political development in Southeast Asia is vital not only to Southeast Asians but to the cause of freedom throughout the world. And the future of the area can have profound consequences for the United States.

Underlying the cultural diversities of Southeast Asia, then, is the basic problem of many kinds of people trying to advance from the sentiments of nationalism to the realities of nationhood, to move from a traditional social order into the modern world. These problems compound each other and tend to sharpen the conflict between democratic ideals and authoritarian practices. Overshadowing all these disturbing problems is the ultimate question of whether the new countries of the region will be able to realize their national identities under freedom, or whether they will in time succumb to the relentless pressure from the Communist world.

TABLE 1-1 *Outline Descriptions of  
Southeast Asian Political Systems*

BURMA, Union of (Capital: Rangoon)  
Independent republic since January 4, 1948.  
Former British colony; administered as part  
of British India from 1885 until separated in  
April, 1937.



Constituent units of the Union include the Shan State, Karen, Kachin, Kayah (former Karenni states), Special Division of the Chins (Chin Hill District and Arakan Hill Tracts).

Union Parliament, elected for four-year terms, consists of the Chamber of Deputies of 250 members, and a Chamber of Nationalities of 125 members.

U Nu, Prime Minister, from January 4, 1948 to October 28, 1958; from February 6, 1960 to April, 1962.

Military regime under General Ne Win, from October 28, 1948 to February 6, 1960; from April, 1962, to the present.

**CAMBODIA**, Kingdom of (Capital: Phnom Penh)

Constitutional Monarchy and independent since November 9, 1953.

Formerly an associated state of French Indo-China; came under French protection in 1863; absolutism replaced by national constitution of May 6, 1947; associated state in French Union in November, 1949.

Parliament of 61 elected members.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former king, was succeeded by his father when he stepped down on June 13, 1960, to become politically active Prime Minister.

**INDONESIA**, Republic of (Capital: Jakarta)

Struggle for independence from Netherlands resolved by treaty of November 2, 1949.

Until March, 1942, a colony of Holland. After Japanese occupation, 1942-45, nationalist leaders proclaimed a republic on August 17, 1945. Four years of intermittent warfare and negotiations resulted in independence.

Currently a "guided democracy" under the direction of President Sukarno. The originally elected 257-member Parliament was suspended by President Sukarno on March 5, 1960, and replaced by an appointed group of 261 members.

**LAOS**, Kingdom of (Capital: Administrative capital is Vientiane, and the royal capital is Luang Prabang)

Constitutional monarchy, formerly an associated state of French Indo-China, which became independent on July 17, 1949.

Traditional monarchy of Thai origins became a French protectorate in 1893 and a member of the Indo-Chinese Union in 1899.

As a consequence of the 14-nation Geneva Treaty, Laos has a coalition government. The Prime Minister is Prince Souvanna Phouma, a neutralist; the Pathet Lao movement and Prince Souphanouvong represent the extreme Left supported by the Communist bloc; General Phoumi Nosavan and former Premier Prince Boun Oum led the pro-Western forces.

**MALAYA**, Federation of (Capital: Kuala Lumpur)

Independent member of the British Commonwealth since August 31, 1957.

The various states of Malaya came under British control beginning with Kedah in 1786. Before the Japanese occupation of 1942-45, Malaya consisted of the four federated states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang, the five unfederated states of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, the settlements of Malacca and Penang, and the crown colony of Singapore.

Malaya is the only member of the Commonwealth, other than Great Britain, to have its own monarchy, or "Paramount Ruler," who is chosen from among the rulers of the separate Malay states for five-year terms. Parliament consists of a Senate (Dewan Negara) of 38 members, and a Legislative Assembly of 100 members.

During 1962, negotiations were initiated by the Malayan government to establish an expanded Federation of Malaysia which would include the current Federation of Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. Current progress in the negotiations point to the establishment of Malaysia on August 31, 1963.

Tengku Abdul Rahman has been Prime Minister since independence.

## **SINGAPORE STATE**

A self-governing state with internal autonomy within the British Commonwealth since May 27, 1958.

Legislature of 51 members; the British control only defense and internal security.

Will rejoin Malayan Federation according to current plans for the establishment of a Federation of Malaysia.

**BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNMENT** (Members with Malaya and Singapore of the proposed Federation of Malaysia)




*North Borneo.* A crown colony with a population of 417,000.

*Brunei.* A British-protected sultanate since 1888, with a population of 60,000 of which 50 per cent are Malays and the rest Chinese and Kedayans.

A constitution was promulgated on September 28, 1959.

*Sarawak.* A crown colony with a population of 655,000. Sarawak was separated from Brunei in 1842 when the Sultan of Brunei made Sir

# SOUTHEAST ASIA



James Brooke the Raja of Sarawak. The Brooke family ruled until the Japanese occupation.

**PHILIPPINES**, Republic of (Capital: Quezon City)

Independent republic since July 4, 1946.

The Philippines were visited by Magellan in 1521, conquered by Spain in 1565, ceded to the United States in 1898; established as a Commonwealth in 1934.

Congress consists of a Senate of 24 members and of a House of Representatives of 120 members. The President and Vice President are elected for four-year terms.

The dominant political parties are the Nacionalista and the Liberal Parties.

**THAILAND**, Kingdom of (Capital: Bangkok)

Formerly Siam. Only country in Southeast Asia never to have been a colony.

Constitutional monarchy established after bloodless revolution in 1932. Parliament of 283 members, partly elected and partly appointed.

Political power since 1932 has been with military leaders, shifting with bloodless *coups d'état*.

**VIETNAM**, Republic of (South Vietnam) (Capital: Saigon)

Became an independent regime within the French Union on March 8, 1949; independence fully recognized by Geneva Treaty of July 21, 1954, and declared a republic on October 26, 1955.

Formerly one of the three French Indo-Chinese Associated States. Vietnam yielded Cochin China to France in 1863 and accepted French protectorate in 1884.

In August, 1945, the Vietminh, led by Ho Chi Minh, Communist guerrilla leader, forced out Emperor Bao Dai and commenced the struggle for independence which was finally consummated in the Geneva agreement which divided the country at the 17th parallel between the Communist north and the non-Communist republic in the south.

National Assembly of 123 seats; President since the founding of regime has been Ngo Dinh Diem.

**VIETNAM**, Democratic Republic of (North Vietnam)

Established after Geneva Treaty of July 21, 1954. Communist regime. President is Ho Chi Minh; Prime Minister since 1955 has been Pham Van Dong.

# Ecology



Geographically, water has been a prime shaper of Southeast Asian cultures. The population of the area is clustered either along seacoasts or within river valleys. The largest country in the region, Indonesia, consists of over three thousand islands stretching for three thousand miles along the equator. The Philippines is another island country, consisting of over seven thousand islands, of which eleven make up over 95 per cent of the total land area. All the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, except Laos, also face upon the sea. High ranges of mountains separate Southeast Asia from China on the north and India on the west and give the area its regional quality as well as a certain amount of security. It has been the ocean that has provided the region with its access to the rest of the world.

Water in the form of rainfall is also a decisive factor in the life of Southeast Asia. Seasonal changes in the region are based less on fluctuations in temperature than on the change from wet to dry seasons. The monsoon pattern of torrential rainfall for several months

followed by a dry period is particularly pronounced in the western regions, but human life throughout the area must adapt itself to a regular wet and dry cycle. Almost all forms of agriculture basic to the region are governed by the fluctuations between the rainy and the dry seasons, especially the rice crop, which is the chief export of Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam. During the heavy monsoon rains, many parts of interior Burma, Thailand, and Laos become impassable to human transportation. One of the long-range goals of many of the governments in Southeast Asia is the construction of dams and reservoirs to hold back the monsoon floods and provide a more constant water supply throughout the year.

The land area of Southeast Asia presents sharp contrasts between jungle-covered mountains and the open flat plains of the river valleys (see Table 2-1). Nearly 80 per cent of Malaya is covered with a dense, nearly impenetrable jungle; much of the outlying islands of Indonesia and of the Philippines consist of mountainous terrain overgrown with thick tropical foliage. Less than 10 per cent of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos is cultivated and settled. The highlands of Burma consist either of rugged mountains or the flat plateau of the dry zone, neither of which has shown

TABLE 2-1 *Land Utilization in Southeast Asia*<sup>a</sup>

Country	Population in millions	Total land area sq. mi.	Population density per sq. mi.	Percent- age of arable land in major food crop	Percent- age of total land in forest and woodland	Total area in rice in one thousand hectares <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of cultivated area in rice
Burma	20.5	261,610	80	72	60	4,931	70
Cambodia	4.8	88,780	55	96	55	1,000	50
Indonesia	95.2	735,865	130	86	65	4,300	40
Laos	1.8	69,480	25	94	70	900	50
Malaya	6.7	52,286	128	18	75	375	17.5
Philippines	27.5	115,600	227	74	55	2,000	48
Thailand	26.3	200,000	132	92	65	5,500	92
South Vietnam	13.7	65,000	210	90	50	1,400	85

<sup>a</sup> These figures represent only very rough approximations as of 1961.<sup>b</sup> 1 hectare = 2,471 acres

itself able to support a very large population.

Agriculture is the basis of all the economies of Southeast Asia. In the less densely populated areas, agriculture takes the form of peasant holdings and a nearly self-sufficient way of life. Wherever there are extensive concentrations of population, the agriculture has become commercialized. For example, the delta regions of Burma, the uplands of central Java, the Red River delta in northern Vietnam, and central Luzon all support large numbers of people because of the commercial nature of their agriculture. These are the areas in which rice is grown in wet fields and with irrigation. In the less densely populated highlands, rice is raised in dry fields and the people follow a shifting rather than a sedentary pattern of cultivation. In Malaya and Indonesia, rubber cultivation both on large plantations and on small holdings has become a main source of agricultural income.

Southeast Asia is relatively rich in natural resources. The region produces nearly 90 per cent of the world's natural rubber, over 50 per cent of its tin, 75 per cent of its copra, 55 per cent of its palm oil, and 20 per cent of its tungsten. Some gold is mined in the Philippines, and in Burma the mining of ru-

bies was an important industry before World War II. Timber and the exporting of hardwoods have been significant sources of income for Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Economically, Southeast Asia has not known the extremes of poverty common to other parts of Asia. Only in part of Luzon in the Philippines and on Java in Indonesia have there been serious problems of population density. Up to the present, the growth of population elsewhere in the region has not exceeded either the expansion of agricultural lands or the creation of new urban activities. The per capita standard of living of most of Southeast Asia is higher than that of either India or China. At the same time, however, the Southeast Asian countries are confronted with all the typical problems of the economically underdeveloped regions. Throughout the area, there are strong political forces calling for industrialization, but only in Malaya and the Philippines has there been substantial economic diversification.

Aside from agriculture, the economic base of the region has been the extractive industries and the production of raw materials for the industrial nations. The exporting of such raw materials as rubber, tin, oil, copra, and lumber has brought parts of Southeast Asia into intimate contact with the rest of the world, and the region has long been an important link in international shipping and communication. As a result of these develop-

ments, most of the countries of Southeast Asia have what are known as dual economies: one economy is composed of an enclave developed by European capital and technology while the other is based on the self-sufficient practices of the peasant. The Western enclaves first appeared on the seacoasts with the arrival of European traders and later continued around the plantations and mines. Now the modernized enclaves are the urban communities, while the self-sustaining economy continues in the countryside.

There are, of course, great differences among the Southeast Asian countries, and the physical and economic features of each deserve separate attention. We should now, therefore, briefly introduce each of the eight main countries of the region.

The islands of Indonesia, stretching along the equator, cover a territory nearly as large as the United States. An essential feature of Indonesia is the contrast between Java and the outer islands. Java is densely populated, short on natural resources, but the cultural center of the country. The outer islands, on the other hand, are sparsely settled, relatively rich in mineral resources, and have been less touched by modern life and urban civilization. The desire of the outer islands to keep the returns from their resources for their own development clashes sharply with the need of the Javanese to utilize the resources of the entire archipelago to maintain their dominant position. Java itself, however, is divided into three main cultural areas—east, central, and west. Each of these in turn is divided between urban and rural communities and between devout and less devout Muslims. Over 90 per cent of the Indonesian population is Muslim, six per cent is Hindu, and a significant four per cent is Christian.

In many respects, the Philippines stands apart from the rest of Asia. Since it was the only country of Southeast Asia to fall under Western influence before it had developed an elaborate indigenous civilization, the Western impact has been more widespread and more profound than in any other country of Southeast Asia. The Philippines did not experience either Hinduism or Buddhism, and

neither Indian nor Chinese culture reshaped the life of the people as they did throughout the rest of Southeast Asia. Instead, the Philippine Islands are unique in Asia in that they have many cultural similarities with Latin America. In a sense, the long period of Spanish influence and rule, from the early sixteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century, provided the Philippines with a basic but clearly foreign cultural pattern in much the same way as Indian and Chinese influences shaped the societies of the rest of Southeast Asia. Islam did reach the southern islands of the Philippines by way of the Straits of Malacca in the early fifteenth century, and to this day the Moro peoples remain loyal followers of Islam. About 93 per cent of the Philippine population is Roman Catholic, 4 per cent Muslim, and 3 per cent Protestant, Buddhist, and pagan. The population is divided into numerous ethnic and linguistic communities. About 90 per cent of the population speaks one of the eight major languages, and, although Tagalog is the official language, it is a minority language. English is widely used as an official language, especially among those active in politics.

The Philippine economy is still essentially an agricultural one. During the period of American rule (1899–1946), commercial crops such as sugar and copra were extensively developed. Recently, there has been some expansion of light industry around Manila and the other large cities. Gold mining and some minor oil fields constitute the main extracting industries. Above all else, the Philippines represents an extraordinary combination of Asian, Catholic, and American traditions. The American impact during the period of colonial rule was particularly penetrating because of the American emphasis on public education. With one of the most stable and democratic political systems of all Asia, the country, economically, may be at an early stage of sustained growth. Per capita income in the

Philippines is second only to that in Malaya, and the Philippine people possibly have a broader feeling for middle-class values than any other people in Asia.

Although Malaya is part of mainland Southeast Asia, it shares many characteristics with the two island countries of the region. The Islamic influence reached Malaya and left the peninsula the only non-Buddhist area on mainland Southeast Asia. Ethnically and culturally, the Malay people are similar to the peoples of Indonesia and the Philippines. Indeed, some of the settlers of central Malaya came originally from Sumatra, and there is a close connection between the cultures on both sides of the Malacca Straits. The most striking ethnic quality of Malaya is the delicate division that exists between the Malay majority of some three million people, a Chinese community of nearly two and a half million, and an Indian minority of over half a million. The equilibrium that has been established between these three groups dominates the political scene and affects almost all aspects of Malayan political life.

Economically, Malaya is the most advanced of all the Southeast Asian countries; its per capita standard of living is nearly six times that of India and China. Most of the economic wealth of Malaya stems from the extensive rubber plantations in the central and southern states and from the tin mining industry located largely around Ipoh in the northwest. In 1957, the capital was moved from the island of Singapore to Kuala Lumpur in the Federation of Malaya, which spurred an increase in the urban population of the country and a corresponding increase in light manufacturing industries. Malaya must depend on food imports from abroad, including even rice, its basic food.

A central ridge of mountains runs down the peninsula from north to south, impeding communication and transportation. The Chinese dominate the urban areas while the

Malay population is scattered among the kampongs or villages. The east-coast states are essentially Malay and have preserved much of the traditional culture. The cities reflect a combination of British, Chinese, Indian, and Malay influences. Singapore, which is now politically separated from the Federation of Malaya, is a self-governing colony in which the British influence is largely limited to defense and foreign affairs. The Chinese make up over 85 per cent of the some two million people in Singapore, and if this population were to be combined with that of the Federation, it would place the Chinese in a majority. Singapore continues to serve as a major entrepôt for Southeast Asia and is still one of the world centers of the tin and rubber market. The future of both Malaya and Singapore is closely tied to the projected plan of combining not only their territories, but also Malay populated British Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak into a larger Federation of Malaysia. In 1962, serious negotiations for such a merger took place, and the prospects are that Singapore may again be reunited with its hinterland but without upsetting the ethnic balance of Malaya.

Burma, the most westerly of the Southeast Asian countries, shares its border with both India and China. Historically, the influences from India have been much stronger than those of China; the Indian minority population in Burma is about 1,500,000, while the Chinese minority totals only about 300,000. Burma is a predominantly Buddhist country in which the majority people, the Burmans, are devout followers of Theravada Buddhism. There are eleven main language groups within Burma. The most important minority groups are the Kachins, Chins, Karens, and Shans in the upper Burma hill country, and in the plains and lower Burma are the Mons, Arakanese, and the Delta Karens. The extraordinary expansion of rice production in the lower Delta region represents one of the most outstanding examples of economic development in the nineteenth century in Asia. Before World War II, Burma was the leading rice-exporting area of the world. The other chief export industries included teak and



and cultural descendant of one of the great empires of Southeast Asia, the empire of Khmer, which reached its peak during the Angkor period from 802 to 1432. As one of the three remaining monarchies in Southeast Asia, Cambodia in theory accepted the French only as protectors during the time, from 1864 to 1949, when the country was part of the French sphere of influence in Indochina. Although the Khmers were under strong Hindu influences, the country gradually became another of the Theravada Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia. Their past splendors have always made the Khmer people feel that they are distinct and separate from the Vietnamese, who came under Chinese influences and the northern school of Buddhism. Cambodia is one of the least developed and least populated of the Southeast Asian countries. Its economy is essentially agrarian, and most of its peasants are self-sufficient rice farmers. In the ruins of Angkor, which date from the twelfth century, the high point of the Khmer empire, the Cambodians have one of the artistic wonders not only of Asia but of the world. The ruins, which were recovered from the jungle only in modern times and have become a tourist attraction, are proof of the amazingly high civilization that the Khmers once achieved and that no other Southeast Asian people has since been able to equal.


Laos is a land-locked country with under

two million people and is the least developed country in the region. Over 90 per cent of its population is rural, mostly engaged in producing rice, maize, peanuts, tobacco, and opium. Laos has practically no exports and has negligible internal revenue. There is some tin and some teak in the country but these have not been developed. Laos has two capitals: the royal capital of Luangprabang, with only about 10,000 population, and the administrative capital of Vientiane, with about 80,000. Like Cambodia, Laos was a protectorate under the French. Historically, the Laotians were intermittently engaged in conflicts with the neighboring Thais, Khmers, and Annamese. In spite of its geographical isolation, Laos seems, in the mid-twentieth century, to be under serious threat of falling under Communist domination.

Each of these countries of Southeast Asia has its own set of problems and its own sense of national identity. Although throughout the rest of this section we will have to focus on the more general and shared characteristics of these countries, we cannot emphasize strongly enough the extent to which these various countries represent distinct entities. In comparing the ways in which they have sought to preserve their own traditions while still developing into modern nations, we will be able to isolate the most important themes running through Southeast Asian politics.



# History



Broadly speaking, the history of Southeast Asia can be divided into four main periods. In the first one, the period of traditional Southeast Asian culture, the indigenous peoples and the early migrants into the area sought to establish very rudimentary political forms. The second period was one of Indian and Chinese influences, the Indian moving in from the west across Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and down into Indonesia and the Chinese touching mainly Vietnam. In the third period came the impact of the West and the colonial epoch, and in the fourth, the contemporary phase of post-colonial politics, the various countries have sought to establish themselves as effective nation-states.

## Traditional Southeast Asian Culture

From earliest recorded history, Southeast Asia has seen peoples push down from the continent of Asia along the peninsula of Indochina and Malaya and on across to the

archipelagos of Indonesia and the Philippines. These waves of migration brought to the area a primitive level of technology based on a wet-rice culture and on fishing. Largely organized around tribes and clans, these early cultures failed to produce very elaborate political structures.

The most enduring institution that emerged from this period was the peasant village. From earliest times, the peoples of Southeast Asia have apparently grouped themselves into small, closely knit communal units, and this pattern of life still exists in rural Southeast Asia today. Most of the people lived in houses built on stilts, usually clustered beside some fresh-water stream. Living a very circumscribed life, the villagers tended to be hostile toward other villagers, and the considerable warfare and violence that ensued prevented the formation of larger political units. Although, geographically, the region offered easy routes for transportation and communication, the level of trade and commerce remained extremely primitive. Indeed, most of the trade within Southeast Asia has always had to be stimulated by outsiders.

The family became the prime unit of social organization, but it did not develop into either as elaborate or as commanding an institution

as did the Chinese and Indian family. People tended to trust their relatives rather than strangers, but beyond this the extended family, with its many gradations of relationships as known in China, did not evolve in Southeast Asia. In contrast to the rest of Asia, and to most primitive societies, some of the Southeast Asian cultures went far in assigning an important role to women. In fact, the Minangkabau of Sumatra in Indonesia and of Negri Sembilan in Malaya actually had a matriarchal society. Burmese women also were allowed responsibilities outside the family circle. Throughout the region, we find that much of the local marketing and bazaar trading is still managed by women. Another indication of the relatively loose structure of family life in Southeast Asia is the fact that in most of the countries before the Western impact there was no tradition of utilizing family names.

## Indian and Chinese Influences

In the second period of Southeast Asian political history, beginning with the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., Indian, and to a lesser degree Chinese, concepts of government were imported into the region (see Fig. 3-1). Initially, the Indian influence came largely through the spread of Buddhism. Religion became the central focus of existence for most Southeast Asians of this time. The complex metaphysics, the elaborate symbolism, and the fascinating stories of the religions of India proved attractive to Southeast Asians. The diffusion of religion also provided a firm basis for political organization. By introducing new concepts of the nature of authority and of man's relationship to his universe, Hinduism and Buddhism opened the way to more complicated forms of government, and the Hindu influence provided a justification for a ruling class. The concept that the legitimacy

of government has a divine basis spurred attempts at creating empires, and in this fashion the diffusion of religion carried with it the diffusion of political power.

Significantly, Southeast Asians were not as profoundly affected by Hinduism socially as they were politically. Nowhere in the region was the concept of caste fully accepted. Although people came to believe that their lot in life was determined by their previous incarnation, they rejected the notion that this should justify social inequalities. Buddhism, on the other hand, provided a more individualistic basis of religious identity and salvation and was far more widely accepted. Political power, however, devolved upon a few, and, from that time to the present, the societies of Southeast Asia have been divided between a ruling elite, surrounded by the trappings of a relatively sophisticated culture, much of it imported, and a mass population of peasants, who participated in a more vulgarized version of imported cultures. Interestingly, the ruling class accepted more of the Hindu ideas embodying deterministic concepts of social status, while the peasants favored Buddhism, which was free from any concept of caste.

"Indianized" empires were spawned in Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia, all having many characteristics in common. Authority was supposedly centralized in a god-king, whose court consisted for the most part of officials who received claims of land in return for their fealty to the king. The symbols of the monarchy were mainly derived from India, and the law was largely based on the early Indian legal code or the code of Manu. The royal courts generally followed elaborate rules of etiquette, but they were not very generous patrons of the arts. Aside from architecture and the drama, none of the arts usually associated with the aristocracy were encouraged by Southeast Asian courts.

No Southeast Asian government ever succeeded in establishing a stable system of administration. A few evolved into noteworthy bureaucratic empires, run by lordly but insecure officials. The mystique of the god-king was powerful both within the court and

among the peasantry, but the lesser officials had to depend on their wits, audacity, and unscrupulousness to keep their positions of power. Concern with status became the obsession of the aristocracy. All who aspired to be more than peasants had to struggle constantly to get and maintain their superior status. Thus all the Indian-influenced peoples of Southeast Asia became imbued with the notion that society is rigidly hierarchical in form.

Local officials in pre-colonial Southeast Asia had considerable authority over the areas they controlled. In Burma, such an official was known as a *Myosa* or "eater of a town," for he alone enjoyed most of the revenue he could extract from his village. In Indonesia, certain privileged families were given land and were allowed to hand it down from one generation to the next. Because of the power of a country's god-king, however, the classical European pattern of feudalism did not evolve in Southeast Asia. A hereditary ruling class emerged rather than locally based lords with autonomous manors. The efforts of government were largely directed to maintaining religious rituals, providing officials with opportunities for economic and social betterment, and waging warfare on a regional basis. In such loosely structured societies, a strong sense of national cohesiveness failed to take root, and once the religious myths were weakened and the god-king's authority discredited, the traditional Southeast Asian systems tended to collapse, and lingered only as a faint memory.

Many features of the second phase of Southeast Asian history still are to be found in contemporary Southeast Asian politics. First, the societies of Southeast Asia are still largely divided between an elite that is heavily influenced by foreign cultures and a mass population that clings to more indigenous ways. Class distinctions have been reinforced by cultural differences throughout most of the history of Southeast Asia, thus severely complicating the job of creating workable political systems today. At best, the rulers have acted as teachers of the people, trying to induce them to model their ways after those

of foreign lands. At worst, this division has left the ruling class with a scornful and somewhat distrustful view of its own population.

Second, Southeast Asian peoples have always thought of government as being, aside from religion, the central activity of life. At the same time, however, governments have tended to be extraordinarily weak in implementing policies and mobilizing resources. Government has been essentially a way of life, supporting the activities of an officialdom. Although the Southeast Asian empires appeared to have many of the qualities of bureaucracies, they never fully developed into stable organizations capable of administering firm policies. Government was usually strong enough to discourage other forms of secular life but never strong enough to change intentionally the life of the people in any fundamental way. Thus, for example, all the governments of Southeast Asia were able to hamper the emergence of a merchant class that might have stimulated economic activity, but, at the same time, these governments were unable themselves to develop effective trade or complex economic activities.

Third, from the earliest times Southeast Asian political systems have relied heavily on the mystiques of ideologies to bind their peoples together. The appeal of legitimacy has tended to be based either on other-worldly considerations or on emotional factors, never on the basis that government is necessary for the functioning of any group life. Government was considered something to be glorified and for people to glory in. People were expected to find satisfaction in the power and the greatness of their rulers; they were not expected to ask the government to resolve their problems. The spirit of government throughout most of Southeast Asia, then, has largely been one of asking people to overlook their own particular interests and to find satisfaction in believing in the myths of authority.

	INDONESIA	BURMA	THAILAND	CAMBODIA	VIETNAM	LAOS	MALAYA	PHILIPPINES
<i>Pre-history</i>	<i>Java</i> <i>Sumatra</i>			Funan c.100 A.D.-539	Tonking and Champa Annam part c.192- 1471 Empire from c.111 B.C		Kedah c.200-1370	
<i>Indianized states established</i>	Mataram c.700- c.900 Sailendra c.750			Pre-Angkor Khmer Kingdoms c.550- c.800	Ngo Dynasty 939-1009			
	A Sailendra Be- comes King of Srivijaya c.860-1293	Pagan 1044-1287		Angkor c.802- 1432	14 dynasties and history of suzerainty under Chi- nese Empire			
<i>Wars among emerging empires</i>	Mayapahit 1293-1520	Pegu 1287- 1539	Chengmai Kingdom 1238-1419			Lang Chang 1353-1704		
		Mongol Invasion 1287		Post-Angkor Dynasties 1432-present			1511 Portuguese es- tablish base at Malacca	1521 Magellan 1571 Manila founded
<i>Europeans first appear</i>	1500's Portu- guese traders	Ava 1314-1555	Ayut'ia Dynasty 1350-1767					
	1595 First Dutch ships	Toungoo 1486- 1752						
	1605 Dutch at Am- boina	Alaungpaya or Konbaung Dynasty	Dynasty at Bangkok 1767-present		1664 French East India Company seeks bases	Vientiane 1700- 1760 Luang Prabang 1707- present	1641 Dutch conqui Malacca	
	1619 Dutch establish Batavia	1752-1885			1787 French-An- nam Treaty		1786 British in Pe- nang	
	1682 Dutch Govern- ment replaces Dutch East In- dia Company							
<i>Colonial era begins</i>	1811 Raffles rules Java for British							
	1824 Dutch-British Treaty	1826 First Anglo- Burmese War						
	1830 "Culture sys- tem" initiated	1852 Second Anglo- Burmese War	1851-68 Rule of King Mongkut				1819 Singapore estab- lished	

	INDONESIA	BURMA	THAILAND	CAMBODIA	VIETNAM	LAOS	MALAYA	PHILIPPINES
	1901 Ethical policy	1885 Third Anglo-Burmese War; end of Burmese Kingdom  British rule as Province of India	1868-1910 Rule of King Chulalongkorn  Modernization of Government	1863 Treaty with France; Protectorate established	1862 French treaty with Annam and Cochun China  1887 Unification of French rule	1893 Protectorate of French	1862-72 Straits Settlement  1874 First Treaty with Malay State  1896 Federation established  1914 Treaty with Johore	1898 Dewey captures Manila  1901 Civil Government established  1907 Legislative Assembly  1935 Commonwealth established  1941 Japanese conquest  1916 Independence
<i>World War II</i>	1942 Japanese occupation  1945 Republican Government proclaimed	1935 Separation from India  1942 Japanese occupation	1932 Coup—Constitutional Monarchy established  1942 Marshal Phibun associates Thailand with Japan		1945 Vietnam declares independence  1946 French return  1947 French Viet Minh war begins		1941 Japanese invasion  1946 Union proposal  1947 Federation established again  1948 Emergency begins	
<i>Independence era</i>	1947 United States of Indonesia; First Dutch police action  1948 Communist uprising in Madras  Second Dutch police action  1949 Round Table Agreement—Independence recognized  1958-59 Revolt of military commanders on outer islands  1960 Sukarno ends parliamentary system; beginning of "guided democracy"	1948 Independence; U Nu Premier of Government    1958-60 First army rule  1962 Second army rule under Gen. Ne Win	1948-57 Phibun rules    1957 Marshal Sarit ousts Phibun	1954 Cambodian independence	1954 Geneva Treaty—Vietnam partitioned    1961 Communist insurgency war begins in South Vietnam	1954 Independence	1957 Independence  1962 Negotiations for establishment of Malaysia (Federation of Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo territories)	1953-57 Presidency of Ramon Magsaysay

FIGURE 3-1 HIGHLIGHTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL HISTORY

## The Western Impact and Colonial Rule

Although many of the cultural attitudes and practices of the Southeast Asians can be traced to the earlier phases of the region's history, the major characteristics of contemporary Southeast Asian politics stem largely from the period when Western culture and ideas were brought to the area. Before political colonialism appeared in the region in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Western traders and missionaries had already touched the area and introduced many changes. Only the Philippines succumbed to foreign control during the period of first exposure to the West. Magellan visited the Indies, as the Philippines were called by the Spaniards, in 1519 and met his death while supporting an inter-island feud. Shortly thereafter, *conquistadores* took over much of the Philippines and planted there new patterns of social, political, and religious life. In converting the Philippines to Christianity, the Spaniards also changed the structure of Philippine society, making it comparable in many ways to Latin American countries.

Pre-Spanish Philippine society was organized around small family-group villages or *barangays* (named after the small vessels that brought the Malay people to the islands), each of which had a hereditary headman or *datu*. Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the Spanish employed the infamous *encomienda system*, which enabled large private estates to be administered by Spaniards with grants from the Spanish king. From the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Spaniards introduced a more complex hierarchical pattern of rule. At the village level, they replaced the *datu* or traditional headman with, first, the *cabenza de barangay* and then later the

*teniente del barrio*. Above these village headmen was the *principalia*, or township, led by the *mayor de pueblo*, and above them were the governors of the provinces, who were appointed by the Spanish crown and were responsible to the Governor-General. The Spanish hierarchical structure represented an extended *patrón* system in which each level had its reciprocal obligations and duties to the other. Lower officials sought the protection and support of superior officials. Government was thus conceived as a complex web of relationships in which protection was offered in exchange for allegiance and obligations. The spirit of the *patrón* system lasted throughout the American period of control and continues to shape Philippine politics today.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the initial Western impact did not bring as dramatic a change. The early Western traders established contact with Asians along the coastal areas and, in time, built settlements and "factories," as the early warehouses were called. These seagoing merchants encouraged the growth of cities and thereby brought a gradual but profound change to the entire countryside. The Portuguese operated in their own peculiar way, however; they were largely content with merely establishing forts and military strongholds to protect their shipping interests. By the eighteenth century, Western traders began to seek political protection for the conduct of trade. After the establishment of the Dutch East Indies Company and the British East India Company at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the European traders began to enter into alliances with local authorities in Indonesia and Malaya. Gradually, the need to maintain control of transportation and to protect commercial interests led the European companies to assume quasi-political roles. By the mid-seventeenth century, both the Dutch and British East India Companies were engaged in substantial governmental enterprises.

The nineteenth century saw the expansion of European influences to all areas of Southeast Asia and the introduction of colonial rule in all countries except Thailand. The different policies followed by the various colonial powers tremendously increased the differences

that already existed in Southeast Asian societies. It is important therefore briefly to survey these differences in colonial policy if we are to understand the differences in contemporary political developments.

The British relied on direct rule in Burma but utilized indirect rule in some of the states of Malaya. When early British attempts to establish formal diplomatic relations with the last of the Burmese kings led only to confusion and misunderstanding, the British resorted to military measures. After the old Burmese monarchy was destroyed in the three Anglo-Burmese wars of the nineteenth century, the British introduced into Burma the type of government that had been evolved in British India. In the outlying districts, deputy commissioners came to personify almost all aspects of government. In Rangoon, the Governor-General was surrounded by a highly modernized government that was divided into several departments to handle the special problems of the country. A British system of law was established and a native civil service was gradually trained to maintain the principles of this foreign-introduced legal system. British colonial policy toward economic matters in Burma was strongly influenced by the nineteenth-century spirit of *laissez-faire*, for the government maintained law and order so that others might engage in legitimate business and trade. The result was an extraordinary expansion of agricultural activities, to the point where Burma became the largest rice-exporting area in the world. Indian capital poured into the country to help finance this agricultural expansion, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Indian investments in Burma were nearly four times those of the British.

In Malaya, the British established a complex method of supporting indirect rule in some states while assuming more direct rule in others. Gradually, however, the British found that, in order to preserve the peace and encourage economic development, they had to create more centralized forms of government. The state of Johore was the last Malay state to be brought under British influence, in 1914. From the end of World

War I until World War II, the British struggled to maintain the separate jurisdictions and traditions of the various Malay states while at the same time seeking to establish a strong federal authority. The result was a patchwork system of government on the Malay peninsula, consisting of three types of colonial rule: direct rule in the three Straits settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca; a centralized form of indirect rule in the four Federated Malay States; and indirect rule in the five Unfederated States.

Again, in Malaya as in Burma, the British were anxious to promote economic and commercial enterprise. By bringing order to the state of Perak, they made it possible to exploit the tin deposits that had long been known to exist in that area. After World War I, the rubber-planting industry expanded rapidly, and large numbers of Chinese and Indians were imported as migrant laborers on the plantations. As the Malay population withdrew even more into its traditional village pattern of life and the Malay aristocracy was preserved by the British, the Chinese and Indians began to dominate life in the cities. Thus the colonial experience left Malaya with many of its traditional symbols of authority protected but with the nature of its society substantially changed. Above all, Malaya became a country of divided communal societies.

The Dutch followed radically different policies in Indonesia. The initial Dutch expansion into the Indies followed classic methods of indirect rule. In time, however, the Dutch asserted greater and greater administrative controls over the territories, although they never introduced a legal system and Westernized forms of government to the same degree that the British did in Malaya. Instead, the Dutch created a dual structure of government, with a Javanese administrative service to deal largely with Indonesians and a Dutch administrative service to handle Dutch interests. The Dutch sought to preserve many of

the traditional Indonesian patterns of life, which meant that very few natives were trained for governmental posts. Where the British were either unconcerned about traditional practices or anxious to educate Southeast Asians for administrative roles, the Dutch tried to maintain the old ways, and, in the process, they discouraged most Indonesians from striving to become part of modern society. The rights of the family and the village, or *desa*, were respected; *adat*, or customary law, was carefully preserved; a wide range of social services was introduced; and both the claims of the peasant and of the aristocrat were protected. Significantly, Java was the one area in Asia in which the introduction of a moneyed economy did not produce an increase in the concentration of landholding and in the number of landless peasants. At the same time, however, the Dutch did not develop a modernized leadership that might have helped build up the country. Thus, although Dutch policy was often considered before the war to be a model of colonial rule because of its sympathy for the traditional habits of the subjects, it proved after the war to have been inadequate for the creation of a new state.

Although the French first established treaty relations with the King of Annam in 1787, French influence in Southeast Asia did not become significant until the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1862, the Annamese emperor was forced to cede Cochin-China to the French, and in 1863 the King of Cambodia accepted the French as a protecting power. Northern Indochina fell under French influence in 1883 and 1884 when Annam and Tongking, respectively, became French protectorates. Thereafter, French colonial policy vacillated between attempts to assimilate the Vietnamese people into French culture and efforts to preserve traditional Vietnamese practices. In the early phase of French rule, the object of French policy was to make

Indochina an extension of France in Asia. A large number of Vietnamese were exposed to French culture, and the Vietnamese became in time possibly the best equipped of all Southeast Asians to participate in European civilization. In Cambodia and Laos, however, the French attempted very little in the way of political development or social and economic change. In both these areas, French influence appeared first in the form of protectorates. In Cambodia, Emperor Ang Duong, founder of the present dynasty, turned to France for protection against both Siamese and Annamese aggressions. The French protectorate was established in 1863 and lasted until 1949, but in 1884 the son of Ang Duong, King Norodom, signed under protest a treaty which made the French Resident-General the actual ruler of the land. In Laos, the French were requested to help save the kingdom of Luangprabang from the Siamese. In 1893, after the French troops had assisted in repelling an attack by the Siamese, a French protectorate was established which lasted until 1949.

While the rest of Southeast Asia was falling under colonial control, Thailand succeeded in meeting the West without losing its independence. The Siamese kingdom in the nineteenth century was a more stable and integrated society than most of the other Southeast Asian countries. Above all, however, Thailand was fortunate in having three enlightened kings who helped lead the country through its first phases of adjustment to the Western impact. Under King Ang Mongkut (Rama IV, 1851-68), the Siamese first brought in foreign advisers and technicians. In the following reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1868-1910), the entire structure of the Siamese government was revamped, and the six traditional departments of government were replaced by twelve modern ministries, each with a specific function. Officials were put on salaries and no longer expected to extract a livelihood from the citizenry. Advisers from various European countries were brought in to assist in the creation of the new ministries. By the turn of the century, the Thai government was as advanced as



many of the colonial governments, and the country had also been able to preserve its independence.

The most profound influence of the West in Southeast Asia was generally in the realm of government. The colonial regimes provided the framework for the new national entities that were gradually to emerge. Colonialism gave to many of the peoples of Southeast Asia their first feeling of belonging to the same political system and of sharing an identity with others beyond merely their own local community. Dutch administration in the Indies, for example, began as several separate enterprises which coincided with domains of traditional rulers but in time were joined tightly to provide the governmental structure for the new country of Indonesia, which embraced all the 3,000 islands of the Indies.

Before the reaction to colonialism produced strong nationalist movements, there was first a period of gradual but significant social and economic changes which affected most Southeast Asian societies.

**THE GROWTH OF CITIES.** The most dramatic result of the Western penetration was the development in each of the countries of a single major city, which became a center of modern life. These cities, in turn, have come to reflect the political, social, and economic characteristics of each of the Southeast Asian countries. Rangoon was a mere village when British rule was first introduced, but it grew to be a city of half a million by the time of World War II. The Dutch established their capital of Batavia, now called Djakarta, in what were uninviting swamplands, and today it is the largest city in Southeast Asia, with a population of over three million. Singapore and Bangkok, Saigon and Manila, each came to represent, in concentrated form, the life of an entire country.

**WESTERN EDUCATION.** Profound social changes followed wherever modern schools introduced Western learning to the Asians. In the Philippines, American policy strongly supported a public-school system and en-

couraged universal education. As a result, after only little more than a decade of American rule there were more high school students in the Philippines than in her former mother country of Spain. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the spread of education was on a more restricted basis. In Burma, American missionaries set up the first Western schools, but by the end of World War I the colonial authorities found it necessary to establish a university in order to train civil servants. In about ten years, Rangoon University had become a center of nationalist political agitation, and most of the future leaders of the country were first introduced to political activities on its campus. In Indonesia, the Dutch restricted the Western forms of education, and thus modern education was limited largely to members of the traditional aristocracy and to those who went to Holland to school.

Wherever it was offered, Western education opened the minds of Southeast Asians to the possibilities of a better life and a hope for more effective participation in national affairs. Out of schools came a new class of people who were to become key elements in the political development of each country. Western education also lighted sparks of personal ambition in young Southeast Asians. Those who had invested time and effort in obtaining the new types of knowledge expected to receive in return greater career opportunities. In practice, most of the secondary-school and even university graduates moved into routine administrative jobs either in government or Western industries, but in time the candidates for such jobs greatly exceeded the number of openings. For some Southeast Asians, education became a search for the security of clerical jobs, while for others it became a source of personal frustration and unrealized ambitions. Thus the Western educational systems produced, paradoxically, both revolutionaries and also some of the more

conservative and cautious Southeast Asian leaders. Both groups, however, tended to link politics with their personal careers, to such an extent that many Southeast Asians saw the future of their countries and that of their own careers as being inextricably linked.

**THE EMERGENCE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS.** Another result of Westernization was the emergence of a class of Asians who served as functionaries and as petty officials within all the colonial administrations. Usually the better educated people—and especially in Burma, Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippines, many of these officials—became important government officers and members of the judiciary. Those with less education became clerks, while those with specialized training became lawyers. Between the two World Wars, substantial numbers of Southeast Asians worked diligently to modernize their countries. Most of them felt they were serving their countries well by trying to introduce advanced administrative procedures and an impartial system of justice, but many of them were later to face the charge of cooperating with a foreign colonial regime. They were caught between their genuine interest in the well-being of their country and their desire for promotion and their hope that they would eventually replace the European officials in an independent country.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.** Throughout the nineteenth century, the self-sufficient village-based economies of agricultural Southeast Asia were gradually replaced by moneyed economies as the rural people of the area began to grow crops either for world markets or their own urban markets. At the same time, the peasant peoples of Southeast Asia became increasingly dependent on textiles and small manufactured products and consequently had to produce more crops in order to pay for them. In Burma, this process took place largely

in response to the liberal economic policies of the British colonial government. In Indonesia, the government, at the beginning of Dutch rule, through the much-hated “culture system,” forced the Javanese peasant to convert a certain portion of his land into crops for commercial trade. In the Philippines, the development of the moneyed economy was based largely on the hacienda system, under which peasants worked for large landlords.

Substantial European capital was not invested in the economic development of Southeast Asia until after World War I. The rise of the automobile industry in America and Europe brought a heavy demand for rubber, which led to the development of plantation economies in Malaya, Indonesia, and Vietnam. During the decade of the 1920's, most Southeast Asian countries experienced very rapid economic growth, as large rubber and coffee plantations were staked out by the British and French. The world depression, however, at the end of the 1920's, hit Southeast Asia hard. The sharp decline in the world demand for the raw materials of the area outpaced the desperate efforts of companies to create international rubber and tin arrangements to strengthen prices in these commodities. Economic development had been confined largely to the urban areas and the plantations, and the depression struck the region before many secondary industries could be set up and before the people had had a chance to benefit from sustained international economic activity.

The very gradual pace of economic change in the nineteenth century resulted in many of the new activities being reserved to particular ethnic communities on an almost guild-like or caste-like basis. For example, in Malaya Indians were imported to work on the plantations, and Chinese immigrants provided much of the labor in the tin mines. It was other Asians—mainly Chinese and Indians—who were accustomed to an urban world and adapted quickly to the new conditions, who very soon gained crucial positions in the evolving economies. The Chinese throughout Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya came to monopolize much of the retail trade. Ob-

taining their goods from European importers, they would then transfer them to the local and rural markets. Indians performed similar roles in Burma and parts of Malaya. Indian moneylenders also brought world capital to the outlying areas of Burma. In time, however, the Southeast Asians came to resent deeply the near monopolies of the Chinese and the Indians in the retail and moneylending fields. As rural indebtedness increased during the depression, nationalist feelings were turned against Indians and Chinese. This prejudice helps explain why the nationalists since independence have been determined to curtail the economic power not only of Europeans but of Indians and Chinese as well.

**THE REVOLUTION IN SOCIAL RELATIONS.** The radical transformations that followed the introduction of Western ideas and institutions into Southeast Asia subjected the traditional patterns of social relationships to tremendous strain. Most Southeast Asian cultures did not have the strong extended family system of China and Japan, but even the more loosely organized Southeast Asian family was being increasingly scattered by the migration of the peasants to the city to become laborers. The spread of education instilled in the younger generation attitudes that were no longer compatible with those of their parents. Although Southeast Asian women have generally had more freedom than have most Asian women, their increased opportunities to attend school and find employment have given them an even greater degree of freedom.

Modern medical facilities and improved health standards triggered a spectacular rise in Southeast Asian population, placing great pressure on those institutions and customs that were appropriate only to lightly populated communities where everyone knew everyone else. The relative number of young people increased and forced cultures that venerated the old to accept the importance of youth. These disrupting upheavals in society brought traditional religious ties under attack. Throughout Southeast Asia, people are still identified by their religious or ethnic associations, but the hold of religion has been con-

siderably weakened. Although religious precepts still govern much of the life of the Burmese and Indonesians, many religious practices within these countries have been curtailed or corrupted. The authority of the monks in Burma, for example, was greatly reduced under colonial rule, and the Islamic religious leaders in Indonesia were isolated by the Dutch from the main streams of intellectual ferment. Religion no longer provides the basic guidelines for everyday social life as it did in traditional Southeast Asia; people now tend to turn to religion for mystical solutions to the stresses that arise from drastic social change. At the same time, religion has continued to serve as a fundamental basis for social and individual identification: for example, Burmese and Thais automatically think of themselves as Buddhists when in contact with foreigners. Thus, although there has been a decline in the power of sacred authority, religious identification remains a powerful social and political force.

**THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM.** Out of the turmoil that attended the clash of the cultures of East and West in Southeast Asia came vigorous nationalist leaders. During the Japanese occupation and after World War II, strong nationalist movements were launched in most of the countries of the region. Before the war, a small group of Westernized politicians, men mainly trained in the law, helped administer their countries through the various forms of government with which the colonial authorities were experimenting. Fundamentally, however, colonialism was much more effective in creating the administrative structure of government than in developing responsible democratic politicians.

Only in the Philippines can it be said that colonialism developed a genuine democratic system. The United States announced almost at the beginning of its period of occupation

its determination to prepare the islands for eventual independence. Political parties were openly encouraged, and in 1907 the Philippines was given a bicameral legislature; the lower house was the first popularly elected body in all of Southeast Asia. Confident that independence would come in due time, Philippine political leaders concentrated their energies on domestic political problems. The Tydings-McDuffie Act gave the Philippines commonwealth status in 1935 and promised that after a ten-year transitional period the islands would become independent. During the ten years, the United States exercised only nominal control over currency, foreign trade, matters of defense, and foreign relations. Until the Japanese invasion, the United States neither used nor threatened to use any of its restrictive powers against the Philippine government.

Nowhere else in Southeast Asia was a comparable record of political maturity achieved, for the eventual goal of independence was never as clearly set forth. There was, however, substantial constitutional development in Burma. Initially, the legislative councils, composed of native Burmese, served primarily as advisers to the government. The first such council, established in 1897, consisted of nine members appointed by the government. In 1909, the Morley-Minto Reforms expanded this body to fifteen members, of whom two were to be elected from the European business community. More wide-reaching constitutional changes came with the introduction in 1923 of a system of dyarchy under which over half the ministries were made the direct responsibility of an elected cabinet, with the balance of the ministries remaining under direct British control. Under this system, Burma was granted its first elected assembly; 79 out of the 103 seats were popularly chosen, and Burmese served as ministers of some of the governmental departments. The British, however, reserved control over the crucial min-

istries of finance and home affairs. In 1935, Burma was separated from India and given a bicameral legislature, with a lower house of 132 elected members. From 1937 to 1941 and the Japanese occupation, four Burmese served as Prime Ministers, and some of the pressing domestic problems were being effectively challenged. The Burmese politicians who sought to operate within the constitutional system, however, found themselves hedged in on one side by the English officials and criticized on the other by their own people for cooperating with the colonial authorities. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia there were very few constitutionally responsible politicians. The Asian leaders concentrated mostly on forming anti-colonial movements, although these movements did not become significant until the Japanese occupation.

## The Japanese Occupation

The Second World War was a decisive watershed in the political development of all the countries of Southeast Asia. When the Japanese forces, following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, poured into Malaya and then the Philippines and Indonesia, a century of European rule was abruptly ended. Eventually, Japanese authority spread over the entire region, drastically altering the structure of society in each country. With the defeat of the Europeans, the gradual nature of social change accelerated into a revolutionary upheaval. Southeast Asians who previously enjoyed considerable influence were suddenly shorn of power and position. New nationalist leaders were prepared to cooperate with the Japanese in the hope of advancing the prospects of independence. Japanese policies were often harsh and cruel toward the vast majority of Southeast Asians, but at the same time the Japanese courted the support of potential leaders in the various countries. While the Western powers were engrossed in the struggle against the Axis, behind the battlefronts in Southeast Asia the desire for independence, and the ability to capture it, were mounting rapidly

under the repressive Japanese regime. Once the lid was off, explosive forces were bound to be released.

The old class of native administrators in almost every country faced a cruel dilemma when the Japanese troops conquered their land. In Burma, many of them either returned to their villages or followed the British to India and continued to serve with the exiled government located at Simla in the Himalayan foothills. When Dutch officials in Indonesia were taken off to prison camps, Indonesian administrators had to decide whether to cooperate with the Japanese or retire completely from government. In the Philippines, where guerrilla operations continued throughout the war, some administrators felt it necessary to work with the Japanese in order to help protect their people. In Malaya, the Japanese occupation loosed a vendetta against the Chinese community.

While those who had been employed in the colonial governments made their hard choices, new Southeast Asian leaders began to emerge. Just before the war, Aung San and 29 others were smuggled out of Burma by the Japanese to be trained as the cadre for an army that was to help them expel the British from Burma. After the Japanese conquest of Burma, other Burmese were recruited into the government, and in 1943 Japan granted this government, under the leadership of Dr. Ba Maw, nominal "independence." All through the war, however, many Burmese worked secretly with the Allies against the Japanese. On March 27, 1945, the army of General Aung San revolted against the Japanese and joined the Allies. Thereafter the Burmese government opposed all foreign groups, including the returning British. When the British Military Administration was established in the spring of 1945, after the Japanese were driven from the country, the British found that even though the country was experiencing severe food shortages and the economy was in a shambles, the new Burmese leaders were determined to retain their positions of influence and resist any return to colonial status. In spite of British promises of ultimate self-government, the Burmese felt that even a delay

of three years for independence would be intolerable. Under the leadership of Aung San, all the nationalist groups in the country joined to form the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League), which brought Burma independence and served as the ruling political party until 1958.

Developments in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation followed similar lines. In 1943, the Japanese established a native army, with Indonesian officers, that eventually numbered over 120,000 men. Japanese rule was ruthless and efficient, but the Japanese did obtain the cooperation of nationalist leaders who were determined to gain freedom for their country. As the Japanese faced defeat in 1945, they established a committee to prepare for national independence. Throughout the summer, the Japanese encouraged the strong nationalist movement that had sprung up, and on August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrendered, the Indonesians proclaimed their independence. Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir were the popular national leaders who took the lead in organizing the new government. A constitution was quickly prepared which established a strong presidency, a cabinet that was responsible to the President, and a legislature, the 135-member Central National Committee. From 1946 until 1949, Indonesian nationalists fought against the Dutch to achieve their final independence.

In Malaya, the Japanese conquest completely disrupted the pre-war colonial society. The only effective anti-Japanese movement in the country was led by the Communists. Using guerrilla tactics, the Communists dominated many jungle areas, but with the Japanese surrender, the Communists joined the rest of the Malaysians in accepting the return of the British. No general nationalist movement developed in Malaya for nearly a decade after the war, because the Communists, in June, 1948, launched a campaign of insurrection and terrorism. To suppress the upris-

ings, again occurring mainly in the jungles, the government had to divert its energies from the job of building a nation.

The Japanese occupation produced less social disruption in the Philippines than in any Southeast Asian country except Thailand. Most of the officials of the Philippine Commonwealth became officials under the Japanese regime. After the surrender of American and Philippine forces in Bataan, all civil authorities were ordered to accept the rule of the Japanese. In October, 1943, the Japanese declared an "independent republic" of the Philippines and established Jose Laurel as President. The exiled President Quezon of the Commonwealth died in the United States in 1944, and Vice-President Osmeña returned with the American forces when, under General MacArthur, they re-conquered the Philippines. One of the major problems facing President Osmeña was what to do with those who had collaborated with the Japanese. This issue, however, disappeared from Philippine politics after the election in April, 1946, of Manuel Roxas, a member of the liberal wing of the Nacionalista Party. Roxas became the first President of the Republic of the Philippines on July 4, 1946, when the country received its independence from the United States.

In Vietnam, Japanese occupation produced an extremely complex situation that eventually led to the division of that country into Communist-dominated North Vietnam and the non-Communist Republic of Vietnam in the south. Japan assumed control in Indochina in July, 1941, after a brief clash with the French. France at the time had already been conquered by the Germans, and the Pétain government in Vichy felt it necessary to come to terms with the Japanese. Thus the French nominally remained in control of the government of Vietnam, while the Japanese asserted authority over the land. In the spring of 1945, when the Japanese realized that their influ-

ence was declining and that the French and their allies might return, they persuaded Emperor Bao Dai to declare the independence of Vietnam. Throughout the Japanese occupation, the only active opposition that developed was that of the Viet Minh, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, a long-time Asian Communist. The Allies had to work with the Viet Minh, because it was the only group sufficiently well organized to provide intelligence during the war. When the Japanese surrendered in August, 1945, Emperor Bao Dai found that he did not have enough support to counter the Viet Minh and acceded to their demands to establish the government in Hanoi. The defeat of the Japanese also brought the return of the French and the beginning of the long struggle between the French and various Vietnamese nationalist leaders over the terms of autonomy and independence. This fight lasted until the Geneva agreement of 1954 ended all French controls in the Indochina peninsula and resulted in independence for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

## The Emergence of Independent States

The postwar years witnessed the triumph of nationalist movements in the rest of the countries of Southeast Asia as well. The Philippines was the first of the former colonial areas to obtain its independence, on July 4, 1946. The following year, the British and Burmese came to their understanding, and on January 4, 1948, the formal transfer of sovereignty took place in Rangoon; Burma became the first and the only former British territory in Asia or Africa to withdraw from the British Commonwealth.

In Indonesia, there was a far more prolonged struggle for independence. When British troops entered Indonesia after the surrender of the Japanese, they found that the Indonesians had made the most of the absence of the Dutch and had established an army which they considered to be the symbol of their authority. The return of Dutch troops

and the release of Dutch civilians set off a year of chaos and conflict as the Dutch sought to destroy the guerrilla bands and reassert their pre-war authority over Indonesia. On March 25, 1947, the Dutch and Indonesians reached a formula by which the United States of Indonesia was established as a part of a new Dutch Commonwealth. Under this arrangement, the Indonesian Republic was to govern Java and Sumatra, while the Outer Islands were to be separately administered. Within three months, this agreement collapsed with the first Dutch "police action." World opinion was quickly mobilized against the Dutch, and pressures from the United Nations and the United States forced a new truce agreement which was signed aboard the American cruiser "Renville."

Once again, however, Indonesia was to be denied peace and stability, as hostility between the Dutch and Indonesians reached the breaking point. During this time, Communist influences were growing within the territory of the Republic, and in December, 1948, the Indonesian Communist Party attempted a revolt. Republican forces, however, quickly suppressed this stab in the back. Then the Dutch initiated their second "police action," which was again futile. Indonesian resistance was stiff and world opinion again censored the Dutch actions. Finally, the Dutch resigned themselves to negotiating with the Indonesians, and the Round Table Agreements of The Hague of December 28, 1949, marked the formal end of the Dutch empire in the Indies. These Agreements transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic.

Malaya was the last of the main Southeast Asian countries to obtain its independence—on August 31, 1957. Independence was delayed until after the prolonged campaign of terrorism by the Malayan Communist Party had been successfully defeated. Although the constitutional evolution of the Federation of Malaya was not marked by dramatic incidents, it did involve some extremely delicate social and political issues. Immediately after the Japanese surrender, the British government proposed that the former Federated and Unfederated states of Malaya be reorganized

into a Malayan Union. Under this proposal, the treaties of the British with the various sultans and traditional rulers in Malaya would have been abrogated and a unitary state would have been established that would have permitted a far more efficient administration of government.

Immediately after the Malayan Union proposals were made in 1947, strong opposition appeared both in Malaya and among those in England who knew Malaya well. Feelings ran high because a Malayan Union would have upset the delicate balance of ethnic groups that made up the Malayan population. The Union proposal would have strengthened the position of the Malayan Chinese, and the Malays felt that under it they would lose various forms of protection which they felt were rightfully theirs as the original inhabitants of the peninsula. The failure of the Malayan Union proposal demonstrated that the government of Malaya would have to be rooted in the communal nature of its society. Therefore, independence would have to evolve through the traditional Malay rulers and in the form of a more stable federation of Malaya. The eventual outcome was assured by the decision of the leading Chinese and Malay political associations, the Malayan Chinese Association and the United Malay National Organization, to join in creating the Alliance, which became the dominant political force in the country. Legally, the federation solution provided for an elected "king," for the "Paramount Ruler" of the federation was to be elected from among the various sultans of the states by the rulers themselves.

Although the trauma of independence deeply affected the subsequent political development of each of the new Southeast Asian nations, other less spectacular factors also colored the formative years of these countries. Most of them began their experiments in self-rule under extremely inauspicious circumstances. The war left severe physical damage

in all of the countries, and, possibly more seriously, the war etched deep psychological scars on large numbers of their peoples. The spirit of guerrilla resistance to the Japanese often carried over to an attitude of lawlessness in the postwar period. Economic dislocation encouraged the spread of black-market activities and the practice of taking advantage of immediate opportunities. World attention was largely focused elsewhere. Europeans were engaged in their own recovery, and America was more concerned with the occupation of Germany and Japan and the need to meet the Soviet challenge. Thus the new countries of Southeast Asia began their independent careers at a time when they could expect little outside assistance.

World attention was attracted to Southeast Asia after the fall of China to the Communists and when, in 1948, the various South-

east Asian Communist Parties initiated campaigns of violence and terrorism. Behind this more dramatic conflict, the new governments of Southeast Asia have had a host of problems that have taxed their abilities to the fullest. There have been the omnipresent problems of national unity and political consensus in ethnically divided societies, the constant lack of trained personnel, the shortage of capital resources, and generally inadequate public institutions to meet the demands of a population with new and revolutionary expectations. In none of the countries have the high hopes that went with independence been realized, and in all of them the fervent sense of national purpose has, in varying degrees, been dissipated. In analyzing contemporary Southeast Asia, then, we must place special stress on the factors impeding the progress of national development in the region.



## Social Structure

### IV

Many of the difficulties of the new countries of Southeast Asia can be traced to the social and cultural foundations of their political systems. Nowhere in the region has the class structure been conducive to democratic practices. Class relationships tend either to be of a highly authoritarian and rigid nature or in such a state of flux and uncertainty that they fail to provide an adequate basis for stable political life.

The Philippines stand at one extreme, representing the Southeast Asian society with the most clearly defined and firmly established social structure. The Spanish tradition is still powerful, and all classes still feel that they have a definite place within the hierarchy. The landowners remain a significant feature in Philippine social and political life, and highly paternalistic relationships continue to exist between upper and lower classes. Overpopulation on Luzon has created serious problems of rural dissatisfaction and a significant class of landless peasants. These problems were particularly acute in the early postwar years, and the Communists were able to ex-

plot them in building up an insurgent movement, the *Hukbalahap*.

In recent years, however, significant changes have occurred which have modified the old pattern of relationships. Landowners and the heirs to large estates have found a challenge in new forms of entrepreneurial activity. Some of these people are leaving the land and the extractive industries to enter new forms of commerce and industry. In breaking with the family traditions, they have also broken with some of the old social habits of mind. They have become less paternalistic and instead of thinking of the masses as essentially farmers working on their lands and owing the landowners respect and deference, they now regard them as potential workers and customers. There has also been a significant shift in the attitudes of the Filipino middle class. The lawyers, for example, who a few years back dealt mostly with the interests of landowners now find it possible to represent a far wider range of interests in society. At the same time, a small but significant middle class has begun to develop within the provincial towns throughout the Philippines. Instead of the great gap that used to exist between the modernized people in the cities and the peasant masses in the countryside,

there are now many evidences that a new way of life is emerging throughout the islands.

These changes in the Philippine social structure have come about as a result of changes in patterns of economic activity, although they also appear to reflect the cumulative effects of the public educational system which was introduced during the period of American rule. The public schools have taught an essentially middle-class, democratic view of life, and increasing numbers of Filipinos have shared a common early experience which has left them with feelings of mutual interest, even though they have subsequently followed different careers. The Philippines, for example, is the only country in Asia in which there are substantial numbers of farmers, mechanics, lawyers, and doctors that all shared a common experience of schooling during their first years of life. Although most of the social differences in the Philippines are still based on the family origins of individuals and people are still largely born to their position in life, there are now significant possibilities for social mobility.

Few other Southeast Asian countries have a clearly defined social structure upon which to build. Indonesia, for example, has no general social structure which can serve as a framework for the entire society. Instead, Indonesian society is composed of a large number of fluid groups, all of which tend to be parochial and limited in scope. Ethnic or communal groupings based on religion are more important than class differences in Indonesia. Dutch policy prevented the development of a strong landlord class, and within the urban areas the class of Westernized people is highly fragmented. Within the elite elements of the society, professional groups are the strongest social forces. Such segments as the bureaucracy, the army, Westernized intellectuals, journalists, and the like are unable to provide a stable social system. Individual interests tend to dominate group interests, and

there are few firmly rooted social and economic relationships.

A fundamental difficulty in most of the Southeast Asian societies is that the stage of their economic development has not yet produced a substantial middle class or a class with an interest in continued economic evolution. Commercial and business activities have generally been under the control of foreigners, either European or Asian, and there has been no strong indigenous entrepreneurial class. The few Southeast Asian businessmen who have emerged have relied primarily on contacts with foreign firms or protection from their own governments, and they have not had to develop effective business organizations to achieve success. Consequently, businessmen in Southeast Asia have not provided substantial leadership for their communities. They have preferred to remain in the background, hoping to obtain the necessary permits for carrying on their business activities but without any notion that their enterprises represent a major contribution to national development.

In many respects, family ties and the conflict between generations are more significant in Southeast Asian society than class considerations. Even in Burma and Thailand, the Southeast Asian countries with the least rigidly structured family systems, the tie of kinship is a powerful factor in influencing social and political behavior. In Burma, for example, some of the leading families which were part of the aristocracy under the Burmese kings maintained their leading position during the British period, and it is the sons and daughters of many of these families who are most active in developing the newly independent country today. Thus, although a revolution in ideas and in formal relationships has swept through Burmese society, there has been a remarkable continuity in the position of certain families. A similar situation is to be found in Vietnam, where most of the current elite can trace their family ties back to the Mandarin class under the traditional Annamese empire. In Indonesia, the traditional aristocracy or *prijaji* class represents a subtle relationship of families more than it

does a distinct social class. Although the *prijaiji* no longer give formal leadership to Javanese society, most of the leaders in the country have *prijaiji* backgrounds, and the members of the *prijaiji* families still tend to marry within the class.

The continued importance of family ties helps explain some of the intensity of conflict between the generations in Southeast Asian society. The clash between the search for new ways and the desire to cling to older traditions is dramatically intensified when it is acted out between fathers and sons. This conflict also helps explain the significance of student politics in Asia. The high schools and universities bring young people together and enable them to share their concern with achieving a new type of society and their feeling of frustration with the controls imposed on them by society. Even though the old order seems to have been greatly weakened in Southeast Asia, the young people still feel a need to resist traditional family controls.

This problem of the generations is very close to one of the deepest divisions in all the Southeast Asian societies, the schism between the urban-based, Westernized national leaders and the rural-centered, village-bound peasant masses. This division is possibly more intense and more significant than that of the usual class or regional clashes that exist in other societies, because it represents a gap in outlook and in ways of thinking which defies easy bridging. The process of social change which has produced an elite based on education has also created a leadership unsure of its own traditions and of its own sense of identity. Those who have all the power are uncertain how they should perform and what goals they should accept for their peoples.

The peasant masses, on the other hand, are still following many of their traditional ways of life and habits of thought. Peasant life in Southeast Asia varies to some degree from country to country, largely depending on practices of land tenure. In the Philippines, where the estate is the basic unit of agriculture, the peasants have long looked up to the landlords as both paternalistic and author-

itarian leaders. In Indonesia, the peasant has been protected from landlords until recent years and has tended to see the government as the protective and paternalistic center of authority. In Burma, the peasant learned early that the foreigners in government and the Indian moneylenders could be helpful as well as dangerous, and thus they developed mixed feelings toward all foreigners and all institutions of government, distrusting them both but hoping to derive some benefits from them.

This difference between the more and the less modernized people creates some of the sharpest social and political issues in Southeast Asian societies and makes many problems more acute than they might otherwise be. For example, regional sentiments and local loyalties abound in Southeast Asia, but they would probably not be as significant in disrupting the social processes if it were not for the clash between the more and the less modernized people. In Indonesia, for instance, the peoples of Sumatra, Bali, and the Celebes tend to distrust the Javanese. But these feelings become greatly intensified when they appear in the form of the better-educated and more Westernized Javanese official seeking to assert control in the name of the national government over the local areas. Even on Java itself there are significant differences between the cultural patterns of East, Central, and West Java, but again these differences are most acute when they appear within the context of the clash between a more modernized man from one district dealing with the less modernized people of another region.

Similarly, in the Philippines regional differences are well recognized, and the people of various provinces share remarkably similar stereotypes about these distinctions. But these differences become a source of social friction only when they are combined with the issue of authority, the clash between the more modernized central administration and the more traditional rural elements.

TABLE 4-1 *Religious and Ethnic  
Composition of Southeast  
Asian Countries<sup>a</sup>*

Country	Religions (Percentage)		Ethnic Groups (Percentage)	
Burma	Buddhist	88	Burmese	75
	Hindu	5	Indians	9
	Muslim	5	Karens, Chins,	
	Chinese	2	Shans, Kachins	7
			Chinese	5
			Others	4
Cambodia	Buddhist	90	Khmers	85
			Annamese, Laos, Thais, Chinese	15
Indonesia	Muslim	90	Javanese	45
	Hindu,		Sudanese	17
	Buddhist,		Madurese	10
	Christian,		Macassarese-	
	Others	10	Buginese	5
			Minangkabau	3
			Balinese	2
			Batak	2
			Arjehnese	1
			Others	15
Laos	Buddhist	85	Laos	95
	Others	15	Khmers, Annamese	5
Malaya	Muslim	50	Malays	49
	Taoist-		Chinese	39
	Buddhist	40	Indian	10
	Hindu	10	Others	2
Philippines	Christian	93	Filipino	96
	Muslim	4	Chinese	2
	Others	3	Others	2
Thailand	Buddhist	90	Thais	85
	Muslim	3	Karens, Khmers	3
	Others	7	(Cambodians)	
			Malays	3
Vietnam			Chinese	9
	Buddhist-		Annamese	88
	Taoist	85	Khmers	4
	Christian	10	Chinese	6
	Muslim	2	Malays	2
	Others	3		

<sup>a</sup> Figures are in most cases only very rough estimates.

Religion is unquestionably the strongest cohesive force throughout Southeast Asia. The lack of firmly established social structures and the disruptive consequences of rapid so-

cial change and modernization are to some degree balanced by the integrative powers of religion. Religion is the basic ingredient in the sense of national identity in many of the Southeast Asian societies. For the Burmese, Buddhism most accurately identifies their distinctive nature. Similarly, in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, Buddhism helps people understand their place in society and gives them a feeling of participation in a common destiny. Islam provides much the same basis for social cohesion for Indonesians and Malays.

As important as religion is in the lives of individual Southeast Asians, today only the Catholic Church in the Philippines provides a formal structure for a national society. In traditional Burma under the monarchy, Buddhism was organized, and the hierarchy of monks reinforced the hierarchy of government. During the British period, however, the Buddhist orders were separated from the state, and a general decline in the organization of the monks quickly followed. In time, each monastery maintained its own discipline, and the ties between other monasteries in the country dissolved. In recent years, there have been various attempts to re-establish the Buddhist orders and even to designate Buddhism as a state religion. At present, however, Buddhism is not a formally organized force within Burmese society, and although individuals are influenced by Buddhist teachings and traditions, Buddhism cannot readily act as an independent social force within the society.

Much the same situation exists in the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia. The Islamic teachers or *Ulama* are an important social force throughout rural Indonesia, but there is no formal religious organization of Islam in the country. In fact, there seem to be significant differences in the meaning of Islam in the lives of people. In East and Central Java, for example, there are the communities of *santri* who are devout Islamic people intensely concerned with preserving the highest traditions of their religion. In the same area, groups of *abangan*, although nominally Islamic, still tend to follow many of the reli-

gious practices common to the area before the introduction of Islam. Among the devout, a conflict has arisen between those who want to adapt traditional Islam to modern conditions and those who adhere more strictly to the earlier versions of Islamic teachings. This split between modernism and conservatism has flared up in various forms and has influenced the organization of political parties

and social associations. Thus, although historically religion has provided one of the most important ingredients in the Indonesian feeling of national identity and although many of the earliest social and political movements came out of religious concerns, religion has been unable to provide a structure around which a new Indonesian society can be organized.

# Ideology



All Southeast Asian societies are now trying to discover or create their own ideological identity. The coherence that religion once provided no longer exists, although the influences of religion are still strong. The appeals of nationalism that were readily focused against the foreigner during the drives for national independence have lost their basic unity. In varying degrees, the leaders, thinkers, and the writers of all these countries have been searching for the meaning of their particular societies and the essence of their national cultures. This is in large measure a reflection of the lack of consensus in these countries as they attempt to transform the traditional order into a modern society.

The processes of social change have brought into question the very legitimacy of most of the governments of Southeast Asia. Paradoxically, the new nationalist governments

must rest their main claims to legitimacy on their being the rightful heirs of the former colonial administrations. In countless ways, colonialism and the civil administration of the foreign rulers have helped to define the essence of legitimacy for the new countries. The delineation of the boundaries of most of the states was determined by the colonial governments. Many institutions and practices of the colonial governments are stubbornly maintained so as not to bring into question the legitimacy of the new governments. For example, in spite of all the complaints of the nationalist leaders about the European legal systems introduced into their countries, none of the Southeast Asian countries has substantially changed the nature of its legal code since independence. Colonial administrative procedures and forms also continue in most of the areas. Those who challenge these institutions have now become the new dissidents and the new rebels.

At the time of independence in most of the Southeast Asian states, expectation was high that a new future was about to dawn and great effort was devoted to outlining appropriate new goals for the societies. Nationalist leaders explored various ideological solutions. But the few years that have passed have already brought considerable disillusionment with the first ideological formulations. Indeed, there is evidence of a general decline in ideology throughout Southeast Asia and a trend toward more pragmatic approaches.

In Burma, for example, during and before the war, the nationalist leaders were exposed to various forms of Marxist and even fascist doctrine. With independence, socialism was the most popular creed in the country, and a number of important Burmese leaders identified themselves as socialists. In 1953, Burma was the scene of the first Asian Socialist Conference, and the headquarters of the Asian socialist movement was established in Rangoon. By 1958, however, the socialists no longer seemed to consider themselves a distinct group, and none of the leading Burmese politicians wore the socialist label. Similarly, in Indonesia it seemed that socialism might have been an important ideological force immediately after independence, but within a few years socialism had lost its appeal and the leading socialists found that they had little political influence.

The appeal of socialist ideas in Southeast Asia was largely limited to the early nationalist leaders in Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Elsewhere in the region, aside from the Communist Parties themselves, Marxist ideas have had relatively little impact. In part, this difference is to be explained by the time and circumstances under which the various nationalist leaders came to political action. The nationalist movements in Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam began to take form just before World War II, and the leaders were at that time strongly influenced by the sympathetic reception they received from the Marxist and Left-wing elements in Europe. These nationalist leaders came to political maturity during the 1930's when anti-colonialism was closely associated in Western thinking with anti-capitalism. These ideologically oriented leaders emerged in the Southeast Asian countries in which the conflict between the old and the new was peculiarly acute and in which there was little development of modern practices outside of government. Very few Burmese or Indonesians, for example, were active in modern commercial or industrial activities during the colonial period; instead, nearly all the Western-educated people went into government careers. Hence, in these countries, those who were interested in mod-

ernizing their societies generally viewed the task in terms of governmental policies.

By contrast, in the less ideological and more pragmatic political systems of the Philippines and Malaya, the leaders emerged at times when the climate of opinion was quite different and the process of modernization already quite widespread. The Filipino nationalist leaders represented an earlier generation whose political ideas were formulated in the period immediately before World War I and whose prime commitments were to representative institutions and to constitutionality. The Malayan leaders are the newest generation of Southeast Asians, and their views have been heavily influenced by the cold war and their country's long internal struggle against Communism. Also, in both the Philippines and Malaya, there are substantial indigenous business and commercial interests, and those in government cannot feel that they are the only ones concerned with development.

An increasing sense of dissatisfaction with political ideologies has developed in most of the countries of Southeast Asia. In those countries whose leaders initially subscribed to socialistic doctrines, there has been growing disappointment over the prospects of economic development. The socialist leaders in Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam once assumed that the elimination of foreign rule and the ending of "colonial exploitation" would produce automatic and rapid economic growth. When, however, the pattern became one of stagnation instead of dynamic development, the earlier almost magical faith in socialism and Marxism began to decline. The result has been a trend toward various other forms of ideologies about the state. In Indonesia, for example, President Sukarno has introduced the concept of "guided democracy," by which the country is to be ruled by the President and carefully selected spokesmen for the various interests and communities in the country, and no longer by popular elections and politi-

cal parties. Paradoxically, in the Philippines and Malaya, the two most stable and rapidly advancing countries in the region, intellectuals and student groups feel that national politics lack the ideological basis which could provide a sharper sense of national purpose. They are therefore calling for the kind of ideological ferment which was once characteristic of Burma and Indonesia but which has lost appeal in those countries.

A somewhat different pattern of ideological development has occurred in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, the three Southeast Asian countries with monarchies. The concept of the authority of the king still has a powerful grip on most of rural Thailand, and the modernizing elite appreciates the role of the monarchy in unifying the country as it faces drastic social change. Although there is little opposition to the monarchy itself, there has been considerable discussion about what forms of political practices are consistent with a constitutional monarchy. Since the coup d'état of 1932, which brought an end to the absolute rule of the king, Thai intellectuals and political leaders have debated among themselves whether the country is progressing as fast as it should toward representative practices. In Cambodia and Laos, the monarchy was somewhat tarnished during the French protectorate period, because it was so obvious to all that the authority of the kings was no match for that of foreign officials. At present, in rural Laos, nearly half the population seems unaware of the position of the monarch, and in Cambodia the influence of royalty is apparently strong only in the capital. On the other hand, in neither of these countries are there any other symbols or ideologies competing with the monarchy as a basis for uniting the people.

In many ways, the ideological position of the Southeast Asian states seems to be more clearly defined with respect to foreign affairs than it does to domestic politics. This is in

part because the international setting has been more sharply delineated in recent years than have the internal alignments within the Southeast Asian countries. These countries have tried to cope with the fact that the world has been divided by a cold war that has required them to indicate their support either for the United States or for the Soviet bloc. Some have sought to avoid this issue and to follow a neutralist policy of non-alignment with both sides. Other states in the area fear the proximity of Communist China and believe that without external assistance they might be exposed to aggression from the massive and overpopulated Chinese mainland. All the countries of the area have a common anti-colonial outlook and are part of the so-called Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations.

At the end of the Second World War, it was generally assumed that the tides of nationalism which were sweeping over Southeast Asia would be the dominant current in shaping the politics of the various countries. At the present time, nationalist sentiments are strong enough to keep alive feelings against the foreigner and against the West. But they are not strong enough to unite the people of the individual countries in a common endeavor to achieve their own national destinies. Nationalism has increasingly taken on a negative aspect. For example, in Indonesia nationalist sentiments were strong enough to mobilize attacks against the Dutch and later against the overseas Chinese, but they have not been strong enough to give all elements of the country a sense of a shared destiny. In Burma, nationalism still expresses itself in attacks on the West and on the various Indian and Chinese minority elements within the country. But on domestic issues, there is less certainty of what is the proper nationalist course of action. The withdrawal of foreign capital in both Burma and Indonesia has reduced somewhat the anti-Western sentiments because there have been fewer targets for attack. At the same time, however, this withdrawal of capital has impeded the process of economic growth within these countries and has led to other forms of discontent.

The basic ideological issue in Southeast




Asia, which runs far deeper than socialism or neutralism or pro-Western orientations, is the question of how these changing countries can preserve their traditional sense of identity while coping with the modern world. The Southeast Asian countries all sense that they are small entities that are now caught up in a dangerous, international world. Many of the leaders wish to adopt the features of modern life, and increasing numbers of the population feel that they should be able to benefit from the advances of modern science and technology. On the other hand, there is deep hesitation and reluctance to risk the changes which are necessary to bring about major developments within these countries.

Nationalist leaders are frequently able to articulate a desire for economic development but often find it difficult to carry out the policies necessary to bring about such development. The conflict in values between traditional and modern ways reduces the effectiveness of all governments in Southeast Asia. Some of the people want change but are unprepared to pay the cost when it means weakening the old and comfortable ways they have known. Others are deeply disturbed because they realize that change means that they would have to become more like the very

people they once opposed—their former colonial masters. For change means they must model themselves after the West, and many Southeast Asians feel that this is something they are not prepared to accept, since at one time they thought of the West as their enemy.

Other nationalist leaders have found that the problems of development are much more difficult than they had anticipated and now, sensing that they may be facing failure, are anxious to find new courses of action which would make them appear to be less committed to modernization. In Burma, for example, the nationalist leaders immediately after independence proclaimed economic development to be their prime goal, but in recent years the government has tended to emphasize these goals less and to defend its record more on the basis of preserving the country's traditions and of making Buddhism a more important force in Burmese life. President Sukarno of Indonesia has also felt it desirable to extol the virtues of traditional Indonesian customs and has been calling on his fellow citizens to honor their traditional practices. Until the various Southeast Asian countries are able to resolve these issues of tradition versus change, it is unlikely that substantial national development will take place.

# Political Dynamics



In the efforts of Southeast Asian countries to find their own sense of national identity in a changing world, the most important political actors are likely to be the political parties, leading political personages, civil servants, and the armies. These groups make up the politically elite communities of most of the countries. Only in the Philippines and to a lesser extent in Malaya are there important groups outside of governmental circles with solid roots within the society as a whole, who have influence on official decisions. Elsewhere the process of economic change has not advanced to the point of producing many interest groups or functional associations with limited objectives. At various times, more or less spontaneous groups such as students or peasants may suddenly enter the political arena to make demands, but in recent years the links between non-political

groups and the men in government who make the political decisions have been relatively weak in most of the area.

## The Party Systems of Southeast Asia

At the time of independence in most of the countries of Southeast Asia, the political parties seemed to dominate the national scene, and it was assumed that they could largely determine the future of their respective countries. In recent years, however, a marked decline in the importance of political parties has occurred throughout the area. In most cases, the difficulty has been that the decline in ideologies has proceeded at a faster pace than the emergence of potential interest groups with pragmatic goals. Just as the national cohesion of the Southeast Asian countries has been weakened by the decline in ideologies, so has the unity of many of the ideologically oriented political parties. At the same time, very few of the parties have been able to develop into associations of interest groups that are seeking to influence the course of government policy.

At this stage in the evolution of party systems in Southeast Asia, it is difficult to foresee what shape they will take in the years to come. At the moment, however, it is possible to distinguish four general types of party systems in the region: (1) the competitive demo-

cratic system in which opposition parties exist, best exemplified by the party process in the Philippines; (2) the nationalist coalition party system, common to Malaya at present and in Burma in the recent past; (3) the fragmented party structure found in post-independence Indonesia and in lesser degree in Thailand; and (4) a party system dominated by a limited nationalist party that tolerates little opposition—Vietnam and present-day Indonesia fall into this category.

The Philippines have the most stable party system in Southeast Asia, and the parties are the least ideologically committed. The two dominant parties, the Nacionalista and the Liberal Parties, are not divided by any sharp ideological differences but rather by the personalities and the policy emphasis of their leaders at any particular time. Neither of the parties is under the influence of any single interest group; both are a collection of politicians seeking to represent as many of the interests of the country as possible. In this respect, the Philippine parties resemble American parties. However, since the interest groups are not as well developed as in the United States, the parties really represent an aggregation of politicians who seek to represent broad interests in society. In essence, the strength of the Philippine party system rests on the basic urges of the Philippine politicians themselves to achieve and to hold power. The need for the Philippine politician to gain influence and to be able to provide rewards, often in the form of "pork barrel" grants, is what gives form to the Philippine parties.

The Nacionalista Party, which was founded in 1907, is the oldest political party in Southeast Asia. It was the only party in the country until 1946, when the goal of independence was achieved, but in that year it lost not only the presidency but also control of both houses of Congress to a group of dissident Nacionalista politicians who formed the Liberal Party under the leadership of Manuel Roxas. Roxas was, at the time, Senate President and was then elected to the Presidency.

The history of both Philippine parties has been one of vacillation between dependence

on the sugar interests and an urge toward populist sentiments. The need for financing compels the politicians to accept the backing of the established interests. The need for votes demands dramatic if not radical programs. Similarly, both parties are faced with the problem of obtaining as much "pork barrel" influence as possible while warding off charges of corruption. The Philippine party system, by seeking to combine as many interests as possible and by striving to make government serve very particular and concrete interests, is constantly in danger of appearing excessively corrupt and lacking in principle. The spirit of pragmatic politics that permeates the Philippine system is offset by the propensity of the Filipino politician to express himself in idealistic forms that seem to have little relationship to political realities. In many respects, Philippine politics resemble American urban politics shortly before World War I. Strong reformist urges periodically crop up and there is constant expectation that muck-rakers will appear to clear the scene. But the realities of Philippine politics require that the Philippine politician try to accommodate as many conflicting interests as possible.

The problems of a party system dominated by a single nationalist coalition party is best illustrated by the postwar period in Burma. This nationalist coalition was formed during the last years of World War II and was given the name of AFPFL, the letters originally standing for Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League; in time, the words lost all meaning and only the letters carried political significance. Originally, the AFPFL was a broad coalition consisting of mass organizations, ethnic groupings, independent politicians, and leading personages of the land; it was carefully organized by Aung San, the youthful Burmese nationalist leader who held the respect of most Burmese and who eventually negotiated the country's independence from Britain. The list of associations that belong

to the group is exceedingly impressive, although often they involve little more than individuals and their personal followings. At the core of the AFPFL was a group of socialists and Marxists who called themselves the Socialist Party of Burma. Affiliated with them were such groups as the All-Burma Peasants Organization, the Federation of Trade Organizations, the Trade Union Congress (Burma), the Women's Freedom League, Burma Muslim Congress, Kachin National Congress, the Union Karen League, Chins' Congress, the United Hill People's Congress, and also the All-Burma Fire Brigade, the All-Burma Teachers Organization, and the St. John's Ambulance Association. In 1948, the Communists were expelled from the party after they had turned to armed insurrection against the government. The AFPFL dominated the first elections, and its influence was decisive in government policies. In the 1956 election, the AFPFL won 148 seats out of a total of 250.

Behind this public position as a nationalist united front, the AFPFL had always been divided internally by numerous factions and personal conflicts. Much of the tension came from the fact that many leaders of the party were also leaders of the affiliated organizations, a situation which generated competition among the organizations over the amount of influence they might have on government policy. Much of the conflict tended to become highly personalized, since the organizations themselves did not represent powerful interests within the society. After the 1956 election, Prime Minister U Nu resigned for one year in order to help "clean up" the AFPFL and strengthen the party. He found as he traveled about the country that it would not be easy for him to eliminate elements within his party who opposed his leadership. As the country became more pacified and the threat from the Communist insurrectionaries and other insurgents began to decline, the strains within the AFPFL became more intense.

They came to a head in the spring of 1958 and finally, in June, split the party in two. One faction, led by Prime Minister U Nu and Kyaw Tun, head of the All-Burma Peasants Association, called itself the "Clean" AFPFL. The other faction, led by U Ba Swe, ex-Prime Minister and leader of the Trade Unions Congress, and Kyaw Nyein, a leader in the Socialist Party, formed the other faction called the "Stable" AFPFL.

The split in the AFPFL ended the nationalist coalition party's control and instead set up two large contending parties relatively equal in strength. The split also meant that all the various organizations that had been built up under the United AFPFL were thoroughly splintered. The division was so close that U Nu found he had to depend on the pro-Communist National United Front (NUF) to maintain a parliamentary majority. Although there was little ideological difference between the two AFPFL parties after the split, the conflict was so great that civil war threatened. The result was that in September, 1958, the Burmese Army under General Ne Win formed a caretaker government in order to hold fair elections. The period of military control lasted until April 5, 1960. Army rule brought a sharp curtailment of party activities in the country and a substantial undermining of party strength in the rural constituencies.

When, on February 6, 1960, elections were held, U Nu's "Clean" AFPFL, which had taken the new title of Union Party, won 156 seats to only 34 for the "Stable" AFPFL. This was largely a victory, however, for U Nu as a person rather than of party organization. The fact that the army had withdrawn from active politics and government was again in the hands of civilians suggested that the country might be solving its fundamental problems of nation-building. Unfortunately, a year of rule by U Nu and his Union Party failed to bring effective government, and the country appeared to be slipping back into disorder and economic stagnation. Believing that civilian rule was leading to a serious threat to national unity, the Burmese army under General Ne Win staged a coup d'état in

March, 1962, and for the second time assumed complete control of the national government. In pushing aside representative government, the army established a Revolutionary Council of 17 army officers, with General Ne Win as the chairman, to direct the nation. Former Prime Minister U Nu and members of his cabinet were arrested, and, along with other leading politicians, they have steadfastly refused to accept the Revolutionary Council's bid that they all merge to form a single party in support of General Ne Win's rule.

The story of the disintegration of the AFPFL dramatizes the extent to which Burma was unable to find in its immediate postwar years a common orientation for the entire society. Since the split, the country has also found it impossible to nurture a pragmatic, contractual form of politics. Instead, the country now apparently must rely more on the impact of leading personalities or on such authoritative organizations as the army or the bureaucracy.

Malaya represents another form of nationalist coalition party system. In contrast to Burma, however, the Alliance which has dominated Malayan politics since independence has been a coalition with no pretenses toward ideological formulations. The Alliance instead has sought to represent the most basic divisions within Malayan society and to bring them together in a cooperative effort for the national good. The Alliance is formed out of three essentially ethnic or communal associations. The first is the United Malay National Organization or UMNO, which was founded in 1946 as an expression of Malay opposition to the British proposal for a Malayan union. Its leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, has served as Prime Minister of Malaya since independence. The second element in the Alliance is the Malayan Chinese Association or MCA, which was founded in 1949 during the height of the struggle against Communist terrorism in an effort to organize the Chinese community in support of a non-Communist government. MCA has sought to protect Chinese interests and achieve interracial cooperation. In the main, it has represented the more conservative Chinese business interests. The third

and smallest group in the Alliance is the Malayan Indian Congress, created in 1945, to represent the Indian community. Its founders have been inspired by the Indian independence struggle.

In the first national elections held in Malaya in July, 1955, the Alliance won 51 out of the 52 seats. In the first election after independence, in August, 1959, the Alliance won 70 out of 100 seats. The other political parties within the country are of relatively minor significance and tend to represent various forms of extremist views. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, with 13 seats, is the second strongest party in the House of Representatives, and it represents a group dedicated to the application of Islamic principles of government. The third largest party, the Nationalist Socialist Front, which was founded in 1957 out of the former Party Rayat and the Labor Party of Malaya, seeks to become the leading non-communal force in Malayan politics. To this end, it has sought to obtain the support of the People's Progressive Party, which has four seats in the House, and of the Malayan Socialist Youth League. The Nationalist Socialist Front seeks to champion a more ideologically oriented form of politics. The most openly Right-wing party in Malaya is the Party Negara or National Party, which was founded in 1954 as a successor to the Independence of Malaya Party. These minor parties represent frustrations either over the lack of ideological content within the Alliance or over the extent to which the Chinese have been accepted within the government of Malaya. The Malayan nationalists have tended to look to their co-religionists in Indonesia for guidance and inspiration. But the difficulties that Indonesia has faced in recent years have provided them with little basis for justifying any substantial break with the policies of the Alliance.

The strength of the Alliance lies in its recognition of the most basic fact in Malayan

society, the division of the country into three major ethnic groups of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. In the other countries of Southeast Asia, attempts have been made to ignore the existence of communal differences, and thus these differences have tended to disrupt the political process. In Malaya, the frank acceptance of this most important fact has enabled the Alliance to carry on substantive policies, although at the expense of being precluded from indulging in ideological issues. The platform of the Alliance has largely been devoted to the extension of education, health, housing, and welfare services and the support of all the various potential interest groups within the society. The Alliance has sought to balance off the interests of the trade unions with those of the foreign private enterprises. In the Malayan setting, a breakup of this nationalist coalition along communal lines would produce an extremely dangerous situation in which the Malays and Chinese would become bitter opponents. Under the Alliance, the country has prospered, and no country in Southeast Asia has had a faster rate of economic growth—an advance, however, that has been achieved in what might be described as an intellectual and ideological void. Even though the countries of Southeast Asia that have engaged in more ideological discussion have had greater difficulties, there are many young Malaysians who feel the need to express the unique quality of their own country.

The crisis of the political party in Southeast Asia is most dramatically illustrated by the fragmented party system that emerged in Indonesia after independence. No less than 70 groups have proclaimed themselves political parties since independence, and in the single national election held in 1955, over 40 parties contended for seats. In part, this fragmentation is caused by the system of proportional representation the Indonesians borrowed from the Dutch. More fundamentally, it represents the divisions within Indonesian

society. And it also reflects the personal conflicts within the inner circle of the Indonesian political class. Most of the top Indonesian politicians have known each other personally for a long time, and many of the disputes within the class are more a reflection of the history of their personal relationships than of deeper policy or ideological issues. For example, immediately after independence, when President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta were working together, a high degree of national unity prevailed, but when the two began to quarrel, political divisions spread throughout the ruling elite.

The instability of the party system in Indonesia has been keenly reflected in the number of cabinet crises the country has experienced following independence. Since 1950, the country has had no fewer than eight cabinets, and a delicate struggle for power within the Parliament occurred at the time each cabinet was formed. The balance has been so precarious that no cabinet has been able to follow forceful policies in any direction. Government by compromise has been the result, and disillusionment with the parliamentary system and liberal party practices has become widespread. President Sukarno himself has called for an end of the party system, and in 1960 he, in effect, outlawed the main parties of the country.

The 1955 election was significant because it was the only opportunity the Indonesians have had to test the popular support of the various parties. Out of this election only four parties emerged as national parties: the Nationalists (PNI), Masjumi (Moslem), Nahdlatul Ulama (Moslem teachers), and the Communists (PKI).

Although the Nationalists won, by slight margins, the largest popular vote in 1955, they obtained the same number of seats in the House as did Masjumi—57 out of 226. The Nationalists, however, have never been a completely united party. Much of the party's strength in the past has rested on the popular appeal of President Sukarno, who is generally considered to be a member of the Nationalist Party. Divided between "left" and "right," its Left-wing element favors collaboration with

the Communists while the Right-wing is prepared to accept a more friendly approach toward the West. Before the 1955 election, it was widely assumed that Masjumi was the most popular party in the country, for it openly acknowledged its identity with Islam and was presumed to be able effectively to combine the appeals of traditional religion with a commitment to more modern ways of government. Masjumi had been founded during the Japanese occupation and received the backing of the Japanese government. Composed of several Moslem groups at the time—its name means a consultative council of Indonesian Moslems—it formed the first two cabinets after independence. It has consistently been opposed to the authoritarian practices of President Sukarno, who formally dissolved the party in July, 1960.

The Nahdatul Ulama was formed in the 1920's by traditional Islamic leaders and has tended to represent the Moslem teachers in the rural areas of Java. Primarily concerned with religious matters and government support of religion, it was a part of the Masjumi Party during the Japanese occupation and immediately thereafter, and only broke away from Masjumi in 1952. In the 1955 election, it captured 45 out of 260 seats. The fourth largest party in the 1955 election was the Communist Party, which won 39 seats. The Indonesian Communist Party is the second largest Asian Communist Party, with a history that goes back to 1920. At present, it is the only significant political party in Indonesia with its own independent organization and active members.

It is worth tracing in some detail the decline of the political parties since the 1955 election, for it encompasses much of the story of recent political developments in the country. In the year that followed the election, the various parties were still clearly unable to manage an effective cabinet system of government. The only party that seemed to be thriving out of the immobilism of the party system was the Indonesian Communist Party, which disassociated itself from the activities of the formal government and concentrated on building up its strength with the labor

unions and student groups. By 1957, the regional areas, particularly in the Outer Islands, were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the government at Djakarta. Sukarno at this point offered his proposal of a "guided democracy" that would operate under a national council and his own chairmanship, and a cabinet of his own selection which would include the Communists. This solution produced a sharp reaction from the regional leaders and the army groups who were predominantly anti-Communist.

In early 1958, a small-scale civil war broke out. The regional military commanders and the civilian leaders who joined the rebellion had overestimated the degree of dissatisfaction with Sukarno's rule. In July, 1959, Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution which concentrated both executive and legislative powers within the office of the President. The Parliament, which had been elected in the 1955 election, agreed in August to function with the limited powers given it by the 1945 constitution. As the civil war dragged on, Sukarno pressed for increased martial law and increased power for the presidency. In January, 1960, Sukarno issued a decree which, in effect, gave him the power to dissolve the political parties, and subsequently he formed a National Front that was to be a mass movement mobilizing all the forces within the country. Sukarno argued that the parliamentary system had failed and that political parties no longer represented the people. In March, 1960, Sukarno proposed that a Gotong Rojong or Cooperative Parliament replace the suspended Parliament. Initially, this new Parliament consisted of 261 members, 130 of which came from the old political parties, the rest being picked by Sukarno himself to represent the various "functional interests" within the society. In August, the Parliament was expanded to 609 members and named the People's Congress. Sukarno then ordered the dissolution of Masjumi and the socialist

parties for their opposition to his principles of "guided democracy."

The various "functional interests" represented in the new Congress included the army, navy, air force, police, village guards, farmers, workers, Moslem scholars, Protestant scholars, Catholic scholars, youth, women, veterans, artists, journalists, and the like. The new body, however, has not been an effective group in giving national leadership. In the meantime, a Democratic League has emerged in Indonesia to represent those elements that still feel the country should adhere to liberal, democratic practices.

With the collapse of the fragmented party system in Indonesia, the country has drifted toward a form of authoritarian rule. The office of the President has the power to dissolve and weaken the position of the other political parties, but it has not been able to provide continuing leadership and effective government. As a result, the immobilism that characterized the Indonesian government under the parliamentary system has continued today under a more authoritarian regime. Indonesian leaders still hope they can achieve their ideal of cooperative national leadership in which all groups will work together in harmony. But the search for unanimity which so characterizes Indonesian politics has not been successful and has led only to increasing frustrations.

In the meantime, however, President Sukarno has been able to direct popular attention toward issues of international affairs. In particular, in the fall of 1961 and during 1962 he reasserted Indonesia's claims to Western New Guinea, or as the Indonesians prefer to call these territories, Western Irian. The Indonesian case for the assertion of sovereignty over the area arose from the fact that New Guinea was a part of the Dutch East Indies out of which Indonesia was formed. The Dutch resisted transferring control on the grounds that the peoples of New Guinea,

the Papuans, are of different ethnic stock from the Indonesians and might prefer their own autonomy and eventual self-government. This continuing quarrel with the Dutch stirred anew nationalist sentiments and the search for ideological statements about the Indonesian sense of national destiny. In his effort to mobilize the nation over this issue, President Sukarno was able to weaken further the positions of all political parties, except the Communists, while greatly building up the strength of the army. In the spring of 1962 the United States, worried about increasing Soviet military aid to Indonesia, intervened in the quarrel and arranged for a transferral of sovereignty under United Nations auspices. On August 18, 1962, Dutch rule in New Guinea gave way to an interim United Nations administration which lasted until May 1, 1963, when control was passed on to Indonesia. Sukarno's successes briefly united the country and also encouraged him to adopt increasingly aggressive policies toward neighboring territories, and most particularly toward the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.

If it were not for the weakness of the party systems of other Southeast Asian countries, it would hardly be appropriate to suggest that Thailand has a party system at all. Political parties within the monarchy have been weak and unstable and are little more than parliamentary groups under the influence of individual personages. To date, these parties have tended to reflect the divisions within the Parliament rather than any particular interest in the society as a whole. The weakness of the party system is partly a reflection of the fact that not all the members of Parliament are elected; many are appointed by the government. From 1952 to 1957, there were 123 elected members and 123 appointed members. After 1957, owing to an increase in population, the number of elected members gradually increased so that by 1962 they totaled 160 as against 132 appointed members.

The difficulties of the Thai party system reflect a basic problem: How can representative institutions be introduced in a transitional



society without unduly disrupting the political process? Whenever the Thai government has encouraged party activities, many individuals have come forward to proclaim themselves the leaders of parties. In order to weed out these groups, substantial power would have to be transferred to political parties, but there is little evidence that even the more respectable of these parties would be able to perform effectively the tasks of government. Thus, as long as the Thai people tend to be relatively apathetic politically the achievement of a mature political system is likely to be a long way off.

The Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) is the leading example of a party system dominated by a narrowly based nationalist coalition party. After the Geneva Treaty and the recognition of complete independence of the Republic of Vietnam in 1954, Premier Ngo Dinh Diem felt it necessary to eliminate the threat of dissident elements within the country, since these groups in the past had not been able to provide national leadership. Diem had to attack the sects formed during the French period that had their own armies and were seeking autonomous areas for their own control. These sects included the Cao Dai (a religious organization which had a pope and an amazing array of saints, ranging from Victor Hugo to early Chinese leaders), the Hoa Hao (another quasi-religious group which had its own private army), and the Binh Xuyen (which had control of all forms of vice as well as the police in Saigon). In destroying these various potential political parties, Diem set up the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM). The movement was first organized in 1951 and legalized in 1954, and its leadership has included two of Diem's brothers. The NRM is closely intermingled with the administrative structure of the government, and it is not always clear that it represents a separate political party. Most government officials have found it desirable to be members of the movement. It has, however, sought to organize cells and a disciplined party membership, following in some ways the Communist type of training and propa-

ganda. Its emphasis has been on propagating the personal qualities of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

In most respects, the National Revolutionary Movement has been an agent in support of authoritarian measures of government. It has not developed into a popular mass movement nor has it become an open political party. Thus in Vietnam a party system has not emerged which would make it possible for the various points of view that might exist within the population to be effectively expressed.

Cambodia has a similar one-party system which is again an arm of the leading political figure, Prince Sihanouk. In 1955, Prince Sihanouk abdicated as King in order to serve as Prime Minister and take a more direct and partisan control of the government. At that time he formed the Peoples Socialist Community or Sangkum Party. In the first national elections, held in 1955, this party won all the 91 seats. In March, 1958, the party again won all the seats in contention. The Sangkum Party has been largely an agent for propagating the private view of the prince and for supporting his neutralist foreign policy. His political party does not perform the functions usually associated with parties in a liberal democratic system; instead, the party tends to be a public-relations organization serving the leading political actor in the country.

Generally speaking, the parties throughout Southeast Asia have proved in the last decade to be unable to perform the type of functions that political parties are called on to perform in the West. The political parties in the area have failed to overcome the basic problems of bringing together the world of the ruling elite and the world of the peasant masses. Attempts to bring in more participants in the political process have not been successful enough to alter fundamentally the character of the political systems, but they have been enough

to disrupt the relations within the ruling elite.

In almost all the countries in the area, therefore, the introduction of political parties has tended to be a force for instability, both within the elite and within the more traditional communities. Where the parties have reached out into the village they have upset old relationships but they have not been strong enough to provide the basis of new relationships. In Indonesia, in particular, the effort of the political parties to build up popular followings often resulted in creating new divisions or intensifying old ones within the small village communities.

Much of the instability of the political parties themselves results from the fact that the parties have been highly personalized organizations reflecting the personalities of the leading figures. Lacking any deep roots within the societies, such parties have been able to change their positions according to the whims of their leaders, thus increasing instabilities for all. Where the parties have been most successful has been in providing an avenue through which people could obtain the benefits government can provide. In some cases, this has meant government employment, as in Burma, or access to the government "pork barrel," as in the Philippines.

Above all, however, the parties have failed in Southeast Asia for the basic reason that they have been unable to serve effectively either as representational parties, because of the lack of interest groups, or as ideological organizations, because of the lack of coherent feelings of national identity. The most striking exception is in the Philippines, where the parties have functioned continuously since independence, opposition parties have operated freely, and power has been transferred from one party to another. There is at the moment, however, little indication that this Philippine experience will soon be duplicated elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

## Political Leadership in Southeast Asia

In most of the countries of Southeast Asia, the individual personal leaders bulk larger than party organizations. Again, the Philippines and Malaya stand out as exceptions to the general Southeast Asian practice of having charismatic national leaders. In Malaya, the ethnic division of the country precludes the emergence of such a leader, for if he were of one race the other communities would feel threatened. Although most Filipino leaders seek to be dramatic and dynamic figures, only Ramon Magsaysay proved to be truly charismatic in the postwar period. Magsaysay had a profound personal impact on the Philippine system after his election in 1953 and until his death in a plane accident in March, 1957. During his presidency, Magsaysay inspired the Filipinos to feel that their government could be not only honestly run but guided by intensely human feelings. In the main, however, the Philippine system has operated without having to depend on dramatic leaders.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the story of postwar politics has been largely that of the personal role of nationalist leaders. In the confusion and uncertainty that has accompanied social change in Southeast Asia, few political phenomena have stood out as sharply as have the individual personalities and characters of the various national leaders. For example, nearly every aspect of public affairs in Burma has, until recently, reflected to some degree the mind and character of Prime Minister U Nu. In the decade since independence, U Nu's style of operation and his peculiar interests as well as his disinterests have all been mirrored in the performance of the Burmese government. To a degree impossible in a more stable society, the individual qualities of the national leader have become associated in the minds of the people as the distinct qualities of their national identity.

Similarly, in Indonesia nearly every act of political significance in the last decade has

been either initiated by President Sukarno or has been a reaction to this charismatic leader. An extraordinarily positive relationship has existed between Sukarno and the Indonesian people, and wherever he has appeared before large audiences he has been able to evoke the strongest feelings in the Indonesian people. Although there has been widespread disaffection and disillusionment with the operations of government, the personal appeal of President Sukarno has withstood all the strains of the postwar period.

While not as dramatic or popular a figure, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam has nevertheless been the crucial individual in shaping the development of his country. The personal interests and preferences of President Diem have colored the entire development of government policy and the organization of the South Vietnam state.

The appeal of strong leaders to Southeast Asians seems to stem from the need of the people to obtain guidance concerning their national identity at a time when they are exposed to extreme conflicts of values. The effort of the national leaders to achieve their own sense of coherence and personal identity gives symbolic meaning not only to the citizens as a whole but to the nation as a collective entity. President Sukarno seems to be most acutely aware of this problem and speaks frequently of the need to find the Indonesian sense of identity. He speaks of his own efforts to achieve this identity and to bring about some kind of balance in which the traditional Indonesian values will still be preserved while the country achieves its place in the modern world. Although the particular solutions President Sukarno has advocated as representing the synthesis of traditional Indonesian values and those of the modern world have not been particularly popular, his effort to achieve them has been widely supported.

The nationalist leaders in Southeast Asia all emerged out of the independence struggles of their different countries. But they tend to represent a class of people who have received more than a common amount of education and who have been exposed to Western forms of knowledge. These West-

ernized individuals, for the lack of a better term, have been frequently referred to as the Southeast Asian intellectuals. Although not professional thinkers or writers, their most distinctive mark has been the degree of education they have received. Under colonial rule, those people who did receive such education led the movements for independence. For example, in Burma the later nationalist leaders first met while students at the University of Rangoon. Since independence, people who have received more education than is common have been going into politics and into government in increasing numbers. The capacity of government to absorb these people, however, is limited. Since the economies have failed to develop rapidly enough to provide them with career opportunities, these intellectuals have become a dangerous source of frustration and, in several of the countries, potential sources of serious opposition to the existing system.

This problem of the frustrated intellectual has been most acute in those countries where the educational standards have declined under the impact of increasing demands for admittance to the universities. Large numbers of people are thus accepted for degrees but often the calibre of their training is not adequate for them to become effective and productive members of their society. In the Philippines, substantial numbers of people have received substandard college educations and thus find themselves unemployable. But at the same time, they have all the expectations of people who believe they have become qualified for modern employment.

Next to the intellectuals, the most important leadership element in Southeast Asia is the military. In all the countries of Southeast Asia, the army has maintained order and given stability to the political process. The army in Burma formally and openly assumed responsibility for the government from October, 1958, to April, 1960, and, more recently, has taken over again on a more permanent

basis. In Indonesia for the last five years, most decisions of the government have been indirectly influenced by the military. Ever since the 1932 coup, the politics of Thailand has been largely under the control of leading military commanders.

The reasons for the significance of the military in Southeast Asian politics are numerous. The need to meet the threat of Communist insurgents and dissident groups since independence has led to substantial budgets and the growth of relatively large military establishments in several of the countries, particularly in Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Within the military establishment, the emphasis is on learning modern skills and techniques related to the handling of modern equipment and the need to organize according to modern principles of administration. The result has been that many of the military leaders have been the champions for modernizing their country. The military officers have also been acutely aware of the weaknesses of their countries caused by the failure of substantial economic development. Soldiers in Southeast Asia have thus often become frustrated at what they consider the incompetence and bungling of their political leaders and have become one of the strongest forces for progress and change. At the same time, the armies are strongly nationalistic and stand as a powerful force against the Communists.

In both Burma and Indonesia, the army played an important part in the independence movement, and thus military leaders developed an early concern for the course of the nation's political development. Army leaders were often popular heroes who symbolized the struggle for independence. The military also came to have a direct hand in government administration in some of the countries when, after independence, there were insufficient civil administrators. Army officers and regional military commanders were called

upon to assume administrative responsibilities and represent the new governments in the outlying districts. Once installed in office, it was not always easy to replace them.

More recently, the military in several of the countries has been able to maintain contacts with the people largely because the army has been one of the most effective channels of social mobility for rural citizens. Young men who have few other opportunities but who are anxious to become a part of the modern world have been able to look for advancement through careers in the army. In most of Southeast Asia at present the armies have been the largest and most effective means for training peasants and villagers in the wide range of technical skills essential for working with modern machines. In spite of all these considerations, the armies could very easily become forces inhibiting progress in Southeast Asia. Already the size of military budgets in the region has become a serious drain on national economies. The authoritarian spirit of the military may in time become more dominant, and it is not impossible that army rule in some of the countries may lead to military dictatorships.

A third major source of leadership in Southeast Asia has been the bureaucracies. In most of the countries, the tradition of the civil service was established during the colonial period, and this has created serious liabilities in the postwar period. The arrival of independence brought a clash between nationalist politicians and the colonial-trained administrators, in which the latter were usually forced to give ground. Politicians often charged that the administrators had cooperated with the colonial rulers against the independence movements. This charge of collaboration has weakened the position of the administrators and left them unwilling to take a more assertive role in the development of their countries. The result has been that bureaucracies in Southeast Asia have tended to be relatively static organizations concerned primarily with maintaining routine operations. Thus, even though the administrators often represent some of the most modern and best-educated peo-

ple in the country, they have not been a powerful force for social change. More recently, however, the frustration of the politicians in achieving dramatic changes since independence has caused the position of the administrative class in Southeast Asia to be gradually strengthened. The general trend toward economic planning and more authoritarian practices has similarly resulted in increased influence for administrators.

All the countries of Southeast Asia have a severe shortage of competently trained civil servants. When the European administrators left the region at the end of the colonial period, the existing bureaucracies in the new states were generally greatly weakened, while the emerging independent governments were faced with increasing numbers of problems calling for administrative attention. In most of the Southeast Asian countries, a rapid recruitment of new and unskilled civil servants resulted, which often proved to be a hindrance to decisive and effective policy implementation.

Throughout Southeast Asia, the prospects of economic development depend to a very high degree on the creation of capable bureaucracies. In Burma and Indonesia, the rate of government-inspired economic growth depends entirely on how effectively state apparatuses manage and direct a wide range of state-owned enterprises. Even where the state is not directly involved in economic activities, the bureaucracies largely determine the pace of economic growth because their administration of national policies determines whether the climate for private investment and expansion is favorable or unfavorable. Here, as elsewhere, their influence is determining.

A fourth source of political leadership is to be found in journalism and the mass media. Communications systems in most of the countries are still sharply divided between the urban-based mass media and the rural patterns of face-to-face contact. In the large cities, newspapers have come to play a vital role in shaping public opinion. In Burma, during the height of the AFPFL rule, the only significant and constructive opposition forces in

the country were the newspapers. Rangoon had over twenty newspapers, many of which sought to criticize honestly the performance of the government. The press in Indonesia has also played an important role in trying to preserve democratic practices. Because of the influence of the press, President Sukarno, after he introduced the practice of "guided democracy," found it necessary to close down many of the leading newspapers. In South Vietnam, on the other hand, the press has been largely a vehicle for disseminating the views of the government.

Radio has possibly had an even broader impact in Southeast Asia than have the newspapers, for it has penetrated the rural areas and brought some understanding of the modern world to the largely illiterate population. In all countries except the Philippines, radio has been under government management and thus has served to communicate nationalist views and the theme of national unity. In this sense, radio has not been a force for partisan politics, but it has stimulated people to a greater interest in their national politics.

A more traditional and diffuse element of leadership in Southeast Asia lies in the religious leaders. Except in the Catholic Philippines, none of the Southeast Asian countries have well-established religious orders that can act as a concerted political force, although as individuals the Buddhist monks and Islamic teachers are of significant political influence in rural Southeast Asia. In Burma and Thailand, any government policy that countered the basic thinking of the Buddhist monks would probably fail. Although the Islamic religious leaders are not a strong positive force in Indonesian politics, they have been able to prevent many developments that would have directly challenged their basic principles. Even the Communists in Indonesia have had to acknowledge the importance of Islam and its religious leaders.

## Social and Political Interest Groups

The process of social change, as we have noted, has not advanced to the point of producing large numbers of special interests within Southeast Asia. In none of the Southeast Asian countries are there many well-organized special interests competing against each other and seeking to influence political parties or the national government in its policies. Many of the groups which in form might appear to be interest or pressure groups turn out, on closer examination, not to perform the functions usually expected of interest groups.

In many of the Southeast Asian countries, the government or nationalist movements sought to organize special interests in order to establish channels of communication with the different segments of the public. During the colonial period, for example, in Malaya, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Burma, the government approached various special interests within the society and insisted that organizations be formed that would make it possible for the government to deal with these interests. Thus, the early associations that developed became vehicles for government influence and control. Even the nationalist movements in their struggle for independence felt the need to mobilize different segments of the society, and they established trade unions, women's associations, youth groups, business leagues, and peasants' associations. In Burma, for example, under the leadership of the AFPFL, a variety of special interest groups were organized as a convenient method for communicating with different segments of the population. Initially, the leadership in these groups consisted of elements from the nationalist movement rather than people from the special interests themselves. The trade-

union movements in Burma, for instance, were largely led by teachers or intellectuals instead of by workers. In Malaya, the leadership of the trade-union movement that was encouraged by the British colonial administration also came not from the workers but from intellectuals and others who had received a Western education.

Since independence, however, leaders of these various groups have often found themselves faced with the choice of either continuing to represent the government in influencing and controlling the special interests or of beginning to represent the interests in fact. Indeed, one of the stresses that has emerged in the politics of Indonesia and Burma and to a lesser extent of South Vietnam has been precisely this choice confronting the leaders of the mass organizations initially established by the nationalist parties. The leaders of the trade unions and of the peasants' associations in Burma, for example, have found that it has become increasingly necessary for them to champion the point of view of their constituents and not just represent the views of the national government. At the same time, the leaders are reluctant to give up their positions within the inner councils of the party. Although it would be premature to say that these groups have developed genuine autonomy, it is significant that they have been increasingly able to assert influence within the dominant political parties. Even such groups as the women's associations, which were initially founded as a means for mobilizing women for the independence struggle, are now used by the women to influence government policy.

Another agent working to make the potential interest groups more powerful has been the Communists. In Indonesia, the Communists virtually control the trade-union movement and thus have brought significant demands upon the government. In Malaya, the trade unions have increasingly felt the need to prove their concern for the workers' interests in the face of Communist propaganda, and have come to assert a substantial independent influence on government. In the Philippines, the conflict to wrest trade-union lead-

ership away from the Communists has created a more dynamic trade-union movement. Potential interest groups of a modern character have thus begun to emerge gradually in Southeast Asia. In most cases, the initial step was the introduction of the forms of private organization or association common to Western society, and only later did these groups develop into genuine and more or less autonomous political forces. In Thailand, for example, the government decided that a modern country should have trade unions. Gradually these developed into more independent organizations.

Many of the more traditional forms of associations continue to exist in Southeast Asian politics. Most of the associations are not active pressure groups in the Western sense but rather communal associations which provide security and oversee the general well-being of their membership. The best organized of these associations are to be found among the Chinese communities, particularly in Malaya. Many provincial associations have been formed to lend personal assistance to all those who speak the same dialect. These groups, however, have rarely sought to influence government. Such associations, by providing social controls over different minority groups, have helped maintain general stability within the area.

Although in all the countries there are chambers of commerce or other forms of business associations, the businessman has not been an important organized force in Southeast Asian politics. Even in the Philippines, the chambers of commerce and business associations have not influenced government decisions. Instead, the Filipino businessman has preferred to work through his individual Congressman. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the businessman has adopted a highly defensive posture, seeking only to protect his limited interest without striving to reshape government policies. In Burma, elements within the business community at one time supported the socialist-inclined government in the hope that their own interests would not be adversely affected by it. In the main, however, the influence of businessmen has only been

significant where it has coincided with the nationalist desire to reduce foreign commercial interests and support indigenous economic activities.

Only in Malaya have Western commercial enterprises been able to wield political influence through organized associations since independence. The Tin Miners Association and the Rubber Planters Association represent both European and Asian interests. Because of the overwhelming importance of these industries to the well-being of the country, the Malayan government has had to be responsive to their wishes. Another exception to the general Southeast Asian pattern of interest-group development has been the peculiar strength of the Peasants' Association in Burma. Its power has largely stemmed from the readiness of the government to use the All-Burma Peasants' Organization as a means for allocating government loans for agriculture.

The persistence of traditional forms of association in Southeast Asia and the tendency of even new ones to follow old practices is in part a reflection of the weakness of government within the region. Many of these associations have taken on quasi-governmental functions partly by default. Thus instead of becoming pressure groups that would influence national policy and change public programs, the associations have tended to provide some of the services of government for their membership.

## Communist Party and Extremist Movements

All the countries of Southeast Asia have been under the pressure or threat of Communist movements since the war. Before the Second World War and the Japanese occupation, the Communists were of minor importance in all the countries. The disruptions

that came with the Japanese occupation enabled significant Communist movements to emerge in most countries of the region. Particularly in Malaya, the Communists provided the leadership of the resistance movement against the Japanese, and in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh organized the Viet Minh movement during the war under Communist leadership. In Burma and Indonesia, the Communists were an important though not dominant influence in the nationalist group. After 1948, when the Communist movements adopted violence to achieve their ends, the stability of the various countries was seriously endangered. In the Philippines, the Hukbalahap movement among the dissident rural elements created a real threat to governmental stability until the presidency of Magsaysay, when substantial improvements were brought to the countryside. Only in Northern Vietnam did the Communists win out, and here it was largely because they were able to identify themselves with the nationalist movement in a prolonged struggle against French colonial rule. The tragedy of Vietnam stemmed in large measure from the extent to which the Communists were able to capture the nationalist movement and thus prolong the struggle in the area.

Much of the strength of the Communists has come from their ability to provide some sense of stability to people who have found their worlds disrupted by the confusion of war and the chaos of rapid social change. The membership of the Communist parties in the area is largely made up of young students and members of the urban middle and working classes. In Burma, the Communist party still remains underground as an insurrectionary movement, but in some countries, Communist-dominated groups have emerged to champion the causes of the frustrated intellectuals who feel their country has not been developing as rapidly as it might.

In Malaya and Singapore, the strength of

the Communist movement is centered almost entirely in the Chinese community and is based on an appeal to Chinese nationalism. In the years immediately after the Communist successes on the Chinese mainland, a substantial propaganda effort was made in Southeast Asia to influence the overseas Chinese community. In recent years, the number of overseas Chinese who have returned to Communist China for education has declined. The potential influence that Communist China has among the Chinese youth remains, however, a factor which colors the entire politics of Singapore.

Since 1961 the most serious threat of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia has come from the campaign of insurgency being conducted by the Viet Cong movement in South Vietnam. By the summer of 1962 it appeared that these guerrilla forces might overturn much of rural South Vietnam and isolate the regime of President Diem to the larger cities. The stepped-up flow of American material assistance and increased involvement of American military personnel has helped check the Communist advances but the final outcome of the struggle is still unresolved.

In addition to the Communists, other dissident movements have resorted to violence in Southeast Asia. The most significant of these has been the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia, which since 1948 has been engaged in almost continual revolt against the policies of the Djakarta government. The professed objective of the Darul Islam movement has been to establish an Islamic state within Indonesia, but in practice the movement has taken on more of the qualities of professional brigandage. The members of the movement tend to be people who have found it easier to follow careers of violence than to accept the poverty of rural existence.

Burma since independence has experienced the most insurrections of any of the Southeast Asian countries, and the insurgents represent such a variety of causes and ideologies that Burma is frequently said to suffer from "multi-colored" insurrections. These rebel groups have included not only two Communist parties—one representing an extremist group



from the party affiliated with international Communism—but most of the minority elements within the country as well. The Karen minority group, consisting of a partly Christianized community, has provided the most serious rebel movement in the form of the Karen National Defense Organization. The other insurgent movements have included the Arakanese, the Shans, the Chins, the Kachins, and the Mons. These groups have been in part inspired by political opposition to the government and in part by the appeal of insurgency as a way of life. Through banditry, many of these rural groups have been able to attain a better living than they would from any kind of farming in a country with

a stagnating and unproductive economy.

Although at present neither these dissident movements nor the Communists constitute a serious threat to any of the Southeast Asian countries except for South Vietnam, the prospects for the future are uncertain. If population in Southeast Asia continues to grow at its past rate and if the level of economic development does not improve, an increasing number of frustrated people may turn their support to the extremist movements, including the Communists. Although the nationalist leaders often claim that their peoples are content with the lives they have been following in the past it is not at all certain that in the future this will hold true.

# Decision-Making: The Organs of Government

## VII

The formal structures of all the Southeast Asian governments reflect their colonial heritage. Western impact, in the form of colonialism, introduced into Southeast Asia institutions and formal structures that were developed in a Western setting. The question of political evolution and development in Southeast Asia concerns the probable future of these institutions and the ways in which Southeast Asian societies will in time come to reshape their formal structures of government.

In almost all the countries, most of the institutions do not perform the particular functions which in the Western setting they were designed to perform. Instead, the lines between the various institutions have been blurred. For example, the armies have performed as civil bureaucracies and civil governments. Cabinets have been the transmitters

of decisions rather than decision-making bodies, and elections have been a means for mobilizing public support for the country rather than a device for selecting alternative candidates. At the same time, however, the formal institutions of government have had significant influence, and it would be incorrect to consider them mere façades or shams. In all the countries, real power has resided within formal organizations of government, and often, to a remarkable degree, Southeast Asians have attempted to adhere to legal procedures and constitutional forms. The very uncertainty over what should be the national consensus has often forced the Southeast Asians to operate with the institutions they inherited from their colonial governments. In the absence of new institutions and new forms, the old ones have had to continue.

The formal structures of government in Southeast Asia thus tend to reflect an adaptation of the particular patterns of the former mother country in local conditions and traditions. The Philippine constitution, for example, is remarkably similar to the constitution of the United States. Executive power resides in the President, who is elected for a four-year term and may not serve more than eight consecutive years. Chosen by direct popular vote, the Philippine President has powers that are somewhat wider than those of the American President, for he not only has direct control over all executive departments but he also supervises local governments. The

Philippines have a bicameral legislature in which the relative power of the two houses is very much the same as in the United States. There is, however, a significant difference in the terms of membership in the two houses. The Senate consists of twenty-four senators who are elected from the entire nation for six-year terms, eight being elected each two years. Members of the House of Representatives are elected for four-year terms at the same time as the presidential election. The organization of both the Senate and the House follows the American tradition of the committee structure, and their functions are essentially the same as in the United States.

Executive-legislative relationships in the Philippines largely revolve around questions of patronage. All executive appointments must receive the approval of Congress. A commission on appointments consisting of twelve senators and twelve members of the House assist the President in appointing high civil, military, diplomatic, and judiciary officials.

The Philippine system is highly centralized, but in recent years numerous attempts have been made to strengthen local governments. The governors of the fifty-three provinces often have significant individual influence in decisions affecting their territory, but most of the local government departments are responsible to the national authorities in Manila and not to the governors. The lower level of government includes the municipalities and the barrios. Magsaysay sought to strengthen local government by bringing to the people in the country areas a feeling of participation in national life through an extensive community development program. This has resulted in the barrios or village governments now being able to retain control over some of the taxes collected within their boundaries.

Vietnam is the other Southeast Asian country with a presidential system, and it, too, has to some degree been modeled after the American pattern. On October 23, 1955, the Vietnamese voted by a 98 per cent majority to depose Emperor Bao Dai and elevate Ngo Dinh Diem to the presidency. Three days later the Republic of Vietnam was declared a sovereign state. One year later President

Diem promulgated a constitution which essentially gave legal sanction to the governmental institutions then in operation. Under the constitution, the powers of the President are considerable. He is elected for a five-year term and is eligible for two additional terms. All the executive powers in the country are channeled to the office of the President, which is headed by a Secretary of State. The President appoints not only the Cabinet ministers who are in charge of the various departments of the government but also the Secretaries of State, who are permanent civil servants at the head of each department. The President may legislate by decree whenever the Assembly is in recess, and the presidential veto can only be overridden by a three-fourths vote of the entire Assembly. The President also has powers to suspend civil liberties and to declare a state of emergency.

The National Assembly in the Republic of Vietnam is a unicameral body consisting of 123 deputies who are elected for three-year terms. Since the founding of the Republic, the National Assembly has generally accepted the unqualified leadership of the President. The judiciary, in theory, is a separate and equal arm of government, but since the magistrates can be transferred by the Department of Justice, the executive has considerable influence over the judiciary.

Constitutional development in South Vietnam has not made orderly progress because the government of President Diem has been under almost constant siege since the establishment of the Republic. With the initial suppression of various sects and potential oppositional forces, the Diem regime felt it was eliminating divisive tendencies which threatened the existence of the new country. By 1961, the much more serious threat of Communist insurgency had become an open challenge to the government. Elements of the Communist forces, Viet Cong, had been left behind in South Vietnam with the partition

of the country after the Geneva treaty in 1954. Gradually, these quasi-military units built up their power among the isolated villages and expanded their coercive controls. In mid-1960, with support from Communist North Vietnam and capitalizing on the crisis in Laos, the Viet Cong forced the Diem government to adopt emergency measures, and a year later the Communist threat to South Vietnam was so ominous that American assistance had to be greatly increased. By the spring of 1962, the war in South Vietnam was the most serious conflict anywhere in the world, and American officers and men were directly involved in supporting Vietnamese troops.

When Malaya gained Merdeka or independence on August 31, 1957, it put into effect one of the most novel constitutions of modern times. In an effort to bring the sovereign rulers of the separate states into the Federation of Malaya, the drafters of the constitution introduced the idea of an elected "king." The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is elected by a conference of the rulers from among their own members. He serves for a five-year term. This paramount ruler has limited constitutional powers, and he is charged to guarantee and protect the Islamic religion within the country. Political power resides in the Prime Minister, who is selected from among the members of the lower house of the Parliament. This house, the Dewan Ra'ayat, consists of 100 elected members. The maximum life of this house is five years, subject to dissolution by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the advice of his ministers. The Senate or Dewan Nagara represents the interests of the separate states, and its members are elected for a term of six years. In all essential respects, the Malayan system operates along the lines of the British parliamentary or cabinet system.

Burma, the other former British territory of Southeast Asia, also reflects its colonial heritage in its formal institutions. Real power

for policy-making resides in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, who are collectively responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. The President, who primarily performs the ceremonial functions, is elected by both chambers in joint session for a five-year term. Parliament is composed of two houses; the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, has 250 members, each representing from 30,000 to 100,000 persons in his constituency. Parliament is elected for a four-year term. The upper house, or Chamber of Nationalities, contains 125 seats of which 62 represent Burma proper and the remaining 63 represent the Shan, Kachin, Kayah, and Karen states and the special division of Chins.

In form, the Burmese constitution is a federal union composed of Burma proper and the special states composed primarily of ethnic minorities. A distinctive characteristic of the constitution is the proviso that ten years after it is put into effect the various states have a right of secession. Although the Burmese constitution defines a union system and although the various states in the union do have many safeguards to protect their interests, the constitution basically establishes a highly centralized system of authority for the entire country. The complexity of the Burmese constitution has given considerable powers to the judiciary because of the constant need for interpretation of constitutional intent. Despite all the difficulties, however, the Burmese have normally shown a remarkable determination to adhere to the legal procedures set out in their constitution. Only with the second advent of military rule and the establishment of the Revolutionary Council of Army officers in 1962 has there been a direct repudiation of the original constitution. Indeed, the lack of popular acceptance of army rule is in no small measure linked to the general feeling that there is no legal basis for the post-coup *d'état* government.

Constitutional arrangements for Indonesia are in the highest degree of flux of any of the Southeast Asian countries. The attempt to introduce a parliamentary system has not proved very successful, and, at present, President Sukarno has been seeking to experiment

with various forms of "guided democracy" and ineffective authoritarian rule. Although there is uncertainty as to the future legislative character of the government, the basic administrative procedures in Indonesia still adhere closely to those introduced by the Dutch. Much of the routine activities of the government continue the way they have for a long time. Decision-making powers are now divided between the President and the military commanders.

The three monarchies in Southeast Asia, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, also have governmental structures that are undergoing rapid changes. Thailand has been suspended between democracy and despotism ever since the 1932 *coup d'état* which brought to an end the absolute power of the king. In 1932, the constitution established a single house which was to be based on universal adult suffrage. No such Parliament has ever existed. The Parliament was initially to have half its members appointed by the government for ten years or until one-half of the eligible voters completed four years of school, whichever came first. This proviso of the constitution insured continued executive control of the government. Thailand has passed through several constitutions and since 1946 has had a bicameral legislature in which the members of the upper house have special qualifications of age and education. Executive authority in the country rests in the hands of the Prime Minister, his Cabinet, and civil and military bureaucracies. In form, the Thai king is a limited constitutional monarchy and in practice his power is restricted largely to his personal influence with his ministers and the leading political figures in the country.

Thai politics are far more stable than the record of changes in governmental forms might suggest. Since the *coup d'état* of 1932, power in Thailand has resided primarily with the leading military figures. The basic constitutional problem of the country centers on the task of keeping the Thai elite satisfied while at the same time broadening the democratic forms of government. In recent years, the military leaders of the country have been deposed by bloodless *coups d'état*.

Before the war, Thai politics was dominated by Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, but immediately after the war, power shifted to the hands of Pridi Phanomyong, who had been an associate of the Field Marshal in the 1932 coup. In 1947, after the mysterious death of King Rama VIII, the Pridi government was overthrown by the military leaders, and Field Marshal Phibun again became the dominant figure in Thai politics. Within Thai army politics, two of Phibun's associates, Generals Phao Sriyanon and Sarit Thanarat, became his competitors. In 1955, Phibun sought to introduce radical changes and a "new era of democracy," by calling for democratic elections, the emergence of political parties, and the recognition of a Hyde Park corner in Bangkok where freedom of speech was to be permitted. The elections of February, 1957, brought out over 30 parties and resulted in an unstable and fragmented situation within the National Assembly. In September, 1957, General Sarit broke openly with his former leader and drove both Marshal Phibun and General Phao into exile with a *coup d'état*. In December, 1957, further elections were called, and the National Socialist Party under Sarit's influence formed the new government. Sarit himself withdrew temporarily from the political scene, but by October, 1958, after medical treatment abroad, he returned to initiate another *coup d'état* and to introduce a more direct military form of rule. Thus, after each *coup d'état*, there have been further attempts to introduce more representative institutions of government, but when these have led to a diffusion of authority, the military have again asserted their influence in the form of *coups d'état*.

The Cambodian monarchy has an elaborate structure of formal government which reflects French influence in many respects. The national legislature is divided between an upper house, the Council of the Kingdom, which consists of 24 elder statesmen who are partly

appointed and partly elected, and a lower house or National Assembly, which is fully elected with one deputy for every 20,000 voters. Executive authority under the king resides primarily with the Council of Ministers or the Cabinet. The duties and powers of the Cambodian Prime Minister and his Cabinet are essentially the same as those the French Cabinet had in its relationship with the French National Assembly under the Fourth Republic. In addition, there are two other important councils which have advisory powers under the king. The Crown Council includes the Prime Minister, the president of the two houses of the Assembly, the leaders of the two main Buddhist sects, and the president of the High Court, and its chairman is the president of the Royal Family Council. The Royal Family Council consists of all the male members of the king's immediate family. These two councils provide informal guidance for the government. It would be hard to determine the relative influence of these various institutions in the decisions of the Cambodian government, because ever since independence the dominant influence in Cambodian politics has been Prince Sihanouk. The prince abdicated the throne in order to take a more active political role and has served as Prime Minister in all the independent governments. His father is the present king.

In recent years, the kingdom of Laos has been in a turmoil as a result of pressures from the international world and from an inability of the Laotian elite to establish a stable system of government. Within the royal family, there have been divisions between members who have been sympathetic to the Communists and those who feel the country should be strongly identified with the West. At the time that Laos achieved its independence under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, two of its provinces were under the control of the Pathet Lao movement, which is asso-

ciated with the Communist movement in North Vietnam. By 1959, indications were that the non-Communist leadership within Laos was achieving an ascendancy, and there was hope that the Pathet Lao military might be incorporated into the Royal Lao Army. In the fall of 1959, however, fighting broke out, and the government of Laos appealed to the United Nations to investigate possible aggression from North Vietnam. In December, 1959, General Phoumi Nosavan organized a Rightist coup to overthrow the more moderate regime of Phoumi Sananikeone. The trend thus seemed to be moving in a strongly anti-Communist direction until August, 1960, when a further *coup d'état* occurred under the leadership of Captain Kong Le, a discontented leader of one of the paratroop battalions. Prince Souvanna Phouma was installed as a neutralist Prime Minister. His half brother, Prince Souphanouvong, is the leader of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao guerrillas. The non-Communist elements within Laos then coalesced behind the leadership of Prince Boun Oum, whose troops were able to recapture the capital of Vientiane from Captain Kong Le.

In February, 1961, the king of Laos, seeking to stave off more serious civil war, proposed the establishment of a three-nation international commission—composed of Malaya, Burma, and Cambodia—to help neutralize Laos and thus maintain its independence. The American government then assumed the lead in pressing for the establishment of an internationally backed, neutral Laos. During the next eighteen months, at conferences held at Geneva, Switzerland, attended by Russia, Communist China, Britain, France, the United States, and the immediate neighbors of Laos in Southeast Asia, the leading figures of Lao politics finally agreed, despite further fighting in Laos, to the establishment of a coalition government, under the premiership of Prince Souvanna Phouma, which would follow a neutralist course with respect to the cold war.

The achievement of the coalition government represented a major gamble in American foreign policy, and at best a temporary stabilization of relations among the Lao lead-

ers. Prince Souvanna Phouma lacks significant political backing within Laos, but as an ideological neutralist and a Westernized intellectual he was the one person in Laos who seemed the most logical candidate to be premier in a coalition government, particularly when both the Soviet Union and the United States indicated he was acceptable to them. During the eighteen months of negotiations and deadlock, the legal government under Prince Boun Oum, backed by General Phoumi Nosavan, steadily lost ground through both military weakness and administrative ineffectualness. Eventually, these pro-Western

leaders were compelled by the situation and by American pressure to accept the coalition arrangement, with General Phoumi Nosavan participating in the new government and Prince Boun Oum retiring from public life. The coalition agreement substantially improved the position of Prince Souphanouvong and the Communist supported Pathet Lao by providing them with positions in the central government. The settlement of the Laos crisis in the summer of 1962 may not give the country enduring stability, but it averted an expanded international conflict which could easily have involved American troops.

# Governmental Performance

## VIII

In evaluating the performance of Southeast Asian governments since independence, we must keep in mind at all times the serious obstacles that these governments are confronted with and the deep divisions that run through their societies and impede the processes of orderly government. The fact that none of the Southeast Asian governments has disintegrated into chaos or has been dissolved into separate units is in itself reassuring evidence that the national leaders have achieved at least the prime goal of government in the area. The differences in peoples, in cultures, in habits of mind, and in degrees of modernization have all created tremendous centrifugal forces in the region. Burma and Indonesia, in particular, have been torn by conflicting parochial "nationalisms," and the fact that they continue to exist as national entities after nearly a decade of independence

is possibly the most important test of their governmental performance.

Within the realm of governmental responsibilities, many of the Southeast Asian administrations are able to perform a wide range of routine functions with surprising efficiency. In many fields, long-standing government practices of the colonial era continue today with very little disruption. In spite of civil war and dissident rebel movements in the countryside, the main Indonesian cities are ruled with a remarkable degree of law and order. Most of Burma has, at some time since independence, fallen under one or another insurrectionary band, but the mail service of the Union of Burma still reaches every area of the country. In spite of *coups d'état* and changes at the capital, taxes are regularly collected in Thailand, and the authority of the king's civil servants is recognized in the most backward hamlets. The streets of Saigon have been cleaned and the refuse collected even though the national government has not always been sure of its own future direction.

The main difficulties in governmental performance in Southeast Asia have appeared at the higher level of policy-making. The link between administrative operations and general policy-making has been extremely weak. Only in Malaya and the Philippines has there been an essentially cooperative relationship between the political leaders of the country and those responsible for administrative operations. In Malaya, the arrival of in-



dependence did not mean a weakening of the civil service. British officials were asked to remain and serve the new government, thus demonstrating that the civil service tradition is a politically neutral one in which technical skills are at the service of the country's political masters. In recent years in the Philippines, the politicians, both at the local and national level, have come increasingly to appreciate the services which the technicians within the administrative services can perform for the society. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, political and administrative relationships have been strained for numerous reasons. The tendency of the nationalist politicians to set unrealistic goals for national development has exacerbated the relations between these leaders and those responsible for implementing policy.

In Burma, the AFPFL leaders in 1953 announced the Pyidawtha program which was to modernize much of the country and to provide it with a self-sustaining economy. The program was unrealistically ambitious, and when the government was unable to achieve its objectives, scapegoats among the administrators were singled out, with the result that the trust between politician and administrator was seriously weakened. Indonesia has had similar unhappy experiences with proclaimed programs of economic development. Attempts to initiate five-year plans in Indonesia have served only to highlight the extent to which the government has not been able to achieve the goals it would like to set for itself. The result has been to increase the degree of cynicism and mutual recrimination among members of the politically influential classes.

The expanded goals of government operation have also tended to reduce the general efficiency of administrative performance in some of the Southeast Asian countries. Political leaders, by setting up ambitious but necessary development programs, have had to dissipate the time and energy of the few trained administrators within the country. Competent administrators have had to be spread thin among the various departments of government, while at the same time a vast expansion in the total numbers of people within the

civil service has taken place. Criticism of the civil service has thus increased as its general standards of efficiency have declined, and inertia and a general immobilism within government have occurred. In Vietnam, the civil service has more than doubled since independence; in Burma, the services have had a fivefold expansion; in Indonesia, nearly a sevenfold expansion. These countries, however, started off with a scarcity of competent administrators.

Fortunately, in much of Southeast Asia, non-governmental factors reduce the pressures against the government. For example, in Burma, in spite of the weaknesses in the administrative services, most of the people are farmers and do not make heavy demands upon the government. In Thailand and many parts of Indonesia, the people have not been mobilized to demand much of government and are content to find that government is not troubling them with its programs or activities. Thus the fact that the governments have not been able to meet some of their own standards of performance has not produced strong public reactions against them.

Compared to administrative procedures and political decision-making, the administration of justice has created few difficulties in the new governments of Southeast Asia. To a remarkable extent, the courts and legal procedures that were introduced during the colonial period have been carried on in the post-independence era. In many countries, a class of lawyers trained in the Western tradition has maintained the traditions of impartial justice. Although some deterioration has occurred in the administration of law at the local levels and in the lower courts, most of the higher courts in Southeast Asia are still bulwarks for democratic procedures and principles. The legal tradition has certainly reduced the tendencies toward arbitrary political acts in the region.

Within the realm of foreign affairs, the per-

formance of Southeast Asian governments has come closer to their aspirations than have their achievements in domestic policy. Burma and Indonesia have become important members of the neutralist group of countries in the world. In recent years, President Sukarno has traveled extensively abroad on good-will tours and has thus sought to develop the prestige of his country. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) powers have gained, through their alliance with the West, a greater degree of influence in Western councils than they might otherwise have been able to realize. Thus, Thailand is an important country for United Nations activities in the region as well as the home of the SEATO

Secretariat, and the Philippines have succeeded in obtaining American foreign aid and in negotiating successful reparation agreements with Japan.

In sum, therefore, most of the governments of Southeast Asia have not achieved the goals they themselves have established. With the conspicuous exceptions of Malaya and the Philippines, the governments of Southeast Asia today are less confident than they were when they first achieved independence. This situation might not be so serious had it not been the general expectation domestically and abroad that the governments would take the lead in guiding these new nations into the modern world.

# Problems and Prospects

## IX

In spite of the setbacks and disappointments of the last decade, Southeast Asia still remains a crucial testing ground of the practicality of democratic institutions in new societies seeking to modernize their economies. The drama of nation-building in Asia has focused on the efforts of China, through Communist methods, and India, through democratic methods, to achieve the status of a modern nation. In Southeast Asia, the same struggle is going on among the smaller nations that are faced with the same range of problems. Whether or not Southeast Asian governments are able to realize their initial commitment to republican institutions of government and democratic ideals may turn out to be a crucial test for the future of democracy throughout the world.

The fundamental question in all Southeast Asian countries is whether they are going to be able to build the modern organizations necessary for maintaining all the activities associated with modern nationhood. The test of organization goes beyond that of just building civil administrations, political parties, and

national legislatures. It extends throughout the society, to the entire range of organizations that are needed to support a modern economy, which include business firms, governmental offices, educational systems, cultural groups, and so on.

During the last decade in Southeast Asia, most of the existing organizations have tended to be either carry-overs from traditional or colonial forms or institutions created by the nationalist movements in their struggles for independence. The nationalist party, the colonial bureaucracy, and the traditional ethnic groups have all continued in the new countries, but the question remains whether they can meet the tasks of the future. There is an urgent need for the creation of new forms of organization to cope with the vast changes within Southeast Asian societies, but these are only gradually beginning to take form.

One of the prime functions of these new organizations is to show the people of Southeast Asia how to modernize their societies. The human resources of the area will be the critical factor in determining the pattern of the future. Although the situation varies from country to country and many bright spots exist, there remains a pressing need for more trained personnel in almost every phase of

Southeast Asian life. The Philippines alone have an impressive amount of trained talent and formally educated people. Their problem is to find jobs and career opportunities for the increasing numbers of people who have received university degrees. The demands of the educated will be a constant pressure on government in the next decade, and if jobs are not available, the Philippines will experience serious frustration in its intellectual class. To compound this problem, the Philippine standards of education are declining. Large numbers of people are seeking college education in schools whose standards have deteriorated to the point where many graduates often do not have the qualifications necessary for finding employment.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there is a continuing need to train a wide range of people in modern skills. During the colonial period, most of the people in Southeast Asia were trained in the liberal arts and looked toward careers in the law. Now there is increasing demand for a greater diversification in educational experiences, for people with commercial, technical, engineering, and medical training. But the traditional prestige of a government career lingers on and produces disturbing imbalances in the forms of education that people are receiving.

The problem of human resources in Southeast Asia becomes even more acute when seen in the light of the projected demographic patterns of the area. Increases in population will dramatically alter the relationship of man to the land in most of the countries within the next generation. This may mean that if rapid economic development does not occur, the burden of an exploding population will create an almost insurmountable obstacle to future development. If self-sustaining economic growth is not built into the economies of the Philippines and Indonesia within the next few years, the pressures of population may wipe out whatever early successes they

have had. The danger is that the governments have not as yet adjusted their programs and policies to this inevitable population rise, and therefore that they may lose precious time and not begin to act until pressures become acute.

Immediately following the problem of human resources in determining the prospects of Southeast Asia is the question of investment capital. The availability of capital is a more serious matter than most of the governments of Southeast Asia have been prepared to admit. During the last decade, most of the governments showed relatively little concern about the importance of obtaining the capital necessary for their economic development, reflecting their bias against economic matters and particularly against the importance of capital itself. With independence, the national leaders hoped that the ending of colonial restraints would produce spontaneous growth and that indigenous entrepreneurs would emerge to take the place of the foreign firms. They also assumed that somehow the spirit of nationalism and the determination of the governments to assist their people would be able to meet the need for financial resources.

The problem of the availability of capital is likely to become increasingly serious in the next decade because during the past decade the region as a whole has in a sense been living off its capital. Only in Malaya and in the Philippines has there been any substantial creation of capital since the end of the war. In the Philippines, foreign firms as well as foreign aid have combined with Philippine entrepreneurs to stimulate new commercial and economic activities. Malaya has attracted the capital of overseas Chinese as well as some European firms. The Chinese who are being driven out of Indonesia and elsewhere in the region have moved their holdings whenever possible to Malaya. In Indonesia, the government was able to avoid a serious economic crisis in 1957 by nationalizing the Dutch holdings and, in 1958, by taking over the Chinese interests. By January 1, 1960, most of the Chinese merchants who had been active in the rural areas had been put out of business. The Indonesian government also

struck at its own citizens in August, 1959, by devaluating by 90 per cent approximately one-half of the nation's currency and freezing the larger bank accounts. Burma has yet to find a way to replace the capital it received from British, Indian, and other foreign firms.

Foreign aid may be able to save some of these countries in the next decade from the extreme consequences of economic stagnation, but the prospects for development depend, in the last analysis, on the ability of the people themselves to mobilize their own resources. Somehow the governments must devise the means of taxation necessary for accumulating capital, and private entrepreneurs must attract foreign capital and mobilize whatever capital exists in their own country.

For the next decade, however, Southeast Asia will remain a region of agricultural societies. The rural areas have not received the attention from the nationalist governments that their importance warrants, largely because the nationalist leaders tend to be urban-educated intellectuals. But the future of Southeast Asia is going to depend in large measure on what happens to the rural life in the area. During the last decade, relatively little change took place in the levels of technology employed in rural Southeast Asia. The area has not suffered because of this because it is the only food surplus region in Asia. In the next decade, the increases in population are likely to produce the type of crisis familiar now in India and China, where overpopulation drags down the standard of life of a people who have a limited technology. The Philippines have mounted a substantial campaign to meet this problem through their community development programs. Before governments can help raise the level of the rural areas, they must establish closer associations with the village world. The question is whether the orientation of the ruling elements in Southeast Asia will change as rapidly as the rise in population pressure on the countryside. Rural discontent will probably force larger numbers of people into the Southeast Asian cities, where, if industrial advances are insufficient to absorb them, they are likely to be caught up in agitational movements

and formations against existing governments.

The economic future of the region not only depends on strengthening agriculture but in diversifying other aspects of the economy. During the last few years, the world demand for the prime raw materials of Southeast Asia, particularly rubber and tin, has remained at a high level and has provided basic support for some of the economies of the region. But any slump in this demand will have serious repercussions in Southeast Asia and adversely affect the ability of the governments to maintain even the vital functions necessary for health and welfare.

All the governments in the region recognize the need to diversify their economies, and most have initiated programs to this end. Only in the Philippines and Malaya has there been significant and systematic development of light industries, and these two economies may soon achieve self-sustaining growth. Elsewhere in the area, the governments have introduced pilot projects or special industries. Unfortunately, these have tended to become mere showpieces that have not served the purpose of generating further economic development. Quite understandably, the new governments have often preferred prestige projects that would demonstrate to the world how they were dramatically changing some phase of their life to the less dramatic but possibly more useful activities necessary for supporting general economic growth.

Fundamental to the social and economic development of the area is the need for national unity in each of the countries. The minority groups pose knotty problems, particularly the overseas Chinese. Nearly eleven million Chinese reside in Southeast Asia and have performed many crucial economic functions for these societies. During the last decade, increasing pressures have been applied against them by the nationalist governments. The future economic growth of some of the

countries, including particularly the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya, will be measurably influenced by the degree to which these resident Chinese are allowed to contribute to national development.

National unity may become a more elusive goal during the next decade as the spirit of the nationalist movements declines and the hard task of rebuilding a sense of national purpose amidst the realities of everyday life remains. In Indonesia, President Sukarno has sought to keep alive the fervor of revolution largely through oratory and through his own personal charismatic appeal. In his Independence Day speech of August 17, 1960, he declared:

I tell you frankly, I belong to that group of people who are bound in spiritual longing for the romanticism of revolution. . . . I am fascinated by it; I am completely absorbed by it; I am crazed; I am obsessed by the romanticism of revolution. . . . [I am dedicated to] solve our national problems in a revolutionary way; [to] make the revolutionary spirit surge on; [to] see to it that the fire of our revolution does not die or grow dim not even for a single moment.

The appeals of Sukarno still can strike a spark in the population, but Indonesians increasingly feel that there is need for other activities if the country is to have a secure future.

One reason national unity has been weak in the Southeast Asian countries is that it needs to rest on more than just identification with nationalist slogans and ideals. The region badly requires the development of special interest groups and functional organizations through which people can express their own interests and, by relating their interests to the national concern, can find more meaning in their national identity. One question in the region thus becomes: Will interest groups be encouraged or will they be considered a threat to the unity of the society as a whole?

Although the process of modernization has

increased the number of people with different viewpoints and interests, which might provide the basis for more plural societies in Southeast Asia, the result at the moment is the fragmentation of social and economic life. Since modernization has thus far brought only disruption to these societies, the political leaders may decide not to encourage the development of modern institutions but may revert to practices that are no longer valid in the twentieth century. In Indonesia and Burma, there has already been a return to mysticism and the acceptance of more traditional attitudes, which serve as havens against the insecurities of modern life.

These mounting pressures and anxieties have spurred the trend toward authoritarian practices. There is growing concern that the governments will not be able to meet their tasks and that the civilian politicians have proved inadequate to the demands of nation-building. In Burma and in Indonesia, the military has had to perform many of the operations of government. Less conspicuous but still of fundamental importance has been the role of the military in Vietnam and Cambodia. But recent political developments in Southeast Asia have revealed serious limitations on the abilities of armies to restore vigor to the process of nation-building. The Burmese Army, after eighteen months of managing the civil government, found many problems it could not cope with and willingly for a time accepted the return of civilian politicians. In Indonesia, the army has helped prevent further disintegration but it has not been able to perform all the constructive activities necessary for national development.

Although the predominant issue in Southeast Asian politics is often couched in terms of the alternative between authoritarianism and more liberal political practices, the more fundamental issue is whether the governments can perform the general tasks of government effectively. Some of the Southeast Asian countries may not only get authoritarian rule but incompetent authoritarian rule, which would not be able to solve the problems of development any better than incompetent democratic rule has been able to so far.

The fact that the region has preserved its independence during the last decade augurs well for the future, in spite of the pressures that continue to threaten the existence of the individual countries. The goals of modernization, democratic development, and stable rule are closely related. In the next decade of accelerating social change, the crucial question will be whether modernization will result in more effective organizations and structures within the Southeast Asian societies or whether it will further disrupt life and diminish the capability of the people to work effectively together. Social change can either produce greater progress in the area or can create greater tensions. If change brings widespread economic development, the prospects are good that democratic institutions will be able to survive. As these institutions thrive, the people will become increasingly committed to them as the years pass, and the disappointments of the last decade will be accepted as merely the birth pangs of national development. The opposite pattern is also possible in some of the countries. Increased disruption of

old patterns without the creation of new ones may lead to dissatisfaction with democratic institutions and to intensified political instability.

The future of Southeast Asia, of course, does not rest exclusively with the countries in the region. It is greatly dependent on developments elsewhere in the world. As in the past, Southeast Asia remains to some extent a vacuum area, in which outside forces are likely to impinge and shape the course of events. In the end, however, the prospects of Southeast Asia will be largely in the hands of the Southeast Asian peoples themselves. In the next decade, they must find some way to develop viable nation-states that will be able to operate in the modern world while at the same time preserving the peculiar characteristics of their own national heritage. This pull between tradition and modernity is basic in Southeast Asia, and the clash has weakened all the countries in the area. But all of them hope to find a synthesis that will resolve this clash and prove that there is a place for small independent states in the modern world.

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DANKWART A. RUSTOW

# Southwest Asia



# Introduction



Few major world regions have had as prominent a place in the newspaper headlines of the last two decades as Southwest Asia. From 1945 to 1958, in particular, some of the most spectacular international crises centered around the area variously known as the Near East or the Middle East. The Soviets' refusal to withdraw their wartime occupation forces from the Iranian province of Azarbayjan led to the first postwar clash between the Eastern and Western blocs—and the first use of the Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council. The termination of the British mandate in Palestine in 1948 precipitated a war between the newly proclaimed state of Israel and its Arab neighbors. A few years later, the tearful, raging, pajama-clad figure of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq<sup>1</sup>

became a familiar sight to the newspaper-reading public; his nationalization of Iranian oil led to one of the most protracted show-downs ever staged over the control of foreign investment in an "underdeveloped" country's natural resources. In 1956, a second nationalization crisis erupted just beyond the geographic borders of Asia, on the Suez Canal, and the subsequent Israeli-British-French war against Egypt brought the world closer to World War III than it had been before. In 1958, the Iraqi revolution and the civil war in Lebanon led to the first overseas action of United States troops since the Korean War.

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commonly employed by librarians and scholars in the United States, although diacritical marks (dots below and lines above some of the letters) and most of the apostrophes of the official transliteration have been omitted. This results at times in spellings that differ somewhat from the haphazard practice of the daily press. The reader will have little difficulty, however, in identifying names such as Abd Allah, Abdülhamid, Azarbayjan, Kuwayt, Musaddiq, Qasim, Qur'an, shaykh, and Uman even though he may previously have encountered them in the guise of Abdullah, Abdul Hamid, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Mossadegh, Kassim, Koran, sheik, Oman, or the like. Only for a very few names, mostly of countries and cities, has a concession been made to well-established Western usage: Aden, Beirut, Mosul, Nasser, Saud, Tehran, Yemen instead of the more accurate Adan, Bayrut, Mawsil, Nasir, Suud, Tahrán, Yaman.

<sup>1</sup> A note on the spelling of Near Eastern names in this section may forestall possible confusion. Turkish names and words are given in the official orthography employed since the change from Arabic to Latin alphabet in 1928. Arabic and Persian, on the other hand, continue to be written in the Arabic script. Hence names and words from these languages are given according to the transliteration system

The events in Iran, Palestine, Suez, and Lebanon and other lesser crises all testify to the paramount strategic importance of Southwest Asia. The geographic location of the Near East makes it a link or a barrier between two oceans and among three continents. Commerce traditionally has moved in an east-west direction. In the Middle Ages, Far Eastern spices and silks reached Europe via trade routes that came by sea to the Persian Gulf and hence overland to the Mediterranean. The so-called "life-line of the British Empire" followed the same approximate route—from India and Australia via Aden, Suez, and Gibraltar to England. And since the First and Second World Wars, European industry has become vitally dependent on petroleum shipped by pipeline or tanker from the area around the head of the Persian Gulf. In a north-south direction, the Near East has been a major potential barrier to Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and Africa. Southwest Asia is, notably, the only area adjacent to the Soviet Union where Communist power still is contained within its pre-1945 boundaries; by the same token, Western airfields, missile bases, and radar listening posts in the Near East are closer to Soviet industrial targets than any other military installations of the Western defense system. "As far as sheer value of territory is concerned," General Dwight D. Eisenhower once stated, "there is no more strategically important area in the world than the Middle East."

But the political importance of a region lies not primarily in its trade routes or strategic positions. Rather it lies in its people—their traditions and aspirations, their hopes and fears, and their patterns of interaction among themselves and with their neighbors throughout the world. The role that Southwest Asia has come to play on the contemporary diplomatic scene cannot be explained apart from the region's domestic political

forces. And the internal political situation in Southwest Asia, like that of other parts of Asia—and indeed of all the so-called "developing areas"—reflects the intense, at times chaotic, interplay of forces of tradition and modernity.

Southwest Asia offers a particularly instructive laboratory for a comparative study of the process of political modernization. It includes traditional patriarchal societies such as Afghanistan and Yemen, which have as yet been barely touched by the industrial revolution of production and transport. It includes Saudi Arabia, where a modern petroleum industry is starkly juxtaposed with a tribal society of Bedouin camel herders. It includes societies such as Iraq and Iran which are in intense political and social turmoil. It includes Turkey which, aside from Japan, has pursued a more drastic policy of rapid cultural change than any other country of Asia. And it includes Israel, where an immigrant population has laid the foundation for a modern pluralistic society in a hostile physical and international environment.

Two basic aspects of contemporary Southwest Asian politics particularly merit the close attention of the student. The first aspect is the emergence of new states. The region includes three countries which have a well-defined historical identity—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan. But throughout the rest of Southwest Asia, the basic political units were first conceived and created in the present century, as part of the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars. The second aspect is the psychological ambivalence of Southwest Asians toward modern European and Western civilization. Of all the "non-Western" regions of the world, the Near East has been the one culturally and geographically closest to Europe. The conquests of Alexander, the rise of Christianity, the Crusades, and the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire testify to the closeness of the connection. Yet Near Eastern experience with European imperialism was of a particularly unpleasant sort, largely because European expansion into the area came late, at a time when Europeans were beset by apologetic second thoughts

about imperialism and when much of the Near Eastern elite had already been converted to Western ideals of nationality and constitutionalism. The recent emergence of basic political units accounts for the prevalent insecurity not only of boundaries but also of political loyalties. And the late and unhappy experience with Western imperialism accounts for the intense mixture of admiration and hate of the West which is so widespread among urban Near Easterners. Both facts, in turn, have decisively contributed to the explosive instability of the recent Southwest Asian political scene.


Before we proceed to a more systematic examination of the foundations of Southwest Asian politics and the social and institutional dynamics of the region, we must stop to define briefly the geographic area to be included in our study. The internal turbulence of the region and the multiple strategic interests that intersect it are both reflected in a regrettable, but to some extent inevitable, confusion in terminology. Even in this brief introduction, we have shifted from the term "Southwest Asia" to that of "Near East," and, in the quotation from General Eisenhower, of "Middle East." The latter two terms reflect a conventional, Europe-centered view of geography. To the nineteenth-century Europeans, the jockeying among the powers for position within the decaying Ottoman Empire was known as the "Eastern Question." Then toward the turn of the century, a threefold subdivision became accepted. The Near East was the Ottoman Empire and its successor states in the Balkans and North Africa; the Middle East was a vaguely defined area around the Indian Ocean; and the Far East was China, Japan, and the islands of Southeast Asia.

But British usage in the Second World War added an element of confusion. The Middle East Command and the Middle East Supply Centre had their headquarters in Cairo, and their assignments included most of what previously had been known as the Near East. In the last two decades, therefore, the terms "Near East" and "Middle East" have been used interchangeably, with

cautious souls inclined to use the dual term "Near and Middle East." The region, however we label it, is defined, at the minimum, to include Egypt, the Arab countries of Asia, Turkey, and Iran. At the maximum, it is taken to include all the predominantly Islamic region from Morocco to Pakistan and Sinkiang, and from the Caucasus to the Sudan and Somalia.

In the context of a study of Asian politics, the problems of delimitation and of terminology are somewhat simplified. Asia is bounded on the west by the Turkish straits, the Mediterranean, the Sinai peninsula, and the Red Sea, and we shall here be concerned with those parts of Asia which are to the south of the Soviet Union and to the west of Pakistan. The major political units to be considered in this chapter therefore are: Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan; the Arab countries of Asia (Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen); and Israel. The most appropriate and unequivocal label for this region clearly is Southwest Asia, a term which we shall therefore use in the specifically political parts of our discussion. On the other hand, history, cultural traditions, and social patterns in no way respect political boundaries of states or geographic boundaries of continents. For example, Cairo, the capital of Egypt, has long been the intellectual center for Arab Muslims throughout Asia. In speaking of cultural and historical features which Southwest Asia shares with adjacent regions of Northern Africa, we shall therefore fall back upon the conventional terms "Near East," and "Near Eastern."

For the sake of precision, three minor modifications of the geographic coverage of Southwest Asia in this chapter should be noted at this point. (1) Turkey, although mostly in Asia, includes 9,000 square miles of territory in Europe. The geographic divide between European Turkey (or Thrace) and Asiatic Turkey (or Anatolia) is formed by the fa-



mous Turkish Straits, consisting of the Marmara Sea and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—two narrow waterways which link the Marmara to the Black Sea in the north and the Aegean Sea in the south. Turkey's largest city and former capital, Istanbul, lies astride the Bosphorus at its entrance to the Marmara Sea. Since any study of politics must deal with entire states, Turkish Thrace and Istanbul will naturally be included in our treatment of Southwest Asia.

(2) Geographically, the island of Cyprus, which lies about 40 miles off the Turkish and 70 miles off the Syrian coast in the eastern Mediterranean, is part of Asia. In 1960–61, Cyprus attained its independence under a complex treaty arrangement among its former colonial ruler, Great Britain, and Greece and Turkey. Since most of the island's population is Greek (about 80 per cent), its cultural ties are mostly toward Europe. Hence Cyprus will be excluded from our purview.

(3) Finally, our discussion will be concerned with fully independent states. This will leave out from more detailed consideration a number of non-self-governing territories, notably the British dependencies along the southern and eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula (to wit, counterclockwise from the

south: Aden colony; the Federation of South Arabia, formerly Aden protectorate—consisting of 22 tribal areas in the Hadramaut region, most of them in "treaty relations" with the British Crown—Masqat and Uman, a sultanate with "close ties" with the United Kingdom; the several Trucial Shaykhdoms and the Shaykhdoms of Qatar and Bahrayn which are "protected" by Britain; and Kuwait, the oil-rich shaykhdom at the head of the Persian Gulf whose 1899 treaty placing it under British protection was superseded by a treaty in 1961 granting official independence; and the Gaza strip, a remnant of the defunct British mandate over Palestine with an area of 200 square kilometers, crammed with a population of 300,000 Arab Palestinian refugees, administered since 1949 by Egypt, and its boundary protected since 1958 by a special United Nations Emergency Force).

A final characteristic feature of Southwest Asia emerges from this quick, preliminary look at geography. Although the region's population is only about as large as that of Japan, or Indonesia, or Pakistan, this population is divided among a dozen sovereign states. The low population density and the political divisions of Southwest Asia have markedly contributed to the political instability of the region.

# History

## II

### The Traditional Near East and Its Decline

Two features, above all, are characteristic of the historical legacy of Near Eastern politics—the tradition of empire and autocracy, and the tradition of local particularism. The Near East was the site of the most highly developed ancient civilizations—those of the old Egyptians in the Nile Valley and Delta; of the Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians in Mesopotamia, the “Land Between the Rivers” (Euphrates and Tigris); of the Hittites in the highlands of Anatolia; and of the ancient Persians on the Iranian plateau. Egyptians, Mesopotamians, and Iranians took turns erecting vast empires throughout the region. Alexander of Macedonia, Hulagu the Mongol, Timur (or Tamerlane) the Turk, and other conquerors invaded the Near East from adjacent regions. All of them combined military talent with a supreme disregard for human lives. Many of them displayed a taste for monumental architecture and public

works—pyramids, roads, dams and canals, and palaces. Yet the more spectacular the rise of an empire the more rapid, as a rule, was its decline.

In contrast to the history of China, no geographically fixed concept of the Near East emerged. The constituent units, such as Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Anatolia reasserted their identity, separated as they were in many instances by vast stretches of desert. Even under the rule of a single monarch, the various cities, towns, and villages retained much *de facto* autonomy. The nomadic tribes of the desert fringes through most of history remained each a law unto itself and a perennial threat to its sedentary neighbors. The difficulties of transport and of social organization generally restricted the effective rule of emperors, kings, and sultans to their palaces and capital cities or to their army camps. Only in the fertile river valleys—above all in Egypt and to a lesser extent in Mesopotamia—did the common needs of irrigation lay the basis for a tradition of bureaucratic organization.

The conquest that was to leave the deepest and most lasting impact on the Near East was one that proceeded from the center of the region, Arabia. Yet the Arab conquest was less



notable for its political than for its cultural and religious consequences. The austere monotheism preached by Muhammad (570–632 A.D.) in the trading towns of Mecca and Medina briefly caused the surrounding Bedouin tribes to forget their mutual raids and feuds. In the name of Islam they conquered, within a century after the Prophet's death, a vast area from Spain to Northwest India. While the political empire of Muhammad's successors, the Caliphs, crumbled, most of its inhabitants retain their Muslim religion—and, on that basis, a distinct if variegated Near Eastern civilization.

Islam served to establish a measure of unity throughout the region—and on a more effective and lasting basis than the previous imperial conquests. In the medieval heyday of Islamic civilization, Muslims from Seville, Cairo, Baghdad, and Bukhara engaged in commercial and intellectual exchange, their allegiance to a common faith transcending any purely political loyalties. Yet Islam allowed not only for political divisiveness but also for cultural diversity. Islam does not prescribe a rigid orthodoxy within an elaborate theological doctrine. The profession of monotheism and of the prophecy of Muhammad, and the intention to carry out the major ritual observances (daily prayers, alms, fast, and pilgrimage) are the only essential requisites for membership in the Muslim community. The Muslim equivalent of a clergy, the *alims* (or, with the Arabic plural, *ulama*), are not a priesthood who form a strict autonomous hierarchy or whose ministrations are considered essential to salvation. Rather, they are "learned men," men who have acquired sufficient knowledge of the basic Islamic lore of law, ethics, and theology. What formal offices the *ulama* may hold they receive by appointment from the local community of believers (e.g., as imams or prayer leaders) or from central political authority (e.g., as qadis or judges).

A great variety of sects and schools of legal

interpretation thus could grow up without disrupting the basic unity of Islam. In fact, sectarian organization rapidly became the normal vehicle for the expression of political or social discontent. A particular form of Islamic religious organization which spread in the Middle Ages is that of the religious brotherhoods or dervish orders. Each of these consists of the brothers who have taken a set of ascetic vows or practice a mystical ritual, and of lay members. While many of these orders are limited to a particular country, others are widespread throughout the Muslim sphere. It has been estimated that today perhaps one Muslim out of 30 or 40 is a member of one of these orders, and it has been suggested that it was principally the rise of these orders (rather than any political continuity) which enabled Islam to survive the twofold onslaught of the Turkish and Mongol invasions (tenth to fourteenth centuries).

Political strength was restored to the Islamic Near East most notably as a result of the Ottoman conquests. The Ottomans started out in the thirteenth century as a Turkish warrior tribe on the Anatolian border of the Byzantine Empire. Their conquests spread spectacularly—first primarily in the Balkan and Danubian areas of Southeast Europe and then in the Arab Near East. Süleyman the Magnificent (reigned 1520–66) ruled an empire from Hungary to Yemen and from the Caspian Sea to Algiers, without question the largest and most durable political structure to emerge west of the Himalayas after the fall of Rome.

Part of the secret of the rapid Arab conquest of the seventh and eighth centuries and of the later Ottoman conquests was the tolerant attitude of Islam toward other revealed religions. Christians and Jews, as "People of the Book," enjoy a special status as subjects of an Islamic ruler. As long as they recognize his rule and pay a poll tax, they are to be left free in the exercise of their religion—and (as we shall see in more detail in a later section) the traditional Islamic conception draws no distinction between religion on the one hand and law, social custom, and ethics on the other. While most administrative and military positions are reserved to Muslims, there

is no stigma on conversion, and, in fact, most of the highest positions in the Ottoman Empire were long held by Christian converts or their immediate descendants. While Christians and Jews mingled freely with Muslims in the Baghdad of the Caliphs, the Ottomans enforced a measure of social segregation; Christians and Jews had a virtual monopoly on trade, finance, and the arts and crafts, whereas Muslims monopolized the government and army at one end of the social scale and held the largest share of agriculture at the other. The Ottoman system of social segregation and legal autonomy of non-Muslims—known as the millet (or denominational) system—thus provided a measure of legal decentralization which was added to the *de facto* decentralization imposed by imperfections of communication.

Even when the Ottoman Empire stood at its zenith, however, the long-range balance of power was beginning to tip toward Europe. The explorations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries not only opened the treasures of the New World to the Europeans, they also installed European power in India and later in Africa, thus effectively setting bounds to the further political expansion of Islam. Meanwhile, the commercial and industrial revolutions and the rise of absolute monarchies and later of nation-states provided Europe with a level of technology and of political and social cohesion for which those of the Ottomans proved to be no match. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottomans retreated along the Danube and the northern Black Sea shore before Austrian and Russian armies. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798–1801) was a piercing thrust whose long-range cultural and political repercussions far exceeded its immediate military effects. The fact that Nelson's British squadrons rather than Ottoman regiments clinched Napoleon's defeat was symbolic of the future. Even more portentous were the Westernizing reforms of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali (1805–49), which closely copied the military and industrial organization introduced under the French occupation and which enabled Egypt to make itself virtually independent of

the Ottoman Empire. First as an ally and later as a declared antagonist of the Sultan, Muhammad Ali conquered large parts of the Ottoman Arab territories. Once again, it was the intervention of the European powers which saved the Ottoman Empire and limited Muhammad Ali to Egypt. The last and most powerful of the great Muslim Empires was clearly in decline.

## The Emergence of the Modern Near East

The nineteenth century brought a phase of intensive and often violent interplay between forces of tradition and modernization (or, as it may properly be called in the Near East, Westernization). Cumulative military defeat provided the initial stimulus for reform, but the movement soon went far beyond mere army reorganization. French military instructors were called to the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth century, and Prussian instructors (including the famed Helmuth von Moltke) followed in the nineteenth. But, as Egyptian experience had shown, the reformed army depended on industrial production for its supplies, and industrialization required increased and centralized taxation and a reform of the entire legal and administrative systems. The new army and the expanded civil service alike needed trained manpower, and an entire network of Ottoman higher and secondary schools was created on the European model by the mid-nineteenth century to supply this need. In the Arab countries, in particular, the spread of Western-style education was furthered by American, French, and British missionary and philanthropic institutions; significantly, it was a Presbyterian mission school, the predecessor of today's American University of Beirut, which set up the first permanent Arab printing press in 1834. The new educational sys-

tem in turn produced an elite committed to Westernization not only as a buttress to tradition and to the Sultan's power but as an end in itself—regardless of the Sultan and, increasingly, against the Sultan.

The Westernized elite's dissatisfaction with the Sultan and his autocratic rule was accentuated by the failure of the nineteenth-century reforms to yield any appreciable increase in military-political power. Defeat had piled on defeat, humiliation upon humiliation, and expense upon expense. With Europe's tacit or open support, the Ottomans' Balkan subjects had one by one attained independence. It was clearly only the rivalry of the European powers, particularly Britain and Russia, which kept any one of them from delivering the last crushing blow. By 1881, the collection of Ottoman customs revenues was turned over to the Empire's European creditors. Similar developments had occurred in Iran, where less effective but proportionately costlier measures of Westernization had depleted the treasury, while lucrative concessions for construction of public works or for trade monopolies had been bartered to European financiers. Increasingly, the educated elite became convinced that a representative constitution was needed to check the spendthrift and arbitrary power of sultan or shah. In the Ottoman Empire, the first organized political movements had their origins in this anti-autocratic opposition of the mid-nineteenth century, and, significantly, the first nucleus was provided by students of the Army Medical School, the most highly Westernized unit among the reformed military services.

In Iran, on the other hand, the opposition was largely led by the Shii ulama, who organized a successful boycott of a British tobacco concession in the 1890's. The rapid growth of an indigenous press gave further impetus to the demands for political reform. Repression at home temporarily transferred the center of organization abroad, to the Ottoman exiles

clustering around Cairo, Paris, and Geneva, and to the Iranian ones around Calcutta. The adoption of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 (reproclaimed after three decades of deliberate disregard under Sultan Abdülhamid as a result of the so-called Young Turk Revolution of 1908) and the Iranian Constitution of 1906 were the immediate results of this snowballing opposition.

But once again, internal reform was accompanied by a short-term decline, rather than by a dramatic increase, in international power. In 1907, Britain and Russia divided Iran into agreed spheres of political and economic influence, and in the First World War, Russian, German, British, and Ottoman troops crisscrossed Iran without anyone's troubling to declare war on her. The Ottoman Empire in the Libyan and Balkan Wars (1911–13) lost its remaining European and African possessions. The reckless intervention of the Young Turk regime into the First World War on the German side served to precipitate the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

Constitutionalism has been no more effective than autocratic reform in staving off disaster. But a far more potent force introduced into the Near East in the nineteenth century was nationalism, a force both for disruption and for reconstruction. In Iran, the survival of Persian as a distinctive language with a rich literary tradition and the emergence in the sixteenth century of Shii (heterodox) Islam as a distinctive religious tradition made possible a continuous and imperceptible transition from traditional patriotism to modern nationalism. For the peoples of the Ottoman Empire—both Turks and Arabs—the change was more abrupt and painful.

The Empire was based on loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty—the descendants of Osman—and to the social and cultural structure of Islam, with its assigned niches for the subject "People of the Book." The needs of frontier warfare and of commerce within an ethnic division of labor had led in many areas to a checkerboard pattern of settlement, with Greek living next to Bulgarian and Albanian, or Turk next to Arab, Armenian, and Kurd. Clearly, nationalism—the demand that each

of these nationalities form a distinct political state—cut at the very ideological and social foundations of the Empire. The Balkan Christians were the first to take over the nationalist ideology of Christian Europe, and their quest for independence was actively supported by European power. Among the Muslims of the Empire, nationalism was long sternly and instinctively resisted. The Westernized Ottoman elite of the nineteenth century attempted to instill in the Empire's subjects an Ottoman patriotism that would be trans-religious as well as trans-national. It is significant that the nineteenth-century political exiles whom the Europeans called "Young Turks" referred to themselves as "New Ottomans" and that some Arab and Armenian delegates took part in their congresses. Subtly and gradually, however, Ottomanism was in practice converted into Turkish nationalism: thus the newly founded civil service and military training schools showed in their admissions policies a distinct bias not only for the Muslims generally but specifically for the Turkish element, and the insistence on Turkish as the language of secondary education did much to antagonize the Muslim Albanians who had thus far been the Ottomans' most loyal Balkan subjects. Yet it was not until the calamity of the Balkan wars that the terms "Turk" and "Turkish" gained intellectual respectability among the Ottoman elite, and not until the early 1920's that the conversion from an Ottoman to a Turkish political consciousness was completed.

The idea of Arab nationalism came just as late; with the rapid decline of Ottoman political fortunes, it spread faster, although the support for Arab nation-statehood was not nearly as widespread in the Syrian and Iraqi provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire as present-day nationalist spokesmen would have us believe. Even less was there any vocal or organized support for Pan-Arabism, the ideal of political unity for all Arab-speaking peoples of Northern Africa and Southwest Asia. For example, an Egyptian nationalist leader, when approached at the Paris Peace Conference of 1918–20 on behalf of the Arabs of the defunct Ottoman Empire, insisted that "our problem

is an Egyptian problem and not an Arab problem."

For the Turkish rump of the Ottoman Empire, defeat in the First World War was followed by victory in the Turkish War of Independence, fought against Allied partition plans generally and more specifically against Greek plans to resurrect a latter-day Byzantine Empire. Victory, in turn, laid the psychological and political foundations for rapid Westernization in Atatürk's newly created Turkish Republic. For the Arabs to the south, hopes for unity and independence were quickly shattered. Vague and alluring wartime promises of Allied support for Arab aspirations were converted into the grim reality of partition and foreign rule. The violent measures required to impose the mandate regimes clearly belied the lofty educational theory of the mandate. The opening of Palestine to Jewish immigration under Britain's wartime policy of support for Zionism (the famous Balfour Declaration of 1917) further wounded Arab pride, for here mandate administration meant not only foreign colonial rule but also foreign colonization.

Only on the Arabian peninsula did independent Arab states emerge from the aftermath of the World War. In the desert interior, the belligerent Wahhabi sect of Islam under King Ibn Saud subdued the neighboring tribes and, in 1926, conquered the Hijaz and thus unified most of the peninsula. Remote Yemen gained its independence without any formal diplomatic ceremony, by virtue mainly of its inaccessibility to great-power conflict.

The people of the Fertile Crescent (i.e., Palestine, Syria-Lebanon, and Iraq), on the other hand, soon learned that, just as the mandates had been installed by force, only force, exerted by the Arabs themselves or by outsiders, could be counted on to bring about any decisive modification in the system of foreign rule. The history of the French mandate in Syria, of the British mandate in Palestine,

and of Iraq both before and after termination of the mandate was punctuated by uprisings such as the Druze revolt in Southern Syria, the Rashid Ali coup in Iraq in 1941, and the recurrent waves of terrorism in the 1940's of Arab and Jewish groups in Palestine.

During the Second World War and in the years immediately following, the combination of internal and external strains completely undermined the structure of British and French domination of the Fertile Crescent. As a result of Ottoman defeat in the First World War, the Arabs of Southwest Asia had shaken off Turkish rule; as a result of the weakening of Western Europe in the Second World War, they attained full independence.

Iran did not assert her independence in a dramatic military effort like Turkey and escaped the foreign rule to which most of the Arab states were subjected. Nevertheless, a treaty that would have made Iran a virtual British protectorate was signed in 1919,

although never ratified by the Iranian Parliament. In both World Wars, moreover, foreign troops operated freely on Iranian territory, and after each war, a Soviet-inspired secessionist regime was briefly installed in the north. The contest in 1951-53 over nationalization of Iran's British-owned petroleum resources, moreover, revealed and released many of the xenophobic nationalist passions familiar in colonial settings.

The historical forces just surveyed have a profound impact on present-day patterns of politics. The tenuous relations of Southwest Asian countries with European mandatory or colonial powers, in particular, are a theme to which we shall have to return in connection with our subsequent analysis of political dynamics. First, however, we must assess the geographic, socio-economic, and ideological setting which—along with historical memory and experience—provides the foundation for today's political structures and processes.

# Ecological and Social Structure



## Geographic Foundations

Southwest Asia, as defined in this chapter, has roughly the shape of an equilateral triangle pointed southward, with the air distance from Istanbul in the northwest to Kabul in the northeast, and from each of these to Aden in the south being around 2,500 miles. But the regularity of the triangle's shape is interrupted by several major bodies of water: the Persian Gulf in the east, up to 200 miles wide and about 600 miles long and connecting with the Indian Ocean through the Gulf of Uman; the eastern part of the Mediterranean in the west; and the Black and Caspian Seas bordering on the region in the north. There are high mountains in the northern third of the region forming two parallel chains (known as the Pontus and Taurus in Turkey and the Elburz and Zagros in Iran) intertwined in the Armenian Knot (Eastern Turkey) and the Hindukush (Eastern Afghanistan), which are part of the giant tertiary fold stretching from the Alps to the Hima-

layas. Two older mountain massifs are located at the two tips of the Arabian peninsula (Yemen and Uman), and a smaller series of mountain ranges (the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon) line the eastern Mediterranean coast. Finally, there is a narrow but deep trough, beginning as the Jordan Valley and continuing as the Dead Sea (a salty inland lake whose surface is 1,300 feet below sea level), which is part of one of the major geological faults on the globe, connecting southward with the Red Sea and the East African lakes (Albert and Tanganyika).

The location of seas and mountains determines the region's climate. In most places where moist winds come from the sea, their passage is blocked by major mountains. Thus there is abundant rainfall along the coast of Uman (in the monsoon season), along the Caspian slope of the Elburz and the Black Sea slope of the Pontus mountains; there is adequate rainfall around the Mediterranean coast, whereas no clouds cross the flat coastlines of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The only major rivers of the region are the Euphrates and the Tigris, flowing from the Armenian mountains to the Persian Gulf, with a number of lesser rivers in Turkey and in Southwestern Iran. Most of the rest of the

region, notably the Iranian plateau and the Arabian peninsula, is steppe or desert lacking rainfall and rivers.

Geography and climate thus divide Southwest Asia into three distinct parts. (1) The northern mountain belt of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan with its fertile coastal plains and generally arid interior. (2) The so-called Fertile Crescent, an arc of arable land stretching from Palestine in the southwest along the Levant Coast (Lebanon and Western Syria) to Northern Syria and Iraq. Inside this arc and south of it is the Syrian desert, including Southern Syria, Southwestern Iraq, and most of Jordan. Further west, the Euphrates and Tigris provide an immense and largely unused irrigation potential for what the ancient Greeks called the "Land Between the Rivers" (Mesopotamia) and the Arabs call "the Island" (al-Jazirah), i.e., Northern Syria and most of Iraq. (3) The Arabian peninsula, most of it alternating between steppe and desert. The Nufud desert in the north adjoins the Syrian desert. The stony waste that occupies the eastern third of the peninsula is known appropriately as "the Empty Quarter" (al-Rub' al-Khali). Elsewhere, the desert is interrupted by oases and small fertile stretches. In the mountains of Yemen, at the peninsula's southern tip, there is enough rainfall for terrace agriculture.

Mineral deposits in Southwest Asia are distributed as unevenly as is water and topsoil. In Turkey, there are small deposits of coal and iron ore, and more substantial ones of chromium and manganese. Potash is produced in Israel at the southern end of the Dead Sea. Yet by far the most important mineral of the region is its petroleum (Table 3-1), with presently known deposits concentrated at the northern end of the Persian Gulf (the al-Hasa coastal region of Saudi Arabia, the shaykhdom of Kuwayt, the Basrah region of Iraq, and the Abadan region of Southwestern Iran). A number of smaller pools surround this central

petroleum region within a 500 mile radius: Mosul and Kirkuk in Northern Iraq, Khani-kin at the Iraqi-Iranian border, Qum in North-Central Iran, the island of Bahrayn, the Qatar peninsula, and the Buraymi oasis along the Saudi-Uman border. Together, these Southwest Asian petroleum deposits account for about three-fifths of the proven reserves on the globe. Intensive prospecting in various parts of the world continues to change this picture. Recent oil discoveries in the Algerian Sahara and Libya, for example, have reduced the share of Southwest Asia in the known world total. On the other hand, petroleum deposits in the Persian Gulf region have been so abundant that only the most immediately promising areas have been exploited or even systematically prospected. Exploratory drilling continues in a number of new Southwest Asian locations, such as Southeastern Turkey, Israel, Yemen, and the submarine shelf of the Persian Gulf—and any new gusher brought in may change the comparative estimates overnight.

## Economic Foundations

Primary production predominates in the economy of Southwest Asia. A vast majority of the population—probably around four-fifths of it—derives its livelihood from agriculture and husbandry, and the most lucrative source of income for the region is its petroleum deposits. There is cereal farming, mainly of wheat, in Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Dates are grown in Iraq (which accounts for about 80 per cent of world production) and form the main staple of the desert and steppe population of the Arabian peninsula. Sheep and goats are a major source of meat and milk in the entire region; these join with cattle and water buffalo (for meat and milk and as draft animals) in the north. In the desert and steppe areas, the camel is the chief traditional resource—for transport, for milk, and for meat.

More differentiated soil products are grown chiefly along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts: hazelnuts in Northern Turkey

TABLE 3-1 *Petroleum in Southwest Asia*

Country	Proved reserves 1960		Production of crude petroleum 1960		Govern- ment in- come from petroleum 1959 (millions of dollars) <sup>a</sup>	Ownership of producing companies by nationality (percentage)				
	(billions of tons)	(per- centage of world total)	(millions of tons)	(per- centage of world total)		U.S.	British	British- Dutch	French	Other
Kuwait	8.4	20.5%	80.6	7.5%	345	50%	50%			
Saudi Arabia	6.7	16.2	60.8	5.6	315	100				
Iran	4.7	11.4	51.0	4.7	258	40	40	14%	6%	
Iraq	3.6	8.7	46.5	4.3	252	24	24	24	24	5%
Neutral Zone	0.9	2.1	7.2	0.7	—	100				
Qatar	0.3	0.8	8.1	0.7	53	24	24	24	24	5
Bahrain	0.03	0.08	2.2	0.2	13	100				
Syria	0.01	0.03	—	—	18	—				
Turkey	0.01	0.02	0.4	0.04	—	—				
Israel	0.005	0.01	0.1	0.01	—	—				
Lebanon	—	—	—	—	4	—				
Jordan	—	—	—	—	1	—				
Southwest Asia	24.6	59.9	256.9	23.8	1,259	56	29	8	6	1
World	41.0	100	1,078.9	100	—	—				

<sup>a</sup> For Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan: revenue from oil pipelines; for other countries, direct payments (royalties, advances, etc.) by petroleum companies to governments. Income from Neutral Zone included in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

(the chief source of world supply); tobacco, figs, and raisins in the Izmir region of Western Turkey; cotton near Adana in the south of Turkey; oranges in Lebanon and Israel. The same areas are abundant in a wide variety of fruits and vegetables. While agriculture is most highly developed in the northwest of the region (Turkey and the Levant coast), there are unused potentials of irrigation in the Khuzistan region of Southeastern Iran, and especially in Iraq and Northern Syria. On the other hand, petroleum production is the dominant feature of the economies of the countries around the Persian Gulf.

Southwest Asian petroleum is plentiful, it is cheap, and it makes a major contribution to the public finance of the countries where it is found. The known reserves of the region, at current rates of pumping, may be expected to last for a hundred years, and there is little question that any significant increase in demand would lead to more extensive exploration. Near Eastern petroleum prospecting, in other words, is a century ahead of current demands, whereas in the United States the margin is only about a dozen years. With

full allowance made for importing machinery and managerial personnel from Europe and America and for transporting the oil in the opposite direction, Southwest Asian oil can be produced cheaply enough not only to fill nearly the entire European demand, but also to constitute a competitive threat to U.S. producers. The average cost of current production in Southwest Asia is 15 U.S. cents per barrel of crude petroleum; the total cost of investment (gross fixed assets) per daily barrel of crude oil production is only \$350. The corresponding figures in the United States are over ten times as high—\$1.53 and \$5,168; in Venezuela they are 17 cents and \$1,632.

The proceeds of this lucrative production are now in excess of \$2 billion annually, and since the early 1950's such profits are divided equally between the American- or European-owned companies and the host governments. They now provide practically all the public



revenues of Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, and Bahrayn, and a major proportion of revenues in Iraq and Iran. In addition, transit dues from pipelines traversing Syria and canal dues from tankers passing Suez are a significant source of income for Syria and Egypt. Jordan and Lebanon also benefit from the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAP-Line) which connects the Saudi fields with the Mediterranean. The pipeline from Kirkuk, Iraq, to Haifa, Israel, has been out of operation since the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.

Important as petroleum is for the public finance of some of the countries, its contribution to the region's industrialization is somewhat limited. We commonly speak of an oil "industry," but it is clear that petroleum production is an extractive, primary production process. The oil fields themselves and the construction of pipelines serve to stimulate some branches of the construction industry and provide employment for local technical and maintenance personnel. Some of the petroleum produced around the Persian Gulf is refined in the region itself, the largest installations being at Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, on Bahrayn, at Abadan, at Kuwayt, and at Aden, thus giving rise to further industrial employment.

But with all this—and despite the conscious efforts of the oil companies to delegate a maximum of technical and managerial tasks to local employees—the oil industry necessarily remains something of a foreign body in the economics of the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf shaykhdoms. Petroleum exploration and production was stimulated solely by demand from other industrialized world regions. The capital and the machinery needed for exploration, drilling, and refining continue to come from the outside, as does the higher-level technical and managerial personnel. Of the profits, half go abroad to the operating companies. The other half is spent, in Iraq and Iran, on various economic de-

velopment projects—irrigation, road building, and the like—although in Iran much of it has been dissipated through the inefficiency and corruption of government personnel. The Kuwayti revenues finance one of the most complete welfare state systems on the globe. The Saudi revenues very largely go into lavish living for the royal family, its entourage, and tribal leaders who once paid tribute to the king but now are rewarded handsomely for loyal conduct. The private fortunes thus made directly or indirectly on oil are likely to be spent on products of European and American industry such as automobiles and refrigerators, unproductively invested in luxurious apartment buildings in Beirut, or put away in anonymous bank accounts in London, Zurich, or New York.

The experience of Southwest Asia thus indicates that a lucrative extractive industry will not automatically transform a desert camel-and-date economy into a thriving modern industrial society. In Iraq and Iran, petroleum can combine with other economic assets—water and topsoil—to generate balanced agricultural and some industrial development. But the most essential single characteristic of industrial society—a skilled and trained population that serves as producers and consumers—is available precisely in the countries without petroleum deposits—Lebanon, Turkey, and especially Israel—and it is here that a genuine process of industrialization has begun.

## Social Foundations

### *Languages and Religions*

Language and religion, in Southwest Asia as elsewhere, form the main basis for, as well as the main barrier to, national integration. The peoples of the Near East have often been said to form a linguistic and religious mosaic. Yet the heterogeneity of the region is not nearly as great or ingrained as such a statement would suggest. The major religious and linguistic divisions coincide with political boundaries, and some of the more picturesque minority groups are numerically small enough

to be of greater interest to the historian than to the political and social scientist.

The main languages of the area are Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, Turkish being the national language of Turkey, Persian of Iran and Afghanistan, and Arabic of all the other countries except Israel. Of these, Arabic belongs to the Semitic family of languages, Persian to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European family, and Turkish to the Turkic branch of the Ural-Altaic family. Yet over the centuries there has been extensive borrowing of vocabulary and even grammatical forms from Arabic to Persian and from Arabic and Persian to Turkish. (Turkish was until 1928, and Persian is to this day, written in the Arabic script.) Other languages of the area include, in approximate order of numerical importance:

*Pushtu* (or Pashto), an Indo Iranian language spoken by about half the population of Afghanistan, where it is the second official language.

*Kurdish*, an Indo-Iranian language spoken by the mountain population in the Iranian-Iraqi-Turkish border area.

A number of *Turkic* languages and dialects spoken in parts of Iran (Azeri, Qashqai, Türkmen) and Afghanistan (Uzbek).

A number of *Iranian* dialects prevalent in other parts of Iran (Baluchi, Bakhtiari, Lur, etc.) and Afghanistan (Tajik, Hazara).

*Hebrew*, a Semitic language revived as the language of Jewish immigrants in Palestine and the official language of Israel.

*Armenian*, an Indo-European language with an alphabetic script of its own spoken by a population once centered in Northeastern Turkey but today surviving chiefly in the urban centers of Syria, Lebanon, and Iran (as well as the Soviet Union).

The religious picture is somewhat simpler. Islam is the faith of about 95 per cent of the Southwest Asian population, and fully two-thirds belong to the *Sunni*, or orthodox, branch of Islam. Their name derives from the Arabic word *sunnah*, meaning established practice, because they consider themselves bound to emulate where possible the practice of the Prophet and of the early Muslim community as recorded in the classics. All Sunnis, if they are sufficiently devout and affluent, try to make the prescribed pilgrimage to Mecca

at least once in a lifetime (and after doing so take the honorific title *Hajj*, or Pilgrim). The major center of Sunni learning is the school, or university, attached to the Azhar mosque in Cairo. From a theological point of view, Sunnis may be divided into several "schools," among which the Maliki, Shafi, Hanifi, and Hanbali are the most prevalent. These differ mainly in minor points of ritual observance and legal doctrine, but respect each other as orthodox, go to the same mosques, and hence form a single religious community.

The most important among the non-Sunni denominations are the heterodox Muslims, known collectively as the *Shiah* (or more fully, as *Shiat Ali*, or "Faction of Ali"), because of their belief that the caliphate—that is, the succession to Muhammad in his capacity as leader of the faithful—should have been passed not through election but in the direct line of descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his cousin and son-in-law Ali and Ali's sons Hasan and Husayn. Perhaps 10 to 15 per cent of the approximately 400 million Muslims in the world belong to this group, most commonly known as *Shiis* or less frequently as *Alawis* (adjectives derived respectively from *Shiah* and from *Ali*). They observe a number of holidays ignored by the Sunnis, such as the anniversaries of the deaths of Ali and Husayn, go on pilgrimage to such Shii shrines as Karbala in Iraq and Mashhad in Iran, and generally accord greater authority to their ulama (commonly known as *mullahs* or, in the higher grades, as *mujtahids*) than do the Sunnis.

Much like Protestant Christianity, the Shiah is in turn divided into a number of rival sects, the most prominent of whom are the *Ja'fari* (or Twelver) Shiis, who believe that the twelfth descendant of Ali, a certain Ja'far, is the Hidden Imam (or Caliph) who will reappear on Judgment Day. The Shiis of Iran and of Iraq are Ja'faris. The other main branch of the Shiah are the *Ismailis* or Sev-

eners, who hold that Ismail, the seventh Shii Caliph, is the Hidden Imam. They are numerous in Pakistan and East Africa and also in Syria, where they are known as *Alawis* or *Alaouites*. (Other Alawis form a prominent minority in Turkey, where however the reticence of Sunni government officials to recognize any schisms among Muslims has prevented any certain knowledge of their exact numbers, habits, or beliefs.)

The Ismailis are probably the best-known of Muslim sects among Westerners. Their contemporary habit of annual donations of gold and platinum to their head, known as the Aga Khan, makes an unforgettable impression on readers of the illustrated press. Centuries earlier, a group of Ismailis who consumed liberal doses of *hashish* and ambushed large numbers of Frankish Crusaders, became known to the latter as Assassins (from Arabic *hashishin*). A third group of Shiis are the *Zaydis*, who trace the correct Caliphal line through a different branch of the Prophet's family, started by his great-grandson Zayd, directly to the royal house of Yemen, who therefore claim the title of Imam. The dominant minority of Yemen are Zaydis, the rest being Sunnis.

There are about 1½ million *Christians* in the Near East. These form about half the population of Lebanon and important minorities among the Arab population of Syria, Jordan, and Israel; smaller Christian communities exist in the towns of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Southwest Asian Christians are divided among a large number of independent churches, such as the Maronites (Lebanon), the Syrian Christians, the Greek Orthodox (mainly in Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria), the Greek Catholics, the Gregorians (Armenians), and the Assyrians (Iraq and Iran). Except for many of the Armenians and for the Greeks of Turkey, all these Christian denominations speak the language of their native countries—i.e., Arabic or Persian.

*Jews* form the vast majority of the population of Israel, and the scattered Jewish communities of Iraq, Yemen, and Iran have in the past decade generally emigrated to that country.

The *Bahais* (mostly Persian speaking) are a nineteenth-century offshoot from Iranian Islam. The perhaps 400,000 Iranian Bahais are the only religious group subject to periodic harassment there. (Islam, considering itself the ultimate revelation, is far more tolerant of preceding religions such as Judaism and Christianity than of succeeding splinter groups.) The Bahais have a world-wide missionary activity and have their headquarters in Acre, Israel.

The *Druzes* (Arabic speaking) are a medieval offshoot from Shii Islam with a secret ritual of successive degrees of initiation. They escaped persecution largely by settling in the more inaccessible mountain areas of Lebanon and Syria. Groups of even lesser numerical significance include the *Zoroastrians*, adherents of the pre-Islamic religion of Iran, known in India as Parsis; the *Mandaeans*, followers of John the Baptist, who live in the towns of Iraq; and the *Yazidis*, a Kurdish-speaking group in the Northern Iraqi mountains, who hold the principles of Good and Evil to be of equal religious dignity, and hence are erroneously known to their neighbors as "devil-worshippers."

The survival of so many languages and faiths in close compass is due to a number of distinct historical factors. The Near East's geographic location has made it a passageway for migrations from adjoining world regions, and most of these migrations have left their linguistic residuc. The region itself has since early historic times been a seedbed for the emergence of religious faiths. The dynastic structure of Near Eastern empires down to the Ottoman Empire has permitted the survival and geographic intermixture of many linguistic groups, and the tolerant attitude of Islam toward other revealed religions has aided the survival of a large variety of denominations.

To form an idea of the effect of religious and linguistic divisions on national integra-

tion, it is necessary to combine the data on language and religion, as has been done in Table 3-2. (Note that the percentage figures

are those that differ from the majority in both language and religion. These include the Arab Muslims and Christians of Israel and the non-

TABLE 3-2 *Linguistic and Religious Composition of Southwest Asia*<sup>a</sup>

Country	Percentage of population belonging to dominant.		Percentage of population differing from majority in.	
	language or religion	language and religion	either language or religion	both language and religion
Saudi Arabia	100% Arabs	98% Arab Sunnis	2% Arab Shiis	—
Jordan	100 Arabs	94 Arab Sunnis	6 Arab Christians	—
Turkey	99 Muslims	91 Turkish Muslims	6 Kurdish Muslims 3 Arab Muslims	1% Greeks, Armenians, and Jews
Syria	97 Arabs or Sunnis	68 Arab Sunnis	13 Arab Christians 12 Arab Shiis 4 Kurdish Sunnis	3 Armenian Christians
Iran	88 Shiis	67 Persian Shiis	15 Turkish Shiis 3 Arab Shiis 2 Persian Bahais	4 Kurdish Sunnis
Yemen	100 Arabs	55 Arab Shiis	45 Arab Sunnis	—
Israel	89 Jews	54 Hebrew Jews	10 Yiddish Jews 3 Arab Jews	7 Arab Muslims 2 Arab Christians
Iraq	100 Arabs or Sunnis	50 Arab Shiis	30 Arab Sunnis 16 Kurdish Sunnis 3 Arab Christians	—
Afghanistan	70 Sunnis	50-60 Pushtu Sunnis	5-10 Uzbek Sunnis	30 Tajik Shiis
Lebanon	94 Arabs	30 Arab Maronites	20 Arab Sunnis 18 Arab Shiis 19 Arabs of various Christian denomi- nations 6 Arab Druzes	6 Armenian Christians

<sup>a</sup> Figures are in most cases only very rough estimates. Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen have never taken a census. Turkey is the only country which has current census data on linguistic and religious composition.

are necessarily approximate, since census data are inadequate in most countries and altogether lacking in some.) It will be seen that about half of the countries of Southwest Asia (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria) are ethnically highly homogeneous, with at least  $\frac{9}{10}$  of the population speaking the same language and belonging to the same religious denomination; and that in no country does more than  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the population differ from the majority in both language and religion. None of the countries of Southwest Asia, therefore, has the ingrained ethnic cleavages that complicate the politics of Ceylon, or Malaya, or even India.

The groups that stand out most distinctly

Muslim minorities (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) in the large cities of Turkey. Of both these minority groups it is true that, regardless of their legal status, they have not so far been, and are not likely to be in the foreseeable future, socially accepted as full-fledged first-class citizens. Despite the official secularism of Turkey, adherence to Islam is still in practice considered a prerequisite of Turkish nationality. By contrast, a Muslim Kurd or Arab of Southern or Southeastern Turkey only

needs to acquire a fluent command of the language to be accepted, for most purposes, as a Turk. The same is true, by and large, of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon; since there are sizable groups of Arab Christians in these countries, they can assimilate without great difficulty.

The status of the Arabs in Israel is complicated by the fact that the state of Israel was specifically founded as a fulfillment of Zionist aspirations to create a political homeland for Jews from all countries—a rationale for state-founding which automatically excludes non-Jews from full membership. On the other hand, the Israeli constitutional and legal system includes elaborate guarantees of minority rights for the Arabs (thus Arabic is the language of the courts in the Arab-speaking parts of the country and the second official language in the Israeli Parliament); in addition, the economic opportunities opened up by Israel's rapid agricultural and industrial development, which contrast sharply with the misery of Arab refugees in neighboring countries, have tended to reconcile the Israeli Arabs to their situation.

Other minorities in Southwest Asia differ from the dominant group of their country only in either language or religion. A few words should be said about each of the countries where these minorities are of appreciable size.

In Iran, only about two-thirds of the population belong to the dominant Persian-speaking Shii group. These people live mainly in the central plateau, whereas the peripheral areas are inhabited (counterclockwise from the northwest) by the Azeri Turks (in Azerbaijan), by the Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiari, and Qashqais in the southwestern mountains, the Arabs along the Persian Gulf, the Baluchis in the southeast, and the Afghans and Türkmen in the northeast. The vast majority of these minorities, however, are Shiis, although they speak their distinct Turkic (Azeri, Qashqai,

Türkmen) or Indo-Iranian (Lur, Bakhtiari, Baluchi, etc.) languages. Persian for most of them is the language of literature and higher culture. The separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Persian Kurdistan after the Second World War would hardly have become as prominent as they did without the active instigation of organized Communists or without the presence of Soviet troops in that portion of the country.

In Israel, the figures for the linguistic composition of the country only reflect a temporary state of affairs. The vast majority of the population consists of immigrants or children of immigrants who—much like immigrants to the United States, but perhaps with even greater emotional fervor—expect to make major adjustments in adapting to and helping to build up their new country. The revival of Hebrew as the common language of the Jewish population of Israel has been an essential part of that process of adaptation and construction, and it is actively furthered both by government policy and by social pressure. Immigrants of the older generation continue to speak their native Yiddish, Arabic, Hungarian, Russian, etc., in private and get along as best they can with Hebrew in public; their children, however, will take considerable pride in speaking Hebrew exclusively. Hence the trend in Israel is definitely toward linguistic uniformity.

The religious and linguistic divisions of Afghanistan are greatly reinforced by the relative isolation of tribal and village communities in the large and small mountain valleys. Although Pushtu, Tajik, and Hazara are the major spoken languages, Persian (to which the first two are related) continues as the language of the court, of politics, and of literature. Whether this distinction between upper-class language and lower-class regional vernacular will survive a future process of social mobilization seems doubtful.

Iraq is almost evenly divided between Shiis and Sunnis, the Sunnis including a larger number of Arabic speakers and a smaller number of Kurds. Although the Kurds inhabit a distinct region in the north, the main distinction among the three groups is a social rather

than a geographic one. The traditional upper class—landowners, urban intellectuals, and bureaucrats—consists predominantly of Sunni Arabs; the majority of the tenant farmers of the Euphrates-Tigris Valley are Shiis and the Kurds are tribal nomads in the mountain valleys of the north.

The only country of Southwest Asia which can appropriately be described as a "mosaic" is Lebanon, and indeed the country's political structure has long been based on an elaborate religious pluralism. The last denominational census, in 1932, listed 10 different Christian sects as well as Sunni and Shii Muslims, Druzes, Jews, and "others." The three largest of these 14 groups—the Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shii Muslims—accounted for 30, 20, and 18 per cent of the population, respectively. There is much evidence that the proportion of Christians to Muslims and Druzes, which then was 55 to 44 per cent, has shifted in favor of the Muslims (mainly because of the higher Muslim birth rate). Yet the traditional formula of apportionment of legislative and executive power has been so thoroughly entrenched that any move to conduct a new census has been defeated. It should be remembered, however, that nearly all Lebanese speak Arabic as their native language, and that they share in the pragmatic-commercial spirit of a small country in whose economy transit trade, banking, and tourism play a predominant role. The most important single issue which tends to divide the Christians and Muslims is that of Lebanese vs. Pan-Arab nationalism, and it was only at the height of Nasser's drive for Arab unity that this latent cleavage erupted in a mild and brief civil war.

### *Social Structure*

The social structure of Near Eastern peoples is not easily described in a few brief phrases. Differences of climate and economic habitat, of language and religion, and of historical experience contribute to the diversity of the picture. Even more crucial is the transformation brought about by the impact of Western civilization on the Islamic culture of the Near East. In fact, the region's social

character is best viewed as the intermingling in varying proportions of two distinct social systems—a traditional and a modern one.

The traditional social system of the Near East has always been extremely status-conscious. A man's social position, as well as his nationality, religion, and even occupation, were visible from afar by his dress and headgear, and any passer-by would regulate his behavior accordingly. In Persian and Ottoman Turkish, forms of speech were carefully modulated according to the comparative rank of the interlocutors. The socio-economic structure of the traditional Near East was tripartite, with clearly distinct subcultures and styles of life prevailing in the towns, the villages, and the nomadic tribes.

The villages, from time immemorial, have included the vast majority of the region's population. The traditional village consists of a cluster of huts built from sunbaked brick or clay, each with stables below and two or three rooms for the peasant's family and for visitors above. The pale ochre of the huts would blend imperceptibly with the sunparched landscape, and the village would generally be at a safe distance from the main highways which might carry invading armies or such undesirable emissaries of central authority as tax-collectors or conscription officers. Politically, the village thus would represent a self-contained microcosm, just as subsistence farming made it, by and large, economically self-sufficient.

Culturally, too, each village would be homogeneous. Turkish, Armenian, and Greek villages might alternate in close juxtaposition in Anatolia, and Maronite, Druze, and Sunni villages in the Lebanese mountains; but within each village a single language and denomination encompassed the entire population. Social rank within the village would depend largely on the size of a family's land holdings, with tenant farmers or day-laborers forming a rural proletariat. The important

office of village headman, although not nominally hereditary, was in fact restricted to members of the one or two wealthiest families. Aside from the headman, the local imam (or priest in a Christian village) would play a prominent role, although pagan beliefs and practices would often survive for centuries under the official veneer of monotheism. Disputes within the village would be settled according to local custom by the headman and the other village elders. Disputes with neighboring villages were frequent and endemic—set off when the herds of one village would stray on grazing land claimed by another, or when a boy from one village abducted a girl from the next—and would be fought out in pitched battles in the hills and perpetuated in lengthy blood feuds.

The towns and cities of the traditional Near East were the centers of commerce and manufacture, of government and learning, and of a fair degree of social mobility. In small and middling towns, especially in the Fertile Crescent and Southern Turkey, patrician families held positions of well-entrenched local power and prestige—families such as the Cenanis in Ayintab (today Gaziantep), the Mardinizades in Mardin, the Gaylanis and Pachachis in Baghdad, the Umaris in Mosul, and the Nashashibis and Husaynis in Jerusalem. Many of these traced their descent to the time of the Crusades, and beyond that to the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad. Their power was based on large holdings of land in the environs of the town, often administered as family endowments, or on hereditary office, religious or secular.

While the patricians would represent the dominant religion—Sunni Islam in the Turkish and Arabic parts and the Shiah in Iran—the merchants and craftsmen of the towns, each branch organized in its separate guild, would include a liberal sprinkling of Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and other minorities. The largest urban centers—Istanbul in the Ot-

toman Empire and Tehran in Iran—included the elaborate machinery of central government: the palaces of sultan, shah, and princes of the blood; the mansions of vezirs, pashas, and other civil and military dignitaries; the large mosques with their libraries and *madrasahs* (or academies of Muslim learning); and the bazaars and quarters or streets reserved to the various trades—coppersmiths, jewelers, spicers, clothiers, cobblers, and the rest.

The nomadic tribes formed a set of autonomous units at the geographic and cultural periphery of Near Eastern society. Their habitat in the mountains, steppes, and desert fringes was precarious. Their twice-yearly treks, from summer pasture in the mountain slopes to winter pasture in the valleys or from verdant steppe in the rainy season to desert oasis in the drought period, made heavy demands on organizational skill and experienced knowledge of terrain. Both the everpresent danger of raids by other tribes and the temptation of raiding them or the sedentary villages and towns fostered martial virtues. For all these reasons, a strict patriarchal organization prevailed among the nomads, with leadership firmly lodged in the shaykh of the head clan of each tribe, and within the chief tribe of each tribal confederation.

Needless to say, the authority of judge or tax-collector in the nearby town, and of sultan or shah in the distant capital city was neither felt nor tolerated among the mountain and desert tribes. Appropriately, their roaming areas came to be known to their sedentary neighbors as the "Land of Insolence." The Ottoman Sultans, who claimed suzerainty over the entire Arabian peninsula, would in fact do little more than play off one tribal confederation against another. Much the same technique was followed by Riza Shah of Iran (1925–41) who exiled the leaders of the powerful Qashqai confederation but allied his house in marriage to the rival Bakhtiari—or for that matter by British agents operating from India or Egypt who gave liberal subsidies now to the Sharif of Mecca, now to Ibn Saud, and consistently to the shaykhs of the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

In all three subcultures of the traditional Near East, the family structure is that of the patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal<sup>1</sup> extended family. Respect for age is considered one of the prime virtues, and indeed the title *shaykh*—claimed alike by the leaders of the tribes, the graduates of the Muslim theological university, al-Azhar, in Cairo, and by the abbots of dervish monasteries—simply means “old man.” Subjection and seclusion of women are other widespread and characteristic Near Eastern-Islamic traits, although in this respect there is a marked difference among city, village, and tribe. The veiling of women in public and their seclusion in separate parts of the house, known as *harem* (as distinct from the male *selânilik*), was an urban and mainly an upper-class custom. Village women, working hard in the fields, can ill afford to cover their faces, and in the cramped quarters of the village mud hut with up to a half dozen family members of all sexes and generations sharing a room, the distinction between *harem* and *selânilik* vanishes. And nomadic camp life encourages a freer mingling of adolescent girls and boys than obtains in either village or city. Similarly, by social custom, demographic arithmetic, and economic necessity, the practice of polygyny (one man marrying several wives—up to four being permitted by the Qur’an) was largely limited to the wealthier peasantry.

While social distinctions were explicit and steep, the traditional structure was by no means static or rigid. Islam, like Christianity, teaches the universal brotherhood of man, and thus affords no ideological justification of elaborate caste distinctions such as prevail in Hinduism. In contrast to Europe, moreover, the Islamic Near East never developed a hereditary aristocracy with accredited political privileges. Landed property, passing from father to son, might give a family wealth and local influence for generations. Descent from the Prophet gave title to the honorifics of Sharif or Sayyid and was carefully recorded by appropriate officials. Religious and secular office, such as that of *mufiti* (juris-

consult), *qadi* (judge), or governor might in fact become hereditary for several generations. Yet the sociopolitical system provided several important correctives against any tendency toward hereditary power. The intricate rules of Muslim inheritance (in both the male and female lines) would quickly scatter any landed estates unless vested in indivisible family endowments. While governmental office would provide the opportunity for rapid accumulation of wealth, the treasury’s practice of arbitrary confiscation soon would redress the balance. Autocracy, in the Near East as in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, had a profoundly leveling influence, and in the Near East most of the governmental tradition was purely autocratic without any interval or substratum of feudalism.

The Ottoman Sultans, for example, recruited their military and civilian officials by preference from among prisoners of war and others whose technical status was that of slaves, precisely so as to prevent the rise of a self-reliant aristocratic class. Thus the military elite of the Ottoman Empire, the Janissaries, were originally drawn from among Christian boys levied as tribute from Balkan subjects; for several centuries they were forbidden to marry so as to prevent any temptation of nepotism or heredity. The military elite of Egypt, from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries, was steadily replenished through the slave trade from among Turkic and Circassian tribes of the North Caucasus; their very name, Mamluks, is one of the Arabic words for “slave.” Similarly, most of the Ottoman grand vizirs, down to the nineteenth century, were men of low birth and predominantly of non-Turkish and often even non-Muslim background.

Particularly in its period of greatest power, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, the Empire attracted many able converts from Europe who rose rapidly in the military and

<sup>1</sup> Anthropologist’s term meaning (a family) taking up residence in the husband’s location.



civilian hierarchies. Only in times of imperial decay did something of an independent agrarian aristocracy assert itself, such as the *derebeyis*, or valley lords, who constituted a major challenge to the centralizing tendencies of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39). Conversely, any young man of lowly origin who, by his own energy, through his parents' sacrifice, or through powerful protectors, had entered a *madrasah* or one of the military training schools could rise to the rank of mufti, qadi, or pasha without any stigma attaching to his antecedents. The sharp gradations of the social pyramid thus were smoothed over by a process of mobility, a mobility based not perhaps on equal opportunity but at least on equal chance.

The impact of modernity has brought about some very fundamental changes in this old social structure. The importance of the nomadic tribes has steadily declined. In part, they have been victims of technological obsolescence. Jeep, airplane, and pipeline have replaced the camel as vehicles for desert transportation, and hence the camel-herding nomads on the desert fringes have declined in numbers, wealth, and activity. Better irrigation has encouraged sheep and camel herders to settle down to till the soil. And industry, such as petroleum extraction and refining, with its many ancillary activities in the al-Hasa region of Saudi Arabia, has provided employment in towns.

Above all, the nomads are beginning to lose their age-old contest with central government. In the early twentieth century, nomadic tribes were prominent in the fight against establishment of foreign rule, or indeed of any solid governmental authority. The tribes of the Middle Euphrates challenged the institution of British rule in Iraq in a widespread rebellion in 1921, and a few years later the Druze mountaineers south of Damascus set off an anti-French revolt that quickly spread to the rest of Syria, just

as in Arab North Africa, the Berber tribes (or Kabyles, from Arabic *qabilah*) provided the focus of resistance to Spanish and French rule in Morocco and the Sanusi-led Cyrenaican tribes to Italian rule in Libya. The Kurdish tribes of Eastern Turkey, following religious leaders of the Naqshbandi dervish order, strenuously opposed the establishment of the secular and nationalist Turkish Republic in 1925, and there was further unrest and violence in Turkish Kurdistan as well as in neighboring Iran and Iraq in the 1930's. During the same period, Riza Shah's government, almost for the first time in human memory, began to bring the tribes of Southern Iran under the sway of the capital. Although these last manifestations of nomadic power provided some bitter and colorful encounters, the tribes' political position has never recovered from these blows; and changes in the economic habitat, especially "sedentarization," are likely to clinch the effect of these political changes.

More recently, with the turbulent transition from the Iraqi monarchy to the military regime of President Qasim, which began in 1958, the Kurdish mountain warriors of the Sulaymaniyyah region have reasserted their independence. Although they have produced, under Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, an unprecedented degree of intertribal unity, it seems doubtful that their size, organization, and natural resources are sufficient to permit the establishment of full-fledged nationality. In the purely military contest, Barzani's forces (at the time of writing, in late 1962) are holding their own against vastly superior numbers of Qasim's infantry and cavalry. Yet they are in no position, without assistance of outside military power, to inflict any decisive defeat on the central government. The airplane has not only made the camel obsolete for transportation in the desert; it also has placed the highland nomad on the defensive in his mountain fastness.

The village remains the stronghold of Near Eastern traditionalism, but here, too, changes are felt. Technological innovations, such as perennial irrigation of the Nile Valley since the turn of the century, the development of

a railroad system throughout the Near East in the decades before the First World War, and, above all, the rapid expansion of highway networks since the 1940's have made it possible for villagers to produce cash crops for distant markets. With trade have come new ideas and modes of living. Governments have built waterwells and elementary schools. Enterprising villagers have opened coffee houses, barbershops, and groceries, and recruits returning from military duty have used their newly learned mechanical skills to operate garages and service stations. The programs of the government-owned radio station (broadcast fullblast from a loudspeaker suspended from a tree-crotch in front of the new coffee house) give even the illiterate villager much the same exposure to world news—and to government propaganda—as his city cousin. Migration to the cities usually comes in stages: the villager first goes into town in search of occasional employment as construction worker, porter, or handyman; then he begins to work in town steadily but returns to his village at harvest time, or at least for family weddings or to settle some title deed; he is likely to bring his bride to the town from his native village, too, and later on his children will begin to grow up as townspeople.

It is in the urban Near East that the most dynamic changes have taken place. Here a Westernized educated elite has grown up, including lawyers, doctors, engineers, merchants, journalists, and army officers. The most numerous category within the ruling class is that of government administrator. For, in a setting where private initiative is at a premium, even the professions of law, medicine, and engineering find their most secure employment in government agencies. All of these city residents are thoroughly Western in their tastes—whether it be the pin-stripe suit of the businessman; the Parisian décolleté of the socialite matron; the blue jeans, chewing gum, and jazz records of the teenager; the radio, tape recorder, and sports car of the conspicuous consumer; or the high-brow intellectual's subscription to the *New Statesman and Nation*.

The revolution which has created this new upper class was, above all, an educational revolution, and it has been so thoroughgoing because it dates back a hundred years or more. Indeed, of all the multifarious reforms attempted in the nineteenth century, the establishment of schools and colleges by Europeans and Americans, and by Near Easterners emulating European and American models, has been the most effective and lasting one. Institutions such as the American University of Beirut and Victoria College in Alexandria were the first places where, toward the turn of the century, Arab Muslims mingled freely with Arab Christians of various religious denominations, and thus came to develop a common Arab consciousness. It was the predecessor of the American University of Beirut, as we noted in an earlier context, which introduced the first Arab printing press to Lebanon in its efforts to supply the need for modern textbooks for its students. Constantinople College (now called American College for Girls) long was, in effect, restricted to Christian students. But its first Muslim graduate, Halide Edib, achieved world-wide fame as a novelist and playwright.

Today even more than in traditional times, education is the major highway of social mobility. The junior high school years are likely to prove crucial. If a peasant family can manage to send its son to the nearest town to complete such a school, he can thenceforth make his career by his own wits and application, by entering a university on one of the meager but highly coveted state scholarships and rising in the profession of his choice. For many members of this educational elite, the basic Westernized training received in Near Eastern schools is supplemented by further study in Europe or in the United States. Thus Iran and Turkey today send more university students abroad than almost any other country of their size.

The Westernized educated class of the

Near East is heavily clustered in the capitals and other large cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Aleppo, Damascus, Tehran, Baghdad. Only a sprinkling, conversely, will be found in towns with less than 50,000 inhabitants. University graduates, it is true, will find themselves assigned as district officers, government doctors, or judges to small towns throughout their country. But such service in the provinces is considered a form of exile, a necessary if unpleasant apprenticeship to be endured at the beginning of a career. The aspiring young intellectual will therefore employ his diligence, ingenuity, and connections in high places to rise at the earliest opportunity to a more fitting position in one of the ministries or elsewhere in the capital.

The possibility of access from the peasantry into the ruling class, therefore, in no way serves to blur the sharp distinction between upper and lower class or to lessen the status consciousness of those on either side of the barrier. In contrast to the peasant turned construction worker, who continues to commute between town and village, the village-born member of the Near Eastern elite is notoriously eager to leave his peasant antecedents far behind. He is more likely to travel to London, Paris, or San Francisco than to journey extensively in the rural districts of his own country; to bring his aged parents into town than to return to his native village for more than the briefest visit. If anything, the gulf between the urban upper class and the peasantry today is more pronounced than it used to be. What once was solely a *social* difference within a relatively homogeneous Muslim-Near Eastern context, today has also become a *cultural* gulf between traditional villager and Westernized intellectual.


Aside from the urban upper class and the peasantry, there is a third social group in the contemporary Near East which, for the sake of simplicity, we may call the urban lower

class. This is a highly varied stratum. It includes the coppersmith on the steep cobblestone alley who tinkers his immemorial rhythm in his open shop; the *muezzin* who from his minaret perch praises God and calls the faithful to prayer five times a day; the obsequious salesclerk in the haberdashery store; the taxidriver who with skillful abandon bounces through the scrambled traffic at break-neck speed; the operators of the humming textile mill; the corner grocer amid his tins and bags of flour and dried beans; the bricklayer atop the scaffolding which will unveil a luxury apartment house; a veritable army of janitors, handymen, maids, and laundresses who perform the domestic chores of the rich; and an even larger number of unemployed whom rural overpopulation and elusive urban opportunity have driven into town.

But there is one thing all these colorful, characteristic figures have in common. Whether they are recent migrants from the village or have been city-dwellers for generations, they have been raised in a static, devout, traditional context and now find themselves in close contact with a Westernized, competitive, secularized setting of which they experience most of the frustrations and few of the rewards. It is this urban lower class, therefore, which provides the recruits for the organized fundamentalist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Nation Party in Turkey. The same lower urban stratum, under the leadership of uprooted intellectuals, has supplied some of the membership of the Communist Parties. In unorganized form, it furnishes the manpower for the recurrent street demonstrations, mob scenes, and riots which have become a ubiquitous ingredient of Near Eastern political activity.

The traditional triad of townsman, villager, and tribesman thus has made way for the contemporary triad of urban upper class, urban lower class, and peasantry. The dynamism of the cultural and social scene that has created these new classes in the Near East has also been reflected in profound changes in political ideology and the prevailing notions of legitimacy.

# Ideology



## Nationalism

Ask any hundred politically articulate Southwest Asians about their loyalty, their political ideals, their notions of legitimacy, and at least ninety-five will tell you that they are nationalists, dedicated to the power, glory, and well-being of their nation. This chorus in unison, moreover, is not the product of police-state coercion or long habituation under totalitarian rule: it is sincere and spontaneous. But several things are noteworthy about this near-unanimity.

First, it is restricted precisely to the politically articulate strata, i.e. mainly to the urban and educated groups. The masses of illiterate villagers, by contrast, have as yet little notion of nation, nationality, or nationalism. They are likely to reply to the stranger's query that they are Muslims, and that they come from such a village or such a district: their loyalties are to this day what Near Eastern loyalties have been for centuries: religious and local. In part, therefore, the urban elite's

fervor in professing its adherence to nationalism reflects the common struggle in which it finds itself engaged to educate the peasantry to active national consciousness.

Second, the ideal of the nation state, so ubiquitously and loudly proclaimed today, came to the Near East only very recently. The Turkish-speaking rulers of the pre-1918 Empire were proud to call themselves Ottomans; their loyalty was ultimately defined by attachment to the house of Osman and to the supranational Islamic-Near Eastern culture which had been consolidated under six centuries of Ottoman imperial rule. Even the nineteenth-century political exiles, who among their European hosts were known as Young Turks, called themselves New Ottomans, adopting the Western term only as a French loan word, "Jön Türk." The cumulative defeats of the Libyan, Balkan, and World Wars (1911-18) gradually converted this Ottoman elite to a Turkish national consciousness. But Ziya Gökalp, poet and ideologist of the Young Turk Union and Progress party, still bracketed Turkification with Islamization and Modernization in his famous political pamphlet; and even Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk or "Father of the Turks," at first had to disguise his nationalist

aims behind a show of Ottoman-dynastic and Muslim-religious loyalty in the first years of his *de facto* government at Ankara (1920–23).

At that, the Turks were among the earliest devotees of nationalism in the Near East. Arab nationalism had found some early intellectual precursors and spokesmen in the nineteenth century; but it did not become the creed of the educated elite in the Fertile Crescent until the centralizing Turkifying tendencies of the Union and Progress dictatorship (1913–18) rudely shattered earlier Ottoman dreams of “unity of the elements”—i.e. multinational harmony within the Empire. The Egyptians, today the most vocal spokesmen of Pan-Arab nationalism, wavered between an Egyptian and a Pan-Arab identification as late as the 1920's and 1930's.

In Iran, the flowering of Persian language and literature during and after centuries of Arab and Mongol-Turkish conquest, and devotion to Shii Islam which emerged as the state religion in the sixteenth century, provided continuing points of attachment for patriotic feeling. But only the struggle against British and Russian encroachments and influence since the turn of the century, and especially since the Second World War, converted this patriotic tradition into a militant national consciousness. The case of Israel is even more striking. Zionism arose as an organized movement among European Jewry in the late nineteenth century. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 added the concrete promise of a “national home” in Palestine for which large-scale immigration since the 1920's and the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948 laid a realistic basis. In the remote mountain countries of Yemen and Afghanistan, any national awakening which would supersede tribal, local, and dynastic loyalties still lies in the future.

Third, nationalism in the Near East began as an ambivalent reaction to the recent European impact on the Near East, ambivalent

because it was compounded of opposition and imitation. Turkish nationalism arose largely in response to the militant nationalism of the Balkan Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who were supported in their aspirations by the nationalist-imperialist powers of Europe. Another important contribution came from Turko-Tatar refugees from the Kazan, Azarbayjan, and Crimean regions of the late Czarist Empire, themselves propelled to national consciousness in reaction to the rise of Great Russian nationalism. And the impulse which came from the Balkans and Russia to Turkey was passed on, by the same chain reaction, to the Arabs to the southeast. After the First World War, the establishment of British and French mandates in the Fertile Crescent provided a logical target for nationalist attack, and since the Second World War the proclamation of the State of Israel has keenly aroused Arab nationalist sensitivities.

The same ambivalent mixture of admiration and hate that the ideologists of emerging nationalism display toward their external antagonists tends to characterize their attitude toward their own history. The immediate past is viewed with shame and horror as one of backwardness and oppression. By contrast, the image of a strong and glorious nation, which it is the nationalist's task and desire to build in the future, is projected into the more distant past. The Arabs conveniently blame their troubles on European imperialism and on centuries of Ottoman rule. If they wish to emphasize Arab unity they revel in the brief but glorious history of the Arab Caliphate, which spread the Arab language and Islamic monotheism from Arabia to the shores of the Atlantic and the borders of India. If their primary loyalties are to individual countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, or Iraq, their dreams of glory will attach to the Phoenicians, to the Pharaohs, or to the Babylonians.

Turkish nationalists of the Atatürk period heartily joined in the chorus of condemnation of Ottoman history and civilization. Since Byzantine mythology had been effectively pre-empted by the neighboring and

antagonistic Greeks, the Turks identified themselves with the Turkish-speaking or related Central Asian nomads and took pride in the conquests of Attila, Chingiz, Timur, and Babur. To counteract the Pan-Turanian tendency implicit in such a view of history (i.e., the demand for political unity among Turkic-speaking peoples from Anatolia to Russian and Chinese Central Asia), Atatürk latterly cultivated the dubious theory that the Hittites and Sumerians—whose realms were close in space but even more remote in time, and whose names the Turks learned from French sources as “Eti” and “Sümer”—were ancient descendants of the original Central Asian Turks. Similarly, the revival of Old Testament history as the national epic—and also the mineral survey—of modern Israel conveniently bypasses 2,000 years of Diaspora. Everywhere the remote past is invoked as an ally against the recent past in the struggle for a more glorious future.

Fourth, by the universal psychological law that links frustration with aggression (and conversely achievement with emotional security), the inner ambivalence of nationalism tends to be resolved to the extent that the nation-state is erected on firm external foundations. The Kemalist Turks took justifiable pride in having been the only defeated power of the First World War to force a negotiated peace upon the victors; having attained in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) the boundaries staked out in their own “National Pact” of 1919–20, they could devote themselves, without any sense of humiliation, to the task of making over their law and politics, their culture and society, in the image of that very West which they had defeated on the battlefield. Similarly, the Israelis, having asserted their military prowess in the Palestine and Sinai Wars of 1948 and 1956 against vastly superior numbers of Arabs, could concentrate on the economic development of their barren country and on the cultural integration of heterogeneous groups of Jewish immigrants from Western and Eastern Europe, from Yemen, Iraq, and Morocco.

The Arab countries, by contrast, face a serious dilemma amenable to no rapid or

easy solution. Arabic is the exclusive or predominant language in over a dozen different countries from Morocco to Uman and from Iraq to the Sudan. In an age of intensifying communication and social interdependence, language universally tends to become the primary criterion of nationality, and large groups in each of these countries profess their adherence to the ideal of Arab (or Pan-Arab) nationalism. Most of the present political boundaries among the Arab countries command little historical respect, since they were often imposed by European colonial powers. The boundaries in the Fertile Crescent, in particular, were the result of the partition of the Arab-Ottoman territories into British and French mandates after the First World War.

Yet, while European hegemony lasted, it set up effective barriers to unification. For a generation or more, political energies were fully absorbed in the struggle against foreign rule within these particular boundaries. But even after the European withdrawal after the Second World War, formidable obstacles to unification remained. The dynastic jealousy between the Saudis of Arabia and the Hashimis of Iraq and Jordan abated, but was soon overshadowed by the intense political rivalry between populous Egypt and oil-rich Iraq. Such schemes of unity as were put forward in the 1940's played up to popular Pan-Arab sentiment but were primarily designed to further the sponsor's personal ambitions or to thwart those of his rivals. The Syrians were suspicious of any moves by which their “advanced” republican government would be absorbed into the “backward” Bedouin kingdom of Transjordan, and Lebanese Christians proved wary of any scheme that would submerge their pluralistic individuality in a flood of Islamic Pan-Arabism. In the mid-1950's Nasser's Pan-Arab propaganda denounced the Iraqi royal house and its perennial Premier, Nuri al-Said, as stooges of Western imperial-

ism. But the continued animosity between Nasser's United Arab Republic and Qasim's revolutionary Iraqi republic indicates that rivalry between the Nile and Euphrates-Tigris Valleys—recorded since Pharaonic and Assyrian times—is no mere dynastic accident but rests on profounder geopolitical causes.<sup>1</sup>

Lastly, the unanimous agreement on nationalism and its verbal symbols disguises a large number of actual or potential political differences. The creation of a strong, homogeneous nation-state lies mostly still in the future, and there often is no single agreed path along which it will be attained. Everyone concedes that, at the minimum, nationalism implies rejection of foreign rule. But what if (as illustrated by the Arab case) the nationalist movement is not strong enough to achieve such independence single-handedly? The so-called Arab revolt, led in 1916 by the sons of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, aimed at shaking off Ottoman-Turkish rule and creating an Arab kingdom in the Fertile Crescent and on the Arabian peninsula. But its net result was the establishment under British tutelage of the Sharif's two sons, Faysal and Abd Allah, as hereditary rulers of, respectively, Iraq and Transjordan. Men of Faysal's entourage, such as Nuri al-Said, considered themselves the authentic spokesmen of Arab nationalism. In the eyes of a younger generation of nationalists, their reputation was irreparably tarnished by their close association with British interests, and in the end they were roundly denounced as imperialist lackeys.

The tacit definition of national independence itself has undergone a subtle yet profound transformation. At first, recognition as a sovereign state—symbolized by acceptance

into the League of Nations and later the United Nations—was taken as the visible token of independence. But later, nationalists were not so easily contented. They demanded abrogation of one-sided treaties, such as those that permitted the garrisoning of British troops in Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, or the establishment of American bases in Saudi Arabia; the departure of British and other European advisers; and the nationalization of such Western-owned assets as the Anglo-Iranian Oil and Suez Canal Companies. At a time when the remaining "imperialist" positions of privilege were British or American, the support of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries was warmly welcomed by Arab nationalists (just as some of their predecessors were tempted to intrigue with the Nazis against the British or indeed with the British against the Ottomans). Since the late 1950's, however, Presidents Nasser and Qasim have become increasingly cagey in their dealings with the Eastern bloc, recognizing with increasing candor that Communism, too, can present an imperialist threat to national independence.

## Monarchy vs. Republic

Aside from other ambiguities, nationalism gives no guidelines as to the legitimate internal form of government or the content of domestic policy. Nationalism implies the direct participation of all citizens within the common affairs of the nation; it therefore presents an egalitarian bias and also one toward representative government. But equality and representation may be achieved, approximated, or indeed simulated, through a variety of constitutional forms.

The major forms of government in the recent and contemporary Near East have been monarchy (absolute or constitutional), parliamentary government, and a variety of dictatorships. The monarchic principle is firmly rooted in tradition and went unquestioned until the early twentieth century. Caliphs, sultans, shahs, khedives, and amirs, symbol-

<sup>1</sup> The above paragraph is adapted from Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Politics of the Near East," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 417.

ized the same patriarchal authority visible in the nomadic shaykh, the village headman, or the head of any Near Eastern family. And in all Near Eastern states, except the earliest Caliphate, monarchic succession had always been hereditary, though more often hereditary by seniority than by primogeniture. Hence the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformers aimed at curtailing the monarch's absolute powers rather than at abolishing monarchy as such.

The Ottoman Empire in 1876 and Iran in 1905-06 were the first and third Asian states (with Japan in 1889 intervening as the second) to adopt written constitutions in the European manner; a movement in Egypt aiming at constitutional limitation of monarchy was thwarted by the British occupation of 1882. Although monarchs in the political struggles of this period were frequently deposed (the Sultan, for example, in 1807, 1808, 1876 twice, and 1909,—i.e., five out of seven Ottoman rulers of the period) and at times assassinated, they were regularly replaced with princes of the same house. The Syrian Nationalist Congress of Damascus elected the Sharif Faysal king of Syria in 1920; under British aegis, monarchies were established in Iraq (1921, again under Faysal whom the French had ousted from Syria in the meantime), and Transjordan (1923 under Faysal's elder brother Abd Allah); and in Iran, Riza Khan, a former army sergeant who had seized power in a military coup in 1921, proclaimed himself Shah in 1925 in lieu of the deposed Qajar dynasty.

Mustafa Kemal set a precedent of fundamental change when, following the deposition of Sultan Mehmed VI Vahideddin in 1922, he had Turkey declared a republic the following year. In Syria and Lebanon, republican constitutions were adopted in the interwar period, and under a French mandate these seemed just as natural as monarchical constitutions in British-mandated Iraq and Transjordan or in British-occupied Egypt. But this very association with foreign rule did much to discredit monarchy as such. Young nationalists came to be persuaded that mon-

archy facilitated the designs of European imperialists, since it required the foreign corruption or control of only a single individual at the head of the state. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 exiled the debauched King Faruq and, after a brief experiment with guardianship for his infant son, instituted a republic. The bloody Iraqi revolution of 1958 cost the lives of King Faysal II and his uncle, the ex-regent Abd al-Ilah, and once again a republic resulted.

In Jordan and Iran, monarchy since the 1950's has been precariously pitted against the surging forces of social unrest and political revolt. On one occasion, in 1953, the Shah of Iran already had hurried into exile when a counter coup under General Zahidi (said to have been backed by the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency) unexpectedly restored him to power. In Saudi Arabia, the steady impact of the oil industry on the socio-economic structure of the population and the corrupting influence of oil royalties on the royal house and its entourage are beginning to wear down the puritanical foundations of the Wahhabi kingdom. In Yemen, bloody palace coups and assassinations of imams and princes had long been endemic. When Imam Ahmad, a cruel, disease-ridden autocrat, died in 1962, a military conspiracy overthrew his successor, Muhammad al-Badr, and led to a civil war between republican and monarchist forces. In Afghanistan alone did monarchy, for the time being, seem secure.

But the formal change from monarchy to republic does not of itself mean an abandonment of the centralized personal direction of the affairs of state; on the contrary, it often means a tightening of such personal control in the hands of a popular dictator—Atatürk in Turkey (1923-38), Nasser in Egypt (1954- ) and later the United Arab Republic (1958- ), Qasim in Iraq (1958-63). Even where a representative competitive system of government was in operation for a



time, personal rule soon reemerged—as in Turkey under Premier Adnan Menderes (1950–60).

## Tradition vs. Change

The transition from monarchies to republics and personal dictatorships is one important indication of the transformation which has occurred in the ideological climate of the Near East within the last generation. In the early part of this century, the chief ideological motivation of Near Eastern statesmen and politicians was a self-conscious defense of inherited institutions and values against the crushing military, political, and cultural onslaught of the European West. A good deal of cultural borrowing from the West was in fact combined with this defensive posture. The Egyptian reforms of Muhammad Ali and the Turkish reforms of Mahmud II and his successors had introduced Western military discipline and equipment, and the Westernization of finance, administration, education, and even parts of the law followed in the course of a logical chain-reaction.

Even Abdülhamid's Pan-Islamic policy—his claim to the Caliphate as a spiritual overlordship over Islamic peoples outside the Ottoman Imperial realm—was in fact patterned on Christian notions of separation of church and state and on corresponding claims of the Papacy, rather than on authentic Islamic tradition. And the religious reformers of the turn of the century in Egypt, even while reasserting Islam in the purity of the early Caliphal period, were adapting for their own use the weapons of European historical and scientific learning which they encountered in their polemics with European theologians. But the rationale for these borrowings was the desire to defeat the enemy by judicious use of his own weapons: the cultural climate was one

of “defensive modernization,” to use Cyril Black's terminology.<sup>2</sup>

The early Arab nationalist movement still largely falls within the same category. The Arab revolt of 1916 emanated from an alliance of the Bedouin warriors, led by the Sharif of Mecca and his sons, with the urban conspirators of Damascus and dissident Iraqi officers within the Ottoman Army. The regimes established in the Fertile Crescent in the 1920's, particularly those in Iraq and Transjordan, represented a consolidation of established interests of landed aristocrats and urban patricians under the leadership of monarchs whose credentials were of recent origin (though hallowed by claim of descent from the Prophet) but whose methods of rule had a traditional character.

The Ottoman revolution of 1908 for the first time brought a basic change in attitude. The leaders of the Macedonian rebellion that forced the reintroduction of the 1876 constitution were young officers in their late twenties and early thirties. After the military *coup d'état* of 1913, these men, operating through the Committee of Union and Progress, were no longer content to exercise power from behind the scenes; they stepped forward to assume active leadership of the affairs of state. Imperceptibly but rapidly their program shifted from one of defense of Ottoman traditions to an assertion of Turkish nationalism. Their political and social reform program was far more radical and comprehensive than anything that had preceded it during the previous century. The exploits of youth in the revolution of 1908 and the following years produced a heady sense of intoxication which was in sharp contrast with traditional Near Eastern reverence for age and experience. In the broad contest between tradition and reform, the presumption no longer was in favor of maintenance of tradition, and change came to be accepted as a positive value in itself. The Kemalist revolution in Turkey only sanctioned in legal practice a transformation which the Young Turk period after 1908 had thoroughly prepared

<sup>2</sup> See his forthcoming book, *Modernization: Essays in Comparative History*.

on the ideological-emotional level—the wholesale abandonment of political, legal, religious, and cultural traditions in favor of the very European institutions which earlier generations had so valiantly fought to resist.

The Arab revolutions in Egypt (1952) and in Iraq (1958), as well as the abortive Iranian revolution under Musaddiq (1951–53), brought a similar infusion of youth into the political scene and represented a similar acceptance of change—radical change—as a good in itself. Where the Turkish revolution of Kemal had been primarily political and cultural, these newer revolutionary movements concentrated on change in social and economic structure: land reform, rapid industrialization, a government-planned economy, an expansion of social welfare and security schemes. A non-doctrinaire and pragmatic socialism combined with nationalism as the dynamic ideology of the aspiring Near Eastern masses and their political leaders.

## Monism vs. Pluralism

The traditional social-political structure of Islamic countries combined a good deal of pluralism within a unitary over-all structure of religion and state. The Christian and Jewish minority populations enjoyed a recognized judicial autonomy within the so-called *millet* system, and lack of transport and inefficiency of governmental machinery conferred a *de facto* autonomy on tribes, on local magnates, and even on individual villages. The centralizing absolutism of the nineteenth-century rulers established a far more effective unitary authority over their far-flung possessions. And the ideology of nationalism promoted an even more compact cohesion, which the general process of social mobilization, the increased role of the state within the economy, and the progress of party organization under populist dictatorships served to spread throughout the population. In most countries, pluralist tendencies assert themselves only in the narrow confines of a landed oligarchy or else in the internal competition for power among several allied groups who jointly sup-

port a dictatorial single-party system, such as the army, bureaucracy, and professions in the Kemalist Republican People's Party of the 1920's and 1930's; or the army, bureaucracy, labor groups, and various ideological parties (e.g., Akram Hawrani's Resurrection or Ba'ath party) in Syria.

A more genuine and deepseated pluralism is to be found only in Israel and Lebanon. In Israel, the tradition of proportional representation and coalition government (which originated within the Zionist representative institutions even before proclamation of the state), has engendered a party pluralism whereby not only positions in the bureaucracy are assigned to followers of various parties, but also several parallel school systems satisfy the demands of secularists and various shades of religious orthodoxy. In Lebanon, the basic pact which divides government positions (appointive and elective) proportionately among the various denominational groups has survived since mandate days; it was subjected to considerable strain in the civil war of 1958 which found Maronite advocates of Lebanese independence solidly aligned against Sunni-Muslim sympathizers of Nasser's Pan-Arab program, but it re-emerged as the only feasible formula of coexistence once civil order was restored.

## Religion vs. Secularism

Traditional loyalties in the Near East, as we have seen, were religious, dynastic, local, and tribal. But the advent of modern nationalism has brought about a profound change in the role and importance of religion. Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, after victory in the War of Independence, abolished the Caliphate, the dervish orders, and the traditional Islamic legal system. There was no separation of "church" and "state" on the Western model, the institution of a privately

administered and financed religious organization being thoroughly alien to Islamic tradition and experience. Rather the religious institutions that remained (mosque officials, etc.) were downgraded in the government hierarchy and put in the charge of secularist officials.

In the Arab countries, there has been no correspondingly drastic break with religious tradition. The law codes in Syria and Egypt in the 1940's and 1950's did not simply transfer European models (as did Mustafa Kemal's "Turkish" Civil and "Turkish" Criminal codes which were replicas of Swiss and Italian models), but tried to codify Islamic precedent with suitable concessions to the demands of a modern age. Nasser also made great use of Islamic themes in his Pan-Arab propaganda; yet even a cursory reading of his *Philosophy of the Revolution* indicates the complete inversion of the traditional priority of values. Where traditional Near Easterners felt themselves to be Muslims first and Arabs or Egyptians afterwards, Nasser glorifies Islam as a dynamic force for Arab unity, and puts both in the service of an Egyptian foreign policy. Significantly, he interprets the Islamic duty of pilgrimage to Mecca not as a religious ritual but as a device for the maintenance of political solidarity among Muslim countries.

But even in "secularist" Turkey, religion plays an unexpected residual role in the very definition of nationality, a role which, because of the ethnic composition of the country, is even more pronounced than in the less selfconsciously "secularist" Arab states. All residents of Turkey—Turkish and Kurdish Muslims, Greek and Armenian Christians, and Jews—are equal in the eyes of the law and share the privileges of Turkish citizenship. When asked about his nationality, a member of the Turkish majority is as likely to indicate that he is a "Muslim" as that he is a "Turk." A Kurd, who is a Muslim in any case, can also become a Turk merely by acquiring

an acceptable command of the language. By contrast, a Greek-speaking resident of Istanbul is accepted legally, and for some purposes socially, as a Turkish citizen. But both he and his Turkish-speaking fellow citizens would indignantly reject the notion that his nationality is "Turkish" rather than "Greek." The circumstance that the modern Turkish word for nation (*millet*) in Ottoman times denoted one of the autonomous religious communities of the Empire both reflects and reinforces this conscious connection between religion and nationality. By contrast, a Syrian, a Lebanese, or an Egyptian is an "Arab" by virtue of his language (and ancestral heritage), regardless of whether he is a Sunni or Shii Muslim or a Maronite, Syrian, or Coptic Christian.

Islam as an ingredient of the definition of Turkish nationality or as a reinforcement of Pan-Arab aspirations—both represent a blending of religious motifs into the new nationalism. But this connection should not conceal the basic opposition of nationalist reform policies to the political traditions of Islam. Islam, both in its early history and in its later doctrine, was a polity as well as a religion. There is no equivalent in Qur'anic revelation of the Christian distinction of the things that are God's and the things that are Caesar's.<sup>3</sup> Muhammad was both prophet and founder of a state; his successors, the Caliphs, bore the titles of *imam* (i.e., spiritual leader of the community) and *amir al-mu'minin* ("Commander of the Faithful"); the classical Muslim view of international affairs divides the world into the "House of Islam" and the "House of War"; and the body of Islamic doctrine, known as *fiqh* or *shariah* (and based on the Qur'an, sayings attributed to the Prophet, the practice of the early Muslim community, and interpretations by the classical theologians), encompasses in one seamless web what in the European tradition would be called theology, law, and ethics. In theory, this Islamic law was immutable, and the decrees of sultans or other rulers could only supplement but not amend or abrogate it.

<sup>3</sup> For an elaboration of this point, see my chapter in Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

In the light of this tradition of fusion of religion and public life, the modern nationalist's claim (most clearly formulated by the Turkish Kemalists) that he is not opposed to religion but will put it in its proper place as a matter of private conscience cuts as deeply at the root of Islamic tradition as does the formal enactment of European law codes in the place of the *shariah*. But even the more conservative reform of law as evidenced in recent codes in Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia departs drastically from Islamic precedent: where once religious law, all-engulfing in theory, made some grudging concessions to the ruler's secular power of decree, the modern codes, however "Islamic" their content, derive their validity from the enactment of secular parliaments.

The traditional Islamic fusion of religion and polity has survived in Afghanistan and, until recently, in Yemen (reinforced in the latter by the ruler's claim to lineal descent from the Prophet in the Alid line), and in Saudi Arabia. In other countries, Islamic-fundamentalist movements have grown up which militantly reassert presumed tenets of early Islamic tradition against the onslaught of secular nationalism and cultural Westernization. Such are the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, the Fida'ayan-i Islam (or Devotees of Islam) in Iran, and, to some extent, the Nation Party and other dissident groups in Turkey. These combine their religious appeal with highly up-to-date methods of propaganda and mass organization, of social welfare services for their members, and in some cases of violence in waves of assassination, organized riots, and guerrilla warfare. They typically appeal to "those segments of the population which have been torn out of their traditional social context by urbanization and industrialization without having found a

satisfactory place in the modern order of things." <sup>4</sup> Their strength will thus depend not on the force of tradition itself but rather on the success or failure of the social reform policies of their secularist rivals.

## Communism

Much irrelevant speculation has been put into print about the supposed affinity or opposition between Islam and Communism. Those arguing a close relationship between the two stress that both are bodies of doctrine demanding complete submission and obedience of the individual; those arguing opposition claim that Islamic morality in the Near East is the surest bulwark against Godless Communism. Islam—like Christianity or any other ancient and complex body of revelation—can certainly be adapted to contemporary political issues in varying and contradictory ways. But the more important fact to remember is that Communism as a doctrine appeals most strongly to segments of the urban intelligentsia, whereas Islam in its traditional form has its stronghold among the illiterate peasantry. The number of card-holding Communists is infinitesimally small—in the Arab countries it has recently been estimated at around 30,000. Russian experience itself indicates that such small groups may, in an unstable and revolutionary situation, wield a power quite disproportionate to their numbers. Nevertheless, Communist power seems far more likely to come to the Near East today through foreign-policy alliances with nationalist regimes than through any domestic expansion of card-carrying Communist membership.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 418 ff.

# Political Dynamics



## Three Major Patterns of Dynamics

Any discussion of the political dynamics of Southwest Asia is complicated by two characteristic features of the region—its division into ten or more independent political entities, and the pervasive instability of political processes in most of these individual countries. Any adequate understanding of current political dynamics must rest therefore not only on an examination, as presented in the preceding section of this essay, of the history, geography, socio-economic structure, and ideological setting of the region as a whole. It also must be reinforced and diversified by an examination of the particular circumstances which, in the lifetime of the present generation, have molded the political con-

sciousness of statesmen, of party leaders, of spokesmen for organized interests, and of common citizens in each particular country.

Both the political division of Southwest Asia into its present diversity of sovereign states and the instability of political processes in many of the individual countries go back to the interplay, in the first half of the twentieth century, between the historical traditions of the region and the unsettling forces of modernization. In two of the countries—Turkey and Israel—intensive programs of modernization have been undertaken under indigenous leadership. In Turkey, the initial motivation was the desire to strengthen the social and political structure so as to ward off the threat of imperialist partition and colonial domination. In Israel, the large influx of immigrants from Europe during the Palestine mandate and their subsequent assertion of political independence within a hostile environment provided the incentive for the building of a dynamic modern society. At the other end of the spectrum stand Yemen and Afghanistan, which by virtue of their geographic remoteness long remained inaccessible to the forces of modernization. Only in our own day have the forces of competitive foreign assistance by Eastern and Western powers begun to undermine the traditional feudal and tribal agricultural and pastoral structure of politics and society.

In the other countries of the region, the seesaw struggle between forces of tradition and modernity has been most intense and

hence the political situation most unstable. There are thus three distinct groups of countries represented in Southwest Asia, each with their own patterns of political dynamics, and these may be labeled, for purposes of convenience, "modern political systems" (Turkey and Israel), "traditional political systems" (Yemen and Afghanistan), and "political systems in flux" (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the countries of the Arab Fertile Crescent). The following sections will briefly review the major dynamic features of each group and each country, starting with the most numerous group of "political systems in flux." Only against this background of dynamic variety will the subsequent region-wide discussion of parties, elections, and interest groups become meaningful (see Table 5-1).

## Political Systems in Flux

The countries in the first group are the ones which, more than any others, have given Southwest Asia its reputation for political instability. Political change in these systems has been frequent and often violent; their recent history is replete with riots, *coups d'état*, assassinations, and revolutions. One basic problem which contributes to this state of flux has already been touched upon—the prevalent desire of the politically active groups to create strong and powerful nation-states in the face of inherited handicaps, including a history of foreign political and economic interference and domination and, in the case of the Arab countries, conflicting loyalties to the separate existing states and to the ideal of a unified Arab nation. The other chief unstabilizing factor is the conflict between the conservative, oligarchic interests represented by royal dynasties and large landowners, on the one hand, and the rising Westernized urban groups, on the other. But the precise mixture of external and internal unstabilizing forces differs from country to country.

borders. In the early sixteenth century, it was incorporated by conquest into the Ottoman Empire, along with the neighboring Arab regions of Iraq and Egypt. Until the First World War, Syria was usually thought to include Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan—that is, the western half of the Arab Fertile Crescent. It was in the cities of this Syrian region—Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem—that the first intellectual stirrings of Arab nationalism came to be felt within the decaying Ottoman Empire. Only with the advent of the so-called Young Turks—i.e., the Union and Progress movement—to power within the Empire (1908–18) did dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule lead to conspiratorial political organization, chiefly among students, army officers, and other urban intellectuals.

The first moves toward anti-Ottoman revolt came early in the First World War when the Syrian movement made contact with the entourage of Sharif Husayn, the Ottoman-appointed guardian of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madinah in the Hijaz. The connection was cemented when the Sharif's second son Faysal was initiated into one of the Syrian conspiratorial societies known as al-Ahd (or The Covenant). Stern repressive measures by the Ottoman authorities, such as the summary hanging of several dozen Syrian Arab leaders including a member of the Ottoman senate, and severe food shortages during the war, served to spread and consolidate the nascent revolt. When, in 1916, Sharif Husayn disavowed his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and, with the encouragement and support of British agents and advisers such as T. E. Lawrence, began to move northward at the head of a body of Arab troops, many of the Arab officers who managed to desert the Ottoman ranks joined him, and the progress of the Arab Revolt was watched with anxious anticipation in Syria. Toward the end of the war, Faysal and Lawrence made their triumphal entry into Damascus.

### Syria

Syria, for most of its history, has been a geographical concept rather than the designation of a well-defined state with unchanging

TABLE 5-I *Southwest Asia Regimes and Heads of State*

*Afghanistan*

Independent kingdom, constitution adopted in 1931, but oligarchic rule of royal family continues.

Amir Amanullah, 1919–1929 (declared king, 1926, forced to abdicate, 1929).

Muhammad Nadir Shah, 1929–1933 (assassinated).

Muhammad Zahir Shah, 1933–

*British Dependencies*

Aden Colony: British Crown Colony since 1839.

Aden Protectorate Federation of South Arabia (until 1962): 22 tribal areas, most of them in "treaty relations" with United Kingdom.

Masqat and Uman: Sultanate with "close ties" with United Kingdom.

Persian Gulf States: Bahrayn, Qatar, and 7 Trucial Shaykhdoms, "Protected" by United Kingdom.

*Cyprus*

British Crown Colony until 1960 when it became an independent republic in accordance with previous agreements among Britain, Greece, Turkey, and representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriotes.

President: Archbishop Makarios III, 1960–

*Gaza Strip*

Part of former Palestine Mandate; since 1949 administered by Egypt and since 1957 guarded by a United Nations Emergency Force.

*Iran*

Independent monarchy; constitution adopted in 1905–1906.

Pahlavi dynasty, 1926–

Shah Riza Pahlavi, 1926–1941, dictator since 1921 as Minister of War and Premier, exiled by Allies to South Africa.

Shah Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, 1941–, rules with pseudo-parliamentary cabinets, briefly ousted in 1953 by Premier Muhammad Musaddiq, but quickly restored by General Fazlullah Zahidi.

*Iraq*

British Mandate, 1920–1932.

Independent monarchy, 1932–1958, but close relations with British continue under treaty of 1930, later replaced by Baghdad Pact (1955–1958).

King Faysal I, 1921–1933.

King Ghazi, 1933–1939 (killed in automobile accident).

King Faysal II, 1939–1958; Regent Adb al-Ilah, 1939–1953 (both killed in revolution).

Republic under General Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958–1963) and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif (1963–).

*Israel*

Proclaimed as independent state upon termination of British Mandate over Palestine, May 15, 1948.

Presidents: Chaim Weizmann, 1948–1952.

Itzhak Ben-Zvi, 1952–1963.

Prime Ministers: David Ben Gurion, 1948–1953, 1955–

Moshe Sharett, 1953–1955.

TABLE 5-1 *Southwest Asia Regimes and Heads of State (cont.)*

*Jordan*

Eastern part of British Mandate over Palestine made into Amirate of Transjordan, 1921; proclaimed independent kingdom, 1946; enlarged by annexation of parts of Palestine, 1949, and renamed Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

Amir (later King) Abd Allah, 1921-1951 (assassinated).

King Tallal, 1951-1952 (declared insane).

King Husayn, 1952-

*Kuwayt*

Principality protected by United Kingdom under treaty of 1899, declared independent, 1961.

Shaykh Abd Allah al-Salm al-Sabah, 1950-

*Lebanon*

Part of French Mandate, 1920; proclaimed an independent republic, 1941; French occupation withdrawn, 1946.

Presidents: Bishara al-Khuri, 1943-1952.

Kamil Sham'un, 1952-1958.

Fuad Shihab, 1958-

*Saudi Arabia*

Traditionalist monarchy of house of Saud originating in central Arabian region of Najd, enlarged 1913-1926 by successive annexation of al-Hasa, Asir, Hijaz, etc.; name Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted 1932.

Amir (later King) Abd al Aziz ibn Saud, 1897-1953.

King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz, 1953- (yields royal powers to Crown Prince

Faysal, 1958-1961 and 1962- ).

*Syria*

Part of French Mandate, 1920; proclaimed independent republic, 1941; French occupation withdrawn, 1946; union with Egypt in United Arab Republic proclaimed in 1958 and dissolved in 1961.

Shukri al-Quwwatli, President, 1943-1949, 1955-1958.

Successive coups install military regimes under Colonels Husni Zaim (March, 1949), Sami Hinnawi (August, 1949), and Adib Shishakli (December, 1949-1954).

Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of U.A.R., 1958-1961.

Nazim al Qudsi, President of Syrian Arab Republic, 1961-

*Turkey*

Republic proclaimed 1923 after collapse of Ottoman Empire and victorious campaign (1920-1923) of nationalist government at Ankara.

Presidents: Kemal Atatürk, 1923-1938 (President of Grand National Assembly, 1920-1923).

Ismet İnönü, 1938-1950, continued to rule with single party (R.P.P.), then allowed free elections in which he was defeated.

Celâl Bayar, 1950-1960, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, heads of victorious Democratic Party, overturned by revolution and put on trial.

Cemal Gürsel, head of revolutionary military Committee of National Unity, 1960-1961, and President of Second Republic, 1961-; parliamentary cabinets based on shifting party coalitions.

*Yemen*

Traditional autocracy under Imams of Zaydi Shiah, attained independence upon Ottoman defeat, 1918.

Imam Yahya, 1904-1948 (assassinated).

Imam Ahmad, 1948-1962.

Imam al-Mansur billah Muhammad al-Badr, 1962, whose accession precipitates military coup under Colonel Abd Allah al-Sallal. Yemen Arab Republic proclaimed by Sallal regime, 1963.



The political future of Syria remained in suspense for two years after the war. Faysal spent much of his time in Paris to plead personally the cause of Syrian independence before the peace conference. An American commission of inquiry under Henry C. King and Charles Crane, dispatched at President Wilson's insistence, found that politically articulate Syrians overwhelmingly favored independence, although if some tutelage were required they decidedly preferred this to be under American or British rather than French auspices. But in early 1920, Britain honored its secret wartime agreements by assigning Syria (including Lebanon but not Palestine and Transjordan) to a French mandate under the newly formed League of Nations. Meanwhile, an assembly of Arab notables at Damascus, known as the Syrian National Congress, proclaimed Faysal king of Syria. But soon French troops, even before the expiration of a perfunctory ultimatum, surrounded the hills of Damascus and after a brief shelling of the city ejected Faysal.

French policy under the mandate throughout the interwar period was clearly predicated on the age-old imperial principle of divide-and-rule. The predominantly Christian district of Lebanon was enlarged to include the port cities of Beirut, Sayda (Sidon), and Tarabulus al-Sha'm (Tripoli) and a sufficient portion of the hinterland to create a new entity (known initially as "Greater Lebanon") which included a bare Christian majority along with Sunnis, Shiis, and Druzes. The Druze-populated mountains to the south of Damascus were given their separate administration, and so was the northern Syrian coast with its Alawi population, named *État des Alaouites*. But the precise administrative divisions of the French mandate into from two to five separate units varied frequently. In the end, two units, Syria and Lebanon, emerged.

French rule had been established by military force, and although it was welcomed by

many of the Christian elements in Lebanon, it was deeply resented by most Syrians. A rebellion originating in the Druze mountains in 1925 quickly spread to the rest of Syria, and was suppressed with some difficulty. In 1928, the French at length convened a Syrian constituent assembly, and a first parliamentary constitution went into operation under the French mandate in 1930. Attainment of independence was delayed by French-Syrian disagreements over the future of the district (or sandjak) of Alexandrette. This Syrian region on the Turkish border had been accorded a special status in a French-Turkish agreement of 1921, and now that Syrian independence became a real prospect, the Turks claimed autonomy for this area with its mixed Arab-Turkish population. Over loud Syrian protests, the sandjak was given autonomy in 1938 and the next year decided to join Turkey (having changed its name to Hatay in the meantime—meaning, in line with Atatürk's Hittite Sumerian mythology, "Hittite country").

Franco-Syrian relations still were in a protracted deadlock when the Second World War broke out. At first, the country was under control of the Vichy Government, but in 1941 Free French and British troops took over in Syria, accompanying their occupation by a solemn promise of postwar independence (the so-called de Gaulle-Lyttleton agreement). The French withdrew their last troops early in 1946—after having been bluntly reminded by the British of their wartime agreement.

Syrian political leaders, who had rallied in a single "National Bloc" during most of the French occupation, soon were embroiled in bitter quarrels. One group advocated alignment with Iraq and Jordan in inter-Arab politics, another argued for alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The first group tended to favor merger or federation within a Greater Syria (including Lebanon, Transjordan and, it was hoped, Palestine) or within a Fertile Crescent scheme, whereas the second insisted on independence and maintenance of republican institutions against the dynastic aspirations of the Hashimis in the neighboring countries. The Arab defeat in the Palestine War greatly aggravated the political

situation. Student demonstrations and riots became endemic, and the stage was set for a succession of military coups—no less than three of them occurring in 1949. The leader of the last of these, Colonel Adib Shishakli, managed to retain power for five years and to restore a measure of order under a stern dictatorship. His overthrow in 1954 led to a resumption of parliamentary intrigues, punctuated by army revolts, riots, demonstrations, and assassinations.

The Syrian political scene from 1954 to 1958 presented the general spectacle of a sharpening of alignments. Syria had long been jealous of its hard-won independence and, in the late forties and early fifties, was the only Arab country which roundly refused American foreign aid. In the mid-1950's, Nasser's demands for Arab unity found a strong resonance among Syrian leaders, who had always been Pan-Arab by conviction and sentiment but had viewed with profound suspicion the schemes propounded by the conservative, British-allied monarchs of Jordan and Iraq. By 1956, Syria, like Egypt, leaned heavily toward the Soviet bloc and received generous shipments of Communist arms. On the domestic political scene, the merger of two radical political groups in the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party under Akram Hawrani created a strong agitational force. At the same time, Syria was the only Near Eastern country where a Communist party operated legally, and Khalid Bakdash, the party's chief, was triumphantly returned to parliament. In 1958, the internal struggle for power among several rival military factions, the Ba'th, and the Communists came to a head. At length, the Ba'th and one of the anti-Communist military groups resolved upon a merger of Syria with Egypt—hoping thereby to thwart an imminent Communist take-over and confident that Nasser with his great popularity and international prestige would be able to check Communist influence in the future.

In this manner, the United Arab Republic—the first concrete if partial accomplishment of hopes for Arab unity—was born. For a while, it appeared as if this first measure

might set off a snowball effect. Distant Yemen joined the United Arab Republic in a loose and vaguely conceived confederation labeled the United Arab States. Muslim leaders in neighboring Lebanon fought a pitched battle against the corrupt oligarchic regime of Christian president Kamil Sham'un. King Husayn of Jordan and his conservative ministers were facing a mounting tide of popular unrest. The July, 1958, revolution in Iraq drowned the narrow oligarchic regime of that country in a savage bloodbath. And the changeover in Saudi Arabia from spendthrift King Saud to his brother Faysal brought to power in the richest Arab country a prince sympathetic to Nasser's Pan-Arab aspirations. Soon, however, the intervention of American marines in Lebanon and of British troops in Jordan restored a measure of calm in those countries. General Qasim in Iraq asserted his authority in several tense encounters against the Communists, on the one hand, and against military insurgents in league with Nasser's U.A.R., on the other. The "United Arab States" remained a diplomatic fiction. Thus, by the end of 1958, the initial impetus toward Arab unity under Nasser's leadership appeared to have stalled.

Within the United Arab Republic, too, unity was more easily proclaimed than implemented. The administration of Syria by Egyptian military and civilian officials was increasingly resented by Syrians. Although Syria has a large agricultural development potential, especially in its portion of Mesopotamia, overpopulated, foreign-exchange-starved Egypt could make no dramatic contribution to it. Several years after the proclamation of the U.A.R., moreover, the legal and economic systems of Egypt and Syria still remained separate. When, in the summer of 1961, Nasser's government attempted to proceed with the long delayed administrative and economic integration, the result was the secession of Syria from the three-year-old union, brought about

by a revolt of the Syrian military carried out so smoothly and swiftly that Nasser was forced to accept the result with whatever show of amiable grace he could muster. Quick recognition of Syria's re-established independence by the major powers indicated the success of the most immediate major aim of the 1961 coup. But the elections held toward the end of the year showed alignments as inconclusive as those of 1945-49 and 1954-58. Only the future could tell whether the competing civilian groups, such as the Ba'th party and the more conservative groups of "Nationalists" or "Independents," could provide a reasonable approximation of stable government or whether a continued series of military coups and uprisings would once again ensue.

#### *Lebanon*

Lebanon, like Syria, attained formal independence in 1943 and actual independence with the departure of French troops in 1945 and 1946. The internal politics of the country continued to be based on a fundamental agreement worked out among the leaders of the various denominations during mandate days. Under this formula, the President of the Republic was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and posts in the cabinet and other parts of the government were to be filled by Christians and Muslims in a ratio of six to five. The commercial preoccupations of a country consisting largely of the biggest Arab port and its truck-farming hinterland served to cement this *status quo*. The Arab boycott of Israel since the Palestine War of 1948 brought considerable economic advantages to Lebanon. Commercial airlines in their globe-circling runs made Beirut rather than Tel Aviv their major Near Eastern stop, and Western firms installed their branch offices in Beirut. The huge flow of oil revenues into Arab countries, especially after the "fifty-fifty" profit-sharing agreements of the early 1950's, brought huge deposits to the banks

of Lebanon, whose policy of free trade provided a sharp contrast to the currency restrictions and tariffs of neighboring states. During the summers, the resort towns on the breezy slopes of Mount Lebanon attracted affluent tourists from sweltering Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. And the inflow of foreign money set off a gigantic building boom in the business and residential sections of Beirut.

The careful denominational arithmetic of the governmental system nevertheless concealed growing dissatisfaction. The "six to five" formula was based on the last population census taken as far back as 1932. There was much evidence that in the intervening decades the higher birthrates of the Sunni and Shii populations and the greater propensity among the Christians to emigrate to the Americas had converted the slight Christian majority of 1932 into a Muslim majority by mid-century. Yet the vested interests of the delicately equipoised political system prevented the taking of any new census.

In the meantime, Nasser's popularity rose high among the Muslims, the pro-Western policy of Christian politicians aroused much resentment among those with neutralist or Pan-Arab leanings, and the increasing corruption of the administration led to periodic outbursts, activist groups among the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims usually being the chief protagonists. In 1952, President Bishara al-Khuri was ousted in a bloodless coup. By 1958, the opponents of his corrupt and ineffective successor, Kamil Sham'un, were arming themselves, and for several months the country's economy and public life were paralyzed by a sporadic civil war. The government thereupon called upon the assistance of American military forces, which was granted under the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. The brief intervention of American marines in the summer of 1958, and the conciliatory policy of Sham'un's successor, Fuad Shihab (who resigned as commander in chief in order to assume the presidency), restored the country to its previous normality and profitable commercial pursuits.

## Jordan

The country of Jordan has the distinction of having the most artificial boundaries, the poorest endowment in natural resources, and the least-developed feeling of civic loyalty of any country in the Near East. Although government publicity handouts grandiloquently purport to trace the country's history to the Nabataeans toward the beginning of the Christian era, the creation of the state of Transjordan (as it originally was called) was the result of the peace settlement imposed on the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. In the British-French agreement of 1920, the parts of geographic Syria north of Lake Huleh and the Druze mountains were assigned to the French mandate of Syria and Lebanon; those to the south to a British mandate of Palestine. The boundaries of this original Palestine mandate were drawn in such a way as to connect, albeit through stretches of desert, with the other British mandate of Iraq.

In 1920, Abd Allah, second son of Sharif Husayn, led a group of Bedouin warriors from the Hijaz toward the Syrian border, presumably to avenge the earlier ouster of his brother Faysal as King of Syria. The British dissuaded Abd Allah from this adventure, and in return installed him as Amir (ruler) of the parts of the Palestinian mandate to the east of the river Jordan and the Dead Sea. This decision not only was designed to create a local principality loyal to Britain, but also to exempt the inland desert portion of Palestine from the provisions of the Balfour Declaration (on which see below in the section on Israel). Abd Allah's tribal forces were transformed, under the command of a British officer, Brigadier John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), into a tightly knit, well-disciplined force known as the Arab Legion.

Transjordan now had a ruler, an army, and a capital (the small town of Amman, once founded by Circassian refugees from the Caucasus who were resettled by mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Sultans)—but it lacked most other tangible assets. Its desert dunes were unsuited for agriculture, and no minerals were

discovered under them. Its coastal city of Aqabah, on the northeastern end of the Red Sea, was undeveloped as a port and its possession, moreover, disputed by neighboring Saudi Arabia. All imports, therefore, had to come via the Palestinian ports of Haifa or Tel Aviv (and since 1948 via Beirut and Damascus). After the Second World War, Transjordan was released from mandate status and given the official appellation of Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan (Hashim being the tribe of the Prophet, from whom Sharif Husayn claimed lineal descent). The country, however, continued to be administered in close cooperation with British advisers, and its annual deficits to be covered from the United Kingdom treasury.

In the Palestine War of 1948, Abd Allah's Arab Legion made the best showing among the Arab states against the military forces of nascent Israel. When the war ended in a draw, the Transjordanian forces were in possession of most of the Arab-populated parts of Palestine, including the old city of Jerusalem and the Judaeian hill country to the north and south. In 1949, Abd Allah annexed these eastern parts of Palestine on the opposite side of the Jordan to his country, whose name appropriately was shortened to Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. This *fait accompli* was deeply resented by other Arab countries, who briefly thought of expelling Jordan from the Arab League. It also led to Abd Allah's assassination in 1951 by followers of the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, whose hopes of ruling an Arab Palestinian state Abd Allah had thwarted.

The incorporation of the rump of Arab Palestine nearly tripled the kingdom's population; one-third now consisted of the original Transjordanian Bedouin tribes, one-third of the resident Palestinian population, and one-third of Arab refugees from parts of Palestine included in the state of Israel. The Palestinians, with their far higher level of educa-

tion and economic advancement chafed at the conservative rule of the King, his Bedouin shaykhs, and their British advisers. The refugees, crowded into miserable camps, were resentful of any government which did not secure the extinction of the Israeli enemy and their resettlement in their former homes. With the influx of refugees and other Palestinians, Amman rapidly was transformed from a small desert outpost into a bustling metropolis of a quarter of a million people.

Abd Allah's son Tallal was declared insane shortly after his succession, and his infant son Husayn succeeded to the throne, at first under the regency of the Queen Mother. By 1955, Nasser's propaganda denouncing all remnants of British hegemony as perfidious imperialism and urging unification of all Arab countries was beginning to make a profound impression in Jordan. In a short but convulsive *coup d'état*, Jordanian officers of the Arab Legion forced the ouster of Glubb Pasha and other British officers and advisers. Young King Husayn fought with desperate courage for the preservation of his throne, tacking now with and now against the winds of revolutionary nationalism. The original British subsidy was replaced by a combination of British and American financial support, and those British advisers who remained were now less conspicuously displayed. The merger of Syria and Egypt early in 1958 was countered by the announcement of an Arab Federation between Jordan and Iraq, but the bloody revolution in Baghdad in July, 1958, exploded that short-lived and ill-defined legal scheme. As United States marines landed in Lebanon, King Husayn retained his throne by virtue of the brief return of British troops, whose departure he had earlier been forced to demand.

Since the 1958 crisis, Husayn has attempted to rule Jordan through a combination of tight martial law designed to keep at bay the forces of popular agitation in the cities, and of eco-

nomic reform programs designed to increase the yields of the rural economy. The war of nerves that was carried on through competitive vituperation between the Jordan and U.A.R. radios gradually ebbed, and by mid-1961 there seemed to be some indications of a *rapprochement* between Amman and Cairo. Still, the question in the minds of most Jordanians and of outside observers remained: How long could Jordan subsist as an independent state, and would its eventual demise come peacefully or in some renewed violent upheaval?

### *Iraq*

Iraq combines a variety of enviable economic assets with a traditional structure of society which only recently has entered a phase of revolutionary modernization. Unlike Syria and Jordan, it has sizable petroleum resources (especially around Mosul in the north and Kirkuk in the northeast). In contrast to oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt, it also possesses arable land and, in the huge Euphrates and Tigris Rivers which traverse it from north to south, abundant water to irrigate it. Yet, despite its memories of high civilization in the days of Sumer, Babylon, Assur, and down to the Baghdad Caliphate of Harun al Rashid, Iraq became one of the culturally most stagnant areas of the Ottoman Empire. Not until the late 1950's, for example, were the first efforts made to transform a number of junior colleges in Baghdad into a modern university. Along with Iran, Iraq may therefore be considered a truly "economically underdeveloped" country, where abundant assets such as topsoil, water, and petroleum income wait to be transformed through skillful management and labor into the basis for a thriving industrial and agricultural economy. Together with Lebanon, Iraq also is the most heterogeneous Arab country of Southwest Asia, its population being slightly over one-half Shii Arab, about 30 per cent Sunni Arab, and about 20 per cent Sunni Kurdish.

British troops from India landed in the Persian Gulf during the First World War, and by 1917 had occupied much of Iraq, extending their control to the oil-rich Mosul

area in the days following the Ottoman armistice of 1918. The establishment of a postwar mandate regime under British aegis was complicated by a bitter and widespread revolt of the Shii tribes of the Middle Euphrates region. By 1921, the British, observing the outward appearances of a plebiscite, managed to install Sharif Faysal (recently ousted as King of Syria) as King of Iraq, a move that suggested itself both because of the former close cooperation between the Sharif and his British advisers and because most of the Arab officers who had rallied to Faysal were of Iraqi origin.

Under Faysal I, Iraq developed into a smoothly functioning, tight political oligarchy. The central core of the ruling circle was formed by the army officers around Faysal, most prominent of whom was General Nuri al-Said, long-time chief of staff, and more than a dozen times Prime Minister of the country. From the beginning of the mandate period, this group of officers of middle-class background was joined by members of old Baghdad families, such as the Gaylanis and Pachachis, and some Basrah and Mosul notables, such as the Umaris and Bash-Ayans. The inclusion of several minority representatives helped to establish a modicum of political unity amid the prevailing religious and ethnic diversity. Thus Sasun Hasqayl, a Jewish banker from Baghdad, frequently held the finance portfolio, and one or another member of the Baban family—descended from a long line of Kurdish chiefs in Sulaymaniyyah but long since urbanized and Arabicized—was a necessary complement to almost every cabinet. The leaders of the Shii tribes and various Shii mujtahids were regularly given parliamentary seats and later also admitted to the cabinet. The challenge of incipient party movements with a strong rhetorical appeal to the intelligentsia and the urban masses was diverted in the late 1940's by the promotion of some of their leaders to an occasional cabinet portfolio.<sup>1</sup>

Although Iraq's formal constitution was that of a constitutional monarchy with a cabinet responsible to an elected Parliament, the

true lines of authority were neatly reversed. Thus not a single one of the forty-odd cabinets which governed in rapid succession between 1920 and 1958 was ousted by a parliamentary vote of non-confidence. Most of them fell through disputes among the ministers or through intrigues by dissatisfied members of the oligarchy intent on speeding their own rise to cabinet office. Once a new cabinet was installed, it was customarily allowed to dissolve Parliament, and a seasoned Minister of the Interior could, by judicious promises of political rewards and threats of punishment, produce a pliable majority. A large proportion of members of Parliament, especially from the tribal areas, were regularly returned without opposition. Behind this oligarchic parliamentary façade, British interests—represented by advisers in all government ministries and the royal palace, by British garrisons at the Habbaniyyah airport and elsewhere, and by the Iraq Petroleum Company (owned jointly by British, French, Dutch, and American interests but administered by British managers)—played a prominent and well-entrenched role.

By a treaty in 1930, Iraq became the first of the League of Nations mandates to be given its formal independence, to take effect with its admission to the League in 1932. But several fissures soon began to appear in the delicately balanced structure. The death, in 1933, of King Faysal I, who combined the skills of a traditional desert leader with those of a modern diplomat, deprived the oligarchic system of its natural point of reference. (Faysal's son Ghazi was a racing-car addict who drove to his death in 1936; for many years thereafter, the royal office was administered by Prince Abd al-Ilah as regent for the infant King Faysal II.) In 1936, a group of army officers seized power in a bloody coup, promising to pursue a more vigorous nationalist policy. Badr Sidgi, the military leader of the new regime, had earlier won his spurs in a large-scale massacre of the small Assyrian-Christian

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph is adapted from Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 434 ff.

minority, who had become well-hated in mandate days as favorite recruits in the British-organized Iraqi military levies. Some other military coups that followed proved to be rather mild and ritualistic affairs—a few planes zooming over Baghdad, a declaration of disloyalty from some army units stationed near the royal palace—and the startled citizenry might hear from the morning news bulletin that yet another military-civilian junta had taken over the government.

A final coup, in the spring of 1941, came close to starting a revolution which would have destroyed the earlier basis of British and oligarchic rule. The leader of the 1941 coup was Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, a dissident member of a distant branch of the Baghdad patrician clan. He sought support in his violent anti-British and Pan-Arab policy by appealing for military assistance to the Vichy French forces in Syria and to the Nazi Germans, who just then were finishing their *blitzkrieg* occupation of Greece and Crete several hundred miles further west. In Baghdad, in the meantime, regent Abd al-Ilah narrowly escaped with his life while crouching on the floor of the American ambassador's car. In Habbaniyyah, a small British garrison desperately fought off vastly superior Iraqi forces. But Rashid Ali's urgent appeals for outside help went largely unheeded. Turkey refused to allow the transit over her railways of any German military equipment destined for Syria or Iraq. Above all, Hitler had no conception of the strategic value of the Near East and instead viewed his Balkan conquests only as a preparatory maneuver for his long-cherished Russian campaign. After a few tense days, Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion raced across the desert to relieve the beleaguered Habbaniyyah garrison, Rashid Ali escaped to Saudi Arabia, and the previous condominium of the royal house, the British, and the local oligarchy was restored.

After the Second World War, the Pan-

Arab, anti-British, anti-Zionist, and vaguely socialist slogans of radical intellectuals found an increasing echo in the press and among the urban masses, yet by and large conservative, pro-Western forces retained the upper hand. As early as 1942, Nuri al-Said had propounded his Fertile Crescent unification scheme, a plan that enjoyed the tacit encouragement of the British government, which had been greatly frightened by its narrow escape from strategic calamity during the Rashid Ali revolt. After the war, however, Egypt's scheme for a more comprehensive if loosely structured Arab League won out over any federation plans. In 1949, street demonstrations in Baghdad forced the resignation of Iraq's first Shii Premier, Salih Jabr, who had returned from Britain with a treaty that would have prolonged British rights to Iraqi bases, even though on terms far more favorable to Iraq than existing arrangements. In 1950 and 1952, Iraq revised its concession agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company to bring royalties up to the "fifty-fifty" level, thus benefiting from the hard fight waged by Musaddiq in Iran without having to duplicate its violence or tension.

In 1954 and 1955, Iraq, once again under Nuri al-Said's leadership, concluded a military alliance with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain known as the Baghdad Pact and corresponding to the "Northern Tier" concept of Near Eastern defense assiduously expounded by United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Although the conclusion of that pact, and Iraq's accession to it, was widely hailed in the Western press as a political gain, it was significant that this (largely illusory) military gain was achieved at the cost of closer Egyptian and Syrian alignment with Russia, and of heavy-handed suppression of all potential opposition within Iraq. Several months before the conclusion of the pact, Premier Nuri prohibited all Iraqi political parties and closed down all newspapers except for a handful specially licensed by the government. The spectacular Egyptian deal for arms deliveries from Czechoslovakia and Russia in September, 1955, was a direct response to Iraq's pro-Western move, and the

"anti-imperialist" propaganda emanating from Cairo and Damascus found a hearty resonance among the muzzled critics of Nuri's policy.

The revolution which broke out in Baghdad in July, 1958,—by far the bloodiest and cruellest the Near East has yet experienced—brought much of the delicately balanced diplomatic, political, and social structure of the last decades crashing down with a loud report. Key figures of the *ancien régime*, including King Faysal II, Crown-Prince Abd al-Ilah, and General Nuri al-Said were killed, and their bodies savagely mutilated or dragged through the streets. Surviving leaders of the monarchic period were held for trial in televised, demagogical star-chamber proceedings. The military leaders of the revolution, headed by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, denounced Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact and adopted a neutralist foreign-policy course eagerly backed by the Soviet Union. The British management of the internationally owned Iraq Petroleum Company, however, continued its operation, and any initial hopes that the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy would lead to an immediate merger with Nasser's United Arab Republic turned out to be unfounded.

Serious rifts, in fact, soon developed within the military junta and among its followers in the capital and the provinces. Colonel Arif, one of Qasim's closest early collaborators, and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, the leader of the 1941 anti-British revolt, were arrested in November, 1958, as leaders of a pro-Nasser faction. In March, 1959, the purge was vastly extended after a U.A.R.-inspired uprising in the province of Mosul. A more serious contest developed between Qasim and the Communist Party, which in June, 1959, had merged with the National Democratic Party and the Kurdish Democrats in a United National Front. In July, Qasim established army control over the Communists' para-military Popular Resistance Forces and at length declared both the P.R.F. and all political parties dissolved. When in June, 1960, party organization was once again allowed, licenses were issued to the National and Kurdish Democrats and to a dissident Iraqi Communist Party which maintained close ties to the Qasim regime, but were de-

nied to the Moscow-oriented bona fide Communist Party. Early in 1963 Qasim was deposed and executed by a junta under his rival, Colonel Arif. The new regime proceeded to normalize relations with Egypt and with the rebellious Kurds, and promised further to reduce Communist influence.

### *Saudi Arabia*

Saudi Arabia may be listed among the Southwest Asian "political systems in flux," although it still retains many features of a more traditional political structure. The present state has its origins in the tribal dynasty of Saud which in the eighteenth century established itself in the central Arabian region of Najd in close cooperation with the Wahhabis, a puritanic Islamic sect. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Wahhabi uprising throughout the Arab peninsula was crushed with some difficulty by the forces of Muhammad Ali of Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the century, however, Najd had come under the control of the house of Ibn al-Rashid of the rival Shammar tribal confederation. Ibn Saud (or with his full name, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Faysal Al Saud), the most illustrious member of his house, grew up in exile at the court of the shaykh of Kuwayt. With the decline of Ottoman power during the First World War, Ibn Saud managed to reconquer his ancestral domains from the Ottoman vassals of Shammar. In 1926, his troops defeated Sharif Husayn and annexed the Hijaz (i.e., the Red Sea coastal region around the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madinah). By the 1930's, Ibn Saud had established full control over the peninsula with the exception of Yemen and of the British-protected areas along the coast from Aden to Kuwayt, and the Saudi Bedouin warriors, recruited into a militant religious brotherhood, were imposing the austere Wahhabi version of Islam upon the



conquered populations. The revenues of the newly consolidated kingdom at this time mostly consisted of pilgrims' fees and of tribute levied from various tribal vassals.

The discovery of oil deposits in the Persian Gulf coastal region of al-Hasa before the Second World War, and the beginning of large-scale production at war's end by the American-owned Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco), soon began to revolutionize the country's financial and social structure and to enhance its international position. The pilgrims' dues were reduced and at length abolished, and subordinate tribal leaders now were subsidized from the royal treasury, as were the members of the sprawling royal house and their Cadillac-riding retinue. A year before Ibn Saud's death in 1953, a new "fifty-fifty" profit-sharing agreement with Aramco brought close to a quarter-billion dollars annually of oil revenues into the royal treasury. Ibn Saud's decadent son and successor Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz soon managed to over-spend even these lavish sums and to rely increasingly on advances on Aramco royalties. From 1958 to 1961, King Saud's powers were transferred to his more economical brother, Crown Prince Faysal. In the meantime, the growing petroleum industry, with its related construction, refining, and transport enterprises, was employing an increasing number of Arabs from more advanced countries such as Palestine and Syria and creating a potential center of social unrest which before long might plunge Saudi Arabia into the political upheavals familiar in neighboring countries.

### Iran

Despite its distinct Shii and Persian national heritage, Iran displays most of the features of the neighboring Arab-Sunni "political systems in flux." The 1905 revolution imposed a scheme of representative constitutional government on the spendthrift Shahs of the Qajar dynasty, but partition of the

country into British and Russian spheres of influence (1907) and a royalist counter-coup of Muhammad Ali Shah (1908) thwarted the efforts of the rising middle-class reformers. During the First World War, Ottoman, German, British, and Russian troops freely operated in neutral Iran. After the war, Bolshevik forces, pursuing White Russian contingents across the Caspian, installed a secessionist Soviet-style government in the northern province of Gilan. In 1919, a treaty that would have transformed Iran into a British protectorate was signed by bribed cabinet ministers but never ratified by the national Parliament (or *majlis*).

Two years later, Riza Khan, a sergeant who had risen to command of the Czarist-trained Cossack Brigade and distinguished himself by ousting the Gilan Soviet regime, seized power in Tehran. In 1925, Riza deposed the Qajar dynasty and had himself proclaimed Shah with the newly adopted family name of Pahlavi. For sixteen years, Riza Shah ruled the country with a heavy, despotic hand, building railroads and hospitals and otherwise trying to modernize the country, and establishing a modicum of central control over the tribal areas in the south. In 1941, Britain and Russia decided to occupy Iran in order to open a Western supply line to the Russian front. Since the pro-Axis Riza Shah proved uncooperative, he was sent into exile to South Africa (where he died in 1944), and replaced with his son Muhammad Riza. The occupation was normalized in a tripartite treaty, in which the two allies undertook to evacuate their troops six months after the end of hostilities.

It was in Iran that the cold war between Russia and the West began even before the end of the hot war against Germany and Japan. The Russians diverted most of the grain from the fertile northwestern province of Azarbaijan for their own use, while Communist-inspired newspapers blamed the resulting food shortages in Southern Iran on capitalist exploitation by the British occupants. In 1944, the Russians pressed for a large-scale concession for oil exploration throughout Northern Iran, a move which prompted the *majlis*, led by an aristocratic lawyer named Muhammad

Musaddiq, to pass a law forbidding any cabinet member to even enter negotiations for a foreign concession without explicit parliamentary approval. In 1945, a separatist Communist regime under the name of Azarbayjan People's Republic was set up in the shadow of Soviet bayonets, some of the leading personnel consisting of party members who had won their spurs in Gilan in 1919 and weathered the intervening years in Muscovite exile.

After the war, freedom of the press and of political agitation was restored, and a large number of ephemeral political parties sprang up. Representation in the *majlis*, however, continued to be weighted heavily in favor of large landowners and other established members of the ruling oligarchy. Weak governments were formed in rapid succession by shifting coalitions among these oligarchic cliques. In the large cities, agitation by nationalist orators and street demonstrations inspired by the Communist Tudah Party or by the religious fundamentalist followers of Mullah Kashani resulted in riots, assassinations, and political turmoil. But a series of daring maneuvers by Premier Ahmad Qawam (1946-47), ably supported by Western diplomatic moves in and out of the United Nations Security Council, succeeded in removing the Communist stranglehold on Iran. The Soviets, faced with the choice of holding on to their position in Azarbayjan or to play for a share in the government of the country as a whole, withdrew their troops in return for three Tudah seats in Qawam's cabinet and a promise of favorable consideration for their old concession demand. After the restoration of central authority in Azarbayjan, the concession proposal was roundly voted down in a *majlis* controlled by Qawam's followers, and the threat of a march on Tehran by the powerful Qashqai tribe prompted the ouster of the Tudah ministers.

A major new crisis erupted when negotiations between the Iranian government and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for a larger Iranian share of royalties broke down. A new government under Musaddiq in 1951 unilaterally nationalized the company's assets. Musaddiq's policy of Iranian national self-

assertion and of strict honesty within the traditionally corrupt central government won strong support from the rising urban middle classes who flocked to his National Front Party. Yet Musaddiq was unable to maintain oil production after the departure of British staffs and in view of the boycott on oil transport imposed by the international companies. Internally, Musaddiq's reform measures antagonized the traditional oligarchy and prompted an increasingly dictatorial course that brought him in conflict with the Shah, the army, and even his erstwhile supporters among the religious followers of Kashani. By 1953, Musaddiq seemed in full control, and the Shah fled to Rome for fear of his life. But a dramatic armed coup, led by General Fazlullah Zahidi, ousted Musaddiq overnight and restored Shah Muhammad Riza to power.

The Shah's restoration brought a reversion to the oligarchic clique politics of the pre-Musaddiq era. A 1954 agreement, mediated by United States negotiators under Averell Harriman, settled the oil conflict. While petroleum properties remained nationalized, most of their operation was entrusted to an international consortium, in which the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now rebaptized British Petroleum Company) held a minority interest, other shares being controlled by the leading international (American, Anglo-Dutch, and French) companies with Near Eastern oil interests. Royalties were divided according to the "fifty-fifty" formula earlier agreed upon in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Although most of the oil income and ample American foreign aid funds were set aside for a major scheme of agricultural and industrial development, most of the monies, amid the prevailing governmental corruption, seeped into private hands.

In contrast to Musaddiq's neutralist foreign policy, the new regime joined the pro-Western Baghdad Pact in 1955. Within the government, the Shah and his palace advisers re-

tained effective power; yet the Shah's widely publicized acts of land donations did more to entertain the readers of the illustrated press than to relieve the prevailing share-cropping system by which the cultivators retained a mere fifth of their produce. By the late 1950's, two political parties, playing at government and opposition, were officially licensed, but the rigging of two successive elections in 1960 and 1961 caused widespread dissatisfaction. Student demonstrations in the late spring of 1961 forced the appointment of a reform administration under Premier Amini. But discontent smoldered on. In Moscow, Premier Khrushchev announced the overthrow of the Shah as an official aim of Russian policy. Successive royal cabinets bravely promised drastic reforms while followers of the outlawed National Front and other discontented elements were waiting for new revolutionary opportunities.

## Modern Political Systems

Whereas Southwest Asia's "systems in flux" display an unstable mixture of modern and traditional features along a more or less continuous scale, the two political systems which may properly be classed as "modern" each represent a case *sui generis*. Israel's population consists mainly of immigrants, the earlier ones mostly from Europe. Their political and cultural background has little in common with that of the traditional Near East. And the very process of immigration and adjustment to a newly founded society and commonwealth has given its population an adaptability that contrasts sharply with the traditionalism of much of the remaining population of Southwest Asia—an adaptability which the older, European immigrants have also managed to convey to the more recent and more numerous Jewish immigrants from Southwest Asia and Northern Africa. In many

of its more specific political and social features, Israel resembles more nearly one of the smaller multi-party democracies of Europe than it does its immediate Asian neighbors.

Turkey must be included in the category of "modern political systems" with somewhat greater hesitation, for its evolution has been gradual, and differs from that of the Arab countries and of Iran more in degree than in kind. Yet, on balance, the modern features are the predominant and more dynamic ones, although events of the late 1950's and early 1960's have shown that this dynamism does not always proceed smoothly or without temporary turbulence.

### Israel

The state of Israel, proclaimed on May 15, 1948, has its roots in Zionism, the movement originating among European Jews toward the turn of the century aimed at combatting the effects of European anti-Semitism by creating a Jewish nation-state. Although the movement's founder, the Viennese Theodor Herzl, briefly thought of locating that state in Uganda, the bulk of the Eastern European followers of the movement had no question that the only location for such a state could be Palestine. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the wartime British Foreign Secretary announced Britain's support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," for the first time propelled Zionism to the stage of great-power diplomacy; and with the installation of the postwar British mandate over Palestine, the goal of Zionism seemed within reach.

Both the Balfour Declaration and earlier Zionist pronouncements had made passing reference to the preservation of the rights of non-Jewish populations in Palestine, as if Palestine were a country with a primarily Jewish population interspersed with miscellaneous ethnic minorities. In fact, however, the 1920 population of Palestine consisted entirely of Arabs (96 per cent, to be precise), and the right which the Palestinian Arabs most cherished was the preservation for their country of that Arab character which it had had for close to thirteen centuries. An early de-

cision of the mandate administrators to give Arabs and Jews each their separate institutions of community self-government served to sharpen the contrast between the two groups, and the stimulation to the Palestine economy brought by large-scale Jewish immigration supported with outside funds only enhanced the Arabs' nationalist consciousness. Like their neighbors in Egypt and Syria, the Palestine Arabs soon learned that demonstrations, obstruction, and ultimately direct and violent action were most likely to impress their demands upon the imperial power.

Very soon after the beginning of the mandate regime, the British, in various ways, began to circumscribe their support of Zionist aims. But each such step—from the separation of Transjordan from Palestine proper in 1921 to the imposition of annual immigration quotas in the White Paper of 1939—was likely to increase rather than attenuate Arab demands. The White Paper, coming at a time when Hitler's extermination campaign made the need for a haven for Jewish refugees more desperate than it had ever been, altogether exacerbated relations between the mandatory and the Jewish population. While the official para-military arm of the Jewish community, the Haganah, replied to Arab terrorist attacks with restraint and supported the British defense effort during the Second World War, more radical Jewish organizations such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang hit indiscriminately at Arab and British targets.

By 1945, the situation in Palestine had deteriorated into a fierce, three-cornered civil war. Neither the British government nor an Anglo-American cabinet commission (1946) nor the United Nations General Assembly (1947) was able to devise a solution that would have been acceptable to both Arabs and Jews—most proposals being roundly rejected by both. The partition scheme advanced by the United Nations, moreover, would have divided the country into a checkerboard of disconnected strips of Arab and Jewish territory, a solution which could have worked only on the basis of that very inter-group harmony whose absence made partition imperative. At

length, the British declared their mandate terminated as of May 14, 1948, giving ample notice so that Jewish leaders were able to prepare the proclamation of Israel for the following day, with the veteran Zionists Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion as President and Prime Minister.

Even before that proclamation, the neighboring Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and later Iraq) had begun to move their troops across the Palestinian borders. In the war that ensued, the Arabs—vastly superior in number but overconfident and vague and uncoordinated both in their military strategy and in their political aims—proved no match for the well-disciplined and determined Israeli forces. When an armistice was negotiated with United Nations mediation in early 1949, Israel was in control of eight-tenths of the former mandate territory, including the newer parts of Jerusalem, the fertile coastal plain, the Galilacian hills in the north and the Negev desert in the south. Nearly a million Arab refugees at war's end were crowded into miserable camps either in the eastern parts of Palestine annexed by Jordan or in the Egyptian-occupied diminutive and crowded Gaza Strip.

With the existence of the new state assured through military victory, immigration was thrown open to all Jews who wished to come to Palestine. This included, at first, numerous refugees from Europe and, in addition, almost the entire Jewish populations of Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and other Near Eastern states where community relations had sharply deteriorated as a result of the Palestine War. All in all, the population of Israel more than doubled in the first decade after independence. From the beginning of Jewish settlement in the mandate days, Hebrew had been revived as the official language of the community, and the strong social pressure of an immigrant society made this linguistic conversion effective, particularly among the second generation. Only for the

remaining Palestinian Arabs was Arabic retained as an official second language.

Ample funds, collected by supporters of Zionism outside Israel, particularly the annual United Jewish Appeal in the United States, financed the settlement of these immigrants, as well as a far-flung program of agricultural and industrial development sponsored by the government and by a number of autonomous semi-public agencies. Other payments, such as reparations received from West Germany in the late 1950's, contributed to the development program. Thanks to these economic efforts and outside support, Israel's standard of living from the start was substantially above that of its Near Eastern neighbors; yet by the early 1960's, Israel could cover only about half her annual imports from current exports.

The continuing hostility of the neighboring Arab states not only necessitated large defense expenditures but also aggravated the foreign payments situation. Initial hopes for a more permanent peace settlement to follow upon the armistice agreements of 1949 were quickly dissipated, and even efforts to work out some kind of technical agreements, such as on division of the waters of the Jordan River among Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, faltered against the Arab's refusal to recognize the very existence of the new state. Throughout the early 1950's, moreover, border incidents and retaliation raids, especially along the Jordan frontier and the Gaza strip, multiplied. The economic boycott instituted by the Arab League forced Israel to import petroleum from Iran or from as far away as Venezuela, whereas the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa lay dry.

At the same time, Israel's export industry was deprived of most of its natural markets and instead had to seek outlets in more distant Asian and African countries. The Arabs' measures of economic warfare, on the other hand, were plainly insufficient to inflict any decisive

damage on Israel's economy or on her political chances of survival. On the contrary, the Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt in 1956 once again demonstrated Israeli military strength even against an opponent recently armed with large amounts of Soviet equipment. Partly under the impact of this second military encounter and partly as a result of United Nations garrisoning of the Gaza strip, Arab border attacks and Israeli retaliation raids all but ceased.

In the early 1960's, Israel still faced many of her initial difficulties, but her existence as a state was well assured. The flow of immigrants had abated, and earlier arrivals were well on their way to absorption into the new society. While a large portion of the country's foreign exchange budget, and hence its standard of living, continued to be underwritten by foreign donations, exports were beginning to pay for an increasingly larger share of the total. The Arab economic boycott continued, including the blocking of Israel-bound shipping through the Suez Canal; yet development of the Israeli port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqabah was designed to make Israel's trade with Asia and East Africa independent of the Suez route. Israeli plans to divert major portions of the waters of the upper Jordan for irrigation of the Negev desert were likely to lead to renewed friction with the Arab neighbors; but the latter's hopes of "driving Israel into the sea" clearly remained illusory.

#### *Turkey*

The Republic of Turkey originated in the War of Independence (1919-23), in which the Anatolian rump of the Ottoman Empire successfully fought for the preservation of its sovereignty in the face of Greek invasion and Allied partition plans. The new state's most significant political asset has been the presence of dedicated political leaders who were able to continue a tradition of responsible service dating back to Ottoman days. Where the Arab successor states of the Fertile Crescent had to build up their administrative staffs from minute beginnings, Turkey could draw on a manpower pool that had served an Empire three or four times its size. Once the Turkish ruling

class found itself relieved of the incubus of the decaying Empire it concentrated with renewed vigor on the far more manageable task of building up a small but viable nation-state.

Not only was there continuity in personnel, there also was a gradual transition in political institutions. The War of Independence was fought, ostensibly in the name of the captive Sultan in Allied-occupied Istanbul, by the bulk of the demobilized Ottoman army with the support of numerous civilian "Societies for the Defense of Rights" and under the leadership of Turkey's outstanding military figure of the World War I period, Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk). The Kemalists' foreign-policy plank, known as the "National Pact," was formulated in the summer of 1919, two years before their *de facto* government at Ankara got around to drafting a provisional constitution; their Grand National Assembly had been directing the affairs of the country for two and a half years when, after the final victory in 1922, it declared that the Sultanate had ceased to exist as of 1920, and the Republic was not officially proclaimed until October 29, 1923, following upon the international recognition of Turkey's hard-won sovereignty in the peace treaty of Lausanne.

Mustafa Kemal had insisted during the War of Independence that all questions of internal reform be resolutely postponed and had based his appeal on a combination of nationalist and religious traditional motifs. Now, with the foundations of the new state firmly laid and political leadership concentrated in his Republican People's Party, he proceeded with a rapid program of secularist legal and cultural reforms. The Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs were abolished in 1924 and schools unified under a secular Ministry of Education; in 1925, the dervish orders were closed and dress modernized by government decree; in 1926, European civil and criminal codes replaced the traditional Islamic law; and in 1928, Latin letters for Turkish were substituted for the Arabic script. The 1930's brought an intensive program of industrial development, known as *étatisme*, concentrating on railroads, textiles, and steel

production. The annexation of the Hatay, completed in 1939 shortly after Atatürk's death, realized a hope he had long personally cherished.

During the Presidency of Atatürk's successor and close collaborator, İsmet İnönü (1938–50), Turkey managed to steer a careful course of neutrality amid the belligerent camps, declaring war on Germany and Japan in 1945 *pro forma*, just in time to be invited as a founding member of the United Nations. The economic dislocations of wartime mobilization contributed to the rapid postwar growth of opposition parties, notably the Democratic Party which took power in a major landslide victory in Turkey's first free and honest election in 1950. Large-scale American economic and military assistance, extended under the Truman Doctrine and subsequent programs, led to a second major wave of industrial and agricultural development. By her support of United Nations action in Korea (1950), her admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1952), and her leadership in concluding the Baghdad Treaty (1954, relabeled the Central Treaty Organization in 1958), Turkey became firmly committed to the West in face of the continuing threat of Russian expansion toward the Near East.

Turkey's political development since 1945 provided the first occasion when a firmly rooted dictatorial one-party regime yielded to a system of open party competition voluntarily and in an orderly manner. The peasant majority, long the neglected entity in Turkish as in other Southwest Asian politics, was beginning to play an increasingly active and self-assertive role, and in the cities, newspapers, political rallies, and party organization multiplied. The democratic experiment also implied a number of gradual but fundamental changes in political course. The policy of *étatisme* was abandoned in favor of encouragement of private enterprise, at least in manufacturing industries. Agricultural devel-

opment through the building of roads, irrigation dams, grain elevators, and extensive farm mechanization corrected the earlier one-sided emphasis on industry, and a number of restorative reforms (such as the introduction of religious schooling and the reversion to the Arabic prayer call) played up to the peasantry's conservative, anti-secularist bias. But the peasants' unconcern with the niceties of liberal constitutionalism also made possible a gradual and systematic erosion of the very political freedoms that had permitted the ascent of the peasantry's champion, the Democratic Party.

Just before their second landslide victory in 1954, the Democrats under Premier Adnan Menderes confiscated the assets of İnönü's Republican People's Party and closed down the smaller Nation Party. By increasingly repressive measures, the press, the universities, and the courts were deprived of their political independence. As a prolonged and severe economic crisis resulted from Menderes' over-ambitious economic development program, all critical voices were silenced and opponents of the increasingly corrupt ruling clique subjected to violent harassment. In the spring of 1960, the authoritarian regime of Premier Menderes and President Bayar was ousted in an almost bloodless coup resulting from student demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara and from the resolute intervention of the army, which refused to let itself be used as a tool of repression of mounting popular discontent.

The military junta, under the Presidency of General Cemal Gürsel, was soon split, as had been similar groups in other countries, between a moderate wing that wanted to restore constitutional representative procedures at the earliest opportunity and a radical faction that wanted to use the power of the new regime to initiate a vaguely conceived authoritarian social revolution. In a bloodless purge late in 1960, the moderate group won out and,

in cooperation with politicians of the various anti-Menderes parties, proceeded to draft a representative constitution, on a checks-and-balance model, for a Second Turkish Republic.

## Traditional Political Systems

Yemen and Afghanistan are the only remaining purely traditional political systems of Southwest Asia, or for that matter anywhere in Asia, in the middle of the twentieth century. Both countries, by virtue of their inaccessible location, escaped the imperial impact of the modern West, Afghanistan in particular being aided by its buffer situation between British India and Imperial Russia. Both countries were being increasingly drawn into the orbit of international politics after the Second World War, and it is safe to assume that their internal political structure will gradually be modified, moving increasingly in the direction of the Southwest Asian "systems in flux."

### *Yemen*

Yemen occupies the extreme southern mountainous and fertile part of the Arabian peninsula. For centuries, it was at least nominally a dependency of the Ottoman Empire, but since the beginning of the twentieth century, Ottoman troops were engaged in a protracted losing fight to assert the authority of the distant central government. After the First World War, Yemen became independent under its local ruler, elected by the *ulama* of the Zaydi branch of the Shiah in San'a, who claims the title of Imam by virtue of his direct descent from the Prophet. The Imam's absolutism was limited in theory by the sovereignty of Qur'anic law, but in practice more effectively by the poverty of communications in his primitive country and by the ever-present threat of palace revolt and assassination.

Imam Ahmad, in such a palace revolt, succeeded the aged Imam Yahya in 1948; by 1960, he himself had been the victim of three assassination attempts in a single year, and the princes of the royal house who had not earlier

become victims of the Imam's retaliation were preparing to dispute the succession. Yemen's nominal confederation with the United Arab Republic in 1958 (under the title United Arab States) had little practical political impact but gave new impetus to the Imam's longstanding border claims against the neighboring British colony and protectorate of Aden. By the late 1950's, Russian, Communist Chinese, and United States missions were vying in such projects as road building, port development in the Red Sea coastal town of Hudaydah, and mineral exploration throughout the country.

In September, 1962, following Ahmad's death, his successor, Imam Muhammad al-Badr, was deposed by an armed conspiracy under Colonel Abd Allah al-Salal, who proclaimed a Yemen Arab Republic. By the end of the year, Salal's republican forces, with firm support from Egyptian troops, were in control of most of the country, while the deposed Imam was vainly trying to mobilize the peripheral tribes and support from the Kingdoms of Jordan and Saudi Arabia for his declining cause. Yemen's move toward the "systems in flux" had come more rapidly than many observers had expected.

### *Afghanistan*

The landlocked mountain kingdom of Afghanistan underwent some of the same crises of threat of foreign occupation and of a see-saw struggle between forces of tradition and reform that beset the Ottoman Empire and Iran, except that the country's isolated location considerably delayed the impact of modernity. In the mid-eighteenth century, the newly formed Afghan state included much of what today is West Pakistan, but a series of wars with the British, operating from India, pushed Afghanistan back into her present frontiers. By 1880, the Afghan amir took a regular subsidy from the British Indian government, to which he entrusted the country's foreign policy. After the First World War, Amir Amanullah, coming to power in a *coup d'état*, shook off the British connection and for the next decade tried to modernize the country with the help of Soviet, German, and

Turkish military and technical missions. A rebellion of conservative tribes exiled Amanullah in 1929, and after a brief period of near-anarchy, a different branch of the royal house was established on the throne, with most cabinet positions being held by various royal princes. The intensified rivalry between the Soviet and Western blocs in the 1950's has enabled Afghanistan to secure sizable loans and grants for economic development from both sides while remaining politically neutral. To what extent—or how soon—this second spurt of modernization will revolutionize the country's patriarchal socio-political structure remains to be seen.

## Party Systems and Elections

The preceding survey of dynamic factors in the various political systems of Southwest Asia makes possible a comparative examination of such essential political features as parties, elections, and organized interests. Throughout this discussion, we shall have to keep in mind the basic distinction between "systems in flux," "modern systems," and "traditional systems." For example, in the traditional countries of Yemen and Afghanistan and in semi-traditional Saudi Arabia, no elections have been conducted, no parties formed, and no vocal socio-economic interest groups organized. Rather, the political process has taken place almost entirely within the royal palace among the members of the ruler's family and among tribal leaders on the periphery. The "systems in flux" and the "modern systems" both have room for parties, elections, and interest associations, yet these perform different functions in each type of system.

### *Systems in Flux*

In Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Iran, elections have been held in the intervals between dictatorships, but the more decisive forces of

### *Political Dynamics*



change have been the establishment and relinquishment of foreign control and internal *coups d'état* and revolutions. The stakes of the political struggle have generally been not peaceful control of the government within a stable representative system, but change of the regime itself through manipulation and violence. Most parties in these countries have been ephemeral, volatile, and representative of only a small coterie of founders. The nationalist political groupings which formed in Syria and Iraq around the time of the First World War, by the 1920's and 1930's had split into a moderate group inclined toward greater conciliation toward the imperial power and a more radical group pressing for abolition of foreign prerogatives. In Syria, the moderates called themselves the People's Party (1924), and the radicals the National Bloc (1928); in the debate on Arab unification and realignment in the 1940's, the Populists sided generally with Jordan and Iraq, the Nationalists with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, the moderates centered around Nuri al-Said called themselves the Iraqi Covenant in the 1930's and in 1949 the Constitutional Union, whereas the radicals were known successively as the People's Party, the National Brotherhood (Ikha, 1931), and the Independence Party (1946). A third, rival group was formed in 1951 by the Shii politician Salih Jabr under the name of Socialist Party of the Nation.

In Iran, the demise of Riza Shah's dictatorship in 1941 and the end of the wartime foreign occupation led to an even more bewildering proliferation of parties. These, it has been well observed, generally were "formed from above—a few people grouping themselves around some prominent personality or publishing a newspaper with funds provided by an anonymous capitalist. Their programs were virtually interchangeable and were confined to a series of pious platitudes, of which the 'integrity and independence of Iran' was usually the first. Their names gave even less in-

dication of their policy."<sup>2</sup> Only intermittently would a strong political figure succeed in rallying a more sizable following, such as Zia al-Din Tabatabai's National Will Party (1944–46) or Ahmad Qavam's Iran Democrats (1946–47), but these, too, would quickly disband upon the decline of their founder's political fortunes. All these groupings, whether in Iran or in the Fertile Crescent, may be described as "narrowly based pragmatic parties",<sup>3</sup> they were, in fact, loose factional alignments within a limited oligarchic class. Their sway in parliament and cabinet, moreover, would periodically be interrupted by states of siege or intervals of dictatorship. Thus all parties were dissolved in Iraq from the time of the suppression of the Rashid Ali revolt in 1941 until 1946, and from 1954 until after the 1958 revolution; in Syria from the first of the 1949 coups until the overturn of Shishakli in 1954; and in Iran from the time of Musaddiq's dictatorial rule. (The parties which were officially licensed in 1958 hardly changed this picture, for they had an even narrower base than usual in the support of the royal palace.)

By the 1940's, dissatisfaction with the restrictive oligarchic character of these more traditional parties was giving rise to the formation, among the younger urban intellectuals, of parties with a more militant and more ideological tinge. To the nationalist tenets of the older groups, they generally added a number of socialist demands—for nationalization of banks, redistribution of large estates, and central planning of the state economy. Their political methods ranged from street demonstrations to direct violence. The earliest of these parties originated in Iraq in the early thirties as a socialist study circle known as the Ahali Group. In 1936, it provided the chief civilian support for the first in the long series of Iraqi military coups. From 1946 to 1954, it legally re-emerged as the National Democratic Party, and in 1958 it was vying with Commu-

<sup>2</sup> L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran, 1941–1949," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 3 (1949), 49.

<sup>3</sup> For an elaboration of this terminology, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Near East," in Almond and Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, pp. 397 ff, 408 ff.

nists and other groups for civilian popular support under the military regime of General Qasim.

A small agitational and terrorist group known as the Syrian National Social Party was founded in Lebanon in 1934 by a Christian emigrant returned from South America, Antun Saadeh. Its avowed aim was the merger of Lebanon with Syria, and it has been outlawed in Lebanon since its founder's execution for high treason in 1949, and since 1955 in Syria as a result of its involvement in a major assassination plot. Another S.N.S.P. conspiracy was suppressed in Lebanon in 1962. The most important of these urban radical groups in the Fertile Crescent has been the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'th) Party formed in Syria in the 1940's by the merger of two smaller groups under the leadership of Akram Hawrani. The Ba'th Party has been the most consistent advocate in Syria of Pan-Arabism, and it has more recently also been active in Jordan and in Iraq (where it was dissolved as a result of the abortive pro U.A.R. uprising in Mosul in November, 1958). Together with the National Bloc, it was the driving force behind Syria's unification with Egypt in 1958.

The National Front of Muhammad Musaddiq in Iran may be likened to these radical parties of the Fertile Crescent. It originated as one of the small parliamentary coteries which abounded in the *majlis* of the 1940's, but it became a movement with a far-flung organization in the major cities during Musaddiq's dictatorial rule in 1951-53. Although it has been outlawed since that time, it survives clandestinely and is one of the forces that may emerge triumphant from any major political revolution in Iran.

The party picture in Lebanon is complicated by the country's intricate denominational divisions and by the prominence of leading political families. Although candidates may only run for seats assigned to their particular denominations, voters of every religious affiliation can vote for all the denominational seats assigned to their constituencies. The prevailing pattern is therefore one of personal alliances of prominent politicians—such as members of the Edde, al-Sulh, and Bustani families

—across religious lines, and parties have been little more than euphonic labels for the resulting alignments. Other groups have a more pronounced denominational base, such as the Phalanges Libanaises (a Maronite group), and the Progressive Socialist Party supported by the Druze tribesmen of the south rallied around Kamal Junblat.

Two other political groups have been of considerable importance in the politics of the "systems in flux"—the Communists and various Muslim-fundamentalist groupings. Both are dedicated to radical social change, one toward what it considers the "wave of the future," the other toward what it conceives as the restoration of a purer past. Both have had their strongest appeal among various groups socially displaced by the rapid and uneven pace of urban modernization—Communism primarily among the uprooted urban intelligentsia, and Muslim fundamentalism among the urban lower class. Both are inclined toward agitation, street demonstrations, and terrorism. Communism has been illegal throughout most of the Near East at most times, but there is evidence that the clandestine Communist parties thrive especially well in settings where all party activity is outlawed—including that of their non-Communist competitors—and where their organizational training and tactical and financial support from the Soviet Union can be put to maximum advantage.

Thus the Communist party emerged as a powerful force after the five years of Shishakli's dictatorship in Syria in 1954, and played a major role in the Iraqi revolution of 1958 after a four-year moratorium on political expression. In Iran, the Communists have been operating under the assumed name of Tudah Party (party of the masses); it remains to be seen whether the repression of political opinion since the Zahidi coup of 1954 will have benefited them as much as the similar moves of Shishakli in Syria and Nuri al-Said in Iraq. The major Muslim fundamentalist groups in

Southwest Asia have been the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, an off-shoot of the Egyptian organization of the same name, and the Fidayan-i Islam, which carried on a terrorist campaign in Iran in the 1950's. Neither group, however, has matched the strength or prominence that the Muslim Brotherhood attained in Egypt until its dissolution in 1954.

### *Modern Political Systems*

Israel since its inception in 1948 and Turkey from the beginning of the Republic until the 1960 revolution have had representative systems of government based on a one-chamber parliament which elects the President of the Republic and to whom the cabinet is responsible. In Turkey, suffrage was extended to women in 1934; in Israel, all adult citizens, male and female, including immigrants upon arrival, have the right to vote. In both countries, parliament is elected to a four-year term, but may dissolve itself earlier by majority vote. Since Israel has no written constitution, a single vote by a simple majority in the Knesset (parliament) suffices to pass or change any law concerning governmental organization. In the first Turkish Republic, a qualified majority of two-thirds was necessary for the same purpose. Aside from these formal similarities, however, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differ significantly.

**ISRAEL.** In Israel, voting is according to the list system of proportional representation, with the entire country forming a single election district returning the 120 Knesset members. This extreme form of proportionalism favors a splintering of parties (Table 5-2). On the other hand, the list method of nomination confers considerable power on the party hierarchies, and the parties' close ties to various interest organizations further accentuate the preponderance of their leadership. The country's party system was inherited with little change from the Jewish representative institu-

tions of mandate days and can in part be traced to the factional divisions within European Zionism in the early part of the century. Most prominent are the various socialist parties, including the moderate Mapai, and the smaller Mapam, which is more radical both in its economic and foreign-policy proposals, as well as a number of smaller groups constituted by recurrent splits and mergers at the fringes of these two. Although the country's comprehensive labor federation, Histadruth, maintains its official status as a non-partisan body, its leadership very largely overlaps with that of Mapai, whereas some of the groups to the left have close ties to the communal agricultural settlements.

The religious parties form another distinct group. There originally were four of these—Mizrahi, Mizrahi Labor, Agudat, and Agudat Labor—loosely combined in a United Religious Front. Of these, the two Agudat groups took the more orthodox position, insisting on strictest observance of the traditional food and Sabbath regulations; they also originally attracted many Jews who objected to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine under secular auspices as contrary to scriptural precept. By contrast, the two Mizrahi groups combined their religious attitudes with positive support for Zionism. In 1951, the United Religious Front dissolved; in 1956, however, the two Mizrahi groups combined in a National Religious Front; a similar merger between the two Agudat parties proved to be only temporary.

Further to the right are the Progressive and General Zionist Parties, which present a secular, free-enterprise appeal mainly to business and professional groups and which merged in 1961 into the Liberal Party. At the extreme right stands the Herut (Freedom) Party, which traces back directly to the terrorist gangs of mandate days and takes an uncompromising position in rejecting German reparations and advocating a more militant line in relations with the Arabs; it is widely suspected of favoring the forcible expansion of Israel's present boundaries.

Although none of these parties, under the prevailing system of country-wide proportional

TABLE 5-2 *Elections in Israel, 1949-1961*

Party	Percentage of vote					Seats in Knesset				
	1949	1951	1955	1959	1961	1949	1951	1955	1959	1961
Communists	3.5%	4.0%	4.5%	2.8%	4.1%	4	5	6	3	5
Mapam	14.7	12.5	7.3	7.2	7.6	19	15	9	9	9
Ahdut Haavoda	—	—	8.2	6.0	6.5	—	—	10	7	8
Mapai	37.4	42.0	36.6	41.8	41.7	48	50	45	52	46
Mizrahi and Mizrahi Labor		8.3	9.1	9.9	9.9		10	11	12	12
Agudat and Agudat Labor	12.2		3.6	4.7	3.7 1.9	16		5 6	6	4 2
General Zionists	5.2	19.8	10.2	6.1		7	23	13	8	
Progressives	4.1	3.2	4.4	4.6	13.6 <sup>a</sup>	5	4	5	6	17 <sup>a</sup>
Herut	11.5	6.6	12.6	13.5	13.6	14	8	15	7	17
Others	11.4	—	2.4	3.4	0.7	7	—	—	—	—
Electoral participation and total seats	86.9	75.4	82.8	81.6	81.3	120	120	120	120	120

<sup>a</sup> Liberal Party (formed by merger of General Zionists and Progressives).

representation, has ever come close to a majority, Mapai, with its solid working-class support has consistently been the largest party. It has supplied all the Prime Ministers and the strongest party delegation in the various cabinets, usually in alliance with one or more of the religious parties. But party pluralism goes far beyond the cabinet. All patronage positions within the government are proportionately allocated to the major parties; Mizrahi and Agudat have their own separate schools supported by the government, and party organizers at the immigrant reception camps try to sign up new members from the start. (Israeli citizenship, and hence the franchise, is conferred on immigrants upon arrival.) Despite these divisive factors, the predominance of Mapai, and the prominence of its leader, the flamboyant and patriarchal David Ben-Gurion (Prime Minister since 1948 except for a self imposed period of retirement in 1953-55), have given Israeli politics more stability and coherence than it otherwise might have had. Ben-Gurion personally has been a consistent advocate of abandoning proportional representation in favor of the Anglo-American system of single-member plurality elections. Such a change would create a closer link between the individual Knesset members and their constituents and promote a clearer alignment approximating a two-party system. Yet, since Israel's election system, like any other

electoral regime, tends to create its own vested interests, it seems doubtful whether any such radical alteration will soon be undertaken.

**TURKEY.** The party system of the Turkish Republic, like Israel's, had its antecedents in the political developments of the preceding period. The Defense of Rights Societies which rallied to Mustafa Kemal's call for national resistance in 1919 and 1920 were largely based on the surviving local organizations of the earlier Union and Progress Party, although the discredited and fugitive top leadership of the Unionist movement was replaced with new and younger personnel. The nationwide Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, in which these local groups joined in the summer of 1919, fits the model of the "comprehensive-nationalist party," "whose exclusive position results from the rallying of all forces for the attainment or maintenance of independence" in a "power contest . . . primarily between the society as a whole and an actual or potential foreign ruler," and which is "comprehensive in the further sense that it desires not merely a political regeneration but, beyond this, a far-

reaching reshaping of society.”<sup>4</sup> It thus belongs in the same category as the Indian National Congress and the Burmese A.F.P.F.L.

After victory in the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal in 1923 transformed the Defense of Rights movement into the Republican People's Party, which for the next twenty-seven years ruled the destinies of Turkey. An early opposition party, the Progressive Republicans, was formed in 1924 among Kemal's closest military and political associates of the War of Independence days and in protest against his increasingly personal dictatorship. It was dissolved early in 1925 after the party was linked, upon tenuous evidence, with an uprising in the Kurdish provinces. With the suppression of an assassination plot in 1926, with which some of the surviving Union and Progress leaders of the World War I period were associated, the rule of Kemal and his Republican People's Party was firmly established without further challenge.

Yet the Kemalist movement differed sharply from the various totalitarian one-party regimes, such as fascism, Bolshevism, and National Socialism, which were established in various European countries during the same period. It had come to power not in a violent internal revolution but in the external fight against foreign domination. It did not attempt to force a ready-made ideology on a resistant populace; rather its political aims were developed pragmatically step by step, and its six basic tenets (the so-called Six Arrows: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, *Étatisme*, Secularism, and *inkılâpçılık*, which is usually translated as “revolutionism” but means, more precisely, fundamental change by legal methods) were codified as late as 1931 after they had already been well embedded in the country's legal system. The benevolent dictatorship of Atatürk and İnönü rather consistently upheld wider political participation as a theoretical ideal to

be carried into practice as soon as the level of popular education and other circumstances permitted. The forms of parliamentary cabinet government, moreover, were carefully observed throughout the one-party period, and occasional nay-votes were tolerated without ill consequence for the dissidents.

A brief experiment in 1930 with an officially sanctioned opposition party (the Free Party), led at Kemal's behest by his close friend Fethi Okyar, was called off as premature after a mere four months. But in the following years, the Republican People's Party (R.P.P.) attempted to broaden its representative base by seating a number of manual workers, women, and members of the non-Muslim minorities in Parliament and by readmitting to the political scene most of the surviving Unionists and Progressives. In 1939, İsmet İnönü inaugurated another half-hearted experiment of a so-called “Independent Group” within the parliamentary R.P.P., whose members could hold their separate caucuses and were not to be bound by party discipline. But since the Independents were officially appointed rather than self-nominated, little effective opposition resulted. In 1945, however, with the international pressure of the Second World War relieved, İnönü allowed the formation of opposition parties and, after a hesitant start in the 1946 elections (when gross irregularities in the count distorted the results of a free vote), pledged his administration to even-handed dealings with government and opposition parties.

The years from 1945 to 1960 thus brought Turkey's first experiment with a competitive multi-party system. The most important opposition group was the Democratic Party (D.P.), formed in 1946 by ex-Premier Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and other dissident Republicans. In its official program, the D.P. largely confined itself to attacking *étatisme* and promising a more liberal and effective economic policy, but its campaign orators soon fell in with the peasantry's pent-up demand for agricultural developments and for an attenuation of the secularist policy of the Atatürk-Inönü period. The demand for a partial religious restoration was pressed even more vociferously

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 397, 400.

by the Nation Party, which had split off from the Democrats in 1948-49.

The three elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957 showed a fairly consistent pattern of alignment (Table 5-3). Voting participation was

publican People's Party were mainly in Eastern Anatolia, including İnönü's home district of Malatya.

Although both major parties courted the industrial workers by promises of legalizing

TABLE 5-3 *Elections in Turkey, 1950-1961*

	Percentage of vote				Seats in Assembly			Senate	Assembly
	1950	1954	1957	1961	1950	1954	1957	1961	1961
Republican									
People's Party	40%	35%	41%	37%	68	31	173	36	173
Democratic Party	55	58	48.5	—	394	499	421	—	—
Justice Party	—	—	—	35	—	—	—	70	158
Nation Party <sup>a</sup>	5	5	6	14	1	5	4	16	54
Liberty Party	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	—
New Turkey Party	—	—	—	14	—	—	—	28	65
Others	1	2	0.5	1	10	2	1	—	—
Electoral participation and total seats <sup>b</sup>	89	89	77	82	487	541	610	150	450

<sup>a</sup> 1954, Republican Nation Party; since 1958, Republican Peasants' Nation Party.

<sup>b</sup> The figures for total seats include vacancies caused by candidates being elected from two districts and hence may exceed the sum of party seats. In addition to its 150 elected members, the Senate of 1961 includes 15 appointed senators and 21 members of the former Committee of National Unity.

high—from 75 to 90 per cent in each case—a reflection probably as much of the spirit of group solidarity of the peasant majority as of the intensive campaigning by the politicians. The Nation Party (renamed the Republican Nation Party after its dissolution by court order in 1954, and the Republican Peasant Nation Party after its merger with another splinter group in 1958), won only in a single district, Kırşehir in Central Anatolia, but in addition attracted a substantial number of votes in some Anatolian small towns and in the poorer districts of Istanbul and Ankara. The Democrats' most consistent backers were the large and medium-sized landowners who benefited most consistently from the Menderes administration's policy of rural development and high cash supports for major crops. The floating vote, which boosted the Democrats' percentage in 1950 and 1954 and substantially reduced it in 1957, was composed of the urban educated groups and of the farmers in some of the poorer agricultural regions who tended to hold the government responsible for good as well as bad crops. The strongholds of the Re-

strikes and collective bargaining (promises which neither party made good when in power), most of the labor unions tended to lean to the Democratic Party, particularly during its government tenure in the 1950's when more benefits could accrue from administrative action than from opposition oratory. The increasingly repressive policy of the Menderes government caused considerable restlessness in the ranks of his own party, and on one occasion the Premier narrowly escaped being voted out by the party caucus. In 1956, some thirty Democratic deputies seceded in protest against Menderes' restrictive press laws and formed the Liberty Party which, like the Nation Party, won only in one province in 1957, and two years later merged with the R.P.P.

During the one-party period, the details of the electoral system were of little practical interest; the slates made up by central R.P.P.

headquarters in consultation with the provincial organizations were bound to win by default in any case. (Both the Progressive Party of 1924-25 and the Free Party of 1930 were formed among dissident R.P.P. members already sitting in the Assembly, and neither survived to contest an election.) But with the transition to competitive party politics after 1945, Turkish leaders took a fresh look at their election legislation and eliminated what were felt to be distinctly undemocratic features. Thus in 1946, the voters, who had previously been voting for electors who in turn chose the assemblymen, were allowed to vote for Assembly members directly. In 1949, poll watchers from all parties were allowed to supervise the tally, and the courts (rather than the Ministry of the Interior) were allowed to handle all complaints concerning election irregularities.

Yet some other features of the election system survived until the end of the First Republic in 1960, notably the plurality-list system of voting. Under this system, election districts corresponded to the sixty-odd provinces into which the country is administratively divided, each province electing one assembly member per 40,000 inhabitants. Within each district, the party list obtaining a plurality of votes carried the entire slate of seats—an average of eight to ten seats per province, but as many as thirty or more in the more populous districts such as Istanbul. The system thus corresponded closely to that employed in electing the American presidential electoral college, and, as in the United States, it conferred a heavy premium of seats on the plurality party, inflicting a corresponding penalty on the second party, and a prohibitive penalty on any third or fourth party unless regionally concentrated. As a result, the Democrats in 1950 and 1954 won 85 and 92 per cent, respectively, of the Assembly seats on the basis of only 55 and 58 per cent of the vote.

If the multiple-member plurality method of

voting created an enormous bias toward a two-party system, the list method of voting conferred important powers on the party organizations. Within the R.P.P., a majority of nominations was entrusted to the provincial organizations, with a 10 to 20 per cent quota reserved to party headquarters in Ankara. The Democratic Party bylaws provided for a similar procedure, except that the entire slates, including provincial nominees, were subject to "approval" by national headquarters—and this in practice meant exclusion of any critics of Premier Menderes from nomination. At first there were a number of safeguards against this heavy concentration of party power: voters could rearrange the order of names on the party lists, substitute new names for the official nominees, or mix various party lists at will, and as a result several districts in 1950 and 1954 returned mixed lists or independent candidates. But by the end of his ten-year reign, Premier Menderes had abolished all these voters' privileges, and in addition secured passage for a law that barred all party dissidents from candidacy. This, in effect, gave Menderes, through his control of the Democratic Party central committee, the power to purge his own party at will.

Since much of the dictatorial power which the Democratic Party and Menderes personally came to exercise had thus its solid base in the election laws, it is not surprising that the entire system came under sharp attack at the time of the 1960 revolution. The Constitution for the Second Turkish Republic, adopted in the fall of 1961, therefore broke radically with the past. The Assembly now was to consist of two chambers, the lower elected by proportional representation, the upper composed partly of members indirectly elected by the provincial assemblies and partly of representatives of certain specified professional categories. There was little question that the new system would destroy the heavy concentration of Assembly voting power in a single tightly controlled party and also remove the earlier heavy bias toward a two-party system. Some skeptics, in fact, envisaged a splintering of parties which before too many years might exceed that of the Third and Fourth French Repub-

lics—with consequent problems of coalition formation.

A more immediate subject of speculation was that of the party alignments resulting from the elections held in the fall of 1961 after popular ratification of the new Constitution. The Democratic Party, which despite its great unpopularity among the urban educated groups still could be presumed to have strong peasant support, was outlawed, and its leaders had been on trial for subversion of the Constitution. İsmet İnönü's People's Republican Party had gained in popularity through its determined and courageous fight against the oppressive Menderes regime. It faced electoral competition from the conservative Peasant Nation Party and from the New Turkey Party recently formed among liberal intellectuals. But the millions of peasant voters who once had revered Menderes as their savior supported the newly formed Justice Party. The uneasy coalition formed between the Republican and Justice Parties late in 1961 was replaced in 1962 by an alliance of the Republican, the Nation, and the New Turkey Parties. A prolonged period of cabinet instability seemed to be the likeliest prospect for the future.

## Political Interest Groups and Political Leadership

Political interest groups in the Western sense of the term are very largely undeveloped in all Southwest Asian political systems except Israel. Instead, a number of institutional groups—foremost being the armies, but also the Muslim ulama, and ethnic groups such as linguistic minorities and nomadic tribes—play important political roles. The vast peasant majority throughout the Near East is completely unorganized, even where, as in contemporary Turkey, city politicians eagerly solicit their views and votes.

### *Labor and Business*

Labor unions have developed in all the "political systems in flux" and in Turkey, but play a relatively insignificant political role. In some cases, they developed spontaneously, but

more often their growth has been artificially induced by progressive social legislation since the 1930's patterned on European models. In a situation where only a small percentage of the population is employed in manufacturing, and where vast pools of underemployed recent arrivals or migrants from the villages flood the urban job market, the possibilities for unions to extract concessions from employers through collective bargaining are severely circumscribed. A common complaint of the Turkish trade unions, for example, is that employers circumvent the very generous employment-security and severance-pay provisions of the government's labor code by dismissing their entire work force every six months, before these provisions take effect. As a result, labor unions generally expect to advance their cause through government favor rather than through their own efforts. It follows that independent political action by the unions is rare and inconsequential.

Business interests are an important factor in politics, but they rarely operate through organized pressure-group activity. The prevailing conspiratorial view of both business and politics, the tendency toward state ownership of manufacturing enterprises, and the prominent position within the private sector of foreign-owned oil concerns in the Persian Gulf states and of export-import firms throughout the region—all these factors militate against formal associational activity. A business firm is more likely to employ its private connections in the capital to obtain administrative exemption from the multifarious government regulations affecting production and trade than to band together with its competitors to put pressure on parliaments to get the law changed.

Israel is the major exception to this rule. The Israel Federation of Labor, or Histadruth, plays a pre-eminent role in the country's politics and economy. Its modern skyscraper office building outside Tel Aviv, popularly known as "the Kremlin," contrasts sharply with the



modest converted branch bank office which houses the Knesset in Jerusalem, and its annual conventions, where delegates divide along partisan lines into Mapai, Mapam, Mizrahi, and other groups, often forecast important shifts of power in parliament or cabinet.

### *Army Officers and Students*

Among the institutional groups which tend to fill the associational vacuum, the armies—or, more precisely, their officer corps—are by far the most important. The early efforts at modernization in the nineteenth-century Near East came in response to the impact of Europe's growing military power, and uniformly began by reform of the armed services. As a result, army officers were among the first groups in society to become thoroughly committed to modernization, and this made them into a "progressive" force at a later time when society as a whole moved toward modernization. The prevalence of foreign rule and of domestic autocracy and dictatorship in recent Near Eastern history and the weakness of parliaments, parties, and associational groups all reduced the importance of political decision and change by procedures of debate and instead tended to put a premium on violent change. Army coups and revolutions spearheaded by army officers thus have been a common and recurrent phenomenon throughout Southwest Asia, from the Young Turk revolution of 1908 to the rise of Atatürk and Rıza Şah to the wave of Iraqi and Syrian coups of the 1930's and 1940's to the Iraqi revolution of 1958. The socio-political role of the army officers in Southwest Asia, in their close association with the interests of a rising urban educated class, thus conforms much more closely to the Bonapartist tradition than to the model of conservative-agrarian Junker militarism.

The role of students in Southwest Asian politics has been not unlike that of the army officers, except that, lacking the physical means of enforcing a new order, they have more often

had a merely disruptive effect. The universities, like the Armies, have served as focuses of Westernization and recruit an indigenous elite from a broad social and geographic base. The glorification of youth, which has rapidly displaced in Near Eastern politics the traditional veneration for age, also gives the political expressions of the students an importance beyond their numbers or experience. Since most of them will go into government service of one sort or another, they speak, moreover, in the heady self-assurance of representing tomorrow's governing elite. Thus students at the Istanbul army medical school provided the nucleus of the Young Turk movement in the days of Abdülhamid, and Arab students in Lebanon and at European universities were among the first spokesmen of Arab nationalism in the early years of this century. More recently, the 1960 revolution in Turkey was spearheaded by the university students in Istanbul and Ankara, to be consummated by action of the armed forces.

### *Traditional Groups*

Muslim ulama or learned men (the closest Islamic equivalent to a clergy) play their most entrenched and significant roles in the traditional political systems. Thus the Zaydi-Shii ulama of San'a used to have the privilege of choosing the Imam's successor from among the deceased incumbent's male relatives, and the Wahhabi ulama of al-Riad are consulted about the religious propriety of all major acts of royal legislation. Within the more hierarchical structure of Shii Islam, the *mujtahids* (i.e., the higher grades of Shii ulama) still play a distinct corporate role. In the Iraqi cabinets of the monarchical period, one or another *mujtahid* from Karbala was usually represented, and the Iranian constitution of 1905–06 created a council of *mujtahids* to review parliamentary legislation. In the "systems in flux," individual ulama, such as the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and Mullah Abu al-Qasim Kashani in Iran, have become the leaders of loosely organized fundamentalist and often terrorist movements of protest against modernization.

The political role of ethnic minorities and

of nomadic tribes has already been discussed in an earlier section on social structure. The power of the nomads has sharply declined in recent decades, although they are still a potential force of some moment in Southern Iran and in the tribal areas of inland Saudi Arabia. The politics of Lebanon, as we have seen, rests on a careful denominational balance of Christians of various denominations, of Sunni and Shii Muslims, and of Druzes. The heterogeneous ethnic composition of Iran has given rise to separatist movements, notably the Russian-sponsored Azarbayjan People's Republic of 1945-46, and in Iraq the Kurds of the northern mountains around Sulaymaniyyah and Kirkuk have been a distinctive political force, organized after the 1958 revolution in the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Whereas the active role of army officers and of university students is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, it seems safe to say that the political influence of the ulama and of ethnic minorities is on the decline. On the other hand, the progress of industrialization and urbanization is leading, in countries like Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, to a proliferation of associational groups—sports societies, study circles, fund-raising societies for the building of new mosques, benevolent societies for migrants to the cities from a given region, etc.—and there is little doubt that these associational groups in the cities, particularly those representing business and labor, will play an increasing role in the Southwest Asian politics of the future.

### *The Changing Role of Leadership*

Little needs to be said about the political leadership of the traditional monarchies. In Afghanistan, and until now in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, leading political positions such as cabinet portfolios have been a virtual monopoly of the princes of the royal house and a few associated tribal or religious leaders. In the "systems in flux," on the other hand, an older conservative leadership must be distinguished from the revolutionary leadership that seeks to replace it. The more traditional leaders, who still predominate in Iran and Jordan and who controlled Iraq until 1958,

include mainly large landowners and members of the traditional urban upper class whose record of public service goes back for several generations or even centuries. Within the rising elite, journalists, lawyers, schoolteachers, engineers, and other Western-educated members of the professions are prominent.

Army officers have held an important place in both the older and newer elites, as the examples of Nuri al-Said and the Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq well illustrate. In part, the conflict between the two leadership groups is one between generations, the defenders of the established order being mostly men in their fifties and sixties, the advocates of drastic change in their thirties and forties. (Muhammad Musaddiq, who as a septuagenarian led the abortive Iranian revolution of 1951-53, is a rare exception.) This age factor means that the younger generation's revolutionary urge is tempered by the awareness that they are bound to move into power through mere passage of time. It also means that young radicals may lose their exuberant enthusiasm for change by the time they achieve power through peaceful or forceful means and have come to enjoy it during some lucrative years in office. Nuri al-Said was a young lieutenant in his late twenties when he prominently joined the nationalist movement to erect an Iraqi state upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire; forty years later he had become the symbol of the corrupt established order, which younger Iraqis would confidently have expected to crumble upon Nuri's retirement for ill health, even if he had not met his violent death in the 1958 revolution.

All political leadership performs a function of mediation—mediation among the conflicting aspirations of politically articulate citizens, mediation between the traditional foundations of politics and an emerging new order, mediation between a country's limited resources of political power and its ambitions for international prestige, mediation, most generally, be-

tween aspiration and reality. At difficult periods of transition—from foreign or dynastic rule to nationhood, from a traditional agrarian, religious order to a modern urban, industrial society—this task of mediation involves many complex, rapid, and fateful decisions. Such periods of swift and fundamental transition therefore generally require strong personal leadership, an arrangement which heightens the chances of both success and failure. Successful leadership depends not only on the leader's sagacity in assessing the real situation and its potentialities for the future and on his ability to symbolize in a coherent fashion the diverse hopes of his followers. It also hinges on his ability to select subordinate leaders who can assist him in his task and from among whom a successor will emerge when the original leader passes from the scene.

The preceding discussion of the dynamic elements in Southwest Asian politics—of

parties, elections, and interest groups—throws into sharp relief the vast range of differences among the several countries. Many factors of traditional religion, social structure, and culture are common to the entire region, and these forces still are supreme in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. The modernizing forces of political organization and agitation, of reform and revolution, which have barely begun to impinge on these traditional monarchies, are more fully at work in the "systems in flux"; the forces of tradition are still in uneasy control in Iran and Jordan, those of revolution are triumphant in Iraq, whereas Syria shifts back and forth among various points of the spectrum. Only in Turkey and especially in Israel have stable forms of political organization emerged. It goes without saying that the operation of formal governmental institutions is profoundly affected by these differences of political dynamics.

# Decision-Making: The Organs of Government

## VI

The Near East, as we have seen, was among the earliest parts of the non-European world to adopt the Western custom of written constitutions, and the influence of particular European models, such as that of the Belgian Constitution of 1831 on the Ottoman fundamental law of 1876, is palpable. The early enthusiasm for codified constitutions arose in the optimistic minds of nineteenth-century reformers who, with a few decisive legal changes, hoped to cure the evils of autocracy, of social backwardness, of economic insolvency, and of military weakness. The immediate sequence of events, however, led to rapid disillusionment. The proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 was followed within the year by renewed defeat at the hands of Russia and, in 1881, by the institution of a European-controlled administration for the Ottoman public debt. In Egypt, the constitutionalist movement of 1881–82 was thwarted in its embryonic stage by the British occupation of the country. And in Iran, the constitutional revolution of 1905–06 foundered against partitions from abroad and coups from within.

Even aside from these foreign complications, the new constitutional precepts were more easily promulgated than implemented. At times, the constitution as a whole or essential parts of it were simply ignored. Abdülhamid's prorogation of the new Ottoman Parliament in 1878—as it turned out, for thirty years—is a glaring example. Similarly, in Iran the upper chamber envisaged by the 1905–06 Constitution was only convened as late as 1949. More basically, the absence of voluntary associations and of deeply rooted, stable party organizations made the purposeful operation of institutions of parliamentary government difficult or impossible. The experience of the Ottoman Empire after 1908 demonstrated how quickly the universal hopes for a liberal constitutional order could be converted into the ugly reality of a partisan and military dictatorship. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, the proclamations of parliamentary supremacy contained in the fundamental laws did not prevent the preponderance of the French mandate administration in Syria and of the clique around King Faysal and General Nuri in Iraq, around Riza Shah in Iran, and around Kemal and his People's Party in Turkey.

Four Southwest Asian countries still operate without formal constitutions. At one ex-

treme stand pre-1962 Yemen, Afghanistan (whose 1931 constitution was never implemented), and Saudi Arabia. Here, in theory, the ruler's will is supreme within the confines of traditional Islamic law. At the other extreme stands Israel, where a combination of British tradition and of objections by the orthodox Rabbinate have prevented the adoption of a formal written constitution, although the unwritten constitution based on parliamentary cabinet government and civil liberties is strongly entrenched. All other countries—Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Turkey—have written constitutions which they operate with varying success. The experience with the Menderes dictatorship in Turkey—based on a constitution providing for strong legislative supremacy, an electoral law heavily weighted in favor of the plurality party, and party by-laws giving extensive powers to the top leader—has given rise, as we have seen, to a thorough constitutional re-examination; and the constitution for the Second Republic provides for such safeguards against concentration of power as bicameralism, judicial review, proportional representation, and a detailed codification of civil rights.

In Iran and Jordan, the written provisions for constitutional monarchy lead a precarious existence amid the realities of royal prerogative and revolutionary popular ferment. In Lebanon, the parliamentary republican constitution has operated fairly smoothly, with occasional interruptions such as those in 1952 and 1958; the real balance of the political system is provided by the recognition on all sides that toleration and a modicum of cooperation among the rival denominations are essential to the country's commercial prosperity. The provisional constitution of the Iraqi Republic of 1958 vests all power in a three-man presidential council; after an initial period of repression, parties have been allowed to form, after acquiring an official license, and parliamentary elections are vaguely promised.

The United Arab Republic Constitution of March 5, 1958, contained a large number of declamatory provisions attesting to the nationalist and social-reformist convictions of its sponsors (e.g., Article 1: ". . . its people are a part of the Arab nation;" Article 3: "Social solidarity is the basis of society;" Article 6: "Social justice is the basis for the levying of taxes and for public expenditures"). But the Constitution was conveniently vague as to the structure of governmental machinery (Article 13: "Legislative power is exercised by the National Assembly. A decree of the President of the Republic will determine the number of its members and the manner of their selection . . ."). In contrast to other dictatorships which prevent the formation of rival parties in practice rather than in theory, a decree by President Nasser, issued one week after the U.A.R. Constitution went into effect (although it was earlier in effect in Egypt) prohibited all political parties with the exception of the officially sponsored "National Union."

Beneath this top layer of varied formal institutions there is a fair degree of uniformity of administrative structure and procedure. The local administration is usually patterned on the French model, with prefects appointed from the central Interior Ministry. The judiciary is not formally separated from the rest of the administration—courts are part of the Ministry of Justice much as tax bureaus are of the Ministry of Finance. Although judges usually are irremovable, punitive transfers and compulsory retirements limit their independence. The armed forces under the chief of staff usually play an independent role within or vis-à-vis the government, even where they are nominally subordinated to a civilian Minister of Defense. The religious establishment is paid from public funds. Except for Turkey, where secular legislation has been in effect since the 1920's, religious authorities still define and administer the law of marriage and inheritance. Education is public and secular and its administration centralized. All in all, the notorious instability and radicalism of Southwest Asian politics have been mitigated by a remarkable degree of administrative conservatism and continuity.

# Governmental Performance

## VII

Any reasoned evaluation of governmental performance must make explicit the standards of judgment to be applied. It used to be fashionable in the West, and particularly in the United States, to assume that democracy, being based on "self-evident truths," was the natural form of government which could be expected to come into existence automatically as soon as the restraints of dynastic absolutism or colonial rule were removed. (Much in the same vein, nineteenth-century liberal economists assumed that individual initiative freed from government control would be guided by the "unseen hand" of a benevolent if secularized Providence to insure prosperity and welfare for the community at large.) On the basis of such conceptions, it would be easy to become indignant at governments of Southwest Asia (or, for that matter of other parts of Asia, Africa, or Latin America) for their inexcusable laggardness in attaining a full flowering of democratic liberties and free-enterprise prosperity. Such a judgment would be as irrelevant as the underlying axioms are naive.

We have come to realize in the twentieth century that representative institutions, more perhaps than any other form of government, are the product of gradual evolution and of special historical circumstances. Thus, in Western Europe, the basic task of national unification was accomplished in painful struggles from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and the administrative structure of modern states evolved under the absolute monarchs who reigned from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, long before legislative control and popular elections became the order of the day. In Southwest Asia, the quest for basic national identity and for country-wide systems of administration is still a major item on the political agenda—at a time when the populations in most of the states already are impatient for the tangible benefits of social welfare and economic progress.

A more realistic assessment of the performance of Southwest Asian governmental systems must consider in turn the establishment of new states, the assertion and maintenance of their independence, the expansion of governmental and administrative functions, and, finally, their accomplishments in the economic and social spheres. Above all, we must not forget how recent a creation the present South-

west Asian state system is. As late as 1914, Syria and Iraq were mere geographic concepts, Jordan was the name only of the river and as a country not even a geographic concept; and Turkey was a European misnomer for the Ottoman Empire. Arabia was a congeries of amirates, shaykhdoms, and tribal confederations among which the Saudi was one of the lesser. What was to become Israel was a utopian dream in the minds of a handful of absentee Zionist enthusiasts. Only Iran and Afghanistan had had a political identity dating back several centuries. The most remarkable achievement of most Southwest Asian states, then, is that they have managed to become established and to maintain themselves in existence as recognizable political entities at all.

Maintenance of political identity has involved a struggle in two directions—against internal forces of disruption and against outside threats to independence. Some of the countries of the region have registered their most solid achievements in the field of internal unification. The Kurdish mountaineers, who were a disruptive force defiant of any outside government as late as the 1920's, have been fully subdued and integrated in Turkey but continue to pose a serious challenge in Iraq. The tribes of the Arabian peninsula were unified and subjected to government control—often for the first time in history—by the concerted efforts of Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi religious brotherhood. And Israel has imbued a polyglot mass of immigrants with a common national purpose and sentiment. Even Lebanon, faced with a precarious seesaw balance of Christians and Muslims, has found unity in an institutionalized pluralism. Only Jordan notably lacks in national integration, making the survival of state and dynasty amid the swirling crosscurrents of Near Eastern politics all the more notable an accomplishment.

The external independence of Southwest Asian countries has been attained and main-

tained more often by good fortune than by the countries' own efforts. Only Turkey and Israel owe their statehood to wars of independence, and these two wars were fought only against comparatively weak local antagonists. The termination of Ottoman rule over Arabs was achieved mainly by force of British arms, and it was the exhaustion of Britain and France in their war with Germany and Japan in 1939–45 which effectively undermined European hegemony. More recently, the rivalry between the United States and Russia has turned out to be the most effective guarantee of the independence of the states of Southwest Asia. Each superpower has tended to shield the area from domination by the other, and both jointly have warded off aggressive interference by smaller powers, such as the concerted Israeli-French-British attack on Egypt in 1956.

Within the boundaries of these new Southwest Asian states, there has been a steady growth of governmental function and administrative machinery. In the Ottoman Empire of the mid-nineteenth century, some 90 per cent of public revenues were expended on the armed forces, the civil list, and the servicing of the mounting public debt. The ruler's power, though all-encompassing in theory, hardly extended beyond his palace and capital and rarely reached into the daily lives of his subjects. Today, by contrast, universal military training, universal public education, extensive public works programs, and a wide array of economic controls, individual income taxes and social welfare legislation, state-owned transportation networks and broadcasting systems have given modern governments, in all but the most traditional states, a power and a responsibility over the daily lives of the citizenry beyond the wildest dreams of nineteenth-century sultans or shahs. And although corruption and partisan repression are common phenomena, a growing elite of civil servants with a modern, Western education are administering this vast network of government functions with increasing dedication and competence. The principle that government is the servant of the people and that it should be representative of their aspirations is accepted

without theoretical challenge in nearly all countries of the region, finding increasing acceptance even in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

The governments' practical possibilities to serve their publics are circumscribed by a perennial shortage of trained manpower, by the highly uneven distribution of economic resources among the countries of the region, and by constantly rising popular aspirations. Of the countries of Southwest Asia, Turkey was the fortunate heir to the late Ottoman Empire's pool of administrative manpower—army officers, judges, district administrators, teachers—roughly nine-tenths of which stayed in the Turkish Republic, with the remainder dividing mainly between Syria and Iraq. Israel, too, has been fortunate in being able to count on the superior skills and dedication of early Jewish immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe who prepared the state for the subsequent absorption of masses of immigrants from the Near East.

Elsewhere, administrative systems had to be created in the almost total absence of trained or experienced personnel. It is symbolic that, whereas the Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal, who had risen to the rank of brigadier general in the Ottoman army, the new Iraqi state was formed by a group of officers who had been lieutenants or captains before joining Amir Faysal's liberation army. Even in Turkey, the traditional ethnic division of labor, which relegated the trades and professions to non-Muslims, left a noticeable gap

in the middle-class occupations once power shifted to the Muslim majority. Throughout the area, there remains a severe shortage of doctors, engineers, accountants, and other technicians of economic development. Although increasing numbers of these are graduated from indigenous institutions of higher learning—especially in Turkey and more recently in Iran—there is still heavy reliance on study abroad (in Europe, the United States, and more recently Russia) or at the foreign colleges in the area (such as the American University of Beirut and Robert College in Istanbul).

The rapid increase in oil royalties received by Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq has made available monetary resources for economic development which would have surpassed the wildest dreams of previous generations. Foreign aid—mainly from the United States government to Turkey and Iran, from Britain to Jordan, from the U.S.S.R. to Iraq and Afghanistan, and from private United States sources (mainly the United Jewish Appeal) to Israel—has added equally sizable amounts. Yet a variety of factors limits the economic effectiveness of this capital inflow—the lack of natural resources other than oil in Kuwayt and Saudi Arabia, widespread governmental corruption in Iran, lack of planning and coordination in Turkey. Dedicated and skilled leadership in the political, economic, and technical fields still tends to be the scarcest resource, and it is in this respect most particularly that Israel excels among the countries of Southwest Asia.



# Problems and Prospects

## VIII

In assessing the forces for change in Southwest Asian politics, we must accord a crucial place to the uncertainties of the international situation. The Near East has long been a crossroads of power conflict, from the days of Darius, Alexander, and Pompey to those of Napoleon, Eisenhower, and Khrushchev. Its transportation routes, once important for the silk and spice trade or as part of the British Empire's "life line to India," today convey a steady stream of petroleum from the wells of the Persian Gulf region to the furnaces and fuel tanks of Europe. In the cold war between Russia and the West, the Near East has held an important strategic position, first as a barrier to Soviet expansion toward the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Africa, and more recently as a testing ground for the competitive appeal of the Communist versus the democratic socio-economic orders

to rapidly modernizing states and peoples.

With the shift of global military strategy from bombers to missiles—and also with the involvement of countries of Africa and Latin America in the East-West political contest—the alignment of this or that piece of territory in the pattern of military alliances has become less important. But international crises have focused on the Near East at regular intervals—Azerbaijan in 1945–46, Palestine in 1948, Iranian oil in 1951, Suez in 1954 and 1956, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in 1958, Yemen in 1962. Western imperial positions have irretrievably been relinquished, except for the British-protected territories along the Arabian coast. But a Soviet take-over in one or another country, whether through internal revolt followed by military occupation or through increasingly closer cooperation with indigenous leaders, remains a possibility which would change the domestic political picture of the affected country thoroughly and pose a novel threat to its neighbors.

But even aside from these external complications, much international ferment is generated within the Near East itself. Although a peace of sorts between Israel and her Arab neighbors was restored after the 1948 and 1956 military clashes, the conflict may flare up anew at some future point over the division of Jordan waters for irrigation, over Israeli passage through the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba, or over the fate of Palestinian Arab refugees. Among the Arab states, the borders

drawn as part of the European-imposed settlement of the First World War enjoy no respect, and political loyalties continue to be divided between existing states and the unrealized ideal of a wider Arab nation-state. Recurrent territorial claims and conflicts have been the result—along the Yemen-Aden border, around the Buraymi oasis, over Kuwayt, and elsewhere. The Egyptian-Syrian merger of 1958 has been the only tangible step so far toward Arab unification, and the dissolution of that union in 1961 has taken much of the impetus out of the Arab unification drive of the 1950's. It seems likely that the Arab countries will become increasingly conscious of their separate identities, although any major internal change of regime in any of the countries (such as the collapse of monarchy in Yemen or Jordan) may present the question in a new form. Needless to say, any basic realignment of borders without will drastically alter the operation of the political process within. In view of the abundance of oil income in Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the smaller Persian Gulf territories (in contrast to the economic poverty and overpopulation of states like Egypt and Jordan), the socio-economic consequences of any sweeping realignment will be equally profound.

International complications, border revisions, and possible mergers apart, it seems safe to predict that the combined operation of political and social pressures will transform political processes in Yemen and Afghanistan, making them increasingly resemble those countries we have called "political systems in flux." In this latter category, it seems likely that the monarchic-oligarchic systems of Iran,

Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will sooner or later (and probably in that sequence) be threatened by the type of revolution that swept away the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and the Iraqi monarchy in 1958—and that already came close to success in Iran in 1953 and in Jordan in the late fifties.

In the post-revolutionary regimes of Egypt-U.A.R. and Iraq, there has been a remarkable parallelism of political dynamics. A period of vigorous suppression of representatives of the *ancien régime* has been followed by a gradual diversification of the support of the military dictatorship; promises of socio-economic reform (facing enormous demographic obstacles in Egypt and more hopeful prospects in Iraq) have alternated with ambitious manifestations of an expansionist foreign policy, and an initial period of close cooperation in international affairs with the Soviet Union has given way to a more realistic assessment of the dangers of Communist imperialism and to a more genuinely neutralist course. In the absence of other yardsticks, similar developments may be envisaged for any future post-revolutionary regimes in Jordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. For some time, in any case, the choice of domestic regime for most Southwest Asian countries seems to lie between conservative, pseudo-constitutional oligarchy and attempts at social revolution under auspices of a military or party dictatorship. Genuinely democratic institutions are solidly entrenched only in Israel. In Turkey, after the initial false start under Menderes in the 1950's, they will have a second chance in the Second Republic of the 1960's.

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ROBERT E. WARD

# Epilogue



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## I

In the introduction to this volume, we noted our concern not only with the structure and decision-making processes of Asian political systems but with their political "output" or performance characteristics as well. We pointed out several themes of particular interest and importance: the course and progress of political modernization in Asia, the competition between democratic and authoritarian forms of political organization, and the success or failure of Asian governments in charting an effective course between political stability and political change. Having examined the political systems of most of the countries of Asia, what can we conclude about the recent political experience of sub-Soviet Asia as a whole?

Before a country can have a "modern" political system, it first must have a "modern" society. A "modern" society, a new type of social development that has appeared in mature form only in the course of the last century, is characterized by its ability to influence the physical and social circumstances of its environment. More specifically, in its non-political sectors it is also characterized by:

1. Low birth, death, and morbidity rates.
2. Greater inanimate than animate sources of energy.
3. Advanced tool technology, mechanization, and industrialization.
4. A high degree of specialization and professionalization of labor.
5. A high level of gross and per capita national product of goods and services.

6. A high degree of urbanization.
7. A high level of differentiation and specialization in social organization.
8. A high degree of social mobility based on standards of achievement.
9. A high level of literacy, mass education, and mass-media circulation.

No society, of course, completely possesses all these qualities, for even the most "modern" society contains some traces of pre-modern or traditional elements. Although nations share many common features—both old and new—each has its own mixture of modern and pre-modern elements. In some cases, there is hardly any "mix" at all, the country being almost purely a traditional type such as Yemen or Afghanistan or largely "modern," as are the United States and the U.S.S.R. Between these extremes, many other mixtures of traditional and modern elements are possible, as the case of contemporary Asia well demonstrates.

In a modern political system, the organization of government is highly specialized and differentiated, the system of decision-making is rational and secular, and governmental decisions and actions are numerous, far-reaching, and efficacious. A "modern" polity is also characterized by:

1. A general sense of identification on the part of the people with the history and national identity of the state.
2. Widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in its decision-making aspects.
3. The allocation of political roles in accordance with standards of achievement rather than of family or class.
4. Judicial and regulatory techniques based on a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law.



Other attributes may also be important, but for our present purposes this can serve as a working list of qualities possessed by all political systems generally regarded as being "modern." We might add that while political modernization is, of course, a continuing process, it is not necessarily one that will continue forever. Other types of political systems, differing in important respects from that defined above as "modern," can conceivably evolve. Such speculation aside, however, the present utility of the concept of "political modernization" rests on the hope that it accurately defines the essential features of the political systems that have appeared in all so-called advanced societies and that it also represents the pattern toward which politically underdeveloped societies are evolving.

Two other aspects of the concept of "political modernization" should be noted. First, no political system is completely "modern." Even those regarded as being the most modern have substantial elements that should be classified as pre-modern or traditional, and these elements seem capable of coexisting with the dominant modern components for long periods of time, perhaps indefinitely. In fact, they sometimes support the modernizing process in important respects. Second, the concept of political modernization draws no moral distinctions among democratic, totalitarian, or intermediate types of governments. The form of government is not a deciding factor. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are politically modern societies.

If we apply the above standards of political modernity to the Asian political systems we have described in this book, we immediately see that very few of them possess these characteristics to a degree that would make them even roughly comparable to the United States or to the European political systems that were examined in the other volume of this series. Only Japan and Israel among all the states of Asia may be said to be politically "modern,"

although throughout Asia the process of modernization is taking place. Turkey, the Chinese People's Republic, and India have obviously moved some distance along this path as have the Republic of the Philippines, Lebanon, and Malaya.

Most Asian countries, however, clearly do not stand upon the brink of effective political modernization. The process is long and complex, and the aptitudes and capacities of the different societies vary widely. But it is probably true that all the states of Asia have crossed its lower threshold. In fact, the degree of "modernizing" that has taken place in most Asian political systems since the Second World War is remarkable—more basic political changes have occurred in the last twenty years than in the several preceding centuries. These Asian countries, however, are not being judged only against previous conditions in Asia; they are also being considered in the light of the gap—even if a slowly dwindling one—that divides the majority of them from the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Western Europe. Indeed, for some purposes, a knowledge of this gap is of more immediate and practical importance than is a knowledge of the homogenizing forces that are striving to close it.

If you will examine the comparative tables set forth in the Appendix, some of the dimensions of this gap will become apparent. The statistics for some of the Asian states are not completely reliable, but, where available, they usually do give a roughly accurate measure of the particular Asian performances versus our own or European performances. The averages derived from the available Asian statistics tend to overstate the level of performance for Asia as a whole, for the Japanese and Israeli figures are usually unrepresentatively high, and the statistics for many of the less developed Asian states are not known. This means that we are often averaging figures that are representative of only the higher levels of Asian performance. Needless to say, no single factor among these comparative listings—such as literacy, degree of industrialization, or the size of per capita shares of the national product—can serve as an accurate index of levels of modernization. But a comparison of the

total performance records characteristic of Asia against those of the five Western societies (the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the U.S.S.R.) is revealing. Incidentally, the term "European" is used in the following paragraphs to refer to the last four of these five Western societies.

The rates of annual population increase (see Table I) are more than twice as high in Asia as they are in the United States, France, Germany, or Great Britain. These reflect the different birth, death, and morbidity rates that are characteristic of pre-modern societies. The available Asian figures for life expectancy at birth (Table I), show an average of 48.38 years for males and 50.89 for females, if we except the uniformly untypical cases of Japan and Israel. Even though these are appreciably higher averages than would result were figures available for more than just eight of the twenty-two Asian states with which we are concerned, they still compare most unfavorably with the United States' figure of 66.5 years for males and 73.0 for females, or with the European figure of 66.55 for males and 72.96 for females. In percentages of literacy among national populations (Table III), the contrast between Asia and the West is even more striking. The Asian average is 36 per cent (30 per cent without Japan and Israel) as opposed to a Western average of 98 per cent.

The available figures on educational attainment (Table III) reflect and support these literacy statistics. In twenty-one Asian states, an average of only 37 per cent of the population aged five to fourteen (33 per cent without Japan and Israel) and 21 per cent (15 per cent)<sup>1</sup> of the population aged fifteen to nineteen are enrolled in primary and secondary schools, respectively. The over-all average for the five to nineteen-year-old class is about 33 per cent (28 per cent). The comparable averages for the Western states are 73 per cent for primary enrollments, 65 per cent for secondary enrollments, and 71 per cent for the over-all figure. A

somewhat more precise measure of Asian-Western educational differences is provided by the figures for adjusted school-enrollment ratios. These attempt to compensate for the fact that the age groups actually enrolled in a given country's school system frequently do not correspond to the arbitrary range of 5 through 19 years utilized as a definition of the school-age population in the calculation of the preceding figures, and for the fact that the duration of schooling varies markedly from country to country. Such adjusted ratios indicate that an average of 43 per cent (38 per cent) of this more precisely defined school-age population is actually enrolled in the primary and secondary schools of the twenty Asian states for which figures are available. This contrasts with an average of 88 per cent for the five Western countries. The case of newspaper circulation per thousand inhabitants is similar (Table III): an average of 50 (22) per thousand inhabitants for Asia, as opposed to 328 for the United States and 325 for Europe. The figures for the distribution of radio sets and the circulation of domestic mail are comparable (see Table III).

If we turn to one of the basic indicators of modernity—the urban-rural distribution of population—a similar situation emerges (Table I). Despite recent increases, only 14.7 per cent of the population of these Asian states now dwell in cities of over 100,000, as opposed to some 30.1 per cent in the five Western states concerned. A breakdown of the origins of gross domestic product supports this finding (Table V). The importance of the primary or rural-linked sector of industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting) bulks large in Asia, accounting for an average of 37 per cent of gross domestic product in the fourteen states for which figures are available. The figure would be significantly higher if data for the other eight Asian states could be included. A comparable figure for the four Western states listed is 6 per cent. In the

<sup>1</sup> Percentages or figures in parentheses in this section refer to averages for the states of Asia excluding Japan and Israel.

more modern secondary sector (mining, manufacturing, and construction), the difference is also impressive. This sector accounts for an average of 20 per cent of gross domestic product in the same fourteen Asian states as opposed to 45 per cent for the four Western states. The figures for the tertiary sector (transportation, communication, trade, public administration, service, etc.) are, of course, the reciprocals of the two former categories and show the expected variations: 43 per cent for the Asian group and 49 per cent for the Western. An analysis of the labor-force distribution among the same three industrial sectors for eight Asian and four European states points up these contrasts even more forcefully (Table II). Among the Asian states, an average of 58.8 per cent of their labor force is working in primary rural employments, as against 15.1 per cent in secondary and 26.1 per cent in tertiary employments. Comparable figures for the four European states are 21.6 per cent, 41.8 per cent, and 35.5 per cent.

Perhaps the most meaningful of all these types of indicators are the figures on gross national product calculated on a per capita basis and the relative standards of national achievement which they crudely reflect (see Table IV). Here the Asian average expressed in United States' dollars is about \$174, while that for the United States is \$2,790, and for the four European states, \$1,132. If we attempt a rough translation of this "money" measurement into "real" terms, i.e., the actual purchasing power of this "money" in the societies concerned, the Asian average is increased to about \$275, but it still contrasts most unfavorably with the United States' "real" figure of \$2,790 and the European \$1,439.

Indicators of modernization based on industrial production and consumption yield a similar picture (see Table II). The Asian states for which figures are available produce electric energy at an average rate of 10,088

million kilowatt hours per year, in contrast to the United States' figure of 840,946 million and the European average of 154,369 million. Only five states in Asia produce any crude steel, so a comparison in this field is largely meaningless. Asian cement production averages about 2,890,000 metric tons as opposed to a European average of 24,569,000 and an American figure of 56,063,000 metric tons. On the consumption side, the Asian states concerned were using energy at a rate of 273 kilograms per capita (174 without Japan and Israel), as opposed to a United States' figure of 8,013 and a European average of 3,455. The figures for average per capita consumption of crude steel were comparable: 41 kilograms for Asia (22 without Japan and Israel), against 501 for the United States and 388 for the four European states. The statistics on relative volumes of railway traffic are comparable.

All these indicators point up what is collectively referred to as the economic backwardness of most Asian states. They also define an important ingredient of the politics of Asia. If there is one thing which characterizes and unites the political systems of all of Asia, it is their overwhelming absorption with problems of economic development. Thus increased productivity along "modern" lines is really the touchstone of politics in Asia. Ultimately, Asian governments stand or fall by this test.

Although none of these indicators is specifically political in nature, together they provide a most useful insight into the short-term political potentialities of these societies. They serve as a crude measure of the distance separating the majority of the peoples of Asia from those in a "modern" society, and they are more precisely quantifiable than are the specifically political characteristics of modern states. Since many of the political goals of the Asian states are defined in economic terms, these socio-economic indicators also measure the success of the political performance of these states.

Thus when we proceed from this type of statistical measurement to a consideration of the more specifically political characteristics of Asian states, it is not surprising to find

that these, too, confirm the distance that separates the average Asian country from the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, and West Germany in level of political modernization.

We need not discuss the characteristics of political modernity in detail to demonstrate this point. A selection of some of their more critical aspects will suffice for our present purposes. In each instance, notable exceptions will doubtless occur to the reader. Japan and Israel, for example, obviously constitute exceptions to many of the following generalizations, while China, India, and Turkey fall outside the ambit of some of them. Still, on the average, the characteristics discussed below tend to be true for most of the twenty-two Asian states under consideration.

Take, for example, the element of political modernity that calls for widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system (though not necessarily in its decision-making aspects). Most of the states of Asia still have so-called dual societies in which the traditional world of the villagers and nomads is sharply contrasted with the modernizing world of the larger cities. Both worlds are changing, but the former much more slowly and in a more piecemeal fashion than the latter. The traditionally oriented elements of the population far outnumber the modernizing ones. Political apathy, the salience of local rather than national social and political issues, and the primacy of communal or family identifications rather than some broader political allegiance are characteristic of village Asia. Neither the communications nor the educational systems in most of Asia yet generate any very widespread popular interest or involvement in national political systems.

Nor is there much popular identification with the history and national spirit of the present states of Asia. Few of the Asian states have histories that extend back farther than the First World War, and thus they have had a very short independent national existence within their present boundaries. Many date from after the Second World War. In this very brief period of time, the peoples of the various states have not succeeded in developing very strong feelings of what might

be called "constructive nationalism," but have tended to keep the revolutionary brand which characterized their national struggles for independence. Progress toward nationalism has been hindered by the "dual" quality of these nations, in which only a minority segment of the population has been effectively awakened to sentiments of national identity. Again, the prevalence of large groups of dissatisfied minority populations and the competition offered to nationalism by historic religious, caste, linguistic, and regional loyalties has detracted seriously from the broad development of a constructive nationalism. Even many of the existing international boundaries of Asia are subject to bitter disputes. They often represent little more than the expediences of nineteenth- or twentieth-century colonial politics and lack any appreciable historical or truly national sanction. Under these circumstances, it is still too early to speak with assurance of any really general and effective sense of popular identification with the new nations of Asia. Such a sense seems to be developing in many countries, but it will almost certainly take a good deal of time to spread through the mass of the people.

The structure and role of political parties also tend to be different in Asia. The parties are centered in the capitals or the major cities, where their normal organizational and other activities are concentrated, to a greater degree than are the parties of the West. Consequently, few Asian political parties have succeeded in establishing anything approximating the popular base enjoyed by many of their Western counterparts. Asian parties are more apt to reflect specifically regional, class, caste, economic, religious, racial, or linguistic interests. In societies where the bulk of the population is normally apathetic toward most political issues, the parties must construct political alliances from far more restricted segments of the population than is the case in the West. Asian societies thus tend to be far less

saturated by the organizations and activities of political parties than do the Western nations.

Many Asian political systems also have considerable difficulty in peacefully accommodating any meaningful political opposition. Such exclusiveness is certainly not an Asian monopoly, but it is sufficiently widespread in Asia to merit notice. It has been hard even for many of the more advanced countries to transcend a one-party system. Tolerance of political opposition, respect for minority rights, and appreciation of the constructive contributions which opposition parties can make to the stability of a political system are attitudes which are often restricted to oratory among the practical politicians of Asia. In the less developed states, of course, the problem scarcely arises. There are no political parties to pose such questions.

The allocation of political power is another critical area where notable differences between Asia and the West exist. In most Asian states, political positions are no longer bestowed exclusively on the basis of nobility of birth, caste, religious affiliation, or military prowess. The possession of any or all of these qualities may still be a decided practical advantage, but the terms of political competition have changed, and so, to some degree, have the qualifications demanded of political leaders. A modern education, oratorical skill, parliamentary knowledge and experience, administrative talent, an attractive and forceful personality, wealth, modern military training and ability, and similar qualities have been replacing the older standards for the selection of political leaders. The allocation of political power in Asia has thus come more to resemble that in the West, but important differences remain. For example, many contemporary political leaders in Asia have been closely associated with the revolutionary stages of their countries' struggles for independence or greater international status, and their talents are usually those best adapted to leading na-

tionalist revolutions: personal courage, perseverance, oratorical skill, a knowledge of guerrilla tactics and rabble-rousing techniques, ruthlessness, and a long personal record of dedication to the revolutionary cause. While these men are well equipped for the immediate "destructive" needs of revolution, they are not as well adjusted to the less glamorous but more disciplined demands of building a modern society.

The methods of competition for leadership roles in most of Asia are quite different from those in the West. Ambitious candidates compete in far more restricted circles, with much less publicity, and with markedly less public accountability. Only relatively small sectors of the population of Asia are aware of the process by which their national leaders are selected, and a far smaller segment is in any way involved in the process, even to the extent of endorsing political acts through the ritual forms utilized in Communist states. The selection of leaders is thus a more exclusive and private function than in the West. The potential disadvantages of this situation, however, may to some extent be offset by the prestige of political careers in Asia. The best people are apt to aspire to positions of political leadership.

The nature of the bureaucracy is also different throughout most of Asia. There is no scarcity of bureaucrats as such, but there is a serious lack of well-trained and professional specialists, particularly at the intermediate and lower levels. In the West, we frequently use such phrases as "the administrative state" or "the managerial revolution" to signify the enormous importance of professional skills in the management of our society. Asia is very far from such a situation in several respects. First, political leaders still dominate the administration of public affairs and subtract a great deal of power and influence from the professionally trained bureaucrats. Second, public administration itself, outside of the former British areas, is often regarded as a largely legalistic rather than a technical type of operation. The focus of the administrator is often narrowly and exclusively legal and, in this sense, "bureaucratic." Administrators who are professionally trained as engineers,

public health specialists, foresters, agronomists, etc., are relatively new to most of Asia and often have a lower status and much less power than the more traditional bureaucrats. Third, most all of the Asian countries desperately need far more truly professional, well-trained technicians and administrators than are available. If this gap is to be narrowed and the administrative efficiency of these societies is to be significantly improved, the prestige and power of the technically trained bureaucrat must be substantially improved, probably at the expense of the politicians and "legalist" bureaucrats.

In most Asian states—with the prime exception of China—the lives and activities of average citizens are much less affected by governmental social and economic actions than is the case in the West. The social and economic organizations in these countries have not yet become so complex and interdependent as to require massive governmental regulation. As a consequence, many functions that are performed by governments in the West are often either unnecessary at present in Asia or are regulated by custom, the family, clan, community, or some other non-political agency. Government in its more developed and complex forms thus becomes a much more marginal activity in the life of the average Asian citizen. And its ability to control the physical, social, and economic aspects of the country's environment is notably more limited than in the West.

Practically all Asian states except Japan, China, India, and Israel have political structures that are far less complex than those of most Western states. Many types of governmental organization exist in Asia, ranging from that of Yemen to that of Japan, but the average Asian governmental apparatus at both national and local levels is far more rudimentary than is that of the major Western states. And the criteria are not just size and complexity, for government in the West affects the lives and behavior of its people far more extensively than is normally the case in Asia. Indeed, it often seems that the effects of governmental actions permeate our whole society. Asian political systems are also usually less effectively integrated than are their

Western counterparts, which are seldom models of efficiency when it comes to coordinated action. But in Asia, governments have even more trouble coordinating the activities of the several branches of their national governments as well as the relationships of national offices with those of local governments.

When national societies achieve a certain level of size and complexity, they are apparently forced to establish a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law in order to regulate the social interrelationships of their citizenry and to settle the many types of disputes that inevitably arise. The older systems of law based on religion, customs, and status and the judicial or conciliatory institutions associated with them are simply not adequate to cope with either the types or the sheer number of disputes which a modern society routinely produces. In modernizing societies, therefore, codes of conduct based primarily on custom and religious sanction tend to be gradually replaced by codes based on formal laws. This is a process which is now well advanced in an Asian state such as Japan, but scarcely begun in areas such as Yemen or Laos.

Many types of legal systems are to be found in Asia, and in a number of countries they are complicated by the importance of established religions such as Islam and Buddhism. In practically all Asian societies, customs, long-established status relationships, folkish institutions of mediation, and, in some cases, vendetta still exist alongside more modern systems of secular and impersonal law. Their role in establishing norms of social, economic, and political conduct and in the adjustment of disputes is at least as important as that of the more modern legal systems for many sectors of Asian society. The trend is in the direction of a more dominant role for secular and impersonal systems of law, but the process is a slow one and still has a long way to go before the legal systems approxi-

mate those in present-day Western countries.

Modern techniques are also being developed in the process of political decision-making in Asia. The governmental apparatus in modern societies tends continually to expand as it struggles to implement the ever-mounting number of decisions which it is the function of this apparatus to produce. In a modern decision-making system, specifically religious considerations or values—other than basic principles of morality generally accepted within the society—are usually not considered relevant to the bulk of its agenda. Such systems are thus secular in nature. As in Western governments, decisions in Asian governments are being increasingly made only after relevant data are accumulated and alternative courses of action are systematically explored. The findings are then applied to the solution of a high proportion—but far from all—of the problems which the system is called upon to resolve.

In more and more Asian countries, an attempt is also being made to generalize from particular experiences and thus to develop laws or norms of rational and scientific political decision-making. The role played by one person or a small group in the government is thus being reduced, for decisions tend to become a more impersonalized product of a system rather than the fiat of a particular leader or group. Again, Asia still has a long way to go in this process. Research and planning staffs are establishing an increasingly central place for themselves, particularly in the area of national economic planning, but the systematic application of modern techniques is still in a fairly early stage of development in most Asian governments.

## II

A second major focus of interest throughout both of these volumes on *Modern Political Systems* has been the world-wide

Many other instances could be cited of important differences between the political systems of Asia and those of the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, and Germany. For our present purposes, however, the ones we have just discussed—together with the more detailed accounts in the preceding chapters—should suffice to establish that most of the states of contemporary Asia stand in relatively early stages of the political modernization process. Japan and Israel comprise the most notable exceptions. The performance of their political systems closely approximates that of some of the West's most modern systems. Most of the other states of Asia have launched more or less systematic and large-scale attempts to modernize both their political and economic systems. Some—such as Turkey, Lebanon, China, India, and the Philippine Republic—have made notable progress in a relatively short time. Others—such as Yemen, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia—lag far behind. As a consequence, the countries of Asia display a wide range of both development and promise in the modernization of their political systems.

But the gulf that still divides the Asian systems from those of the more modernized Western states is broad and formidable. It is narrowing, but how rapidly? In the West, the political modernization process took centuries. In Japan, it has taken almost a hundred years to reach the present stage of political development. Although the new technologies and the more urgent needs of today may substantially accelerate the process of political modernization, historical experience suggests that generations are more realistic steps in measuring progress than are five-year-plans.

competition between democratic and authoritarian or totalitarian forms of political organization, and the closely associated theme of the success or failure of Asian governments in maintaining a reasonably effective balance between their needs for both political stability and political change. What general statements can we now make about these issues in Asia?

First, we must remember that there are very few democratic governments in Asia. Japan, Israel, India, and the Philippines most closely approximate Western European and American standards of democracy. Turkey might also be loosely described as a protodemocratic state, but the attribution is more dubious. Beyond these, there are few, if any, governments which in their present form can seriously be regarded as democratic in anything but ultimate aspiration. On the other hand, truly totalitarian governments are equally scarce. The Chinese People's Republic, and to a lesser degree, the governments of North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia are the sole examples. The means of governmental control and the technological and communications systems of Asian societies are too inadequately developed to sustain real totalitarian governments. Events in China since 1949 provide a warning, however, that, given a sufficiently able and ruthless group of leaders—such as the Chinese Communist Party—this low level of development is not a reliable barrier against the spread of totalitarianism in Asia.

Most contemporary Asian political systems, however, fall somewhere between these two poles of democracy and totalitarianism, and are perhaps best described as authoritarian in their political organization. On the one hand, they lack the effectively dictatorial qualities, the total mobilization of populace and resources in the service of the state, and the general rigor of truly totalitarian governments. On the other hand, such essential qualities of democratic political organization as universal suffrage, a relatively informed and participating electorate, regular and meaningful elections, responsible government, and respect for individual and minority rights are either absent or present only in such qualified or intermittent forms as to lack immediate political significance. What remains tends to be an unstable amalgam of traditional Asian forms of governmental organization and borrowings from the political institutions of both Western democracy and Western totalitarianism. Thus we come to the principal question about the political future of Asia: Will the various

countries develop along democratic or totalitarian lines or simply remain static? There are so many factors that will determine the answer that we must use great caution in making predictions. It may be useful to point out a few of the questions involved in assessing these issues.

First, what length of time are we considering? Short-term and long-term forecasts may differ significantly on questions as complex as these. As yet, the "science" of political analysis is ill-prepared to do more than venture quite tentative and qualified estimates even for relatively short periods in the future; long-range estimates are still largely acts of either faith or credulity.

Second, what is apt to be the effect of world events on the stability and on the democratic or totalitarian development of the countries of contemporary Asia? Most of the Western democracies, for example, passed through their formative stages in the far less chaotic circumstances of the nineteenth century. How essential to the democratic result were the more isolated national developments, the less devastating military technologies, and the relative absence of global strife and trauma which characterized those quieter times? Does the cold war require that the states of Asia commit themselves either to a more democratic or to a more totalitarian form of government?

Third, is it not possible then that the Asian countries will ignore the pressures from both the democratic and the totalitarian directions and continue indefinitely along the ambiguous and eclectic political lines which have characterized their political development until now? There are Latin American governments that have remained highly unstable as well as authoritarian for more than a hundred years.

No certain answers to these questions are possible. But in the short run, our most careful estimates offer small consolation to those



seeking either political stability or democracy in Asia in the near future. Even if major wars are avoided and a gradual mellowing occurs between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the problem of China remains. The present global tensions are almost certain to be with us for many years to come. And sub-Soviet Asia is one of the areas where these tensions are currently and prospectively the most acute. There the two great powers confront each other amidst one of the potentially most explosive situations in the world today. The unknown ambitions and capacities of Communist China make matters even more serious. This fact enormously complicates the already stupendous problems facing the governments of these areas. The pressure of international events on this region is growing stronger rather than weaker. When we consider the degree of political instability that has characterized the governments of much of Asia under less pressing circumstances, it is difficult to be optimistic about what the immediate future holds in store for these countries.

To reach the levels of democratization that presently exist in Japan and India, most of Asia will have to struggle, not for years, but for generations. The social prerequisites for democracy, like those for political modernization, include widespread literacy and education, economic development and a reasonable measure of economic security, a developed system of modern communications, and domestic peace. These are just beginning to emerge in much of Asia. Beyond this, democracy also requires a developed and responsible party system, respect for human and minority rights, and an effective belief in government as the servant of the people. These are still in an embryonic stage in most of Asia, and they can develop only slowly and under favorable circumstances. In Japan and India, for example, it has taken almost a hundred years

of widely diversified experience and slow development to produce the present political societies. For anyone to assume that such circumstances now exist or will shortly emerge throughout Asia in general is both fatuous and dangerous.

These may seem to be direly pessimistic views of the present political conditions and the political future of Asia. They are not so intended. They represent an attempt to generalize about Asian politics and political systems in somewhat more realistic terms than are often employed, with the hope that these may provide a basis for more accurate understanding of and more effective action toward a fascinating and extremely important part of the world. From the viewpoint of the United States, it is not essential that all or most of the non-Communist states of Asia be democratized in the near future. It is enough that they make whatever progress may prove possible toward economic and political stability and modernization and that they not become Communist or make common military or political cause with the Communist bloc. We have no choice at present in most of Asia but to support and work with some form of authoritarian political systems. Little else exists, or is apt soon to emerge. Our own commitment to democracy and a somewhat naive and unhistoric view of the capacity of external economic, military, and technical assistance to engender democracy too often combine to obscure this fact. It is essential for us to realize that political modernization in Asia need not involve democratization. Both are important, but in most cases only modernization may at present be feasible. However, there are excellent reasons for believing that progress toward political modernization—authoritarian though its early political forms may be—can, with public understanding and support, gradually build toward a political system that will become effectively democratic.

# Appendix



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## Comparative Analysis

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# Comparative Tables of Statistics

The following six tables furnish specific insights into the relative levels of performance and development of the twenty-six societies under consideration in *Modern Political Systems: Europe* and *Modern Political Systems: Asia*. Figures for the United States have been added to provide a further measure of comparison. In compiling tables of this sort, we must always question what particular types of indicators are most meaningful. A great many more than we have used are available. This particular selection represents our best judgment of the measurements that are most useful in our comparative study of the socio-economic development of political systems that are experiencing varying degrees of modernization. The tables should also provide the reader with a ready source of reference for the basic statistical facts about the countries under consideration. Thus they complement the more detailed tables and charts that appear under the various countries and regions in the two volumes.

A word of caution is in order about the actual figures contained in the tables. They have been derived or calculated from the most reliable and authoritative sources available to the authors. But in many cases, their accuracy is still questionable. On the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic, for example, many of the data sought are still regarded as state secrets. The figures used, therefore, are either official and, in some instances, suspect or the result of calculations by outsiders based on incomplete and unsatisfactory information. This does not mean that they are necessarily inaccurate or without value. In most cases, they represent the best approximations that are publicly available and probably do convey a satisfactory notion of at least the order of magnitude involved.

In the case of the newer states of Asia, we encounter a different sort of statistical problem. In some instances, these countries have not yet developed a fact-gathering and analyzing apparatus of sufficient sophistication or reliability to provide much insight into national circumstances. Who knows the basic statistics about Yemen, for example? Sometimes, for political reasons, these countries are not interested in compiling or making public such information. With the statistics of these nations, then, we are in the same position as we are with those of the totalitarian states. We use the best estimates available, but with caution and with a knowledge of their shortcomings.

One further aspect of the tables should be noted. The figures used in a given column or section are apt to derive from many different dates. It would be very convenient if all nations had compatible decennial or quinquennial censuses. Unfortunately, they do not. The Chinese People's Republic has not had a census since 1953, for example, and, as a result, we do not really know, within a margin of error of forty million people or more, the present population of China. Laos or Yemen have never had a real census. As a consequence, some incompatibility of base dates for the data set forth will be encountered. Wherever this is important, an attempt has been made to provide the base dates concerned.

Finally, having offered these qualifications, the editors would like to say that they feel that these tables do provide useful insights into the relative levels of performance of these societies and that they furnish a valuable basis for the type of comparisons and generalizations that are set forth in the conclusions of both volumes.

TABLE I *Comparative Table of National Populations and Areas* \*

Country or area	Year of census or estimate	Population	Estimated annual percentage population increase	Percentage of population in communities of 100,000 and more and 20,000 and more inhabitants			
				100,000 and more		20,000 and more	
				Year	Percentage	Year	Percentage
<i>Asia</i>							
Japan	1960	93,418,501	1.0%	1959	41.2%	1955	65.7%
Chinese People's Republic	1958	669,000,000	2.3	1953	8.3	—	—
India	1961	438,000,000	2.3	1960	8.6	1951	12.0
Pakistan	1961	93,831,982	2.4	1961	7.3	1951	8.0
Burma	1959	20,457,000	1.0	1958	5.3	1953	8.2 <sup>1</sup>
Cambodia	1959	4,845,000	—	1959	8.7	—	—
Indonesia	1961	95,189,000	2.2	1959	9.4	—	—
Laos	1959	1,760,000	3.2	1956	6.3	—	—
Federation of Malaya	1959	6,698,000	3.0	1957	10.8	1958	20.8
Philippine Republic	1960	27,455,799	3.2	1960	9.9	1948	55.6
Thailand	1960	26,257,848	4.3	1947	9.9	—	—
South Vietnam	1959	13,790,000	5.9	1959	10.8	—	—
<i>Afghanistan</i>	1959	13,150,000	—	—	—	—	—
Iran	1960	20,633,000	2.4	1960	18.1	—	—
Iraq	1959	6,950,000	3.1	1957	14.5	—	—
Israel	1961	2,170,082	3.6	1959	34.3	1955	56.3
Jordan	1961	1,690,123	3.1	1952	8.1	—	—
Lebanon	1958	1,550,000	2.8	1958	33.2	—	—
Saudi Arabia	1956	6,036,000	—	1956	8.4	—	—
Syria	1960	4,555,267	3.5	1955	28.9	—	—
Turkey	1960	27,829,198	2.9	1960	12.1	1955	18.2
Yemen	1949	4,500,000	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	1960	179,323,175	1.7	1960	28.4	1960	44.5 <sup>1</sup>
<i>Europe</i>							
France	1959	44,097,000	0.9	1954	16.8	1954	33.3
West Germany	1959	52,785,000	1.2	1959	30.7	1950	41.5
Great Britain	1961	52,675,556	0.5	1958	51.0	1951	70.8
U.S.S.R.	1959	208,826,650	—	1959	23.5	1959	35.5

\* Compiled from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1961*; *F.A.O. Production Yearbook, 1961*; and United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1961*.

<sup>1</sup> Communities of 25,000 or more.

<sup>2</sup> Jewish population.

TABLE I *Comparative Table of National Populations and Areas (cont.)*

<i>Country or area</i>	<i>Total area (sq. km., 1959)</i>	<i>Inhabi- tants per sq. km.</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Arable area as percentage of total area</i>	<i>Inhabitants per sq. km. of arable area</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Expectation of life at age 0 (male—female)</i>
<i>Asia</i>							
Japan	369,661	252	1960	14.0%	1,805	1960	M 65.37 F 70.26
Chinese People's Republic	9,561,000	68	1954	11.2	612		— —
India	3,262,980	134	1958	49.0	274	1961	M 46.8 F 48.2
Pakistan	946,719	98	1957	26.1	351		— —
<i>Burma</i>	678,033	30	1957	12.7	238		— —
Cambodia	172,511	28	1956	11.4	242	1958-59	M 44.2 F 43.3
Indonesia	1,491,564	62	1954	11.9	507		— —
Laos	236,800	7	1956	4.3	173		— —
Federation of Malaya	131,313	51	1958	16.7	298	1956-58	M 55.78 F 58.19
Philippine Republic	299,681	93	1957	24.4	376	1946-49	M 48.81 F 53.36
Thailand	514,000	51	1957	15.2	327	1947-48	M 48.69 F 51.90
South Vietnam	170,806	81	1958	18.2	404		— —
<i>Afghanistan</i>	650,000	20	1954	13.9	146		— —
Iran	1,648,000	13	1950	10.3	120		— —
Iraq	444,442	16	1955	12.3	121		— —
Israel	20,700	102	1958	19.6	508	1959-60	M 70.67 F 73.47 <sup>a</sup>
Jordan	96,610	17	1954	9.2	183		— —
Lebanon	10,400	149	1958	26.7	558		— —
Saudi Arabia	1,600,000	4	1952	0.13	2,874		— —
Syria	184,479	25	1957	24.9	99		— —
Turkey	780,576	35	1958	31.8	113	1950-51	M 46.00 F 50.41
Yemen	195,000	26		—	—		— —
U.S.	9,363,389	19	1954	20.1	95	1959	M 66.5 F 73.0
<i>Europe</i>							
France	551,208	82	1958	38.9	210	1960	M 67.2 F 73.8
West Germany	247,960	213	1958	35.1	601	1959-60	M 66.69 F 71.94
Great Britain	244,022	215	1958	29.0	732	1960	M 68.3 F 74.1
U.S.S.R.	22,402,200	10	1956	9.4	94	1958-59	M 64 F 72



TABLE II *Comparative Table of Indexes of Industrialization* \*

Country or area	Distribution of labor force				Per capita energy consumption <sup>g</sup> (1960, kilograms)	Year	Total production electric energy (million KWH)
	Year	Per-centage primary industry <sup>1</sup>	Per-centage secondary industry <sup>2</sup>	Per-centage tertiary industry <sup>4</sup>			
<i>Asia</i>							
Japan	1959	36.5%	26.0%	37.5%	1,164	1960	115,489
Chinese People's Republic	—	—	—	—	—	1959	41,500
India	1958	71.2	12.9	15.9	140	1960	19,685
Pakistan	1954-56	65	13	22	67	1960	1,450
Burma	—	—	—	—	55	1960	396
Cambodia	—	—	—	—	34	1960	57
Indonesia	—	—	—	—	134	1959	1,081
Laos	—	—	—	—	31	1960	12.8
Federation of Malaya	1957	58	12	30	241	1960	1,190
Philippine Republic	1958	58	15	27	138	1959	2,286
Thailand	1954	88	3	9	63	1957	468.6
South Vietnam	—	—	—	—	52	1960	306
Afghanistan	—	—	—	—	14	1959	82.6
Iran	—	—	—	—	366	1959	907
Iraq	—	—	—	—	430	1960	852
Israel	1958	17	31	52	1,266	1960	2,312
Jordan	—	—	—	—	190	—	—
Lebanon	—	—	—	—	596	1960	350
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—	—	229	—	—
Syria	—	—	—	—	289	1960	368
Turkey	1955	77	8	15	237	1960	2,886
Yemen	—	—	—	—	6	—	—
U.S.	1961	7.6	— <sup>3</sup>	— <sup>3</sup>	8,013	1960	840,946
<i>Europe</i>							
France	1957	26	36	38 <sup>5</sup>	2,402	1960	72,118
West Germany	1957	16	47	37 <sup>5</sup>	3,651	1960	116,418
Great Britain	1951	5.4	47.4	47.2	4,920	1960	136,666
U.S.S.R.	1959	38.8	36.7	19.8	2,847	1960	292,274

\* Compiled from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1961*; *Demographic Yearbook, 1961*; and I.L.O., *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1959 and 1961*.

<sup>1</sup> Agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry.

<sup>2</sup> Mining, manufacturing, construction.

<sup>3</sup> Secondary and tertiary industries combined accounted for 92.4 per cent of the U.S. labor force in 1961.

<sup>4</sup> Trade, utilities, finance, communications, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Includes the unemployed.

<sup>g</sup> Quantities in kilograms of coal equivalent.

TABLE II *Comparative Table of Indexes of Industrialization (cont.)*

Country or area	Crude steel production (1960, 1,000 metric tons)	Crude steel consumption (1960, kilograms per capita)	Cement production (1960, 1,000 metric tons)	Year	Volume of railway traffic (millions of: A—Passenger km.; B—net ton km.)	
					A	B
<i>Asia</i>						
Japan	22,138	208	22,538	1960	159,260	53,859
Chinese People's Republic	18,450	27	12,500	1959	45,670	265,260
India	3,287	11.4	7,835	1959	74,135	82,002
Pakistan	7	5.0	1,138	1960	11,035	8,215
Burma	—	—	45	1960	1,528	776
Cambodia	—	2.2	—	1960	83	74
Indonesia	—	3.1	387	1959	6,627	1,046
Laos	—	—	—	—	—	—
Federation of Malaya	—	29	286	1960	612	706
Philippine Republic	—	15	788	1959	824	193
Thailand	—	8.4	440	1960	2,353	1,138
South Vietnam	—	4.5	406	1960	542	141
<i>Afghanistan</i>	—	—	37	—	—	—
Iran	—	25	782	1959	1,997	1,928
Iraq	—	33	487	1959	656	768
Israel	—	170	806	1960	350	220
Jordan	—	—	165	—	—	—
Lebanon	—	107	854	1960	5	36
Saudi Arabia	—	9.5	—	—	—	—
Syria	—	23	489	1960	42	107
Turkey	266	22	2,038	1960	4,396	4,322
Yemen	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S.	90,067	501	56,063	1960	34,216	835,421
<i>Europe</i>						
France	17,281	306	14,349	1960	32,040	56,886
West Germany	34,100	525	24,905	1960	38,583	56,437
Great Britain	24,695	425	13,501	1960	34,677	30,496
U.S.S.R.	65,300	296	45,520	1960	170,800	1,504,400

TABLE III *Comparative Table of Educational Attainment  
and Circulation of Mass Media* \*

Country or area	Percentage of literacy <sup>1</sup>		School enrollment ratios				
	Year of census or survey	Percentage of total population	Unadjusted school enrollment ratios <sup>5</sup>				Adjusted school enrollment ratio (primary and secondary levels)
			Year	Primary <sup>6</sup> 5-14 years	Secondary 15-19 years	Total 5-19 years	
Asia							
Japan	1948	98%	1960	62	109	77	96
Chinese People's Republic	1950	50	1955	36	7	28	35
India	1961	23.7	1958	24	35	28	35
Pakistan	1951	19	1958	20	15	19	29
Burma	1954	58	1958	31 <sup>7</sup>	16	27	45
Cambodia	1958	33	1959	44	6	33	38
Indonesia	1950	15-20	1959	39	13	31	39
Laos	1950	15-20	1958	24	1	17	20
Federation of Malaya	1957	47 <sup>2</sup>	1960	58	25	50	62
Philippine Republic	1958	75	1958	56	26	48	72
Thailand	1956	64	1959	51	23	44	55
South Vietnam	1950	15-20	1958	32	11	26	
Afghanistan	1950	1-5	1959	4	1	3	4
Iran	1956	15	1959	26	13	22	28
Iraq	1947	31	1959	36	19	31	42
Israel	1948	94 <sup>3</sup>	1959	80	36	69	86
Jordan	1950	15-20	1959	51	33	46	63
Lebanon	1950	45-50	1959	56	32	49	61
Saudi Arabia	1950	1-5	1959	5	1	4	5
Syria	1950	25-30					
Turkey	1955	39	1959	37	14	31	42
Yemen	1950	1-5	1958	5	0.3	4	5
U.S.	1959	98	1957	88	71	83	104
Europe							
France	1946	97	1959	76	75	76	94
West Germany	1950	98-99 <sup>4</sup>	1959	68	81	73	84
Great Britain	1950	98-99	1958	67	75	70	81
U.S.S.R.	1959	98	1959	67	24	53	79

\* Based on UNESCO, *Basic Facts and Figures, 1961* (Paris, 1961); United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1961* (New York, 1962); UNESCO, *World Illiteracy at Mid-century, a Statistical Study* (Paris, 1957); and United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1961* (New York, 1962)

<sup>1</sup> Literacy is defined as the ability to read and/or write.

<sup>2</sup> Including Singapore.

<sup>3</sup> Jewish population only.

<sup>4</sup> Including East Germany.

<sup>5</sup> Unadjusted school enrollment ratios represent percentages of enrollment related to the population of the relevant age groups, i.e., 5-14 years inclusive for the primary level, 15-19 years inclusive for the secondary, and 5-19 years inclusive for the total column. Since the age levels of pupils actually enrolled in a given country do not exactly correspond to these arbi-

TABLE III *Comparative Table of Educational Attainment  
and Circulation of Mass Media (cont.)*

<i>Country or area</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Daily general-interest newspaper circulation per 1,000 inhabitants</i>	<i>Radio sets per 1,000 inhabitants</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of domestic letters sent and received (thousands)</i>
<i>Asia</i>					
Japan	1958	398	157	1960	6,796,000
Chinese People's Republic	1955	20	10		—
India	1959	48	4	1959	3,378,000
Pakistan	1955	9	2.9	1960	541,165
Burma	1958	8	2.4		—
Cambodia	1959	5	3.9		—
Indonesia	1958	11	9.0	1960	213,792
Laos		—	—		—
Federation of Malaya	1959	34	35	1960	78,555
Philippine Republic	1956	19	22		—
Thailand	1958	8	4.4		—
South Vietnam	1958	28	6.8	1960	34,848
Afghanistan	1959	5	1.5		—
Iran	1959	5	42	1956	125,135
Iraq	1957	10	14	1953	16,825
Israel	1957	210	194	1960	97,609
Jordan	1959	19	37	1958	4,171
Lebanon	1959	97	52	1960	12,028
Saudi Arabia	1959	2	12		—
Syria	1958	19	57		—
Turkey	1959	45	45	1960	172,976
Yemen					—
U.S.	1959	328	948	1960	62,072,000 <sup>a</sup>
<i>Europe</i>					
France	1959	243	239	1960	5,733,000
West Germany	1959	313	289	1960	7,739,000
Great Britain	1959	582	287	1960	10,082,000
U.S.S.R.	1959	160	194	1956	3,896,000

bitrary age groups and since the length of schooling varies widely from one country to another, the respective school enrollment ratios must be interpreted in the light of actual age ranges and the duration of primary and secondary schooling in each country. This accounts for the fact that ratios for some countries exceed 100 and that ratios at the secondary level occasionally exceed those at the primary level. The adjusted school enrollment ratios attempt to compensate for such variations by relating total enrollment, not to the arbitrary age group of 5-19 years, but to the population more nearly corresponding to the actual duration of schooling in each country.

<sup>a</sup> It should be noted that in all cases in this column, except Great Britain, these percentages tend to understate actual performance since the states concerned have normal school-entering ages of 6 or 7 rather than 5.

<sup>b</sup> Public schools only.

<sup>c</sup> Domestic and foreign mail.

TABLE IV *Comparative Table of Gross, and per Capita National Products, 1960 \**

Country or area	"Money" GNP		"Real" GNP		GNP per capita in dollars	
	Billions of dollars	Percentage of world total	Billions of dollars	Percentage of world total	"Money" GNP	"Real" GNP (1961)
<i>Asia</i>						
Japan	36.0	2.6%	58.0	3.3%	383.0	613.0
Chinese People's Republic	58.0	4.2	116.0	6.6	83.0	167.0
India	29.6	2.1	59.2	3.4	69.9	139.8
Pakistan	5.6	0.4	11.2	0.6	62.4	124.8
<i>Burma</i>	1.3	0.1	2.6	0.1	60.6	121.2
<i>Cambodia</i>	0.4	— <sup>1</sup>	0.8	— <sup>1</sup>	77.4	154.8
<i>Indonesia</i>	9.2	0.7	13.7	0.8	98.6	147.9
<i>Laos</i>	0.1	— <sup>1</sup>	0.2	— <sup>1</sup>	52.0	104.0
<i>Federation of Malaya</i>	2.6	0.2	3.9	0.2	368.3	552.4
<i>Philippine Republic</i>	4.8	0.3	7.2	0.4	188.2	282.3
<i>Thailand</i>	2.3	0.2	4.6	0.3	101.2	202.4
<i>South Vietnam</i>	1.5	0.1	2.9	0.2	110.7	210.3
<i>Afghanistan</i>	0.8	0.1	1.5	0.1	58.5	117.0
<i>Iran</i>	2.5	0.2	3.8	0.2	120.3	180.4
<i>Iraq</i>	1.1	0.1	1.6	0.1	160.9	225.3
<i>Israel</i>	1.7	0.1	2.4	0.1	733.4	1,026.8
<i>Jordan</i>	0.2	— <sup>1</sup>	0.3	— <sup>1</sup>	126.3	189.4
<i>Lebanon</i>	0.5	— <sup>1</sup>	0.8	— <sup>1</sup>	319.5	479.2
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	1.2	0.1	1.7	0.1	169.8	254.7
<i>Syria</i>	0.8	0.1	1.2	0.1	173.3	259.9
<i>Turkey</i>	6.3	0.5	9.4	0.5	222.5	333.7
<i>Yemen</i>	0.2	— <sup>1</sup>	0.5	— <sup>1</sup>	80.2	160.4
<i>U.S.</i>	515.0	37.3	515.0	29.4	2,790.0	2,790.0
<i>Europe</i>						
France	55.3	4.0	66.4	3.8	1,200.0	1,440.0
West Germany	65.7	4.7	89.5	5.0	1,170.0	1,590.0
Great Britain	70.4	5.1	91.5	5.2	1,340.0	1,740.0
U.S.S.R.	176.0	12.7	212.0	12.1	818.0	986.0

\* Compiled with the assistance of Professor P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan and based on M. F. Millikan and D. L. M. Blackmer (eds.), *The Emerging Nations* (Boston, 1961), pp. 150-151; and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (May, 1961), p. 126-127.

<sup>1</sup> Less than 0.05 per cent.

TABLE V *Comparative Table of Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product* \*

Country or area	Year	Percentage distribution		
		Primary industry <sup>1</sup>	Secondary industry <sup>2</sup>	Tertiary industry <sup>3</sup>
<i>Asia</i>				
Japan	1960	15%	38%	47%
Chinese People's Republic	1956	48	32	20
India	1959	48	18	34
Pakistan	1960	54	13	33
Burma	1960	42	19	39
Cambodia	1959	41	12	47
Indonesia	1959	56	10 <sup>4</sup>	34 <sup>4</sup>
Laos		—	—	—
Federation of Malaya	1960	45	10	45
Philippine Republic	1960	34	23	43
Thailand	1960	36	20	44
South Vietnam		—	—	—
Afghanistan		—	—	—
Iran		—	—	—
Iraq		—	—	—
Israel	1959	12	29	59
Jordan		—	—	—
Lebanon	1958	17	17	66
Saudi Arabia		—	—	—
Syria	1959	32	18	50
Turkey	1959	44	22	34
Yemen		—	—	—
U.S.	1960	4	37	59
<i>Europe</i>				
France	1960	10	45	45
West Germany	1960	7	52	41
Great Britain	1960	4	45	51
U.S.S.R.		—	—	—

\* Compiled from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1961.<sup>1</sup> Agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry.<sup>2</sup> Mining, manufacturing, and construction.<sup>3</sup> Trade, utilities, finance, transportation, communications, public administration, defense, etc.<sup>4</sup> Construction is included in the tertiary category.

TABLE VI *Comparative Table of Exports and Imports  
as a Percentage of Gross National Product \**

<i>Country or area</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
<i>Asia</i>			
Japan	1959	10.5%	11.1%
Chinese People's Republic	—	—	—
India	1958	5.7	8.7
Pakistan	1958	(6.9)	(9.1)
Burma	1959	19.9	21.8
Cambodia	1956	—	—
Indonesia	—	—	—
Laos	—	—	—
Federation of Malaya	1957	44.4	35.3
Philippine Republic	1959	12.1	10.9
Thailand	1957	21.7	23.1
South Vietnam	1956	—	—
Afghanistan	—	—	—
Iran	—	—	—
Iraq	1956	48.9	32.5
Israel	1959	12.5	25.1
Jordan	1954	(5.7)	(40.2)
Lebanon	1958	(7.6)	(51.2)
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—
Syria	1957	(25.0)	(26.8)
Turkey	1959	1.7	2.8
Yemen	—	—	—
U.S.	1959	4.2	4.7
<i>Europe</i>			
France	1959	14.2	12.5
West Germany	1959	24.3	20.6
Great Britain	1959	14.6	16.8
U.S.S.R.	—	—	—

\* Compiled from United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1960*; International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics, June, 1961*; and other sources.

Parentheses indicate percentage of national income rather than of gross national product.

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